Freethought & Rationalism Archive

excreationist · 01-29-2002, 08:52 PM

I have been beginning to read a 1975 textbook called "Experimental Psychology and Information Processing" by Dominic C. Massaro.

It talks about the "mind-body" problem. It says that four solutions are Decartes-type Interactionalism, Epiphenomenalism (just an observer, not interaction), Materialism and Idealism.

In the book they seem to see materialism as a synonym for behaviouralism:

Quote:

Materialism simply denies the existence of the mind. If the mind does not exist, then to understand man we need understand his behavior. A material rejects James' definition of psychology as the study of mental life. For the materialist, there is no mental life and no need to study it. The proper subject of psychology is, rather, observable behavior; materialism is the metaphysical foundation of of behaviorism.

I guess "functionalism" hadn't been invented yet, even though the text book was full of flow-charts about how the mental processes of the brain could work. It explains something that appears to be a synonym though, called "Monism":

Quote:

The term monism is used to describe this solution because the mind and body are not considered to be separate entities whose interaction must be explained. Rather, it is assumed that human beings are highly complex organisms with a number of complex visible attributes such as a complex brain and nervous system. One of the properties of this complex being is that it leads a mental life. To understand man, we must understand these mental processes.
One critical attribute or dimension of the physical entity, man, is consciousness. Throughout history, consciousness has been attributed to a nonphysical entity, the mind or soul. However, it is more logical to conceptualize consciousness as a dimension of human beings in the same way that the thumb and forefinger arrangement represents one of their characteristics. Mental life is the distinguishing feature that qualifies man as the unique subject of psychological study. When we say that the contribution of the mind is critical to understanding man, we are not positing another entity; rather we are referring to a dimension or attribute of man itself. In studying the processes that William James laid down in 1890, we shall be studying neither mind nor body, but the internal mental operations of the whole person.

I think this earlier definition of materialism has caused a lot of confusion. It has caused the idea to circulate that materialists reject the existence of mental phenomenon.

I think the other term, Monism, is even more confusing though.

<a href="http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=Monism" target="_blank">dictionary.com</a> defines Monism as:

Quote:

1. The view in metaphysics that reality is a unified whole and that all existing things can be ascribed to or described by a single concept or system.
2. The doctrine that mind and matter are formed from, or reducible to, the same ultimate substance or principle of being.

jpbrooks · 01-29-2002, 10:19 PM

Personally (from the definitions provided), I don't see why a behaviorist would necessarily have to be a materialist. Why couldn't a behaviorist be an Epiphenomenalist, since (if Epiphenomenalism were true) mental states could have no causal influence on brain activity and thus on behavior anyway?

I agree that since materialism doesn't necessarily deny the existence of mental phenomena, a materialist need not be a behaviorist.

Similarly, I see no reason why a "functionalist" would necessarily have to be a monist.

But each of these approaches seems to focus on an important aspect of our psychology. So perhaps a more comprehensive account is possible.

[ January 29, 2002: Message edited by: jpbrooks ]</p>

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01-29-2002, 10:19 PM	#2
jpbrooks Senior Member Join Date: Aug 2000 Location: Chicago Posts: 774	Personally (from the definitions provided), I don't see why a behaviorist would necessarily have to be a materialist. Why couldn't a behaviorist be an Epiphenomenalist, since (if Epiphenomenalism were true) mental states could have no causal influence on brain activity and thus on behavior anyway? I agree that since materialism doesn't necessarily deny the existence of mental phenomena, a materialist need not be a behaviorist. Similarly, I see no reason why a "functionalist" would necessarily have to be a monist. But each of these approaches seems to focus on an important aspect of our psychology. So perhaps a more comprehensive account is possible. [ January 29, 2002: Message edited by: jpbrooks ]</p>

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