Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

K,
Uh...no. This is a completely different topic K. This has nothing to do with precursive faith or James' essay, thats why it's in a differerent post.

I am just asking a 'yes' or 'no' question...

Given the above evidence and my experience how is my belief in God irrational? Irrational defined as 'lacking usual or normal mental clarity or coherence'.



Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

K

SOMMS:

If you aren't using James' formula, I would say that your belief in God is irrational becuase it lacks the normal mental clarity or coherence that people apply to most other aspects of their lives.

If someone is found stabbed to death, it is assumed that a person perpetrated the crime. With the same kind of evidence you have presented for the existence of God, we could assume that a demon had committed the act.

"I got a strange chill as I walked past the murder scene. I actually heard in my head a voice screaming 'murder'."

"Something just felt wrong at the time it happened."

"The victim had had an extreme run of bad luck right before the murder. That's something that could best be explained by a demon out to get him"

"There were no fingerprints at the scene. Unless somebody can explain why not a single fingerprint was found, I can only surmise that it must have been a demon. They have no fingerprints."

You get the picture. I think you would agree that such an assessment lacks normal mental clarity and coherence.

Your belief in God (given the evidence you've stated) falls in the same category. He's a supernatural explanation with no real evidence - just personal evidence and the lack of 100 percent explanation for everything we observe.

K

luvluv:

Nothing can be proven conclusively - especially the supernatural which can change in the blink of an eye (real vampires aren't detectable by any instruments, only a true believer can tell where they are!). So, this requirement doesn't buy much.

The next requirement is a bit nebulous - what does it mean to say that they can legitimately disagree. There were some reasonably intelligent people who believed that a spaceship was waiting to whisk them away to a life of bliss if they castrated themselves and then committed suicide when the Hale Bopp comet came by.

I know that you've stated that the Heaven's Gate beliefs don't meet James criteria of providing benefit in this lifetime. I've just used it to demonstrate that intelligent people can hold extremely irrational beliefs. What does it mean to "legitimately" disagree?

I've discussed this with SOMMS. Evidence is available for anyone to investigate and draw conclusions. So while the two individuals above may have seen evidence to support their beliefs, that evidence (or lack thereof) can be scrutinized by others. James' formula is all internal. It is not possible to say that an individual believes anything irrationally as long as the person holds that belief because of internal motivation (by feeling that the belief is momentous and forced).

All this assumes I am a naturalist or that I agree with the naturalist postion. All I will say is that there is no real evidence to suggest anything supernatural. If evidence for the supernatural emerges (and I'm not talking gaps or warm, fuzzy feelings), I will re-evaluate.

Supernaturalism of the gaps is not a good argument. The gaps in understanding are just that, things that we don't now understand completely. They are by no means places where it has been determined that naturalistic explanations are impossible. There is no more need to assign supernaturalism to the gaps than there is to assume that the world doesn't exist when we sleep.

Now you're playing both sides of the fence. What happened to the requirement that two equally intelligent people could legimately disagree? That requirement says that the underlying belief must have some rationality. Otherwise we're right back to saying that someone who finds it momentous, forced, and live to believe that they have to stick lemon slices in their nose while singing Row Row Row Your Boat in order to prevent the lizard king from eating their brains is rational to risk believing it.

So, are you arguing that James' formula works regardless of the undlerlying belief (as you claim to be doing here)? Or does the undlerlying belief have to be rational (as you've indicated with your evidence and intelligent disagreement stipulations).

I just find it almost non-sensical if you really are saying (as you claim here) that it can be rational to hold completely irrational beliefs. What does that mean? That's like saying that it can be wise to hold foolish beliefs.

I can't argue with that.

I would definitely argue against that.

Again, what does it mean to rationally hold an irrational belief? Mayber we should just use a different terminology. How about motivated? If a person finds a belief momentous, forced, and live, then they are motivated to believe it. This seems a much clearer phrasing of what's actually going on. It also leaves out the ugly mess of saying that it can be rational to hold an irrational belief. That way, people irrationally hold irrational beliefs, but they are motivated to do so because they find the belief momentous, forced and live. It keeps the definition of rational intact and everybody is happy.

Then don't try to use evidence and equally intelligent people disagreeing (ie. the beliefs must have some rational basis) to avoid having to say that James' formula indicates that the David Berkowitz rationally held his belief that a 2000 year old dog commanded him to kill people.

... or non-existent or even completely contrary to the belief. That is if you are now truly backing off of the rationality of the underlying belief as you've emphatically stated above.

The same way we make good choices in other aspects of our lives. By withholding judgement when there is little or no evidence either way. By making decisions supported by the evidence when sufficient evidence is present. And by choosing the path supported by the most evidence when a decision must be made - always willing to reevaluate when new evidence comes to light.

One way to make bad decisions is to find something we find important, forced and believable without evidence and use that to make a decision.

"I've got this feeling that I'm going to be really lucky this weekend. I'm taking my kid's college fund and going to Vegas."

"I've had way too much to drink tonight, but it's time to hit the road. Nothing's going happen. Accidents always happen to other people."

"Sometimes I think I should be saving for the future, but hey, Social Security will always be there."

