Alonzo Fyfe

If, in order to earn the name "moral theory", I must tie moral-ought to the motives of the individual about which I am making the claim, then I consider morality itself to be one of humankind's most vile inventions, which should be discarded not only for its incoherence, but for its consequences.

Because morality is simply a license to be selfish, to discard the interests of others that one does not care about, to impose upon the world one's own tastes and preferences without regard to the harm and suffering one casues to anybody one happens not to care for. It is a license for racism, sexism, and all other forms of discrimination, for discarding and constructing a "moral universe" of one's own liking and picking and choosing who else will be included within its walls, and who will be cast beyond its protections, according to personal prejudice and preference.

Morality itself is evil.

If this seems like a contradiction, it is borne out of an incoherence within morality itself, that it praises what it condemns, asserts what it denies, and does not practice its own preachings.

That basic incoherence is this: that morality requires at the same time that moral ought be tied directly to the desires of the agent about whom it is being applied, and take seriously the impact that it has on others. That to say that you 'ought not' to do something I must say that you have a reason not to do it, while at the same time tying this 'ought not' to the harm inflicted on others that the agent may, in fact, have no reason to avoid."

And "morality is evil" takes its meaning from the fact that it is at least logically possible, and actually quite common, that what a person has reason to do is harmful to others, or at the very least there is no logically necessary link between what an agent has a reason to do and what is beneficial to others -- and moral terms require such a link.

[ May 03, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

SmashingIdols

No more, no less, than society itself, to whom morality is but one (codified) of many tools of survival.

Morality has never been about individuals - selfish thought is the essence of immorality itself. It is only about the adherence of individuals to the codified rules of social behavior. That's the whole idea - the fact that some people can and do break these rules; those that are moral do not.

You can no more redefine and invent individual morality than you can your own language; whithout others speaking it, it does not qualify as language. Like language, morality is property of the Society that dictates it.

[ May 03, 2002: Message edited by: SmashingIdols ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

That's my point. If somebody talks about 'morality' using the 'harm to others' criterion, somebody out there says 'you are using moral terms incorrectly because you are not talking about the reasons a person has for doing or not doing something.' They raise objections such as 'the naturalistic fallacy' -- for it makes no sense to tell somebody that he ought to do something that he has no reason to do.

If somebody talks instead about 'morality' using the 'reasons people have for or against doing something' criterion, then somebody out there (like you -- and me, if the truth be known) says that 'selfishness is the essence of immorality' and 'harm to others' is the only legitimate moral concern, even if the person doing the harm has no reason to refrain from doing so.

Around and around and around it goes. The debate cannot end because both sides are trying to make sense of an incoherence.

Some try to do so through contortions and contrivances that say that every person ultimately has sufficient reason to do the most altruistic act. But these eventually show themselves to be contortions and contrivances. And even if this did not happen, they suffer a critical weakness. Morality requires a conceptual connection between what a person has reason to do and what benefits others, and these contortions can at best offer only a material connection -- if the world turns out to have been built the way they claim it to have been built -- which it isn't.

[ May 03, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Dr. Retard

Why not just say "the customary conception of morality is self-contradictory"? Seems less likely to mislead.

bd-from-kg

Alonzo Fyfe:

What do you mean by “vile”? Is this intended as a moral condemnation? Is the intent here to persuade people to adopt a different theory of morality, or a different concept of what constitutes a moral theory? If so, what makes you thing that it might do so? Why would anyone’s behavior be affected by being persuaded that certain beliefs can be objectively described in a certain way? Do you regard “Don’t do such-and-such, because some people use a certain word to describe such behavior” as a serious argument? Is the reason offered a serious reason?

Or is there no intent at all; is “morality is vile” just a casual observation, like the observation that a certain cloud resembles a dog?

Similarly, what do you mean by “should”? Do you mean simply that the action in question satisfies some arbitrary criterion, but that you don’t mean to suggest that this fact might reasonably be expected to be regarded by anyone as a reason for doing it? If that is all that you mean, why are you bothering to tell us about it? Why would it be of any more interest to us than the fact that some action would increase the amount of pink paint slightly while decreasing the amount of mauve paint by the same amount?

