Automaton

All it demonstrates is the existence of a necessary first cause. I do not deny this argument, and accept it as valid. I am also an atheist. So what is the fuss about?

Liquidrage

What I mean by something being "outside" the cosmos (which I will define as the mereological sum of all contingent things; this is, or at least subsumes, the physical universe) is that it does not share any common parts with the cosmos. By saying there is no "outside the cosmos," it seems you have simply rejected the conclusion of my argument, without engaging any of the premises.


I was replying to your second post, not the first.

Your initial post is nothing more then showing that First Cause is an issue that defies logic.


You assert that the cause is "unknown." My argument is that the being that takes this causal action has at least one knowable property; it necessarily exists. This is so because if it did not, it would overlap with its effect, which violates Axiom 3.

Two different issues here.
There is a difference between a cause and a causer.

You can not claim the First Cause "exists" as a truth because we already known that something involving First Cause is going to turn an obvious truth into a falsehood.

One of your axioms is false. That is why First Cause is such an interesting topic.


My argument does not make any references to time or temporality at all; whether the universe has existed from eternity or not does not affect my argument. I don't know where you reached the conclusion that my argument points to some uncaused event at some point in time.


It does though. Only in a finite time does there need to be a first cause.
In an infinite chain of cause and effect the mystery is in the infinity.


I haven't "pawned off" the First Cause to some owner; the owner of the First Cause was established in my initial post on the argument. Yes, there is a "gap" in the argument; I have said before that this argument alone does not solve this problem, nor is it intended to. This problem must be solved by either a global case for theism or something along Thomas Aquinas' natural theology, as I've mentioned.[/QB][/QUOTE]


Here I am arguing your conclusion.
By claiming that the First Cause is the realm of a creator or deity or whatnot you are pawning it off.
Your axioms do not point to a creator. Only First Cause.

You are basically saying that whatever caused the first event in our chain did not need a first cause in its own chain. That is clearly pawning off the problem of having an uncaused event.
The problem of a first cause defying logic still exists.
All you've done is create a new chain of related events to place it into. You are claiming our chain of events is the result of an event from cause in a different chain yet you do nothing to explain why that chain doesn't need a cause.

[ July 21, 2002: Message edited by: Liquidrage ]</p>

Caverdude

Hey Phillipe,
All I can say is I am damned impressed!!! For someone your age to produce such a complex arguement is outstanding. You must be at the head of your class.
That said, I have one observation concerning the above quote on overlap. How would you then explain the existence of God? How did God come into existence? This is basically a rhetorical question since it really cannot be answered, but it is some food for thought.
I look forward to more posts from you.

C'ya

Doubting Didymus

We need some clarification on this matter.

Dear Philip Osbourn.

What is your belief concerning god?
Is your god you proposed first cause?
You have consistently said that you are not trying to prove aspects of god such as perfection, omnipotency, compassion etc. What are your beliefs regarding the aspects of god and why do you believe them?

Answering these questions for us will be a great help for us in trying to work out what you are trying to say.

Silent Dave

Philip--

With regard to the brick analogy, it doesn't work because a disgruntled office worker dropping a brick on Tuesday still takes place within the framework of induction. Analysis of the CPF does not.

With regard to the CPF itself, it would necessarily include all contingent facts in the universe, since a positive fact by your definition expresses the existence of a contingent being, and a state of affairs qualifies -- for example, "I stubbed my toe" is a positive fact since it expresses the existence of a contingent state of affairs, namely that of my stubbing my toe.

My point is this: in order to know that positive facts normally have a cause, we would have to be within the framework of induction. Once removed from the CPF, we are removed from that framework. Therefore, you have no basis for saying that the CPF has a cause -- it cannot be logically deduced, and inductive reasoning cannot apply.


Dave

HRG

But this aggregate will have a different type: to wit, "set of K" if the original kind was K. IOW it will not be of the kind K.
No, the CPF is a set of positive facts.

And that's where the fallacy of your argument lies - IMHO. As often, it involves an illegitimate exchange of quantors: "For all X, there is an Y such that" is not equivalent to "there is a Y such that for all X".

Even if I agreed that every positive fact needs a cause (quantum theory suggests the opposite), you cannot conclude that there is a unique cause to a set of facts.

Your argument, if valid, would conclude that there is an integer which is larger than all other integers (let integers correspond to positive facts. Every integer has a "cause": an intéger which is larger; but the set of all integers - your CPF - does not have an upper bound). IOW, the argument contains the fallacy of composition.

[quote]
Corollary 1: The CPF of the actual world is a positive fact.

Disagree. See above.

Regards,
HRG.

rainbow walking

Originally posted by Philip Osborne:
"Are you sure it establishes the first cause as a creator of the universe? How do you make the connection from 'Cause'...."

That's just me being sloppy with the terms. But I think I mentioned before that the argument alone does not establish that the First Cause is a personal being, which is just to say it does not establish that the act of creation was one with intelligence and purpose. The point is that there is something outside the cosmos which is the cause of the cosmos.

rw: O'kay

rw: If you tighten up Axiom 1 to eliminate the cascading effect of multiplicity you have a good argument Philip.

