njhartsh

Again, a breath of fresh air--an opponent who knows what the phrase "question-begging" means! Ah, this is the life.

My intention there was merely to express agreement with your points regarding area (1) and area (3). "I like chocolate ice cream" is an objective(1) statement about the outcome of a subjective(3) evaluation. I believe we agree here.

I see this as raising (at least) two separate questions:

(1) Whether a moral statement such as "Practice X is wrong" necessarily implies "Everyone should hold that Practice X is wrong."
(2) Whether "mak[ing] us (not just me) better off" is necessarily relevant in our moral examination of Practice X.

I would answer both (1) and (2) in the negative, though I think (2) is much more important to our discussion. (I'm obviously eliding a bit above by substituting "practice" for "desire"--but then I don't think it's at all facially clear in a moral statement like "Abortion is wrong" that the speaker is fundamentally concerned with "desires". "If God says abortion is wrong," argues the Divine Command-advocate speaker, "what do anyone's desires have to do with anything?")

On issue (1), I don't see why a moral statement about a given practice necessarily implies a belief that other people should share the speaker's perspective about that practice. It follows from my statement "Capital punishment is wrong" that I think other people should not practice capital punishment, but I don't see the clear implication in my statement that they should not believe in (or "desire"?) it.

In point of fact, when it comes to moral beliefs of mine that I consider very important (CP definitely qualifies), I do think that everyone should agree with my perspective. But this, I think, is extraneous to the initial moral statement ("Capital punishment is wrong") itself. And it has very little to do with moral epistemology.

As for (2), then: why is it necessarily important that a given practice (or desire) take other people's desires into account in order to be the basis for a real moral statement?

If Adolf Hitler declared, "We ought to exterminate the Jews," or if John Calvin stated, "Almighty God ought to torture infidels for eternity," aren't these patently statements of moral beliefs? Yet Hitler obviously cares not a whit about Jews' desires, nor does Calvin care about nonbelievers' desires. Why should these failures remove them from the entire arena of moral principles?

"Mak[ing] us better off" seems to me arbitrary in your account--is Macbeth barred from stating, "Duncan ought to throw himself off a cliff, and everyone else ought to get out of my way so I can be king"? This wouldn't necessarily make anyone better off besides Macbeth himself, but it still looks like a perfectly legitimate statement of subjective value to me.

Your assertion ("moral statements are statements about what we (not just I) should desire in virtue of the fact that desiring it would make us (not just me) better off") sets up a distinction between "moral" and non-"moral" statements, a distinction which appears to me subjective in every sense except that it describes an objectively extant state of your mind.

My wording above--viz., "your argument"--was not nearly precise enough. I was in fact responding to your critique of Keith Augustine's argument. In that context, you wrote:

I claim that your critique of Augustine is misguided, because all you are referencing is a simple mistake on the part of many "people who engage in moral discussion." It seems to me that Augustine is right to dissent from this widespread mistake. Your "genocide/rock" comparison no more refutes Augustine than my theoretical "creationist" argument proves God, and that was the analogy I was attempting to draw.

Boy--I just directly disagree. If I am, as you describe, an action-movie lover and a cartoon-hater, then I will almost certainly describe The Matrix as "terrific" and Lilo & Stitch as "awful." I don't understand why you think that your aesthetic evaluations will enter into my statements at all.

Even if we agree to disagree on action and animation and head for, what, a period drama instead, I fail to see how that impacts my decision about what's "good" and what's "bad." Even if I understand that you will disdain The Matrix and that it would therefore make more sense to see The English Patient with you instead, what possible relevance does that have to my idea of what's "good"? If you ask me, "Any good movies playing?" I'll say "Yeah--The Matrix Reloaded!" If I'm feeling diplomatic, perhaps I'll append "...Although you probably wouldn't like it"; but that's entirely irrelevant to my evaluation of The Matrix. Sorry, but action movies plainly do "qualify" in my value system as "good," whether I'm heading to the cineplex with you or not.

Unquestionably it's true that people with somewhat divergent aesthetic tastes (or moral beliefs) can negotiate on the outcome that they mutually feel is least intolerable to them, but I fail to see what this necessarily has to do with any one person's sense of what is right and what is wrong.

I don't see what is the least bit internally contradictory or otherwise logically impossible about the proposition that large numbers of people have been making "nonsense" arguments. (Potshot: Theologians have been around for a long time...) It may well be that most people advocate moral positions that they believe will be "good for us" in a nice, broad sense. It is certainly not true that all people (consider ethnic cleansers, slaveholders, Calvinists) do so. I see no epistemological difference (difference in how the speakers have determined their perspectives to be correct) between the "good for us" advocates and the "screw those people" advocates.

