Primal

Taffy again:

Bakground knowledge.

Because we define what is illusory/a hallucination by it being irregular and being a claim of a certain nature i.e. radically different from what we know to be true. Or conistentently disoconfirmed by latter evidence.

Hence then it is somewhat nonsensical to say that regularly occuring sensations are hallucination i.e. quirks.

Someone on acid cannot for example seriously claim that there is a pink dragon and say his claim is on par with the evidence for evolutionary theory.

Perhaps all we view may be false and latter found to be hallucinations, but given what standards we consider self-evident and probability derrived from this; it is unlikely.

The question is thus, applying these same standards meant to filter out hallucinations in general from background knowledge, doesn't the theist poistion fit in more with the "hallucinations" category then it does with "genuine" sensation?

Note that theists often admit hallucinations can be filtered from genuine experience, so we are using the same standards here.

[ November 19, 2002: Message edited by: Primal ]</p>

Taffy Lewis

Primal,

An 'extraordinary' claim refers to something that isn't ordinarily the case or something which is out of the ordinary. That means it's not the sort of thing that ordinarily happens (ie. it is unlikely). Thus referring to theistic belief as an 'extraordinary claim' begs the question. For the theist, it's not an extraordinary claim at all. It can only be extraordinary if you already believe it is unlikely.

Theistic religious experiences are not cases of sensory experiences at all. Sensory experience puts us in touch with our immediate physical environment and theistic religious experience puts us in touch with God. They are two separate and distinct modes of experience with two distinct objects.

In response to my question about how we know that our sensory experiences are not hallucinations, you respond:

But this justification is circular. You can't use sensory experiences as background knowledge to argue that sensory experience is largely veridical. That would be similar to believing what Smith tells you because Smith told you he's trustworthy. Circular reasoning is fallacious.

The truth is that we cannot give a noncircular, independent justification for the belief that our sensory experiences are generally reliable. But so what? I find myself compelled to accept them and I am not aware of any reason to doubt them. That's good enough for me.

Since it is no good criticism of sensory experience that it cannot be justified in a noncircular way, we should not require more of theistic religious experiences.

Badfish

Ahhh yes, what are there names?

Isis? and whats the other? Or is there many? Or am I thinking of the wrong thing here?

spishack

I am new to this scene and maybe I am just not thinking deep enough or something, but I don't understand what this debate is about. If something is experienced internally (ie. feeling of God or last nights pizza) than how can anyone objectively affirm or deny that experience. They can't. The only way one can know whether or not that experience was true is the person who had the experience.

Philosoft

The general idea is, if the something experienced internally is defined in a logically contradictory manner, then it doesn't exist by definition, and the something experienced is not what the experiencer claims it is.

Jobar

Hello spishack (spy-shack? spish-ack?) and welcome to II from a fellow Georgian.

Internal experiences are true or false to the experiencer only, only as long as they are not made external- that is, spoken about. If I tell you that I go out flying around like Superman every night, you are justified in watching the sky over my house for several nights, and when you see nothing, tell me that I'm just dreaming. If someone tells me there is a white-bearded gent in the sky who spies on everyone's sex life, and wants us all to know him and love him, and will send us all to everlasting flames if we don't- oh yeah, and he created us all, each and every one- then I am justified in saying they must be a loony.

Francis Mortyn

To say "There is a God" and "There is not a God" are both equally meaningless statements because the term "God" is undefined and undefineable. One might as well be a wumphist, enjoying a personal relationship with a wumph, or an awumphist, denying the existence of God. Both positions are nonsensical until "wumph" is defined. Saying "There is a wumph" or "There is no wumph" are both just blowing hot air.
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quip

[SARCASM]
Hey, I know how to 'prove' that god does exist! All you need to do is open your mind and logically deduce his does not exist.......When nothing happens resort to Christianity.[/SARCASM]

faustuz

The point of the original post was that Christian apologists have a tendency to universalize their purported experiences. It common for apologists, once they run out of arguments that have not been refuted, to use this device as a final, supposedly irrefutable claim. I simply find it amusing.

spishack

Happy Thanksgiving to all. And also thanks to everyone for the input on the debate. I think I am up to speed. (however you never can tell )
In regards to the following statement.

The point of the original post was that Christian apologists have a tendency to universalize their purported experiences. It common for apologists, once they run out of arguments that have not been refuted, to use this device as a final, supposedly irrefutable claim. I simply find it amusing.

That's a very general statement. I know a few apologist who don't use this technique. What are some examples of the arguments that have been used?