Sounds like you’re talking about subjective morality.

On what basis are you passing this judgment?

1. The phrase “tied directly to the desires of the agent” is extremely ambiguous. It could mean that the thing that it is said that one “ought” to do must be something that the agent actually does desire to do, or that it is something that it would be rational for him to desire to do, or that it is something he would desire to do if he’d had a proper upbringing, or something that you are trying to induce or persuade him to desire to do. Or it could mean any number of other things.

2. But in any case, what’s odd about the idea that there might be some relationship between what an agent desires to do and the impact the available choices would have on others? Are you suggesting that it is logically impossible to take other people’s interests into account, or that it is irrational to do so, or what?

What moral theory do you have in mind? I know of none (other than pure egoism) that asserts that one “ought not” do something only if one has a reason (in the sense of a desire or motive) not to do it.

On the contrary, if there were always, as a matter of logical necessity, such a link, morality (and moral terms) would be completely superfluous, and so would not exist. And no sane person has ever supposed that it is logically necessary that motives and desires be directed toward the welfare of others, yet a number of sane people have imagined that moral language is meaningful. If moral terms really “require” a “link” that is manifestly not there, it seems odd that so many people have used it, and continue to use it.

Do you have any idea what the purpose and function of moral language is? Its function is to influence behavior. Influencing behavior of necessity involves influencing motives and desires. Of course there has to be a link between “moral ought” and motives or desires. The question is not whether there is such a link, but what is its nature. After all, not all language designed to influence behavior is considered moral language. What kinds of arguments count as moral arguments? What kinds of reasons for doing something count as moral reasons? How does it happen that people’s behavior is often influenced by moral arguments? How and why does the giving of moral reasons often affect motives and desires? These are the serious questions that need to be considered by a moral philosopher, and which must be addressed by anything that deserves to be called a “moral theory”.

[ May 04, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

What do you mean by "vile"? Is this intended as a moral condemnation?

"Moral" in what sense?

What I mean is that internalist morality pays no necessary intention to the welfare of people other than the agent. That it basically tells people "do what you will; and if what you will involves harming others, then harm others." I mean what I say -- that morality is a selfish practice allowing no end to the harms that one may inflict on others one does not care about.


Is the intent here to persuade people to adopt a different theory of morality, or a different concept of what constitutes a moral theory?

Actually, no. It is not possible to persuade somebody to do something they do not want to (have reason to) do.

At the same time, what a person has reason to do may be very harmful to others.

A person who is evil (pursues ends that, in pursuing them, causes harm to others), who does not care about others, will do evil deeds (harmful to others) and no amount of moral argument can persuade him otherwise.

He can be persuaded, perhaps, if one finds out what the evil person does care about -- such as his own freedom or his own life, and informs him that if he is caught doing evil, he will lose something he actually values.

This is the only type of persuasion effective against evil people.


Or is there no intent at all; is "morality is vile" just a casual observation, like the observation that a certain cloud resembles a dog?

The evil person views "X is harmful to others" as being as insignificant as "a certain cloud resembles a dog." That is what makes an evil person evil.

That morality tells people that if, for them, "X is harmful to others" is no more significant than "a certain cloud resembles a dog" that no moral moral objection can be raised against their doing X that morality is evil.

The good person finds "X is harmful to others" to be important. That is what makes a good person good.


Similarly, what do you mean by "should?"

I mean that, all things considered, it is the best thing to do.


If that is all that you mean, why are you bothering to tell us about it? Why would it be of any more interest to us than the fact that some action would increase the amount of pink paint slightly while decreasing the amount of mauve paint by the same amount?

That something is the best all things considered will may have no significance to the person who cares nothing for what is good all things considered -- the evil person. I am, indeed, wasting my time if I seek to explain to the evil person that his pursuits are harmful. I might as well be telling him something as insignificant as your paint example above. He just doesn't care.

But somebody who does care about what is good all things considered would be interested in the fact that this practice called "morality" works contrary to this goal.

I am talking to them, and they will find these words about "morality" to be important.


