Prometheus

pug846:

I think you are mistaken. This situation is unique. Morality determines whether or not we are to examine anything in the first place. If there is no objective moral reason to apply the burden of proof, then I don't have to listen to you. If it is applied subjectively all you are saying is that you personally don't feel like wasting the effort to prove that there aren't any objective morals. We aren't just talking about empirical claims here. We are talking about the background we use when examining them.

pug846

Eh? Are you claiming that the burden of proof is a normative principle?

Either way, your argument could still apply to the existence of God given that one could argue that God is the source of morality, hence, invoking your principle that the burden of proof has shifted.

Prometheus

To say that one ought to use the burden of proof is a moral statement. The principle does work independent of morality, but I'm talking about the reasons behind applying it.


No my argument does not apply to the existence of God. If one wanted to argue that morality is dependent on God the burden of proof would be on them to show this. They are already assuming that objective morality exists not God's existence since they are arguing for it. They aren't arguing in favor of the existence of objective morality, they are arguing in favor of the idea that it's existence is dependent on God. God isn't prima facie connected with the notion that there are objective moral values

[ October 06, 2002: Message edited by: Prometheus ]</p>

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jlowder
IIDB Regular
User # 5
posted October 06, 2002 10:38 PM

This will be my last post in this exchange; I'll let Bice have the last word. My whole point in this exchange was not to argue that moral objectivism is true. Rather, my purpose was simply to refute the claim that naturalism undermines moral objectivism. I've pointed out repeatedly how Brice's arguments merely support the conclusion that moral objection is false, not the conclusion that metaphysical naturalism undermines moral objectivism. In his latest post, he continues to ignore this distinction.

This amounts to what we might call the "lack-of-evidence argument moral objectivism." Brice says that he doesn't take moral objectivism "seriously" since no "adequate proof has been presented." And suppose Bright were about this: suppose there just is no evidence for moral objectivism. At best, that would only show that moral objectivism is false. That fact (if it were a fact) wouldn't support the conclusion that a "godless universe would be the end to the concept of an ultimate morality which preexisted man." It is the latter point that is at issue. I am not objecting to Brice's rejection of moral objectivism. Rather, I am objecting to Brice's assertion that metaphysical naturalism itself undermines moral objectivism.

This is a caricature of moral objectivism. Moral objectivism doesn't posit "natural laws" that "provide an ultimate morality which preexisted man." All that moral objectivism entails is that moral principles are true or false independently of people's opinion. Therefore, the fact that "natural laws" do not "provide an ultimate morality which preexisted man" doesn't undermine moral objectivism at all.

I think it is highly arrogant to claim that an entire group of people--the vast majority of whom Brice has never met--hold a belief based on faith. If anyone is holding a belief based on faith, it is Brice for believing that everyone who disagrees with him about the nature of morality--including nontheistic philosophers <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/quentin_smith/" target="_blank">Quentin Smith</a> and <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/" target="_blank">Michael Martin</a>--must do so on faith.

Why?

Even if that were true, this doesn't support your claim, "metaphysical naturalism implies that no objective moral truths exist."

I'm not trying to make Brice or anyone else feel uncomfortable. I'm simply trying to find an argument for the conclusion, "metaphysical naturalism implies that no objective moral truths exist." I do not find such an argument in any of Brice's posts.

Once again, Brice is appealing to the (alleged) lack-of-evidence argument against moral objectivism. For the sake of this discussion, I'll assume that Brice is right. But that still does not support Brice's claim, "metaphysical naturalism implies that no objective moral truths exist."

I'm going to drop the issue of the value of human beings, since I consider that to be totally irrelevant to the issue of whether moral objectivism is true. Moral objectivism doesn't presuppose that human beings are valuable, either intrinsically or instrumentally. Human beings could be literally worthless (i.e., not valuable at all) and yet moral objectivism could still be true. The value of human beings has nothing to do with whether moral objectivism is true.

In his conclusion, Brice again repeats the very point at issue:

However, Brice still has not provided one reason to hold that belief. Brice has provided several reasons for believing that moral objectivism is false, but he has not provided a single reason for believing that metaphysical naturalism means that moral objectivism is false.