It seems to me that there are several meta-ethical beliefs that are widespread among people I (probably you too) tend to respect: "Precedent and widespread support are salutary things for a moral doctrine to have"; "Arbitrary, knee-jerk moral judgments are to be avoided"; "One should not draw moral distinctions based on certain sensitive characteristics such as race or sex"; etc. People holding such meta-ethical beliefs (as well as people who believe morality to be objective(3)) will undoubtedly make moral arguments that presume these meta-ethics, especially when the people holding these beliefs are among one another. But that fails to make said meta-ethics true, necessary, self-evident or objective. I do not see the epistemological relevance of the linguistic/rhetorical trend you have observed; it merely describes a practice based on arbitrary (and sometimes doubtful) presumptions.

Just as my statement, "The Matrix rocks and Lilo & Stitch sucks," in fact means "In my judgment, The Matrix rocks and Lilo & Stitch sucks," so too does the statement "X is wrong and Y is right" in fact mean "In the speaker's judgment, X is wrong and Y is right." I do not believe that there is any further (or indeed other) conclusion we can necessarily draw from such a statement.

Thanks again for responding.

- Nathan

Alonzo Fyfe

The fact that people treat moral statements as if they are objective (as if they reference an objective reality outside of the speaker's subjective mind) does not demonstrate that they really are.

This argument is ambiguous, allowing for two meanings. In one sense, it is valid.

In another sense, it is not. In the sense that it is valid, it does not apply to my claims. In the sense that it applies to my claims, it is not valid.

One sense is ontological -- having the form, "The fact that a person talks about a red dragon outside of his front door that will kill him if he tries to leave is not proof that such a dragon actually exists." This is correct. Linguistic behavior is irrelevant to claims about existence.

The other sense is linguistic -- having the form, "The fact that people talk about triangles having three sides does not imply that triangles actually have three sides." This is incorrect. Linguistic behavior is completely relevant to questions about the meanings of terms.

So, at the point that you raise this objection, I had already passed the ontological claim as was making a separate linquistic claim. Thus, your response does not apply.

My ontological argument is this: Other minds exist. Other minds contain desires. Objective(2) value claims are value claims that describe relationships between states of affairs and desires that are in other minds. (Whereas subjective(2) value claims are value claims that describe relationships between states of affairs and desires that are in my mind.) Objective(2) values are as real as
subjective(2) values.

I am not going to prove the existence of other minds, I am going to take this as a working assumption. Anybody not willing to grant this -- their interest in my argument will end here.

With the ontological issue now behind us, it is now time to move on to a second question. "When people make moral claims, does it make more sense to understand those claims as subjective(2) claims or objective(2) claims?" This is now a linguistic question, and observations on how people use these terms are quite relevant to answering the linguistic question.

"People who make moral claims like "X is morally good", hold another person who says "X is not morally good" as denying their own statement. If we understand moral claims as subjective(2) value claims, then these are not contradictions, and we have the further proposition that people making moral claims are incompetent users of their own language. If we understand moral claims as objective(2) moral claims, then one statement is in fact the denial of the other.

Therefore, this provides reason to believe that people making moral statements should be understood as making objective(2) moral statements.


Again, I think you are correct that many, many people believe they are referencing a source . . . outside of their own minds . . . but this is a mere mistake on their part.

Many, many people believe that, when they are riding a bicycle, that they are balancing by shifting their weight from side to side, the same way that they would balance on a beam. In fact, this is a mistake on their part. People balance on a bicycle by turning the wheels. This is why, as the bicyble goes slower, their turns of the wheel become increasingly radical.

One cannot infer from the fact that people have mistaken beliefs about what they are doing when they are riding a bicycle, that nobody in fact is riding a bicycle, and that all claims about people riding bicycles are to be dismissed.

Instead, it is a perfectly legitimate enterprise to watch people in the act of riding bicycles and attempting to discover what they are doing in fact.

People's claims that they are making reference to objective(3) values when they make moral claims are irrelevant. The enterprise is to watch people in the act of making moral claims, and attempting to discover what they are doing in fact.

We (you and I) have already agreed to rule out the thesis that they are making reference to objective(3) values, because there are no objective(3) values to make reference to. If this is NOT what they are doing, then what ARE they doing?

We look at their moral practices, and find out.

Fortunately, you provide some of your own observations in this regard.


