John Page

I think this guy should get a medal.

I think the "round square" objection of Russell's disappears like the three legged dog while all dogs have four legs. In realty , contradictory objects do exist (e.g. optical illusion) due to our mind's inability to "square the circle".

What do you think?

Pyrrho

Contradictory objects do not exist; optical illusions give the illusion of something other than what they are (hence the name "optical illusion"). Meinung needed to get out and look at trees and smell some flowers more than he did. He seems to have spent too much of his time in an ivory tower developing nonsensical metaphysical twaddle. This is a perfect example of one of the reasons that philosophers are commonly ridiculed.

Witt

John:
I think the "round square" objection of Russell's disappears like the three legged dog while all dogs have four legs. In realty , contradictory objects do exist (e.g. optical illusion) due to our mind's inability to "square the circle".


Contradictory objects cannot exist.

The round square exists, implies, it is round and it is square.
If it is square then it is not round.

Therefore,

The round square exists, implies, it is round and it is not round.
It is round and it is not round, is a contradiction.
Therefore,
It is not the case that, The round square exists.

That is (The round square is round & The round square is not round) cannot be asserted.

Surely, there are no truthful contradictions.

All purported objects from contradictory predications cannot exist.

That which is and is not cannot be, in any reality!

QED.

Witt

John Page

I'd like to propose a modification to the explanation here:

Two appearances, one having properties that are mutually exclusive (e.g. no corners, four corners) to the other cannot represent the same object because the properties are contradictory.

Exceptions include appearances that are distorted (through the imposition of an unexpected medium), illusory (where perception shows, for example, that parallel lines appear to converge) or appearances that are in transition (such as an umberella having furled and unfurled appearances, a piece of clay being molded from a circular shape to a square shape, a four legged animal only having three legs because of an accident).

Can we conclude that the appearance of (apparently) contradictory objects is the result of our perception reporting contradictory properties that can be explained under the exceptions rule?

Cheers, john

NearNihil Experience

Interesting subject, and philosopher. Never really thought I'd hear anyone mention that name.

I see what Meinong was getting at. And here are my thoughts on the subject...

There is quite a distinction between things that exist and things that do not exist. From that, there is quite a distinction between things that exist independent of thought(objects) and things that are thought(perceptions, the color green, numbers, etc).

From that, things that exist are things that manifest as object or thought. They exist as an object or an idea of an object, a perception (internal or external).

Thus, IPU's and the color green exist(only as a perception)...and things like myself and my keyboard exist as a combonation of object and perception.

This is not primacy of mind, Forms and the like. This is primacy of matter. Existence preceding essence.

And to bash logic...
As far a contradiction goes, if only things that are logically possible/ probable exist, then, the frame work above provides for contradictory things to exist, only in mind as perception. And if something contradictory appears as an object, then obviously our perceptions have failed us. That would mean the universe had a few more tricks up the sleeve anyway.
Logic fails at the mental level. Contradiction is most likely inherent as a chaotic characteristic in human perception due to massive information input. Unconsciously ordering perceptions can not be a flawless process. Perceptions get jumbled. Soon that overwhelming feeling of disaster, impending doom, and paranoia become an invisible man in the sky with a beard. Go ahead, someone try to explain in logical notation green or one or God. I'll be impressed.


Now to explain the re-inventing the wheel header...

a quote from the 1st century

"Appearences to the mind are of four kinds. Things either are what they appear to be; or they neither are nor appear to be; or they are and do not appear to be; or they are not and yet appear to be."
-Epictetus,
Discourses

Rock.

SlateGreySky

Could you offer a proof for this statement? Where is the line drawn between "object" and "perception?" I mean, could you demonstrate that this distinction (object versus perception) is metaphysically valid? I believe it is not.

Could you please explain this further? I'm not sure I understand how your framework "provides" for contradiction in any more robust of a manner than anyone else's metaphysical framework.

So logical contradiction (and theism) are just results of a psychological phenomenon? Got a proof for that? Most logicians consider contradiction to be a function of language, which makes more sense, given that logic is primarily linguistic rather than psychological in its origin and aims.

Green: Gx
One: ([null]) - that is, the set of all null sets (cf. Frege)
God: Gx (or, if Gx is already "green," how about Tx - Theos, right?)

Impressed yet? Probably not, and I don't blame you: representing green, one, and God logically is no more difficult than representing them in ordinary language. That's because logic is a function of language rather than some unique process of psychology.

Roll.

xoc

It raises the question again of whether existence could be considered an attribute. The round square must contain the attributes "round" and "square" because it has been defined to do so, and to deny that would be to contradict it's explicitly pronounced state. It could be said the "round square" is inconceivable, but this is again a contradiction because it's already been conceived of(just not possible to imagine/picture, but this is not sufficient cause to dismiss something).
So comes the dilemna of where such an "object" should be placed- obviously not in the real phenomenal world, not in a logically ideal world, but in a other "ideal" world. I think existence as an attribute makes sense when taken as "whether it is instantiated in the real world:T/F?" because objects are mere conceptions in that we tend to define objects as being 1 or more by a relative form of physical bonding. Is a set cross-bow one object or a series of objects? Any object must be seen as a series of "objects"(molecules, etc.) so it's objective state is always imprecise and variable in the world(relative). To idealise real, possible objects(loaded crossbow) and to idealise unreal, impossible objects(square circle) leaves us both with only Idealised Objects, having in that sense a shared and equal ontological status.

John Page

Logic is not a function of language! Logic is the function of the mechanism that implements the system of logic concerned. The results may or may not be expressed as language.

Formal logic is an abstract system formulated to give reliable, objectively agreeable, results. We can take the rules of a formal logic and implement them mentally.

This does not mean that human thought operates on logic. I'm siding with Contra who posted:Cheers, John

SlateGreySky

I'm not sure I understand what you mean here. Could you describe the "mechanism that implements the system?" It seems to me that language is just that mechanism . . . what else would it be?

I'm assuming that you're talking about the results of logic. If so, it seems to me that they're always (and necessarily) expressed linguistically: how else would they be expressed?

How do we go about implimenting rules mentally? Could you please describe the process? Could the process be described such that language is not included as an element of that process?

John Page

The Brain/Nervous System is, in the case of natural human logic, the mechanism that implements the system. In the case of Boolean logic, the computer's workings implement that system of logic.
Physical states.
I don't know how the mind/brain works in humans but it appears there is plenty that is not language dependent. The rules of human natural (inbuilt?) logic processes are implemnted mentally. The process is a physical one.

To the extent that computers don't "know" or "understand" language they can still manipulate information (which one might use to define a mental act) and implement systems of logic.

So, while language is implicitly required to describe logic it in no way implements it. Furthermore, I propose that a substrate of "logic" capability (capacity for mental action?) is a precondition for the implementation of language!

Cheers, John