Brice then writes:

This is the fallacy of shifting the burden-of-proof. Again, it was Brice who made the assertion, "metaphysical naturalism implies a value neutral universe, one in which no objective moral truths exist." Therefore, Brice has the burden of proof to support that assertion. However, he has not yet provided any arguments or evidence in support of his claim. Even if moral objectivism turns out to be false, that doesn't support the assertion that metaphysical naturalism disproves (or provides evidence against) moral objectivism.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ October 06, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]

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John bice responds again:

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Bice
IIDB Visitor
User # 8274
posted October 07, 2002 08:24 PM

The correct spelling of my name, by the way, is Bice.

I will answer all your objections to the best of my ability in this, somewhat verbose response.

Apparently, Mr. Lowder, you were offended by my faith comment. I apologize. I was using the word faith in keeping with the dictionary definition: “belief in, devotion to, or trust in somebody or something, especially without logical proof.” Perhaps, I could have said that they show a high level of confidence in something that is lacking in positive evidence. However, I thought the word faith was appropriate. Objectivists are making an assertion that objective morals exist. They make this assertion based on scant or no evidence, and certainly not logical proof. To hold to such a position, in the absence of compelling evidence, is the definition of faith.

If I was, indeed, “highly arrogant” in my assertions, at least I’m not alone. I recently found several writings on the subject of morality by a man named Keith Augustine. Some of his work is available here on the Secular Web. Here is a quote from his article “Moral Subjectivism Revisited:” “ . . . Ockham's razor compels us not to make any more unjustified assumptions than we have to in order to account for some feature of the world. Postulating the existence of objective moral laws is simply another case of multiplying entities beyond necessity. It takes quite a leap of faith (emphasis added) to compare concepts so invested with this human notion of greater meaning as ethical and aesthetic principles with concepts such as laws of physics or fundamental logical rules which are neutral or indifferent to the human desire for meaning. Ethics and aesthetics deal with specifically human (or at least sentient) concerns and do not serve any function outside of them.”

My intention was not to be offensive; I was attempting to point out what I consider to be a somewhat theistic-like manner of thinking. I was not attempting to impugn the work of anyone that holds a belief in objective moral principles. With regards to my arrogance, I have never been one who is particularly swayed by appeals to authority. I am familiar with the idea of objectivism; I reject it as flawed, highly implausible, and lacking in compelling evidence. I do not need to meet the people that hold that opinion in order to be critical of it. Perhaps that is arrogant, but I feel that an argument either makes sense or does not; I am not impressed by how many learned people might disagree with my assessment. After all, at one time many people believed in a flat earth, and an earth centered universe. As an atheist I'm used to holding a minority opinion. Several of my minority opinions I find somewhat distasteful, however I try not to let my opinion be swayed by the way I would like things to be. The belief that there likely is not any sort of afterlife, and the belief that true free will does not exist, are among my distasteful beliefs.

It is also interesting to note that, C.S Lewis, the famous Christian apologist, once used an argument that had a objective moral component to prove the existence of God, based on the belief that there would have to be a god if objective morals exist. Unfortunately, for Lewis's theory, his supposed objective moral examples were anything but.

I hope this isn’t offensive, but I see the belief in objective moral facts to be influenced by wishful thinking. It offers a convenient answer to theistic criticisms of “immoral atheists.” I believe it to be the wrong answer. The right answer, I have alluded to before, “Morality and ethics are simply a construct of man; they are a ‘science of societal interactions’ which is based on subjectively evaluated desirable outcomes.” Just because an ethical system is based on a subjective group of core values does not mean that it cannot be a useful and successful system. I would point out to theists that the fear of God does not prevent religious people from doing wrong, our prisons are filled with theists. I would add that it would be impossible to know what God really expected from us due to the flawed nature of revealed religion. Scripture has been shown to be highly contradictory, flat out false in areas; further, our current morality exceeds that of the Old or New Testament (slavery, equal rights for women and minorities, child labor, etc) in spite of the fact there has been no further instruction from God. That, in my opinion is the way to counter theistic accusations toward to moral ramifications of atheism.