"I know he hits me sometimes, but deep down I'm sure he loves me and that we're meant to be together. It won't get any worse."

By the way, here again you've claimed that this is a method for making good choices. Calling the choices good indicates that the underlying belief is rational. We can say that all of the choices are motivated (as I suggested above), but I wouldn't call them good choices.

PopeInTheWoods

And one other thing before I shove off.

How does "precursive faith" deal with mutually exclusive claims that are live, momentous, and forced, if both "must not be missed if they are true" (such as "Xianity is true" and "Islam is true")?

Andy

Family Man

There's a couple of things in luvluv's response to K I'd like to comment on

If you are justifying the decision to "risk" belief, you are justifying that belief. If you "decide to believe" something, then you believe something. There is no real distinction between the two statements. Get a grip, luvluv.

If I go to buy a car, and a salesman shows me one that doesn't have a motor, I'm not very impressed if he tells me it isn't designed to be driven. It ain't doing what I what it to do. It is always irrational to DECIDE TO BELIEVE an irrational belief. If James theory tells me it is rational to believe (or DECIDE TO BELIEVE, as if there is a difference) an irrational belief, then it's telling me it's a crappy theory. And frankly, it's annoying to me to have a supposively intelligent person tell me that it is rational to hold an irrational belief.

True, but as an evidentialist, I don't have to come to a final conclusion about a belief before making a decision on how to act upon it if I need to. One can make decisions without having complete information. But I don't have decide whether a proposition is believable until I do get the appropriate information. I suggest you re-read Clifford's formulation so that you understand that his standard is not about making decisions, but only about when it is ok to accept a belief as true.

Jobar

luvluv, James attempts to provide a justification for belief with little or no evidence. But we do not decide to believe, or disbelieve. Our beliefs are largely consequences of our emotions; our decisions are products of our reason. The two interact, but are not identical.

I don't think you, or James, understands this.

Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

K,
Reducing your postion to an argument from popularity hurts your position K. Let's just stick to the issue at hand shall we?

Exactly how does my belief lack 'mental clarity or coherence'? You need to explain why it lacks clarity or coherence...not just state that is does.


Stick to the problem at hand K. 'We' are not doing a forensic analysis of a murder scene with me claiming 'demons'. This is not what I am claiming.

I am asking you why you claim my belief is irrational given the evidence.

I am not:
-Claiming demons killed someone.
-Asking you what your beliefs are.
-Talking about others beliefs.
-Giving evidence why you should believe in one thing over the other.

Given the specific evidence I've presented, can you explain why and how my belief in God lacks coherence?


I am beginning to think you can't. This is only the fifth time I've asked you.



Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

K

SOMMS:

It wasn't an argument from popularity. It was showing that theistic belief is different from all other beliefs that are considered rational in that it supposes a supernatural explanation.

It is not coherent. As I've tried to demonstrate, it is not coherent. In all other aspects of life, the supernatural is not a rational explanation for things that aren't completely understood or whose only evidence is "personal evidence." It is incoherent to rope off one kind of belief, spiritual belief, and call it rational to propose a supernatural explanation for something that isn't completely understood and some personal evidence.

No we're not. The example was given to show the absurdity (irrationality) of claiming a supernatural explanation simply because of a lack of full understanding and personal evidence. This is not considered rational in any other aspects of our lives. It is incoherent to call it rational when dealing with theistic belief.

See above.

Because it ropes off one type of belief and gives special rules for only this type of belief.

And this is only the fifth time I've answered. I'm beginning to think you're trying to duck the thrust of my answers, so I'll ask you directly. Are supernatural explanations allowable for all rational beliefs or is it somehow twistedly coherent to allow them only for theistic beliefs?

luvluv

Family Man:

Okay, I'm begining to see why this is going nowhere.

Have you ever taken a philosophy course before? Or read an introductory primer on philosophy?

Go to find your favorite philosophically inclined atheist on this board (I'd reccomend bd-from-kg, though he is probably tired of addressing this question) and ask him or her if evidentialism can prove the reliability of our memory. Or go pick up Bertrand Russell's book, The Problems of Philosophy. I believe in it he also shows that memory cannot be shown to be reliable through evidence. He as atheist, maybe you can trust him.

But ponder this for a second. How do you know your brother's memory of event B is the same as yours? Answer: Because you REMEMBER your brother telling you that his experience of event B was the same as yours. In other words, you are using your memory to prove the reliability of your memory. That is circular reasoning. It would be circular reasoning even if your brother were in the same room with you right now. By the time your brother finishes forming the words to tell you that his experience of event B was the same as yours, you are relying on your memory to tell you what your brother (apparently) just said. You use your memory for every argumentative act. Memory cannot be justified empirically because every attempt to prove it's reliablity DEPENDS on it's reliability and is thus inherently circular.

But don't take my word for it. Ask around.

So since the reliability of memory cannot be empirically proven, how did you form the belief that your memory is reliable?

Secular Pinoy

If it hasn't been cited, here are the essays by WK Clifford, Will James, and an essay by AJ Burger responding to both.

The Ethics of Belief