Philo

Based on my own readings and thoughts I cannot see how any argument from analogy (Design, Evil, Burden of Proof, First Cause, etc.) can be extended from this universe to God. All arguments from analogy rely on the similarity and general uniformity of the universe. If two things are similar in one aspect then by analogy they are similar in other aspects. The reason this is valid is because the universe over all is remarkibly uniform throughout. For example. If deep canyons on Earth are caused by water flows it can be inferred by analogy that deep canyons on Mars were also caused by water flows.

This may be a valid proccedure from planet to planet, or from galaxy to galaxy, but we have to draw the line once we wish to discuss things beyond the universe. The problem is that things outside this universe are not uniform with respect to things that are inside. At least we have no reason to believe them to be. In fact the supernatural operates by definition in ways that go against the normal operation of this universe.

I don't think I'll find much argument on whether or not arguments from analogy can be extended to God. I think the most dispute will arise with what actually constitutes such an argument. Should Burden of Proof, Occam's Razor, and causality be included?
thoughts?

Normal

The problem is that the most anyone can do is just guess, and relate the laws of the universe to some model of creation for the universe. If the laws we understand don't apply, then it is useless even to guess.

Philo

>> If the laws we understand don't apply, then it is useless even to guess.<<

Yes, that is exactly what I believe.

Spenser

I think Atheism is 'not guessing' so I think Occam's Razor is justified. Because we can't know it is best just to assume the simplest explanation. After nothing needs no proof...

I ate Pascal's Wafer

Well, it seems to me like the argument from evil depends on God having a particular nature. In effect, as a premise it defines God's nature as many people seem to believe and then show how God, as defined, cannot exist. We cannot know for sure what some deity's nature is, but we can be reasonably sure what it isn't.

The burden of proof isn't really an argument extended from this universe to God, but rather just a principle that we apply to theists asserting that God exists. It only deals with God as a secondary issue, with the primary issue being that we are trying to make the theist support his claims. God's existence is irrelevant to whether or not the theist can support his assertions, so I don't see where this would apply.

I think I see what you're saying about the other issues. However, I would be tempted to say that none of our arguments would apply to some supernatural god. We cannot know for sure that any entities which exist outside of the known universe have to obey the same laws we do--including logic. Thus, it would seem to me like in order to discuss the nature of the supernatural, one must first accept the premise that our own rules of logic apply to the supernatural. If our rules of logic don't apply to the supernatural, then how can any of our arguments (including arguments from analogy) apply?

Then again, if supernatural entities don't affect the natural world and don't go by our known laws, then why try to determine their nature in the off chance that they exist? But, that's a different discussion.

I think our understanding of causality should not be applied to supernatural entities. Cause-->effect situations are properties which we are constantly exposed to in our own natural universe, but which may not apply outside the natural universe. Thus, it would seem like it's fallacious to assume that supernatural entities (or realms) are subject to cause and effect.

However, I don't think the Burden of Proof or Occam's razor should be included. After all, neither of those arguments is really concerned with the nature of God. For example, Occam's razor can only show that God is not necessary to explain our own universe. It cannot show that God does not exist in some supernatural realm--just that God does not interact with our own universe.

-Nick

Philo

The most obvious objection to that statement is one that you made yourself. We cannot even be sure that logic applies to God.
Outside of that I would have originally thought you were wrong, but I think you've changed my mind. I would have said, beyond this universe we do not know how all-good entities behave or just what all-powerful means. However, I am beginning to think that all I was making was a symantical argument. And that if we stay true to our definitions we can conclude that there is not at this moment a loving father looking down on us and making sure everything turns out all right. Yes, I think that settles it. The argument for evil can still apply, but only to a God who is clearly defined as all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing and only if we accept that logic holds up.

I don't quite understand what you mean.

I've always looked at Burden of Proof and Occam's Razor as statements of probability. Burden of Proof tells us that something that cannot be proven is unlikely to exist. Occam's Razor tells us that the simplist answer is more likely. These are tools used to determine probability within our own universe. The probabilities of certain events beyond this universe are completely alien to us. I do not believe that the methods we use for here and now can be applied to them. But perhaps my understanding of Occam's Razor is flawed.

