Philip Osborne

Hi everyone!

A few introductory remarks: I'm a Christian, and a junior in high school interested in the philosophy of religion. I'd just like to begin my correspondence on this forum with a new cosmological argument, which gets the vast majority of its inspiration from the one developed by Robert C. Koons.

The following argument is a version of the traditional cosmological argument from contingency Unlike most such arguments, it does not depend upon the impossibility of an infinite regress. The argument uses the notion of "facts," which can be thought of as concrete parts of the world, such as an event, process, condition, or state of affairs. Facts are things that make propositions such as "Socrates exists" true. It concludes with the existence of a necessary First Cause with a considerable degree of causal ability.

First, we will need two definitions, and an axiom.

Definition 1: A fact is positive if and only if it reports the existence of a contingent individual.

Definition 2: The Conjunctive Positive Fact (CPF) of the actual world is the mereological sum or aggregate of all positive facts in the actual world.

Axiom 1: If there is a thing of a kind x, then there is a sum or aggregate of all things of kind x.

According to Definition 1, it is not enough for a fact to merely entail the existence of a contingent individual, in the sense that "Joe ate the food" entails the existence of both Joe and the food. The proposition reporting the truth of a positive fact must state, "x exists" and nothing else. Alternatively, this proposition can take the form "x exists and y exists and z exists...." The statement made true by a CPF takes this latter form.

Here's the proof that there is a CPF in our world: If there are any positive facts in our world, then there is an aggregate of all such facts. There is a positive fact (i.e. "I exist," which is contingently true). Hence, there is a sum of all positive facts. This sum is identical with a CPF; hence there is a CPF in our world. Call this CPF "q." Since this CPF has the form of a positive fact (by Definition 1), the CPF is itself a positive fact. This proves that:

Corollary 1: The CPF of the actual world is a positive fact.

Now, I will invoke my causal principle:

Axiom 2: If a fact is positive, it has a cause.

Some will challenge this statement, objecting that free acts can be uncaused, at least on the Libertarian theory of free will. Also, some events in quantum mechanics can be uncaused. But neither of these facts are positive; they involve something more than the mere existence of a thing. To my knowledge, anyway, uncaused events in quantum mechanics do not bring about the existence of a new thing. Hence, they do not constitute counter-instances to Axiom 2. Alternatively, one might object even though the evidence for Axiom 2 may seem overwhelming, it is not enough to constitute proof. But we can respond by reformulating Axiom 2 as: "Normally, positive facts have a cause." This is the "defeasible" causal principle; it means that unless there is good reason to think otherwise, we should assume that positive facts have causes. This shifts the burden of proof onto the opponent of the argument.

By Axiom 2 and Corollary 1, we see that q has a cause, which I will call "x."

Corollary 2: q has a cause, x.

It remains to be seen what kind of a cause x is. Before we can do that, I need to introduce a new axiom:

Axiom 3: Causes and effects do not overlap.

"Overlap" is meant only in the sense of sharing a common part. Axiom 3 is based on the idea that a thing cannot cause itself to exist. For if it did, it would have to exist first. But then its causal action does not bring it into existence, since it already existed.

q is either caused by an action of (a)itself, (b)nothing, or (c)something else. These exhaust all possibilities. By Axiom 3, option (a) is false. And we have just proven that (b) is false. So (c) is true. x is another individual. What kind of an individual is x? Is it contingent? In that case, the fact of the existence of x would be part of q, because, ex hypothesi, q includes all contingent beings of the actual world. So, x would be a cause and also would be part of the effect. But causes and effects do not overlap (Axiom 2). Hence, x is not contingent. If it is not the case that x is contingent, then it follows that x is necessary. Hence, there is a necessary first cause of all contingent beings in the actual world.

The argument does not establish that this first cause is all-perfect, personal, etc. However, it does, if correct, establish the key theistic doctrine of there being the creator of the cosmos. I'd just like to discuss its soundness as far as it can take us.

rainbow walking

The argument does not establish that this first cause is all-perfect, personal, etc. However, it does, if correct, establish the key theistic doctrine of there being the creator of the cosmos. I'd just like to discuss its soundness as far as it can take us.