I think many folks prefer a first cause simply because it is more intuitively gratifying and less difficult to wrestle with than an infinite regress. But that doesn't have to imply purpose and or intelligence, as some have already pointed out, and you have conceded.

I'm inclined towards a symbiosis of both infinity and first cause by postulating an infinite "Essence" of the Axioms of Time and Existence, with a first cause being the instantiation of "substance" with/from the "Essence" becoming, (or over-lapping as you called it), integrated during the instantiation with the integration itself becoming the necessary non-contingent "Effect" of reducing "Infinity".

I realize this requires an "inversion" of some terms but if you think about it when speaking of first causes and infinities we are speaking of that which "could have been" before any "Substance" and since these terms were derived from "Substance" they need not be so defined when applied prior to "Substance".

I call it the "Reduction Of Infinity Principle".

For an example I would postulate the color spectrum moving along an imaginary time line at an incredible speed gradually slowing to the speed of light at which point it instantiates into light itself having the effect of causing all contingent substances as a result. From this I would postulate regress as infinite but progress as reducible. As progress reduces substance increases with a gradual shift in properties.

I further postulate that this "gradual shift" is the cause of the quantum effect that theorists are currently wrestling with. As infinity continues to reduce, the gradual shift in properties may result in a reduction in the sequential process of time itself. This would account for the apparent curvature of space, the chaos factor and the second law of thermodynamics.

Conversely, an observer looking back, using conventional wisdom without taking "gradual shift in properties" into account, may erroneously ascribe a much longer period of time to the instantiation of this universe. If a gradual shift in properties has already taken place the universe would appear to be 14 or so billion years old when in reality it may not be so. Assuming gradual shift to be consistent to reduction of infinity it is possible that instantiation may have occurred much swifter at the outset, gradually slowing to its current observable sequence of events. If ones computations of these sequences are based on current observation, and gradual shift has occurred, one will not arrive at a correct dating of this universe.

Or

It could be interpreted that current computations are correct and that what has been defined as the BB is actually that point in the shifting of properties when gradual reduction of infinity instantiated the effect of this universe. I think this to be more intuitively satisfying and less frustrating from a scientific standpoint.

[ July 22, 2002: Message edited by: rainbow walking ]</p>

Philip Osborne

Some pretty interesting objections. I'll answer them all here.

"But this aggregate will have a different type: to wit, "set of K" if the original kind was K. IOW it will not be of the kind K."

Actually, I called the CPF a "mereological aggregate" rather than a sum. That may be a trivial difference, but it can often be that aggregates can share the properties of their component parts, so we have to determine independantly whether or not the sum of K is of a kind K, rather than assuming that because K is a sum, it is not of kind K. For instance, the aggregate of two different computers is going to share a number of common characteristics with that computer; the aggregate began to exist at some point in time, it will end at some point in the future, it is capable of being perceived by the intellect, etc.

Also, this aggregate shares the common property of being caused. Suppose from two unrelated objects, a and b, I create the aggregate a & b. a is caused by F, and b is caused by G; F and G are unrelated. In that case, we can say the common cause of a & b is the mereological aggregate F & G. On this construal, the causal principle provides just as much evidence for aggregates being caused as it does for individuals, so there seems little risk of committing the fallacy of composition.

"And that's where the fallacy of your argument lies - IMHO. As often, it involves an illegitimate exchange...."

The argument does not necessarily commit this fallacy; providing that the sum of all positive facts is itself a positive fact (the Corollary is derived from two definitions; essentially, it is true by stipulation. The only question is whether it is caused or not.), then that sum can be one of the possible values which the quantification "For all x" ranges over.

"Your argument, if valid, would conclude that there is an integer which is larger than all other integers (let integers correspond to positive facts. Every integer has a "cause": an intéger which is larger; but the set of all integers - your CPF - does not have an upper bound)."

This example seems a strawman, since it is already known that the set of all integers is not going to have the same characteristics of an integer itself. But as I've argued, this situation is not analogous to the CPF.

"With regard to the CPF itself, it would necessarily include all contingent facts in the universe, since a positive...."

To my knowledge, anyway, the existence of individuals is different from the existence of "states of affairs." That is, after all, why the distinction is made. For example, the statement "There exists a state of affairs such that I stubbed my toe" has features which are different from "There exists a book." If states of affairs count as individuals, then I can use the term individuals*, which conveys the meaning I originally intended. If this is countenanced, then analyzing the CPF does not remove us from the framework of induction.

"What is your belief concerning god?
Is your god you proposed first cause?
You have consistently said that you are not trying to prove aspects...."

I have only said that this argument does not prove aspects of God such as omnipotence, moral perfection. omniscience, etc. I do believe that God possesses these characteristics; that is a consequence of my Christianity. If you want me to provide rational argument, I think there is such argument to be made, but for the sake of space, I will not provide it on this thread.

