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08-13-2002, 05:24 PM | #1 |
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Request for comment - creationism apologia
I would like to ask for comments on the following essay of mine:
<a href="http://polaris.umuc.edu/~rcole/implied_past.html" target="_blank">Creationism and the Implied Past</a> After considering that it would be unreasonable to expect a creator to create everything in the universe with an implied age of zero, I began to wonder what sort of implied age the universe as a system should have under creationism. It then occured to me that since natural law is simply what we observe, any putative state of creation should imply some past consistent with the laws operative from that initial condition. What form that implied past must take isn't specified, so if the form could be deduced, then this would provide a basis for creationism falsification. Otherwise, there is no basis. Thoughts? |
08-13-2002, 05:49 PM | #2 |
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Your argument is that god had no choice but to create a universe with an implied age?
What you have suggested is unfalsifiable by any evidence, as you yourself admit, and thus it is a completely pointless gust of hot air. Your suggestion that gods creating a universe with apparent age being logically neccesary is not only exceedingly stupid, but it is completely incompatible with the general concensus among theists of gods omnipotence. I find it very surprising that you cannot see for yourself that this does not help the cause of christian creationism, any more than it helps the cause of hinduist creationism, or pink unicorn creationism. Using this theory, you cannot say anything about the universe at all. Under your model, how can you tell at which stage in history god created the universe? How can you place the date? You can't, as any date you choose for the momentous occasion would have the same implied past. Thus: god could have created the universe 6000 years ago, 4 billion years ago, or two seconds ago. If you seriously expect the scientific enterprise to be deterred by unfalsifiable wank, then you have another think coming. Not only will scientists think that this is a load of bollocks, but so will young earth creationists, and most traditional christians. |
08-13-2002, 06:01 PM | #3 | |
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08-13-2002, 06:33 PM | #4 |
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I'm sure you're aware of omphalism, whose original proponent was Phillip Gosse. IIRC, his Omphalos was published before Darwin's OoS as an attempt to reconcile Genesis with evidence of a much, much older earth emerging from the relatively new science of geology.
I don't think Gosse's idea met with much success in the 19th century, so I doubt it will fare much better in the 21st. What the argument boils down to is that we cannot trust our senses, doesn't it? So, rather than sitting in front of my computer creating this post, I might, in reality, be plugged into a battery-pod where I'm being fooled by some Matrix-like simulation engineered by AI run amok or crafty aliens. Who could tell? [ August 13, 2002: Message edited by: Richiyaado ]</p> |
08-13-2002, 07:25 PM | #5 |
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What is the difference scientifically between a universe that appears to be 15 billion years old and one that actually is 15 billion years old? The only difference between them is that one explanation requires invoking a creative force that works outside the laws of nature, which isn't something that science can address anyway. Therefore, the difference betwen those two scenarios isn't a scientific one, and scientifically they're the same. You could substitute the creative force of your choice and it would make no difference.
Edited for spelling - unless the paws of nature really are relevant... [ August 13, 2002: Message edited by: Albion ]</p> |
08-14-2002, 06:08 AM | #6 |
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"It will be shown that there can be no scientific evidence of events antecedent to a putative moment of creation which can suffice to falsify the creationist claim."
I think it would take the idea of divine creation outside the realm of science, which is where it belongs. It appears to me to be a long winded way of saying that the world could have been created three seconds ago complete with my memories, radiochronometers implying 4.5 Ga of Earth history etc.. Then, in effect, you say that any universe created 3s ago could be interpreted to have been around for 15 Ga. This seems untrue to me - science isn't completely 'logical' in that way - we don't, in fact, consider the possibility that the world was created 3 seconds ago. Science is about the way the world presents itself to us. Similarly, if no radiochronometer recorded an age of >6000 years, it would still be logically possible that the universe had been around for 15 Ga and they had all been reset in some miraculous event, but I doubt any scientist would waste time thinking about it. And in the defence of scientists, note that creationists don't waste time thinking about it either. God could have created the world 1000 years ago, complete with bibles and whatever other evidence creationists believe implying he created it 6000 years ago. Yet I've never heard a creationist express doubt in their theories for that reason. [ August 14, 2002: Message edited by: beausoleil ]</p> |
08-14-2002, 08:19 AM | #7 |
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This paper appears to offer an ontological argument for the existence of god, although the author has gone to great pains to avoid discussing the creator in any fashion, other than to assume that he did in fact create the universe. I call this an ontological argument due to the use of referential vocabulary (“state,” “permissible,” “implied past,” and so forth), but it differs from traditional ontological arguments in that the being in question is only rendered possible, rather than necessary. The ontological characterization nevertheless applies, however, because as is typical of such arguments, the vocabulary cannot be detached from the scope of the definition. The argument is, under such circumstances, circular; but even if it were valid, the only conclusion that can be drawn (and only by an extrapolation of this particular argument) is that “by definition, god could exist.”