Now, when I argue that capital punishment is wrong I do indeed mention the feelings about it in those foreign countries, and my opponents once in a while point out the majority support in this country. But none of this cinches the poing. Indeed, even if I were the only person on the globe who found capital punishment objectionable, that would not not change my mind. My subjective(2) evaluation is not a bit founded on the popular support for my evaluation.

The above is a paraphrase, but I do not believe it alters the argument.

Anyway, if I am right that moral statements are objective(2) statements of the type I think they are, then you in fact should not be deciding moral issues by popular vote.

There is a recognizable distinction in language between "what I like" and "what is good for me." This distinction makes perfectly good sense without assuming any type of objective(3) value. Regular exercise is good for me. Do I like regular exercise? Well, not really. Visiting the dentist is another thing that ranks fairly high on the "good for me" list, but is a long way from the top on the "what I like" list.

Yet, "good for me" can still be understood in terms of "getting me what I desire." I get more of what I desire through regular exercise than I get without it. I get more of what I desire through visiting the dentist regularly than I get without it. But getting more of what I desire out of something, and desiring it, are not the same thing.

Moral statements of the form "capital punishment is right" or "capital punishment is wrong" are NOT analogous to "we like capital punishment" or "we do not like capital punishment." They are statements that are more like "capatal punishment is good for us" versus "capital punishment is not good for us."

Now, you can't answer the question of whether "capital punishment is good for us"

is true simply by taking a head count of the number of people who like capital punishment -- no more than you can determine if "regular exercise is good for us" by taking a head count of the number of people who like to exercise.

You don't use a head count to settle issues of whether capital punishment is good or bad? Good, you shouldn't. Moral questions are not the type of questions that can be answered by taking a head count.

On the other hand, it is a perfectly legitimate argument against capital punishment to note, "Europe does not have capital punishment, and European citizens are less likely to be murdered than American citizens. This, at least, gives us some reason to believe that capital punishment is not good for us. If it was, in fact, good for us than countries with capital punishment would have fewer murders than countries without it -- not more."

That moral debaters view arguments like this to be relevant (even if not decisive) lends support to the thesis that moral debaters take moral statements to be objective(2) "good for us" vs. "bad for us" type claims.

I also want to call your attention to the form of the argument that you used here. In order to test my theory, you tested it against practice, and asked the question, "does the theory actually provide the best account of peoples' moral practices." You found cases where the theory did not describe the practice, and rejected the theory.

In this case, the theory you rejected was not mine. Your criticism provides good reason to reject the thesis that moral claims are "liked by us" versus "not liked by us" claims. Yet, it does not apply against my theory, which is that moral claims are "good for us" (that is, fulfills our desires) vs. "bad for us" (that is, thwarts our desires) claims.

The form of the argument is actually quite appropriate.

It is the same form as the argument that I use against the thesis that moral claims are subjective(2) value claims. Understanding moral claims in this way does not make sense of the practice of treating "X is good" spoken by one person as the denial of "X is not good" spoken by a different person. Because the interpretation cannot make sense of how moral terms are used, it is to be rejected in favor of an interpretation that makes sense.

More to come.

Alonzo Fyfe

This raises at least two possibilities:
(A) Keith Augustine's account is wrong.
(B) The people you cite are wrong.

I choose (B). Why should I choose (A) instead?

Hmmm. One problem . . . I don't cite anybody. I say that the theory that is best is the theory that best explains the phenomena under question. The phenomena under question is the use of moral terms.

To a certain extent, your response here is like saying,

"Concerning John Smith's thesis on the mating habits of penguins, I have two possibilities.

(A) John Smith's thesis is wrong.
(B) The penguins are wrong.

I choose (B), why should I choose (A) instead?

My first guess is that this displays some misunderstanding of the problem. The "people I cite" are the penguins themselves -- native speakers of english language concerning their use of moral claims.

A better presentation of the issue would actually be:

This raises two possibilities.
(A) Keith Augustine's account of moral claims.
(B) Alonzo Fyfe's account of moral claims.

Now, actually, Keith Augustine gives us no reason to accept his view. He simply assumes -- and presents no argument -- that rejecting objective(3) morality means we must accept subjective(2) morality. This is a false dichotomy, and a false dichotomy does not give us any reason to accept his view.

In addition, Keith Augustine's account cannot handle the fact that native speakers making moral claims take the proposition "X is wrong" to be the denial of "X is not wrong". My account can.

In addition, Keith Augustine's account says that native speakers should be treating the issue of "slavery or no slavery" the same way they treat issues such as "fries or mashed potatoes." My account says that they are significantly different types of questions.

