Normal

Can't argue with this point. It is true that the immaterial existents would have a certain je ne sais quois "unquestionable" element to them, based solely on some function of reason, but if these immaterial existents can be preceived in the same way as material existents, then there is much reason to doubt their validity.

I see the parallels, of course, but I also see a basis in the material for a stance against plaid and stripes being worn together. What is your basis for thinking that me killing someone who lied to me, because he is dishonest, is wrong? You say I'm hurting society, I say I'm helping society. We might both agree that lying is wrong, and unjustified killing is wrong, but I feel justified in my actions.

This is purely hypothetical btw

But we all agree "unjustified killing" is wrong. If you don't have a reason to kill someone, then it is not *right* to. This is not the same as if you have no reason to take a walk, it is not *right* to.

Yes, I believe there would have to be for any argument to be anything other then a waste of breath.

But the family currently (think they) value wealth and power. You would have to offer them an avenue that could still respect these values but stop them on their murderous crusade. Of course they would be acting irrationally to my subjective moral system, but within their own system it's rational. An objective value shared between us would be necessary in order for any argument to take place.

Well I think the main point is that human life is indeed valued, if only self-valued. What else can be said about the actual value? The incoherentness of the intrinsic value of human life is an interesting argument. I think it would necessarily have to be self-valuing in order to continue to exist. If a person did not value their life anymore, what is stopping them from suicide?

The son of theives can learn that stealing is wrong. There are plenty of examples in history about a person growing up in a certain culture and realizing at some point "This is wrong". If that didn't happen, how could morals develop at all?

I too believe that religion ties together universal human values (or at least tries too), but the interesting development to me is not so much religion's validation of people's own values, but the consequence of people to value other people's values as well as their own.

I think it would either have to be externally recognized, or an intrinsic value, or at least "pseudo-intrinsic" value. What else could explain the universal magnitude of those common goals?

Wow, he seems to say that morals are objective, or they cannot exist. I think he views the problem in too much of a black and white viewpoint though. If the majority of people think x is wrong, and x is being committed, then naturally the majority will fight against x happening.

You both claim x, "ours is the best way to live". I assume female circumcision carries with it some kind of advantage (I can't conceive of what that is), but let's call it y.

Their case: Y -> X

Your case: ~Y -> X

What is the rational basis for your case? I assume you would argue something along the lines of intense suffering, z, that doesn't outweigh the benefits of Y, so your argument would be:

Y -> Z
Z -> ~X
Therefore, Y -> ~X

There has to be something there that clearly defines Z as more "wrong" then Y is "right" for your argument to work.

I fully recognize the difficulty in dealing with these systems, the hard part comes from deciding who is really the one being irrational, why, and what basis do you have for pulling them back into rational thought.

Alonzo Fyfe

How in the heck did you get this out of the post that was referenced?

The post states the following:

'Morality is subjective' is taken to mean that "X is believed wrong is a sufficient condition for X to be wrong.'

However, people who hold the claim 'X is wrong' also tend to hold the proposition that 'If the only thing that can be said against X is that it is wrong, then it is not wrong.' In other words, 'X is believed wrong is NOT a sufficient condition for X to be wrong'.

Which yields a contradiction for the subjectivist, where 'X is believed wrong' is taken to be sufficient, and at the same time not sufficient, for X to be wrong.

Now, many people make the HUGE mistake of a false dichotomy -- they tend to think that one must EITHER believe in 'intrinsic moral properties' or some form of 'agent-subjectivism'. So, when they hear me argue against subjectivism, they assume, "Alonzo must hold some type of nutty theory that intrinsic moral properties exist.'

But, let me state it clearly . . .

Intrinsic moral properties does not exist.

Yet, one does not need to believe in intrinsic moral properties to hold that agent-subjectivism has got some really serious problems with it. In fact, agent-subjectivism is so deeply flawed I can't imagine any reason why an intelligent person would suggest it, except he feels trapped by the mistaken belief it is the only alternative to the even more seriously flawed theory of intrinsic moral properties.

Normal

I'd re-word that as "X is believed to be harmful is a sufficient condition for the desire for X not to be preformed"

What's your problem with agent-subjectivism again?

Alonzo Fyfe

In a sense, I agree with this statement, but it has little to do with subjectivism.

Harm is DEFINED as the thwarting of a strong and stable desire. (See Joel Feinberg, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, Oxford University Press, 1984).


So, yes, if X is harmful, then of course X will thwart a desire. It's true by definition.

Though, here, we must be careful on three accounts.


(1) "Harmful" is a value-laden term.

A part of the very meaning of 'harmful' is that it is bad. If value is subjective, then 'harmful' is subjective; and if 'harmful' is objective, then there must be at least one area in which value is objective.

The problem is that the value-laden content of the word 'harmful' means that any attempt to analyze value in terms of this concept risks begging some very important questions.