Hi Philip,
Are you sure it establishes the first cause as a creator of the universe? How do you make the connection from "Cause" to "Creator"? Creator is a term that implies purpose and intelligence. Cause need not make any such connectives.


edited to correct spelling

[ July 21, 2002: Message edited by: rainbow walking ]</p>

Doubting Didymus

So what? Even if you have proven the existence of a first cause, it does nothing to show that that cause has anything to do with any god of any kind. So even if you can say for certain that the universe has a first cause, the correlation with theism is unfounded as you then have to move completely into the realm of speculation to say things like: 'god is a first cause' or 'god exists outside of time'. All you can say from your argument is that no-one knows for sure how the universe began. That includes theists. You may not just say 'the universe has a cause' and sit back smugly. Please show how this relates to theism, then we can talk.

rainbow walking

Axiom 1: If there is a thing of a kind x, then there is a sum or aggregate of all things of kind x.

q is either caused by an action of (a)itself, (b)nothing, or (c)something else. These exhaust all possibilities. By Axiom 3, option (a) is false. And we have just proven that (b) is false. So (c) is true. x is another individual. What kind of an individual is x? Is it contingent?

rw: If X is a kind of individual, according to Axiom 1 there is a sum or aggregate of kind X's meaning you have multiple necessary causes.

Philip Osborne

"Are you sure it establishes the first cause as a creator of the universe? How do you make the connection from 'Cause'...."

That's just me being sloppy with the terms. But I think I mentioned before that the argument alone does not establish that the First Cause is a personal being, which is just to say it does not establish that the act of creation was one with intelligence and purpose. The point is that there is something outside the cosmos which is the cause of the cosmos.

"So what? Even if you have proven the existence of a first cause, it does nothing to show that that cause has anything to do with any god of any kind. So even...."

I've just mentioned that the argument does not establish these things. If you are not interested in such arguments, perhaps this discussion is not for you. At any rate, if we want to establisht the personhood of the First Cause, we will probably need something along the traditional Thomistic line.

Alternatively, we could follow Koons' procedure and use this argument as support for design arguments. Hume objected that if the universe displays complexity and therefore requires intelligent design, then the designer must also display a degree of complexity that requires a designer, ad infinitum. But suppose we have already acknowledged the existence of the First Cause, which exists necessarily. Assuming that a necessary being requires no designer, we can end the regress of designers by introducing the First Cause into the design argument. So construed, the cosmological argument is part of a cumulative case for theism.

"If X is a kind of individual, according to Axiom 1 there is a sum or aggregate of kind X's meaning you have multiple necessary causes."

Axiom 1 does not always imply that there is more than one of the thing involved in the sum. If that were the case, then it would clearly be false, since there are possible situations in which only one instance of a given type exists. Suppose there is only one Philip Osborne in the universe. The mereological aggregate of all Philip Osbornes, which includes me and nothing else, still counts as a legitimate aggregate. For instance, the set of all odd prime integers whose square equals the number itself includes only 1, but still counts as a set.

Liquidrage

The point is that there is something outside the cosmos which is the cause of the cosmos.

You did not establish this.

The universe is not a sea of foam sitting in a giant glass bubble. You mention quantum mechanics yet your point of outside the cosmos is rather classical in thought.
There is no outside the cosmos.

Attributing First Cause to a deity is meerly applying ownership to an unknown cause.

All you established is that at some point in the finite past a process occured that was not caused.
Few would aruge with this and this uncaused process is indeed a mystery.

Finally, your "creator of the cosmos" violates your statements. As I mentioned earlier, all you've done is pawned off the problem by giving it an owner. The problem still exists.

Philip Osborne

What I mean by something being "outside" the cosmos (which I will define as the mereological sum of all contingent things; this is, or at least subsumes, the physical universe) is that it does not share any common parts with the cosmos. By saying there is no "outside the cosmos," it seems you have simply rejected the conclusion of my argument, without engaging any of the premises.

You assert that the cause is "unknown." My argument is that the being that takes this causal action has at least one knowable property; it necessarily exists. This is so because if it did not, it would overlap with its effect, which violates Axiom 3.