Sounds like you're talking about subjective morality.

Nope. I am talking about internalist morality -- theories that tell people "you did nothing morally wrong so long as what you did is consistent with what you ultimately want to do."

Whether such a theory qualifies as objective or subjective is irrelevant.


On what basis are you passing this judgment?

On the basis of "harm to others."


The phrase "tied directly to the desires of the agent" is extremely ambiguous.

Yes it is. But, in the context where I used the phrase, it applies to every one of the interpretations you mentioned. (Except, perhaps, where you talked about "proper upbringing", because 'proper' is a moral term through which one can sneek in aspects of 'harmful to others' morality.)


But in any case, what's odd about the idea that there might be some relationship between what an agent desires to do and the impact the available choices would have on others?

It's not odd at all.

In fact, I can't think of a single desire that has no impact on others, except the desire of the last person in the universe, where there are no others.

What is odd is supposing a necessary relationship between what everybody ultimately desires and what has a positive impact on others -- that nobody ultimately desires anything that requires harming to others.

The word 'ultimately' here can carry whatever interpretation of 'perfectly rational' or 'with sufficient knowledge and understanding' that one may want to insert.

Even if some contingent relationship happens to exist -- it is still a contingent relationship. The practice of morality still tells people, "do what you ultimately wish, regardless of who may be harmed by it." It just adds, "And, by the way, it turns out -- I think -- that you do not ultimately wish to do anything harmful to others. But that's just my opinion. I could be wrong."

To which the evil person chuckles, rubs his hands togeather, and says, "Wanna bet?"


Do you have any idea what the purpose and function of moral language is? Its function is to influence behavior.

Whose behavior? Towards what end? By what means? Under what circumstances?

Morality is evil because (I am told that) I can't make a moral claim -- I can't say, for example, that the person who raped my cousin or took money out of my desk drawer did something immoral -- unless I am prepared to say that the rapist and the thief would not have done what they did if they fully understood what they were doing.

However, if I must be prepared to make such a claim before I am permitted to say that the rape and theft were immoral, I must also be prepared to say that if I am wrong -- if they would still have committed the rape or the theft even if fully rational with perfect understanding -- then the rape and the theft were not immoral.

The most popular theory in psychology tells me that belief and understanding has no impact on desire, that a perfectly rational rapist or thief is nothing more than a perfectly efficient rapist or thief. Perfect understanding means that he understands the best way to victimize people without getting caught.

So, if I combine this practice called 'morality' with the most widely used theory of psychology, I am forced to conclude that the rape and the theft were not immoral. That they may well have been permissible, and perhaps even obligatory.

That their only moral crime, if there was one, was that they may not have carried out their rape or theft in the most efficient manner -- in the way that a perfectly rational individual with full understanding would have executed the rape or the theft.

What type of influence can this be expected to have on people's behavior?

Because of this, I answer that morality is evil.

[ May 06, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

bd-from-kg

Alonzo Fyfe:

Your position is completely incoherent. On the one hand, you’re using moral language in a way that is quite obviously intended to persuade people to reject certain kinds of moral theories. On the other, the kind of moral theory you are encouraging them to reject is any theory that says that moral “ought” is tied directly to the desires of the agent. And you insist that this includes theories in which the “tie” in question consists of the fact that in saying that someone ought to do something you are trying to induce or persuade him to desire to do so (or to encourage other people to act in the recommended way in similar situations).

But your use of terms like “vile”, “condemn”, and “should” is tied to the desires of potential agents in precisely this way. So you are condemning your own use of moral language. In fact, you’re condemning virtually all use of moral language, since such language is practically always intended to influence behavior.

Wrong. You’re talking about any morality that posits a direct tie between moral “ought” and the desires or motives of an agent. This is an attempt to justify your kind of theory, which says that there is no relationship at all between the two, by claiming that the only alternative is to say that a fully knowledgeable and rational agent would necessarily do as he “ought”. In particular, there’s a huge chasm between saying that knowing that an action is “wrong” might be considered by a rational agent to be a reason for not doing it and saying that it would always be considered by a rational agent to be a compelling reason – i.e., one that would always override all reasons for doing it.

