Jack Kamm

I was reading the thread "Proof of Materialism." It's quite long and goes off topic several times. I think I read the whole thing (it was in bits and pieces), but I can't say that I remember it all.

So anyways, forgive me if this question was answered earlier, but what exactly is the definition of material? What is the definition of immaterial? What is the definition of natural? What is the definition of supernatural? The thread seems meaningless until those questions are answered.

I hold many of the same beliefs materialists do; I don't believe in a soul because the mind seems to be dependent on the brain, and I don't believe in what is commonly called "supernatural" (ghosts, spirits, gods, miracles, etc.) because extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Am I a materialist?

On a related note, I'm starting to do a bit of reading on the mind-body problem in order to understand the subject better. Any suggested readings?

jon1

These days, the term materialism is interchangeable with physicalism which basically states that everything is physical or as you might hear "everything is supervenient upon the physical". Materialism has traditionally been the metaphysical theory that everything is simply matter (matter being that which posseses extension, mass, etc...) which leaves no room for things like cartesian minds and such. This brand of materialism goes all the way back to the Atomists of Ancient Greece. Physicalism is a modern version of materialism since the old materialism is a bit too confined. You might ask what makes something "physical" then. Well I suppose the simple definition of physical is something that is governed by the laws of physics. Then of course there is the conundrum of the higher level sciences and their laws (chemistry, biology,psychology, etc...). This is where the notion of supervenience physicalism comes in which states basically that any world microphysically identical to ours in all respects will not vary on the higher levels. So even though the entities the higher level sciences deal with cannot be reduced to the microphysical ones, they are still dependent upon them and thus they are still physical. There's more to supervenience than just that but for our present purposes I think that will suffice. You mentioned the mind-body problem. Frankly, I'm partial to Chalmers myself, but if you want a good book that surveys the Philosophy of Mind then I'd pick up "Philosophy of Mind" by Jaegwon Kim. It's an excellent book.

sodium

I don't think there's one agreed upon answer. Materialists tend to share a common outlook, but I don't think historically materialism has had a single precise definition that everyone agrees on.

In the thread you mentioned, I offered up two doctrines that I think serve to differentiate the materialist view, more or less as it has been used historically.

1) Minds, mental activity, and values are not fundamental. At a low enough level of description you don't need reference to these things. At a low enough level, you can describe using only non-mental, non-personal components (what we call matter). Groups, relationships and activities of these components are responsible for all these personal properties.

2) The components mentioned earlier are not remarkably different from the components of non-living non-sentient things, with which they interact.

So, then matter would be that stuff that isn't irreducibly mental / personal / emotional / perceptual. So there are no souls or minds or gods or Karmic forces that aren't reducible to the kind of non-sentient stuff we find in rocks. Finding out what that stuff is like is a job for physicists, not philosophers.

I don't think there are any good definitions of what is natural vs. supernatural. However, there does seem to be general agreement about which phenomena fall on which side, even between skeptics and believers. In practice, when we have good reason to believe in something, we call it natural, and when we don't, we call it supernatural. Even the supernaturalists seem unconsciously to recognize this difference.

I rather liked "The Mind's I". It's a series of essays mainly focussed on Mind / Body and similar issues.

That, I think, is a weaker claim. Supervenience allows that although a particular physical state implies a particular mental state, this is the result of some fundamental natural law which gives physical states mental effects. But that makes the mental fundamental to the operation of the universe, which goes against the spirit of materialism. In my opinion, non-reductive physicalism is not compatible with materialism.

jon1

"Supervenience allows that although a particular physical state implies a particular mental state, this is the result of some fundamental natural law which gives physical states mental effects. But that makes the mental fundamental to the operation of the universe, which goes against the spirit of materialism."

Well then, how could any reasonable person hold to materialism then unless they can deny the existence of mental states altogether?

contracycle

Not at all. It merely suggests that a physical process that has the APPEARANCE of mentality is inherent to the universe. Wich seems a simple enough claim given our knowledge of computers these days.

eh

Ultimately, I think the only meaningful definition of material would have to do with space and time. That is, an object is material if it is located in space-time. Non material then, would be something outside of spacetime. Of course, we have no experience of such an entity, so such a notion is undefined and a non concept.

Pyrrho

I recommend looking in a common philosophy dictionary or other philosophy reference book, such as The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. For something more in depth, you would probably want to consult the writings of a particular materialist, and then you will want to keep in mind that other materialists are likely to disagree on some points.


No, you don't seem to me to be a materialist, though to avoid pointless metaphysical discussions with materialists, you might want to say you are when in their presence; your views seem mostly compatible with materialism anyway. I do something similar in calling myself an "atheist", when really I don't think the term "god" is generally adequately defined in order for any meaningful things to be said about it; see: http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.p...threadid=49215

You might find the writings of David Hume to be of interest. I would recommend starting with his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and if you want more along those lines, you can take on his Treatise of Human Nature. The Nidditch-revised Selby-Bigge versions of these books, published by Oxford, are, I believe, still the current "standard" texts, though Oxford has come out with newer versions that may become the new standards.


I recommend reading Hume first.

jon1

"It merely suggests that a physical process that has the APPEARANCE of mentality is inherent to the universe."

Are you saying that a publically observable process in a brain has the appearance of mentality or that mental states such as the qualitative experience of seeing red, feeling pain, etc... are physical processes with the appearance of mentality?

sodium

But let's say I believe that there is a soul sitting beside my pineal gland. This soul is unitary, it cannot be broken into parts, even conceptually. This soul is the real me, and it controls my actions through rather obscure interactions with my brain. Now, am I a materialist?

Now, let's say I don't believe in souls. However, I do believe that a moving photon cannot always be assigned a specific position. A photon can be emitted, and later interact with another particle, but during its travel, it can't really be said to be occupying a specific position. Whether it is actually "located" in space seems like a matter of definition. So, am I a materialist?

It seems to me that the first view should be ruled out by materialism, but that the second view should be compatible with it. Any comment? Also, is it your view that materialism is simply true by definition?

sodium

Consider water. Water is wet, but where does the wetness come from? I think most people would agree that what we refer to as wetness, is the behaviour of the component particles of water. These things are conceptually different, but they refer to the same physical phenomenon. Wetness holds no privileged place in the laws of the universe, but is the result of more basic particle interactions, that don't involve wetness. Wetness isn't just caused by the interaction of particles, it is another way to describe certain interactions of particles.

So, in other words, wetness can be reduced to a more fundamental non-wetness. But this isn't a denial of the existence of wetness.