PERMISSIBILITY “By permissible, it is meant that induction only applies to states allowed under natural law.” This definition either dismisses induction as a valid way of knowing at least some information, or it renders all things that do not operate under natural law impermissible (i.e. god, miracles, etc.). If god in particular exists prior to or apart from natural law, god is impermissible. The author may object that god is not subject to induction, at least in the way “states” are, but this conflates the premise with the conclusion. It does so by stating, in effect, that “the thing must exist because, if it did, it would possess this necessary characteristic (not subject to natural law), and is thus ultimately circular. The argument that god is not subject to the constraints of permissibility is circular for the same reason. IMPERMISSIBILITY “A state can be impermissible either because it is always forbidden, or because it is inconsistent with some prior state which is assumed to have occurred.” This definition has little or no value. In the first clause, the term “forbidden” needs to be defined. I would assume that forbidden states are those that would be contradictory, intrinsically impossible or, from the definition of “permissible,” violate natural law. In regard to the latter, if god is not subject to natural law, god can violate natural law, and would therefore be impermissible. As to the second clause: that a prior state is assumed does not render that assumption accurate. A present state could still be permissible if the assumption(s) regarding the past state are false. The use of the word “assumed” thus invalidates the second half of the “impermissible” dichotomy. THE CASE OF A DETERMINISTIC UNIVERSE “Premise 1: For any permissible S1, there is a most probable permissible future state S2” “Conclusion 1: Any permissible state S2 has at least one prior permissible state at time t1 for which S2 is the most probable future state at t2.” In a deterministic universe, the probability that S2 will result from S1 is 100 percent. That is, from a state of perfect knowledge, S2 can be predicted with complete accuracy from S1. Viewed in the context of conclusion 1, the concept of “most probable” can mean that the imperfect predictive ability of those in S1 determines the accuracy of the S2 that they foresee, in which case the assessment of “probability” is illusory. If this is confusing, it is because the term “probability” infers the likelihood of one occurrence among many possible occurrences, revealing another definitional insufficiency inherent in both premise 1 and conclusion 1. If the universe is deterministic there can be only one prior permissible state, making premise 1 and conclusion 1 misleading, if not meaningless. THE CASE OF A NON-DETERMINISTIC UNIVERSE Alternatively, “most probable” can mean that the multiplicity of possible permissible S1’s necessitates taking all such S1’s into account in order to establish a probability of one particular S2 occurring. In a non-determined universe, such possibilities must exist, and no single S1 is absolutely necessary to produce S2. Positing a singe component universal to all S1’s does not follow; arguing the existence of such a universal component as a priori necessary leads us back to question-begging once again, and it is similarly invalid to assume that a hypothetical creative force does not constitute a S1 without a separate existential proof. So we are left with two choices: either the universe is determined and such possibilities do not exist, or the universe is on some level indeterminate, and alternate possibilities do exist. If the universe is determined, however, the Christian notion of god is obviously thwarted, inasmuch as he is defined as having gifted humans with free will. Using that definition as a premise, god is either possible but unnecessary, or does not exist. THE REALITY OF THE PAST “It is the opinion of this author that the implied past is every bit as ‘real’ as a past that actually happened” “[T]he past has no valid ontological standing.” The nature of ontology is in the offering of a priori proofs for the necessity of the actual existence of a given thing. If the past has no valid ontological standing, is does not actually exist. If the “implied past” has an equivalent reality to “a past that actually happened,” the implied past therefore does not actually exist. Furthermore, if the implied past does not exist, the appearance of such a past is illusory. As an illusion by definition involves a deception of the senses, the creator of the illusion has engaged in an act of deception. THE REALITY OF THE PRESENT “[I]nsofar as our memories are the result of our brain states, our beliefs of the past are purely a function of the present state of the universe.” If the past (in either form) is ontologically invalid, it necessarily leads to the conclusion that all temporal progressions are ontologically invalid up to, but not including (for now) the present state. The consequence of this conclusion is that all actions we take, inasmuch as our experience guides our actions, are based on illusory stimuli. Furthermore, when the present moment recedes into the past, it too becomes illusory. The present therefore only has a transitory reality (keeping in mind that “ontologically invalid” means “does not actually exist.”). We can go even further, and say that what we can properly call “reality” comes to exist and subsequently ceases to exist moment to moment. And finally, since not only our memories but also our instant sensations are the product of our “brain states,” the present is just as ontologically invalid as the past, meaning that there is no reality at all. EVOLUTION AND CONCLUSION I have stated throughout that the author’s argument only allows for the possibility of a creator, and does not offer an argument from necessity. I believe that this conclusion is self-evident, but will address the one explicit statement he makes that supports my position. ”[T]he question of whether other natural processes could have produced life is moot under this discussion. The salient point is that evidence must exist [in order to satisfy the requirement of an implied past] of some valid processes having produced life. If it were not evolution, then it would simply have been something else.” The author’s entire argument is essentially a solipsist objection to the appearance of a past. It states that since we cannot know definitively if the past was created retroactively (the previously non-existent t’s -1, -2, -3, and so on, where the actual moment of creation is t=0), that the scientific refutation to a young earth is untenable. Simply stated, moments in time preceding the Genesis creation event did not exist prior to that event, but in some way do exist afterward. The author does not say that this state of affairs actually is, but rather that the possibility alone trumps the scientific evidence. Characterizing the question of alternative processes for the creation of life as “moot” is not a refutation of the possibility of those processes in any sense. The truly salient point in his paper is contained in the last sentence of the above quote: if it’s not this, then it’s something else. That staggering insight puts the author’s hypothesis on par with the hypothesis of our friend the invisible pink unicorn; things might have happened that way, but we have no reason whatever to think that they did. As ambitious as the author’s project is, mere possibilities, resulting from some contrived definitional framework, are terribly unconvincing. Looking back, refuting the author’s argument was unnecessary, since in his post he asserts that his argument succeeds because it cannot be disproved. Even if that were true, given the context of possibility only, want of a disproof does not constitute a proof, making his entire exercise one long argument from ignorance. |
08-14-2002, 02:35 PM | #8 |
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Defending creationism is no easy task, and certainly around here, one apt to provoke insults, as one of my less polite interlocutors demonstrated. I'll try to respond to the more thoughtful comments.