It would be more than “odd” to suppose this; it would be absurd. Obviously there is no logically necessary relationship between any knowledge or belief and any desire or action.

True. Your point being?

This notion is so absurd that I have trouble imagining that even a professor of psychology could believe it. You must be misunderstanding something.

The rest of your post appears to be devoted to venting your spleen at the supposed claim that any acceptable moral theory must imply that a rational agent with full knowledge and understanding would necessarily take the interests of others into account. But lots of moral theories do not imply this. Still, there is a long tradition of moral theories (tracing back to Aristotle at least) that hold that to act rightly is to act in accordance with “right reason”, or that it is “contrary to reason” to put one’s own interests ahead of everyone else’s. To call this entire tradition “evil” seems a bit ... excessive, shall we say.

As for my moral theory (which seems to be the real target here) we were engaged in an interesting discussion of it on another thread. Have you decided to abandon that thread and start all over on this one? If so, count me out; I’m not interested in reinventing the wheel.

Alonzo Fyfe

Let's zoom in on the crucial issue.

I wrote:

The most popular theory in psychology tells me that belief and understanding has no impact on desire...

And you responded:

This notion is so absurd that I have trouble imagining that even a professor of psychology could believe it. You must be misunderstanding something.

Please, tell me what I am misunderstanding.

Please visit the <a href="http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/practicalreasoning.html" target="_blank">Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind - practical reasoning.</a>

scroll down and you will find a definition of "instrumentalism." It contains the following quotes:

"Instrumentalism is the default view in the field, and probably among philosophers in general."


Instrumentalism is described in part as holding that

"...you can reason about how to get what you want, but not about what to want in the first place."

If you find this vague, in the definition of "Reasoning with maieutic ends" it describes this characteristic of instrumentalism again by saying,

"...ultimate ends come out as arbitrary: your ultimate ends are the things you just happen to want, they are beyond the reach of deliberation and rational control."

(The view called "reasoning with maieutic ends" disputes this aspect of instrumentalism -- calling it unrealistic. Yet, this does not change the point that this is a part of instrumentalism, or that instrumentalism is the default view in the field.)

My objection, then, is this:

If we combine the moral internalist definition of "moral should" which ties in with the ultimate ends of the agent, with the dominant view among theories of action which states that ultimate ends are arbitrary and beyond the reach of reason, we get the conclusion that what moral-should is arbitrary and beyond the reach of reason.

(In other words, morality is evil -- in the "allowing or endorsing harm to others" sense of evil.)

Of course, you could answer that instrumentalism is wrong. In fact, I think it is wrong. I tend to endorse a version of "plans and intentions theory" called "script theory."

But saying that it is wrong is far different from saying that "not even a professor of psychology could belive it."

[ May 07, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

free12thinker

I believe morality comes from tolerance, individual or universal.

Can we tolerate loss of life at the hands of another being? A Universal No
Can we tolerate loss of items at he hands of another being? A Universal No
Can we tolerate rape or sodomy at the hands of another being? A Universal No

It's all about tolerance.

I think where Fyfe gets angry is with the morality that deals with issues that aren't central to our progression of life. When people put tolerance on a scale of 'good for humanity' versus 'good for individuals'. Things like homosexuality, gambling, casual sex, role expectations by gender, age, and such. These are moral/ethical topics which lend themselves to personal preference and do not weigh on the progression of society.

I too get angry about these victimless sins that we deem immoral. These victimless sins which certainly promote discrimination based on gender, sexual preference, age and the like.

[ May 07, 2002: Message edited by: free12thinker ]</p>

bd-from-kg

Alonzo Fyfe:

You wrote:

When I questioned this, you asked:

Glad to help.

You quote the Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind as saying that the theory of instrumentalism holds that:

and

Neither of these statements implies anything at all about whether belief and understanding have any impact on desires. So far as I can make out, instrumentalism as a whole is silent on this question. Your assertion is simply a non sequitur.

By the way, as the title Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind might suggest, instrumentalism is not a “theory of psychology”, but a philosophical theory.