In addition, Keith Augustine's account cannot handle the use of evidence in debates -- not only handling the types of evidence people take as relevant (e.g., does capital punishment deter crime?) but the type of evidence people take as irrelevant (moral claims are not settled merely through a head count). My account correctly predicts both the types of evidence people consider relevant and the types of evidence they consider irrelevant.

One other related issue . . .

One of the principles that philosophers of language argue for is the Principle of Charity -- all else being equal, an interpretation that yields a truth value of "true" is to be preferred over an interpretation of a truth value of "false".

All things being equal, an interpretation of moral claims that yields a truth value for the propositon "moral values are objective" are "true" is to be preferred over an interpretation that yields a truth value of "false".

In fact, philosophers of language argue that without the Principle of Charity, interpretation is impossible, for there will always be an unlimited number of interpretations that yield a truth value of "false".

My account for interpreting moral claims stands up better in the light of the principle of charity.


Whoa! Enough of this meta talk for you, I guess: Now we've brought in some basic moral principles from goodness-knows-where. "Wrong by definition"? That clashes oddly with subjectiv(3)ism.

Actually, no. It does not.

Go back to an example from an earlier post . . . when discussing good movies. It is true by definition that "good-(movie)-for-Alonzo" does not mean the same thing as what is "good-(movie)-for-Alonzo-plus-Nathan". I do not need to introduce any type of objective(3) value to do this.

Now, there is an objective(2) answer to the question about what movies are "good-for-Alonzo-plus-Nathan".

If somebody wants to raise an objection that the "good-for-Alonzo-plus-Nathan" definition should not be used because it might yield an answer that victimizes Nathan, I am still going to counter that it is true by definition that Nathan's well-being cannot be excluded from any account of what is "good-for-Alonzo-plus-Nathan.' The very instant you remove consideration of Nathan's wellbeing and count it irrelevant, it is true by definition that you are no longer talking about what is "good-for-Alonzo-plus-Nathan'. And this entire argument makes no reference to any type of objective(3) value.

Wiploc

By this time I think I agree with you. You have overcome one of my objections in subsequent posts to other people: when you say that morality is based on what everybody desires, you aren't really taking a headcount of what people actually think they want; you are more like taking a headcount of what enlightened people with self restraint would want.

I still feel free to point out that "objective moral values" is oxymoronic. I grant you that it is objectively true that rape is bad because women don't like it, and even that the women not liking it is an objective fact; but, ultimately, the actual not liking is done subjectively. If women didn't have that subjective value, it would not be objectively bad to rape them.

One last point, and an awkward and unpolished one it is --- but I still want to offer it. I very much like how you make sense of moral claims, but I understand the ojection that people aren't necessarily making sense when they make moral claims. I guess my point might be that for some audiences you could sell your case more easily if you used the subjunctive, saying something like, "Well if people were making sense, this is what they would have to mean." That gets me past my resistence anyway.

crc

Alonzo Fyfe

::Gasp. Choke. Gag. Fall over in a dead faint::

Do you realize how rare it is that somebody would actually say something like this?

"point out?" Well, I do not consider anything of significance to hang on this.


Well. . . just to clarify . . . you seem to be suggesting that rape would be good if women liked it . . . and that's not entirely true.

It would be more accurate to say that if a woman wants to have sex, then it is not rape. Plus . . . and this is important . . . one has an obligation to obtain prior consent (to find out from the woman if she wants to have sex) before having sex. That is to say, people ought to generally have an aversion to having sex with a partner who not only wants to have sex but who has clearly communicated that want.


Well, a good "theory of science" not only has to make sense of the practice of science and of scientific cliams, it also has to properly categorize pseudo-science and explain why pseudo-science is not science.

A good "theory of ethics" not only has to make sense of the practice of ethics and of ethical claims, it also has to properly categorize pesudo-ethics and explain why pseudo-morality is not morality.

The theory that I am defending categorizes objective(3) ethical claims as "pseudo-ethics" -- because objective(3) values are not real.

It is true that I have not made much of this "ethics/pseudo-ethics" distinction and I need to make more use of it. I just have this habit of dismissing pseudo-ethics as unimportant, and of focusing my discussion on ethics. Perhaps I should change that habit.

Alonzo Fyfe

Nathan:

Sometimes, you seem to be writing as if a theory of X is prior to the X that the theory is about, such that problems with the theory of X provide a reason for dismissing every element of X itself.

We have a practice of making moral claims where those claims are (among other things) agent-neutral, universal, and prescriptive. This is our X. Now, we need a theory of X.