(2) A distinction between what thwarts a desire, and what is believed to thwart a desire -- between what is harmful and what is, perhaps falsely believed to be harmful.

The first is the need to distinguish the belief that something will thwart a desire and the fact that something will thwart a desire.

A person, lost in the desert for years, comes across an airplane wreck. Inside, he sees a container with a clear liquid that looks like water, with a label that identifies it as poison.

Because of the label, the individual has the belief that the contents of the bottle will thwart a desire -- he believes he has a reason not to drink the liquid. But this belief may be false. The objective fact of the matter (let's assume) is that the pilot grabbed a clean bottle that simply had a label for "poison" on it, and filled it with water.

So, the person thinks he has a desire not to drink from the bottle. But this is false.

In short, there is an objective fact of the matter, as to whether the contents of the bottle will fulfill or thwart the agent's desires -- a fact of the matter that is independent of the agent's beliefs about the contents of the bottle.

In other words, one must distinguish between that which will actually thwart a desire, and which is merely believed to such as to thwart a desire.

So, in your proposal above, we must be careful to ask -- are you talking about an actual desire that X not be performed, or merely the (possibly mistaken) belief that the action will thwart a desire?


(3) Desiring something "in itself" or "for its own sake" -- and desiring something "as a means" to something else.

Our aversion to pain, and our desire for sex, are both things desired "for their own sake". These desire-statements directly describe a fact about the agent's brain -- that "being in pain" is something to be avoided, and "having sex" is something to be pursued -- for no further reason.

My desire for . . . a knife, for example . . . is not because I have some strange desire to have a knife. Rather, the knife is a tool. It is useful for putting button on a bagel. And I desire the butter on the bagel because it tastes better that way. And I desire to eat -- for its own sake.

The reason this distinction is important is that "a desire for X for its own sake" describes a brain state. It is a statement about the structure of the brain. More importantly, it is as objective and scientific as any claim about the structure of the brain stem or the functionality of the hypothalimus.

A desire for something "as a means" is not directly about a brain state. A person with a desire for a knife does not have a brain state that says "knife, good". Rather, the term refers to a much more complex relationship between a number of beliefs, desires, and facts about the knife. Though, ultimately, brain states are relevant, and these types of statements are also objective -- factual -- capable of scientific testing.


Because of these important ambiguities, it is difficult to determine exactly what your statement means -- which makes it difficult to determine if it is true or false.

There is one sense in which I would agree with what it says. But there are other interpretations where I would disagree, others in which the statement is tautological (and, therefore, lacking substance), and others that are internally inconsistent.

Normal

Agreed; harmful is purely subjective; that is, something is only harmful if it is preceived to be harmful, but this is built into the statement itself:

"X is believed to be harmful is a sufficient condition for the desire for X not to be preformed"

The person would not want to drink from the bottle because he values his life, but the person does want to drink from the bottle to quinch his thrist. Just because he doesn't know the truth of the contents does not change his value system. When we are talking about desires, it is important to know that these are subjective as well. A desire is only fulfilled if the person realizes a desire is fulfilled; otherwise, what is stopping that person from continuing to desire?

Again, a desire is only fulfilled if the person has knowledge of it's fulfilment. Based on their subjective value system, they recongize a desire being fulfilled if X is not preformed. If they don't recognize a desire being fulfilled if X is preformed, then a desire is not being fulfilled.

"X is believed to be harmful is a sufficient condition for the desire for X not to be preformed"

The person believes X is harmful, therefore they recognize a desire being fulfilled when X is not preformed. The objective fact about whether that desire can be better fulfilled by X being committed can only be recognized subjectively, and that would only occur when that desire is indeed fulfilled.

Alonzo Fyfe

I am afraid that we do not have an agreement here.

Harm is the thwarting of a strong and stable desire. But it does not depend on perception. A person who is murdered does not perceive himself as being harmed. He used to, but not any more. He's not perceiving much of anything. Yet, he has been harmed.

For another example, assume that somebody discovers that you will visit me, and gives you a valuable item to pass on to me as a gift. I know nothing about the gift. (Let us assume, I never will.) You sell it. I have been harmed -- again, being harmed is independent of perception.

Or, yet a third example, a woman has a prized ring. Her son takes it and replaces it with a replica, except with a fake stone, and sells the real one for drug money. His mother, we shall assume, never finds out. Yet, she has still been harmed. It is not the telling her that harms her, it is the taking of the ring and replacing it with a substitute that harms her.

I am not denying that harm depends on thwarting desires, but only that 'perception' or 'awareness' is a part of the equation.


You are correct, factual ignorance does not change a person's desires. But it does change his behavior. There is a difference between saying that an agent "does not want what is in the bottle" and the agent "wants it, but doesn't know it." You can't take a person's claims at face value -- just because he says he does not want what is in the bottle, doesn't mean it is true.