My argument does not make any references to time or temporality at all; whether the universe has existed from eternity or not does not affect my argument. I don't know where you reached the conclusion that my argument points to some uncaused event at some point in time.

I haven't "pawned off" the First Cause to some owner; the owner of the First Cause was established in my initial post on the argument. Yes, there is a "gap" in the argument; I have said before that this argument alone does not solve this problem, nor is it intended to. This problem must be solved by either a global case for theism or something along Thomas Aquinas' natural theology, as I've mentioned.

Silent Dave

Hi Philip--

For a self-professed junior in high school, you're pretty sharp. I wish I had given as much thought to theological and P of R matters back at that age. But your argument fails for several reasons.

First, if a fact can be called positive if and only if it reports the existence of a contingent being, then the existence of a necessary God cannot be a positive fact. Perhaps this is somehow accounted for in your definitional scheme, but it seems counter-intuitive. Certainly the vast majority of theists would affirm the existence of God to be a positive fact.

Second, reformulating axiom 2 to say that normally positive facts have a cause is insufficient to establish that the CPF has a cause. Induction works within the framework of other contingent facts, and when all the contingent facts are being examined inductively, the framework no longer exists.

Third, even if successful, your argument only shows that the contingent parts of the universe were created. It does not show that the entire universe was created. For all that your argument shows, the laws of logic, physics, etc. are completely uncaused. An atheist could agree to the soundness of your argument, and their atheism would not be damaged in the slightest. This means that your argument, even if successful, does not support theism in the slightest. That being the case, I fail to see why you offered it.


Dave

[ July 21, 2002: Message edited by: Silent Dave ]</p>

Doubting Didymus

Whoa there, clever clogs!

The argument for design is well and truly done and dusted, Im afraid. Hume tried very hard to argue against it, but there was very little he could do at the time, without having knowledge of evolution. You are right that an intelligent first cause would break the 'regress of designers', but evolution shows that complex design can come from no designer at all, which means that there need be no regress of designers in the first place.

Thus, the cosmological argument is not helpful as part of a cumulative case.

Philip Osborne

I'm not sure why the existence of God would have to be a positive fact. The point of the argument is that His existence is not a positive fact, in order to avoid overlap. Theists who hold God's existence to be necessary would not hold the existence of God to be a positive fact, given the way the terms are defined.

Your second objection is pretty interesting. I think it can be answered in the same way that Hume's objection from many universes can be answered. Hume said that in order to know that the universe had a cause, we must observe many universes being caused. Similarly, you seem to be saying that in order to know that a CPF normally has a cause, we must observe many CPFs being caused. But this restriction seems unnecessary. In order for me to know that a brick dropped on a Tuesday in a cubicle by a disgruntled office worker will drop to the floor, it is not necessary for me to observe many instances in which a brick dropped in such a manner falls to the ground. Similarly, we do not need to observe many instance of a CPF being caused in order to establisht that the CPF of the actual world is caused.

Additionally, it is important to note that the CPF is not the aggregate of all contingent facts. It is the aggregate of all positive facts. The CPF will exclude, for example, facts such as "Socrates ate breakfast on Tuesday," or "Phil stubbed his toe." This is important because the First Cause itself can be a contingent fact if it is a fact describing the contingent causal action of a necessary being. This situation involves no overlap with the CPF, whereas a situation in which a contingent being causes the CPF would involve overlap.

My argument is not meant to show that God created the necessary parts of the universe. The Genesis account of Creation, however it is interpreted, does not entail God being the creator of abstract objects, causal laws, etc. Many theists, such as myself, are inclined to think that God is constrained within laws that express necessary truths (a premiss which is used often in rebuttals to the argument from evil). For instance, God cannot create square circles, something that both is and is not, etc. Theism does not entail that God caused necessary truths to obtain. Although some theists think this is the case, I am inclined to think they are mistaken. Theism could be true even if necessary facts are uncaused.

Not every design argument is related to evolution. For instance, Swinburne's arguments from natural laws and consciousness do not even touch upon the subject of evolution. I will not go into an extended defense of the design argument here, however.