Our first theory of X is that there are objective(3) moral entities or powers. Such entities would be agent-neutral (they are "out there" like planets and gravity), universal (they are "out there" for everybody), and prescriptive. The problem is, when we look for these objective(3) agent-neutral, universal prescriptivities we do not find anything "out there" that fits the bill. So, we have to give up on our objective(3) theory.

Well, let's look at subjective(2) theory. Well, this has a bit of a problem accounting for universalizable, agent-neutral prescriptivity because it is neither universalizable nor agent-neutral. But, it is prescriptive. Well, one out of three is not bad -- if it is the best we can do we should go with that. It is, at least, better than objective(3) theory where, because objective(3) entities do not exist, give us absolutely nothing.

But it is not the best we can do. Objective(2) theory of X is prescriptive, universalizable, and substantially (though not entirely) agent-neutral. Where subjective(2) theory gives us 1 out of 3, objective(2) theory accounts for 2.99999999 out of 3.

Thus, I argue that Objective(2) theory is better than subjective(2), which in turn is better than objective(3) theory.

What you seem to be arguing at times is that, because our first theory of X is a mistake (there are no objective(3) values), that we must not only throw out this theory of X, but even X itself -- or huge chunks of it -- must also be thrown out. But this further implication is invalid. The only thing that follows from the fact that the objective(3) theory of X is bad, is that we need a new theory of X. That theory itself will determine what parts of X are to be kept or thrown out. Determining which elements to throw out cannot logically be done prior to determining which is the best theory of X.


Boy, I just directly disagree. If I am, as you describe, an action-movie lover and a cartoon-hater, then I will almost certainly describe THE MATRIX as "terriffic" and LOLO & STITCH as "awful."

Of course you would, I am not disputing this. It follows directly from the premise that MATRIX has a high probably of qualifying as "terriffic- for-me" and LOLO & STITCH has a high probably of being "awful-for-me" (when these statements are spoken by you).

It would be absurd to deny this.

But, even though this is true -- and I grant that they are true beyond dispute -- I would bet good money that if I were to look over a transcript of your conversation the last time you decided to see a movie with others, the conversation focused around arriving at what would be "best for us". Any "terriffic-for-me" and "awful-for-me" statements included in that discussion were offered only as partial pieces of information that were relevant to the overall conclusion, "what movie is best for us?"

Remember, at this point in the argument, I am concerned only with demonstrating that:

(a) People make, understand, and rationally discuss propositions of the form "best-for-us".

(b) The truth or falsity of "best-for-us" propositions are substantially (though not entirely) independent of the attitudes of any given speaker -- that is to say, these statements are objective(2).

(c) "Best-for-us" propositions do not require any type of objective(3) error -- they do not require postulating any type of desire independent value.

In addition, to complete my thesis, I am going to have to eventually add another part of this thesis: that moral claims are not "best-for-me" claims but "best-for-us" claims. But that is a separate issue, not at all dependent upon or essential for the propositions being defended here. I can be totally wrong in saying that moral claims are objective(2) claims, and it can still be true that people make sensible objective(2) value claims.

And I am NOT saying that people never, ever, make subjective(2) "best-for-me" types of claims. To make such an assertion would be laughable. Clearly, people make subjective(2) claims and make them in contexts where they make sense. Your "terriffic-for-me" and "awful-for-me" statements are perfect examples.

However, my thesis is that they are not the ONLY type of value claim that people make, they are not the ONLY type of value claim that makes sense. People ALSO make objective(2) value claims of the form "good for us".

Alonzo Fyfe

(1) Whether a moral statement such as "Practice X is wrong" necessarily implies "Everyone should hold that Practice X is wrong." . . . It follows from my statement "Capital punishment is wrong" that I think other people should not practice capital punishment, but I don't see the clear implication in my statement that they should not believe in (or "desire"?) it.

This is largely what I believe.

"Practice X is wrong", on the view that I am advancing, means that a good person would not engage in practice X. Where a "good person" is a person with good desires. And "good desires" are those desires that tend toward the fulfillment of other desires.

(Nothing has value except in virtue of a positive relationship to desires; even desires themselves are not 'good' or 'bad' except insofar as they themselves fulfill desires. A good desire fulfills desires; a bad desire thwarts desires).

There is nothing in this that carries any implication about what a person should believe; that remains governed by the principle that a person ought to believe that which is true and not believe that which is false.

As far as their not actually performing the action, how do you propose to make it the case that they don't DO the thing, except by making it the case that they don't WANT to? This is the main reason why I hold that morality is ultimately concerned with what we ought to WANT (with good and bad desires).