I ate Pascal's Wafer

I think you touched what I was getting at here:

The argument for evil holds, but it requires that we accept a few premises first: namely, that God is all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing and that our laws of logic are universal (i.e., apply outside of the universe as well). In this case we know logic applies to God because one of the definitions used is that logic is universal. We have no way to validate the premise, but if we accept the premise then everything else falls into place. Thus, in this instance, if the rules of logic are still applicable, then God as defined cannot exist.

As you mentioned, though, we have no way to know what the nature of an omnimax deity would be as we cannot validate the premise that our laws of logic apply outside the natural universe. We can accept the premise that they do apply and go from there, but there is no way to substantiate the argument if there is no way to validate the premise.

To the best of my understanding, the burden of proof 'argument' is not used to show that God is not likely to exist. Rather, it's a way to pin down theists and make them support their claims. All too often theists will assert that God exists, and that nobody can prove them wrong. "You can't prove that God doesn't exist, so have as much (if not more) faith than me" is a common theistic argument. Of course it's not my job to prove that God doesn't exist because I'm not making the positive claim that there is no god. The theist is making the positive claim, so the theist has to support the claim.

Anyway, the point is that theists like to shift the burden of proof to atheists. The burden of proof isn't meant to cast doubt on a theistic claim, but rather force the theist into supporting those claims.

Not necessarily. Let's say I tell you that I have a white Persian cat. Would it be up to you to prove that I don't have the cat? No. You aren't making the positive claim that I don't have the cat. You just don't believe I have the cat because I'm in college and taking care of a cat can be expensive, but you aren't making any positive claims either way. Since I made the initial positive claim (that I have a cat), it is up to me to support the claim. I can post pictures of the cat, or scan the registration papers, or any number of things to validate the claim. The point is that it is up to me to support the claim, and you are justified in disbelieving me until such time as I support the claim.

In other words, the burden of proof applies to much more than just supernatural arguments. The burden of proof applies to anybody making positive claims. By enforcing the burden of proof, the intent is not to show that the probability is good that God doesn't exist, but rather to make the theist support his claims. That this happens to show that the probability is not good of God existing is just a good side effect.

Hmm. I think I see what you're trying to say. Namely, that Occam's razor suggests that the simplest answer is more likely, but that we cannot know what the simplest answer is because we cannot know the nature of what exists outside our universe. I'm not so sure I agree with that yet, so I'll have to get back to you.

-Nick

Philo

I realize this, but what I would like to know is why it is valid. For what reason must the person asserting the claim be the one to provide evidence? Most people answer this question (when theists ask it) by analogy, and that is the same thing I have done. What I noticed is that depending on the analogy, proof is not always required and not always required in the same amounts.

1. You tell me you have a white persian cat. I know that many such cats do exist (actually I know nothing about cats, do they?) and have no good reason to disbelieve in the existance of your cat. The reason I would not be right in disbelieving in your cat is because the probability of your cat's existance is quite high.

2. You tell me that aliens exist. This statement I would not actively disbelieve because I know that their are many different worlds out there and it is very possible that aliens do exist.

3. You tell me you have been visited by aliens. I know that humanity so far (with the possible exception of your case) has made no contact with aliens so far. An alien visitation is a very strange occurance, one does not see it every day. We have no evidence that such visitations have occurred in the past. I find it highly unlikely that you were really visited by aliens and thus do not believe you unless you furnish proof.

This is why I believe BoP to really be a statement of probability. Probabilities are assessed to determine how much proof is neccessary of the person asserting a claim. If this is true then it seems clear to me that using something that determines probabilities in this universe could not be validily extended to God.

Anyway, I won't be able to post again until Monday. I'm headed to Florida for the weekend.

I ate Pascal's Wafer

Philo, Damn you. This is supposed to be axiomatic.