Augustine makes a similar point with regards to wishful thinking: “To say that music is good is simply to express an opinion. In fact, we could even consider that the vast majority of people may agree that there are certain basic acoustic features of music which makes it distinguishable from noise. Nevertheless, music is a human invention--the distinction between an annoying sound and a pleasant one does not exist in nature but only in our minds. I think it would be relatively uncontroversial to argue that the same holds for the distinction between a moral and an immoral action were it not for people's distaste with the perceived consequences of such a view. But, as in the case that our minds cease to exist after brain death, disfavor with the perceived implications of such views does not in any way discredit their validity.”

In part because of laziness, and in part because Keith Augustine’s opinions on morality so perfectly mirror my own, I will quote him extensively to answers many of the objections raised. Why reinvent the wheel?

I hope I haven’t committed a fallacy, but the burden of proof seems to be clearly on the moral objectivist. The moral objectivist is making a claim to the existence of something, namely, objective morals. While it may be clear that morals exist, it is not at all clear that they are objective. Similarly, if I were asserting the existence of teapots in orbit around Venus, it would not be your burden to disprove the assertion; the burden would be mine to offer evidence. Furthermore, I feel that I have defended my original assertion (Godless universe, end to ultimate morals), which was a minor point in my article. I offer an additional defense of my position in this latest response. Once again, moral objectivism, like God, is impossible to disprove, I can only offer explanations as to why I feel it is highly implausible. Having explained why moral objectivism is implausible, in much the same way as are evil spirits the cause of disease, I can state with a high level of confidence, that a Godless universe puts and end to ultimate morals that preexisted man. I don’t have to disprove moral objectivism in order to make that statement with a high degree of confidence. Showing that objectivism is implausible is enough.

Mr. Augustine seems to agree; here is a quote from his “In Defense of Moral Subjectivism: An argument for the Subjectivity of Moral Values” “In this essay I have set forth to: 1) Show that the existence of objective moral values is implausible (not impossible) on a purely naturalistic account of the world; and 2) show that the claim that objective moral values do not exist does not lead to contradiction (i.e., is logically consistent). I have not tried to show is that the existence of objective moral values is impossible, for there is no logical contradiction in assuming the existence of such laws. But given that moral subjectivism is just as logically viable as moral objectivism and that moral objectivism is implausible if a scientific naturalism is true, I think that there is a good case for the nonexistence of objective moral values. In addition to this, if we are to accept Ockham's razor as a valid general principle of rigorous scientific and philosophical inquiry, then the burden of proof falls on the moral objectivist to show that the introduction of a new kind of nonphysical entity into our picture of the world--an objective moral law--is necessary to explain some tangible aspect of human morality that cannot be touched on by a subjectivist account . . .. A moral objectivist may argue that because most people have a ‘moral sense’ about what actions are right and wrong, the burden of proof actually falls on the subjectivist to show that this sense is illusory. However, the moral subjectivist can simply point out that many people claim to have a ‘moral sense’, but all these people come to opposite conclusions about whether or not, for example, abortion or the death penalty is ethically right. If this ‘moral sense’ can lead to such widely different conclusions, then it is unreliable. The moral objectivist could argue that objective moral values still exist, but that only certain people's moral sense is correct while the others are mislead. However, such an argument appeals to an arbitrary decision as to who's moral sense is correct. An objectivist could also argue that our moral sense cannot discern any objective moral laws although they still exist. But if such were the case, there would be no reason to postulate the existence of such laws, for it was the existence of a moral sense in the first place which was appealed to as evidence for the existence of objective moral laws.”

Augustine explains his use of Ockham’s razor: “Ockham's razor is usually stated as: "Do not multiply entities beyond necessity." It holds that in any explanation of some phenomenon or account of the world, we should make the fewest number of assumptions necessary to account for the observed phenomena. In the context of human morality, an account where the existence of objective moral values is not assumed is simpler than (thus preferable to) an account which introduces an unverified new entity--an objective moral law--into our picture of how the universe works.”

