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07-24-2002, 05:23 PM | #1 |
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A surprising passage from Hume
I say surprising, because Hume's radical skepticism, I thought, denied all universal standards in both epistemology and ethics. Here's what he says, and I'd be interested in responses to all aspects of the passage. Is it accurate in its facts? (I don't know enough about the Quran to say.) Does it imply that Hume believed in some absolute standard of morality?
"The admirers and followers of the Alcoran insist on the excellent moral precepts interspersed through that wild and absurd performance. But it is to be supposed, that the Arabic words, which correspond to the English, equity, justice, temperance, meekness, charity, were such as, from the constant use of that tongue, must always be taken in a good sense; and it would have argued the greatest ignorance, not of morals, but of language, to have mentioned them with any epithets, besides those of applause and approbation. But would we know, whether the pretended prophet had really attained a just sentiment of morals? Let us attend to his narration; and we shall soon find, that he bestows praise on such instances of treachery, inhumanity, cruelty, revenge, bigotry, as are utterly incompatible with civilized society. no steady rule of right seems there to be attended to; and every action is blamed or praised, so far only as it is beneficial or hurtful to the true believers." |
07-25-2002, 05:22 AM | #2 |
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Tis irrelevant for sure, Robert Lee Cooke; but you're not related to the late great W. Paul Cook/Cooke? of N. Montpelier; who printed& edited *driftwind* way back then are you? He mort about um 1947/48.... Abe
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07-25-2002, 07:41 AM | #3 |
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Not really surprising. Hume is a sceptic about universal standards of morality that are metaphysical, that is, somehow subject-independent.
This leaves it open to think, as Hume does, that there are standards nevertheless. In the passage you quote, I think Hume is just pointing out that, in those situations where someone else applies moral terms in ways deeply inconsistent with your own/the local applications, it's incoherent to call their uses good, just, etc merely on account of *those* people thinking they are. |
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