"It does though. Only in a finite time does there need to be a first cause...."

Not necessarily; even if something exists from eternity, it is possible for it to have some sort of sustaining cause. For instance, an orchestra performing at a concert is the sustaining cause of the existence of the music. We can consistently hold that the music exists from eternity and also hold that the music has a cause, if we suppose that the orchestra exists from eternity.

Thanks, guys. I appreciate the correspondence, especially as this subject isn't appreciated at high school.

Goliath

Philip Osborne,

What, exactly, do you mean by "individual" here? Do you mean that facts can only refer to people (and not to places, inanimate objects, etc)?

Uhhhh...what? I know what a sum of numbers is. I know what a direct sum of groups is. I do not know what you mean by a mereological sum. What is an aggregate?

What, exactly, do you mean by a sum of facts? Clearly, you seem to mean that a "sum" of facts is a binary operation on SxS (where S is the set of all facts). So, how do you define the binary operation of "sum" as it relates to facts?

Furthermore, is q well-defined? In other words, does it even make sense to sum up all facts? Wouldn't q contain itself as one of its terms, since the sum of facts (again, whatever you mean by "sum") is also a fact?

Until you define what you mean by a sum of facts, I have nothing to say about this axiom.

[quote]

According to Definition 1, it is not enough for a fact to merely entail the existence of a contingent individual, in the sense that "Joe ate the food" entails the existence of both Joe and the food. The proposition reporting the truth of a positive fact must state, "x exists" and nothing else. Alternatively, this proposition can take the form "x exists and y exists and z exists...." The statement made true by a CPF takes this latter form.

[\QUOTE]

Okay, so facts can only report the existence of things?

[QUOTE]

Here's the proof that there is a CPF in our world: If there are any positive facts in our world, then there is an aggregate of all such facts. There is a positive fact (i.e. "I exist," which is contingently true). Hence, there is a sum of all positive facts. This sum is identical with a CPF; hence there is a CPF in our world. Call this CPF "q." Since this CPF has the form of a positive fact (by Definition 1), the CPF is itself a positive fact. This proves that:

[QUOTE]

Again, I can't say a whole lot about this until I have a clearer idea of what you mean by adding two facts together. Are sums of facts defined for infinite collections of facts? What about uncountable collections of facts?

Ah, here is where your argument breaks down. Other than some bizarre uses of terminology (ie a sum of facts) I see very little difference between your argument and the following:

1) If I say something has a cause, then it has a cause!

2) I say the universe has a cause.

3) Therefore, that cause is God.

4) Therefore God exists.

Suffice it to say that I do not believe that Axiom 2 need always hold.

I'm sorry, but "not sharing a common part" is a rather vague definition of what it means for two causes not to overlap. What do you mean by a "part" of a cause?

[quote]

q is either caused by an action of (a)itself, (b)nothing, or (c)something else. These exhaust all possibilities. By Axiom 3, option (a) is false. And we have just proven that (b) is false. So (c) is true. x is another individual. What kind of an individual is x? Is it contingent? In that case, the fact of the existence of x would be part of q, because, ex hypothesi, q includes all contingent beings of the actual world. So, x would be a cause and also would be part of the effect. But causes and effects do not overlap (Axiom 2). Hence, x is not contingent. If it is not the case that x is contingent, then it follows that x is necessary. Hence, there is a necessary first cause of all contingent beings in the actual world.

[QUOTE]

Again, is q well-defined? Would q not contain itself?

In fact, I'm seriously doubting that q is well-defined.

Ah, so even if your argument included well-defined terminology and appeared sound, it doesn't even come close to an argument for the existence of the xian god (or any other kind of god), now does it?

Sincerely,

Goliath

PS I apologize if I appear ignorant with regards to the terminology that you used above (ie "aggregate," "sum of facts," et al). I am a student of Mathematics, not Philosophy.

Philip Osborne

A mereological aggregate can be thought of as a set; for instance, the sum or aggregate of all Qwerty keyboards can be thought of as the set of all Qwerty keyboards.

The point you bring up about q possibly being one of its own terms may be a serious one, but I'm not sure what the consequences to my argument, if any, would be. We might define positive facts in such a way as to abandon our assumption that the aggregate is itself a positive fact. In this case, we would have to make do with the fact that the aggregate is a contingent fact.

Alternatively, we may redefine the CPF to be the aggregate of all singular positive facts, where a fact is singular and positive if and only if the proposition made true by it reports the existence of one and only one individual (the term "individual" is used in the sense of predicate logic; anything can count as an individual, so long as it has at least one property). The CPF would still be a positive fact, but is not a singular positive fact, and thus is not one of its own terms.

"Okay, so facts can only report the existence of things?"

No, I mean that positive facts can only report the existence of things. Facts such as "I have indigestion" are still facts, but are simply not positive.

I hope that clears up everything for you.

-Philip

[ July 22, 2002: Message edited by: Philip Osborne ]</p>