To be honest, this is not something that I have ever tried to justify. Anyway, here's my attempt.

It seems to me like the person asserting the claim should be the one to provide the evidence because the other way would result in confusion and an intellectual stalemate. If the person who hears the claim is required to disprove the claim, else the said claim would be considered true, then we would have a situation set up such that rather than making progress by supporting the claims we make, we are stuck trying to disprove the claims which are made.

In other words, what we consider knowledge would not be those claims which have evidence supporting them, but rather those claims which have not been disproven. The more attempts it takes to refute an argument, the more likely it would be that it is true--even if there is not the first shred of evidence supporting it.

The problem as I see it is that if this were the case, then we would have a situation where several mutually exclusive beliefs are all justified because nobody can falsify said beliefs. In order to avoid the situation where mutually exclusive beliefs can be equally justified, the person making the claims should be required to support those claims. Thus, a claim is not accepted as true (or likely to be true) until it can be supported. This approach to knowledge would prevent two or more mutually exclusive beliefs from sharing the same claims to truth.

Of course. This is a rewording of the mantra that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.

The difference as I see it is only a manner of degrees, though. As claims become more and more fantastic, more and more evidence is required. You would be likely to believe I have a cat, but I may have to scan the registration to demonstrate that I own a Ferrari or the like. The reason for this is that people are just likely to believe you if the claims you make are believable.

In the end, though, it is still up to me to support those claims. If I wanted to convince you that I own a cat, and you decided that I was lying, then it is not up to you to prove that I am lying. Even though it's a simple claim, I have to somehow demonstrate that I own the cat by posting pictures or scanning registration forms. You aren't very likely to put me through this trouble because the claim is not fantastic enough, but if you decided to do so and if I wanted to convince you badly enough, then I would have to jump through a few hoops in order to present some sufficient evidence.

Ok, I think I see what you are saying now. We tend to really press the BoP issue when the person is making a fantastic claim for the sole reason that we don't think it's very probable that their claim is true.

I just haven't seen the BoP as a tool used to show that the existence of God is not very probable. In forcing the theist to support their claims, we are implicitly admitting that we do not think it is very probable that God exists. However, it seems like we have our own reasons for believing that God's existence is improbable, and we let those other reasons determine how much evidence is required for us to accept the claim that God exists. In other words, the BoP is not used to show that God's existence is improbable, but rather that we believe God's existence is improbable so we demand the theist to support his claims before we will accept them.

----------------------------

As far as Occam's razor goes, I'm inclined to think that it's still applicable. As I see it, Occam's razor isn't limited to just the simplest answer, but also the answer which requires less "leaps of faith". Perhaps I am mistaken here, but that's how I have always understood it. So, even assuming that God is a simpler explanation than a naturalistic beginning, it requires a leap of faith by accepting one more entity. Thus, it's not so much that Occam's razor attempts to determine the probability of a claim being true by determining what the simplest answer is, but rather it tries to determine the probability of a claim being true by determining which claim requires the least number of hypothesized entities.

I hope you have (had) a good time in Florida. You should come down more often. The weather has been comparitively nice this weekend.

Hey, what part of GA are you from? I'm from Tallahassee, so we might be able to meet up sometime if you like.

-Nick

Wiploc

Maybe double standards work outside the universe, but they don't work here. If you get to make statements about the outside of the universe (like, "that's where god is") then I get to make them too (like, "that's where arguments from analogy work best!")

Many arguments from analogy are rebuttals. As rebuttals they work just fine.

Example:
- Theist: God is like a loving Father.
-
- Atheist: Loving fathers don't drown all their
- children when they get in a snit.

Since double standards don't work here, if you get to invoke your Rule of Ignorance, then so do I.

Example continued:
- Theist: Hey, you don't know what loving
- fathers do outside the universe.
-
- Atheist: Then you don't know whether
- god is like a loving father outside the
- universe.

The argument from analogy wins!

Final score:
Argument from analogy - 1
Double standard - 0

crc