[True? We are talking about truth? It almost sounds as if we are talking about something that is . . . GASP! . . . OBJECTIVE!]

Yes, relationships between states of affairs and desires are OBJECTIVE in a very meaningful and important way. They can even be measured and studied scientifically.

Which is why this whole 'subjective' vs. 'objective' debate is nonsense. We are not talking about something that is 'either/or' but something that is 'both'.


Technically . . . no.

There is a recognized distinction between a desire being fulfilled and a desire being satisfied -- or, on the negative side of the equation, between a desire being thwarted and a desire being frustrated.

Fulfilling and thwarting do not require any type of awareness or realization. You give a guy a button and tell him, "if you press this, it will probably turn off the machine that will otherwise crush your child, but it will certainly kill you." He presses the button.

There is no 'realization' - the person pressing the button ends up dead and does not discover the outcome of his actions. His desire to save his child is fulfilled if the machine that will crush his child stops, thwarted if it does not stop. But he feels no satisfaction over the machine stopping, or frustration if the machine does not stop.

Joel Feinberg's definition of harm referenced above says that a person is harmed if a strong and stable desire is thwarted. Realization is not relevant to harm. This is why murder, the diverted gift, the substituted ring, all count as harms even though the person is not aware of having been harmed. Because their desires have been thwarted -- they just don't know it.

Peoples' actions always aim for the fulfillment of their desires -- or to avoid the thwarting of those desires. Of course, among those desires, are a desire for satisfaction, and an aversion to frustration. But the fact that satisfaction and an aversion to frustration are desired, does not imply that they are the ONLY things that are desired.


Now, let's apply this to the concept of somebody else being harmed. Whether you are harmed is absolutely and completely independent of anything that I may believe or desire. Relative to me, whether you are harmed or not is as fully 'objective' as the distance between the earth and the sun, and the chemical composition of an orange, or the age of the earth.

Which AGAIN identifies how this whole 'objective/subjective' dichotomy is fake -- how things can be both objective and subjective, and how people who say that it must be one or the other are . . . in a word . . . wrong.


Ultimately, when a person makes a moral claim, it is very much like the claim that I would make about whether you have or have not been harmed. Whether you have been harmed or not doesn't depend on what I believe or desire, or on any psychological state I may have (pretty much). Your harm, when I discuss it, is fully objective relative to my beliefs and desires.

Morality depends on psychological states, but NOT the psychological states of the person making the moral claim.

Normal

As soon as a person is killed the issue of desire WRT that person is meaningless. Up until he died you could say he desired not to be killed. After he is killed you can reasonably say nothing about whether he was harmed, you can only impose your own desire system onto the objective state of affairs, and that would be a subjective view itself.

"X is believed to be harmful is a sufficient condition for the desire for X not to be preformed"

Substitute "Stealing" in for X, and you have the desire for X not to happen. If you have no knowledge of X happening, it does not impede your desire. These "unknown wrongs" will only affect you once their knowledge becomes known to you. The reason I think "objectively wronged" is incoherent, is because only a person subjectivelu can make that judgement. I could say "stealing is wrong", therefore I desire it not to happen, and you notice an objective state of affairs where something was stolen from me, you assume, subjectively, that I have been wronged, but that is only a judgement I can make once the objective state of affairs is fully known to me.

Again, X is stealing, but the desire is only affected with knowledge of X happening. Having your desire objectively affected is incoherent, because your desire is completely subjective. Only an individual can know their own desire.

Why not? He doesn't want what's in the bottle because he doesn't want to be poisoned. To want something and not know it, to me, is incoherent, unless it is subconscious. Want is utterly subjective, and barring subcouscious wants, only a person can know if he wants something or not. That he doesn't know the poison is really water is not subconscious, it is an objective fact unknown to the person.

The objective facts that are completely unknown to a person have no bearing on their subjective value system, only on the quality of choice they make. The best choice consistant with a person's desire will still be made given the known facts.

His desire to save his child dies with him, as it is subjective. There is no objective desire, only an objective state of affairs that the man desires to occur.

I can see how mixing objective states of affairs with subjective desires seems contradictory, but I still contest that desire exists solely in the individual. An objective state of affairs such as the ring being stolen, or the diverted gift, will frustrate no ones desires until the state of affairs is known to those individuals.

Not so. You will perceive me being harmed in ways that I might not think harmful. If I care nothing for stealing, and I don't have a desire for things not to be stolen, and you do, you would perceive a ring being stolen from me as harmful, and I would not. The subjective stance on what is harmful to you does not necessarily apply to me, and vice versa. You can only guess that I have been harmed, or say that I have been harmed in your system, but subjectively I might not be harmed at all.

But how can you know what is harmful to me at all? Objectivity relative to your beliefs and desires is not objective at all, you are merely detached, and superimposing your "desires" on my state.

Then WHICH phychological states does it depend on? That seems completely non-sensical to me.