Once again, here is Mr. Augustine: “ . . . Theodore Schick accused me of arguing ‘that morality must be subjective on the grounds that [I] cannot see how it could be objective.’ But this is not what I argued at all. I said that I thought that the idea that ‘there can be no objective moral laws’ was plausible to atheists. I think it is perfectly possible that objective moral laws exist in some Platonic realm of ideas, but I think it is implausible that such is the case. Since moral laws refer to the actions of sentient beings, it is difficult to conceive how they could originate by unconscious natural mechanisms. That laws of nature originated after the Big Bang is plausible because natural laws govern the physical components (forces, particles, etc) that arose from it. But ethics does not come into play in the history of the universe until very recently--when Homo sapiens appeared. It is possible that moral laws have existed since the Big Bang, but that they could not manifest themselves until sentient beings arose. However, such a view implies that there is some element of purposefulness in the universe--that the universe was created with the evolution of sentient beings ‘in mind’ (in the mind of a Creator?).”

There you see another explanation as to why I see a theistic-like underpinning to moral objectivism.

Augustine continues: “To accept the existence of objective moral laws that have existed since the beginning of time is to believe that the evolution of sentient beings capable of moral reasoning (such as human beings) has somehow been predetermined or is inevitable, a belief that is contrary to naturalistic explanations of origins (such as evolution by natural selection) which maintain that sentient beings came into existence due to contingent, accidental circumstances. If objective moral laws are part of the natural universe (not part of some supernatural realm), then the universe cannot be unconscious--it must be, in some unknown sense, sentient. Few naturalists would want to accept such a nonscientific pantheistic conclusion.” Here Augustine covered some of the points I was making in my discussion of values of humans, mosquitoes, and viruses. Evolution is an unguided process, it implies no value, and replication is the only conceivable point. How does one derive a value judgment?

Augustine continues: “Another reason that moral objectivism is implausible is because all the laws of nature that we are aware of are descriptive: they describe how certain configurations of matter or energy will behave under different circumstances. But moral laws are prescriptive: they describe how certain sentient beings should behave under different circumstances. This is why a law of nature like the law of gravity cannot be violated, but a moral law like "Thou shall not kill" can be. Nothing else in the universe has this strange prescriptive quality--nothing we know in nature gives any part of the natural world a "duty" to behave in a certain way . . . . We do not accuse a lion of immorality for tearing a giraffe to shreds. Animals are not 'subject' to moral laws because they don't make moral decisions. Yet, if we all accept a purely naturalistic evolutionary account of the origin of Homo sapiens, it follows that human beings are merely another species of animal, and consequently we are not subject to moral laws. What differentiates humans from the other animals is that we are animals that make moral decisions. But decisions are mental states which exist in minds--individual human minds. Decisions will vary between people with different thoughts on a subject, hence it is reasonable to argue that moral values are subjective and vary with individual conscience.”

Augustine again: “it appears that there can be nothing objective about so-called ‘moral laws’, because it seems absurd on its face to say that maxims which tell sentient beings that certain actions of sentient beings are moral or immoral could exist in the absence of sentience.”

That statement has a striking resemblance to my statement that you object to so strongly, “a Godless universe would be the end to the concept of an ultimate morality which preexisted man.”

Richard Dawkins has been quoted as saying: “A universe with a supernatural presence would be a fundamentally and qualitatively different kind of universe from one without. The difference is, inescapably, a scientific difference. Religions make existence claims, and this means scientific claims.” Objectivism is a claim that relates to the literal existence of something. Therefore, the objectivist needs to offer some evidence that can’t be explained just as easily with the principle of subjectivism or ethical nihilism, neither of which makes claims to the literal existence of moral facts. The notion of objective moral facts leads to a number of interesting scientific questions. By what mechanism are these objective moral truths generated? By what technique are they discovered? Is there even one objective moral truth that can withstand critical reasoning and not be found to contain a subjective core value? Is there even just one? I have not seen a satisfactory explanation of any of these questions. Once again belief takes on the quality of faith. I can’t help but be reminded of the arguments for God. There are many assertions, but precious little evidence.

