the_cave

Sorry I didn't reply to this--

Maybe a good starting point for a this debate would be to merely claim that god is the most perfect thing that is. In this sense, certain aspects of the universe are analagous for the materialist; those aspects of the universe which create beauty, human sentience, good acts, and so on, are the most perfect things that are. The theist merely calls the cause of those things "god".

And I would follow from there; a materialist could claim that our universe is imperfect, because there are other aspects to it that bring sorrow, despair, pain, suffering, and so on. So they claim they could imagine a more perfect universe.

But why doesn't this more perfect universe exist? If it's so perfect, why didn't it create itself, instead of this place? This leads me to suspect that there really is no more perfect universe, since it doesn't exist, and ours does.

Surely the universe defines perfection for the materialist, since it created us and our minds. And it was indeed powerful enough to create that perfection, because here we are, with all the beauty we've created so far. Is there a power greater than that of the universe for the materialist? It seems not--so the universe is effectively "all-powerful", in that it wields all the powers that actually exist.

In a similar manner, I can imagine some thing wielding the power to bring about the existence of the universe itself, and its perfection (of whatever degree). That thing would define perfection, and bring it about with its maximal powers. I can't imagine anything more perfect than this thing, since it is simply that which is most perfect. I'm willing to start with that as part of a basic definition of "god", whatever else god may be.

Mageth

However, I do not necessarily think the case is similar when considering whether or not God could himself know of his omniscience. It is either logically possible for him to know of his omniscience, or not. If the former is true, then he does; if the latter is true, then he can’t and doesn’t, though this wouldn’t limit his omniscience.

If he can't know whether or not he's omniscient, then it would seem that he was not omniscient; there's at least one fact he can't know. And I think, logically, he can't know, as he can't prove that there is not a fact x which he does not know. Interestingly, he also couldn't prove his other omni-attributes (excepting, perhaps, "omnibenevolence"). Using similar arguments as used for omniscience, god couldn't prove or know that he is truly omnipotent or omnipresent. (i.e. fact x may be knowledge of a power he doesn't have, or fact x may be knowledge of a "place" he doesn't exist).

The_Ist

Well, I think when it is said that God is omniscient, it means that he knows everything that is logically possible to know. God doesn't know how to draw a square circle; however, since such knowledge is logically impossible to possess, his omniscience is not negated. I think the same idea would apply to God knowing of his omniscience, if it is indeed logically impossible for him to do so.

As I touched on in my last post with regard to the concept of Lebensform, I don't think we are in a position to conclude this. "Knowledge" and how it is acquired may be quite different for God than it is for us. God may "know" of his omniscience in the same way that we "know" about pain (though this is just speculatory). The main point is that it cannot be conclusively stated that God cannot know of his omniscience.

I think that applying the same idea regarding how God may know of him omniscience similarly allows for the possibility of God knowing of his other attributes.

Mageth

As I touched on in my last post with regard to the concept of Lebensform, I don't think we are in a position to conclude this. "Knowledge" and how it is acquired may be quite different for God than it is for us. God may "know" of his omniscience in the same way that we "know" about pain (though this is just speculatory). The main point is that it cannot be conclusively stated that God cannot know of his omniscience.

Nor can it be conclusively stated that god can know of his omniscience. Perhaps, at best, whether or not god is omniscient (or omni-anything else) is something that we cannot know one way or the other for certain, and thus we can only assert, not claim to know, whether god is omniscient or not. Likewise, to us limited beings, even god could only assert, and not establish, that he is omni-anything.

Your position seems to boil down to "God knows he's omniscient because he's omniscient", or because he's god and somehow "experiences" knowledge different and "experiences" that he is omniscient perhaps similar to the way we experience pain. I find that tautological and unsatisfying.

Talking about god acquiring knowledge seems to imply that, at one time, God was not omniscient, BTW. And runs into the logical problem I posed about how god would know when he'd obtained all knowledge. You suggest that perhaps he just felt some kind of twang, like a rock falling on his foot, that let him know he'd learned the last bit of knowledge. Again, I find that a very unsatisfying attempt at explanation.

The_Ist

I also see no way how God could directly display his omniscience to us.

However, omniscience entails knowing everything that can possibly be known. It seems to me as though I have given an argument (two posts ago) that upholds the logical possibility of God knowing of his omniscience. Accordingly, since it is logically possible that an omniscient being knows of his own omniscience, it follows that, if he truly is omniscient, he MUST know of it. For if he did not, he wouldn’t know of something that is logically possible to know, and thus wouldn’t be omniscient in the first place. IOW, an omniscient being is necessarily aware of its own omniscience.

1) I am not arguing that "God knows he's omniscient because he's omniscient."

2) My basic argument is that, insofar as it is a logical possibility that a being can know of its own omniscience, it follows that God necessarily does (see above). My argument regarding the concept of Lebensform a couple posts ago was only meant to establish this logical possibility, by positing that “knowledge” for God may not mean the same thing as it does to us.

3) I do not see how my argument is tautological, since I am not arguing in accordance with #1. And the fact that my argument may be “unsatisfying” has no bearing on its validity. The only burden of proof I have in this discussion is to maintain the logical possibility of God knowing of his omniscience.

I should not have used such terminology. God does not acquire knowledge, he just has it. Actually, this point is further evidence that “knowledge” with respect to God is something fundamentally different than what it is for us; we acquire it, while god doesn’t.

I am not suggesting that this knowledge of his omniscience came to him at a certain time, but that he has always possessed it. (Sorry for possibly creating a misunderstanding by using the word “acquiring.”) Everything else in this passage I’ve explained above.