I am not familiar with omphalism, but I don't think this particular argument assumes we cannot trust our senses. On the contrary, since it assumes inductive inference, it relies upon the reliability of sense data. The actual reality of the past is a side-question raised by the argument. I don't think the argument hinges upon it, but Albion made a good point from parsimony. If the creator is the only extra feature of the creationist model, as compared with the alternative, then we should accept the alternative. Since this argument does assume pure naturalism in the operation of the universe (simply allowing the creator his one miraculous creative act), then this situation applies. But the point of the argument is to consider whether creationism can be falsified by old earth evidence. Creationism may fail for reasons of parsimony - that is another question. It is certainly possible that the universe could have been created 3 seconds ago miraculously and we could not tell the difference. This rather silly defense of creationism is not the point of the argument. The argument says that any act of creation entails an implied past. Since we don't know where on the time axis creation occurred, it could have been 3 seconds ago, but there is no reason to assume it was. The argument does not need to locate creation at any particular point relative to present, although a creationist could plug in 4000BC or whatever figure he chooses. In response to EON_1, the argument in no way offers an ontological argument for the existence of the creator. The creator is simply assumed to exist, since the universe is assumed to have be created. Understand that the question at hand is not whether creation occurred, but whether a creationist model can be falsified by old earth evidence. So I have no circular argument for the creator's existence, since I am not arguing existence. With regard to the second accusation of circularity, the one about induction, once again I am not talking about the creator. I am simply saying that the inductive principle holds in the universe for all time. This is essential to the assumption of causal chains which can be inferred backward in time. It is true that such naturalism disallows miracles - the argument does not allow the creator to interfere with natural law after creation. Of course no creationist would accept this, but like I said, defending creationism isn't easy. We have to chuck some of the baggage to keep the leaky ship afloat. With regard to the definition of permissibility, the use of the word assumed may have been a bad choice. The point is simply that some states are not permitted as a function of prior states. For example, a state of the universe containing my body on the surface of a planet in orbit around tau ceti tomorrow would be impermissible. Of course this is based on current understanding of natural law. I don't follow EON_1's point about the non-deterministic case. All I'm saying is the following: "for any state of the universe allowed under natural law, there exists some prior state from which the universe could have evolved under natural law." Moreover, I allow that there are many possible causal chains which could connect the 2 states, each with varying probabilities in a non-deterministic case. That doesn't strike me as a particularly controversial claim. I don't follow EON's dispute with this and I'm not positing any single component universal to all prior states. I agree that creationism is defeated under determinism. The argument allows for either determinism or non-determinism. I worded the premise for the non-deterministic case because the other is really just a subset of the one. To reiterate, the point of the argument is to consider whether creationism can be falsified by old earth evidence. To do this, I assume a creationist model and hence am not trying to establish the existence of a creator. If it is true that: "given any state of the universe and a set of laws, at least one past is implied", then the existence of old earth evidence does not necessarily justify the falsification of creationism. In order to do that, one would have to show that a specific set of evidence was incompatible with the possible pasts implied under creationism. Does this help the creationist cause? I think so because it at least allows that an old earth could have been implied under creationism. If it were not valid to accept that creationism implies a past, then old earth evidence is an automatic falsification. This conclusion, if valid, removes that slam-dunk. Does it establish creationism or in any way raise its likelihood of being true? Certainly not. Bur elevating something from the realm of falsified to the realm of possible (however unlikely) is an improvement. |
08-14-2002, 03:29 PM | #9 | |||||||||
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08-14-2002, 05:09 PM | #10 | |
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There are states of the universe in our current theory with no implied past. Simplistically, this has to be the case since we posit an origin. In a scientific sense, this is what the origin means - the point at which there was no implied past. It still seems to me that you assert that no scientific evidence can refute the creationist claim. Is this not so? (What evidence might refute it?) If it is, the creationist claim is clearly outside the realms of science, just like the 'silly' 3s argument, which was my point. |
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