Mr. Lowder, I didn’t mean to imply that you were making me literally uncomfortable. I simply meant that I feel I can make the statement “metaphysical naturalism implies that no objective moral truths exist” with an acceptable level of confidence. Or, to again borrow from Augustine “metaphysical naturalism implies that objective moral truths are “implausible.” I hope the above discussion has helped to clarify my position.

I feel that the question of value is crucial, that is why I keep bringing it up. If you look at any “ought” statement, there is always a subjective value behind it (at least every time I have considered it). For example, the objectivist general principle that you offered, “It is prima facie morally wrong to end the life of a person against their will,” places objective value on human life. If, instead, human life had no value, why would it be morally wrong to end the life of a person against their will? There would be no objective value difference between live matter and dead matter. That’s why the discussion of intrinsic value is important. If all matter in the universe was valueless, or of equal value, regardless of what form it takes, as naturalism would suggest, there would be no way to make objective ethical or moral judgments. We can still make subjective judgments quite easily, but objective judgments are out.

In closing, Mr Lowder, I hope that I haven’t offended you with my comments about faith. I felt I was using the word appropriately. I hope you do not carry any hard feelings. I, for one, have sincerely enjoyed our semi-private discussion. You have caused me to reevaluate my beliefs; I consider that to be a positive thing. I hope I have done the same for you.

-John Bice

All quotes from Keith Augustine were taken from “In Defense of Moral Subjectivism: An Argument for the Subjectivity of Moral Values” and “Moral Subjectivism Revisited."

[ October 07, 2002: Message edited by: Bice ]

Keith Russell

Greetings:

I think that the idea that for something to be 'objective', it must exist independently of human beings, is incorrect.

'Objective' can only apply to evaluations human beings make about reality, but an objective view, or opinion, must be related to reality, based on reality, and derived from reality.

Something that exists (or which is believed to exist) indepdently of human consciousness or evaluation is called 'intrinsic'.

Something that exists only as part of human consciousness or evaluation is considered 'subjective'.

Thus, I believe that morality can be 'objective', and yet still not have 'preexisted' human beings.

Keith.

-DM-

John Bice adds:

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Bice
IIDB Visitor
User # 8274
posted October 08, 2002 07:08 PM


Unless there is another response to this discussion, this will be my last addition.

As I was engrossed in this discussion, I failed to go back and re-read the original quote from my article that has been in dispute.

Lowder said:

What I actually said in the article was: “While Johnson may be quite correct that a Godless universe would be the end to the concept of an ultimate morality which preexisted man; he ignores the possibility that man can, and does, make his own moral judgments and create his own ethical virtues and absolutes.”

Notice that I said “may be quite correct.” I never even implied that metaphysical naturalism absolutely rules out the possibility of objective morality. I simply implied that is it a possibility.

Mr. Lowder states:
In the course of this discussion I have asserted, “metaphysical naturalism implies a value neutral universe.” I have defended that position in my post that preceeds this one, and I will add further argumentation here. It is critical to note that, like God, moral objectivism seems impossible to disprove.

Theologians have for centuries claimed that God's existence is knowable through reason alone. Many, so called, "proofs" of God's existence have been generated. In each case these "proofs" have failed on some level. The moral objectivist also claims that objective morals can be known through reason. I believe that their arguments also fail. In the statement “I don't believe Zeus exists,” the burden of proof in not on the Zeus doubter. It is impossible to rule out with absolute certainly that Zeus exists. Therefore, the statement is most accurately read as a statement of probability. Said in a more cumbersome way, Zeus could exist, but it is highly improbable based on current evidence. The burden of proof falls on the Zeus believer to demonstrate that Zeus does exist, or that his existence is more probable than his non-existence. The theist is making a positive existence claim. Similarly, the statement " metaphysical naturalism implies a value neutral universe,” is most accurately read as a statement of probability. Based on current evidence it would be a violation of Ockham's razor to believe the existence of objective values (or morals) were more probable that their non-existence (for reasons argued in my previous posting). The statement is not intended to imply the impossibility of objective morals, simply the high degree of implausibility. As with the theist, the burden of proof falls on the objectivist, who is making a positive existence claim.

[ October 08, 2002: Message edited by: Bice ]