Tara

I thought this was a very fun (but maybe oversimplified) article on free will and ultimate responsibility...

http://world.std.com/~twc/strawson.htm


Denying that we have "free will" does not deny that we are "free, when unconstrained, to choose and to do what we want or think best, given how we are."

So certainly we don't have "strong" free will in that we can't help what we are. The pessimist view makes a lot of sense to me:

"For whatever one actually does, one will do what one does because of the way one is, and the way one is is something for which one neither is nor can be responsible, however self-consciously aware of one’s situation one is."

No free will, ergo we can't be ultimatly responsible. That "No and Yes" answer seems really odd to me; we're not free agents yet still ultimately responsible?! Who would believe that?

Keith Russell

Carl, if we cannot determine what we will, how would we know?

If you believe that our actions are determined (and/or pre-determined), and I disagree--

--how will you convince me to change my mind?

Keith.

DRFseven

Don't you understand that something has to give us the impetus to will something? You want to take a nap, but you will yourself to cut the grass. It's not "for nothing" that you cut the grass; it's for something. You are biased TOWARD the grass being cut instead of AGAINST it being cut. Your behavior, then, is NOT FREE of that bias. If you had not acquired, through your particular circumstances, the desire for the grass being cut, you'd have no will to cut the grass.

Nowhere357

The definition you've provided supports my position.

Each of the key words used in the definition directly imply both mental attendance (awareness) and an active expression of that awareness (will).

Each of the synonyms also invole both awareness and expression.

No, we use will when we apply mental effort to make a decision. Here you seem to be speaking of "consciouness".

We can speak and move by applying will. We also can speak and move automatically - sometimes we don't even have to be aware of what we're doing.

Nowhere357

I agree that we are "free, when unconstrained, to choose and to do what we want or think best, given how we are."

So if we deny free will, WHAT is it that is denied?

Nowhere357

I would not argue otherwise. So this shows you have missed my point.

Having a desire is not the same as acting on it.

In my case, the grass remains uncut, until I apply a greater-than-zero amount of will and actually go out and cut it. Without this application, I default to nap mode.

Carl Treetop

Ah, but *what* caused you to apply that "greater-than-zero amount of will"?

Carl Treetop

We were each born with a knowledge-acquisition machine (brain), and with the instinct to survive. From infancy on, we soak up knowledge of the world, of ourselves, of life, ultimately in order to be able to compete and survive. We have no say in our genetic makeup or the culture and world into which we are born, although these factors control what we learn and how we process the information. Our survival instinct provides the impetus or will to act on the information we acquire. The need and ability to acquire knowledge is inborn, as is the ability to will. *What* we will is determined by factors we do not control.


Depending on how you have been conditioned, I may or may not be able to convince you. I trust that you and I will believe what we each perceive to be in our own best interest.

In my case, I believe that the closer my beliefs are aligned with nature/reality, the greater my chances for pleasure/satisfaction/security in this life. I am amenable to altering my beliefs as logic dictates. On the other hand, religious fundamentalists believe that the intellect is weak and unreliable, so they prefer to put their faith/belief in their religious authorities (no matter how irrational the teachings may be). I certainly do NOT think that you fit into this latter category, Keith; but I also do not know how locked in you are to your current beliefs.

Nowhere357

The fact that I'm a sentient creature with free will, which I applied to make the decision.

I understand what your point is. Will must have a cause.

I submit that a given cause can have more than one possible effect. Deterministically, this is seen as "randomness". It is not the case that my decisions can be predicted with 100% accuracy.

It's becoming clear to me that the phrase "free will" is loaded with too much theistic baggage to be of general usefulness. What term captures the concept while avoiding the confusion?

I know I'm slow, but I like to think I'm not at a dead stop.

Carl Treetop

Tara,

That link you posted took us to an excellent article (by Galen Strawson). Thanks.

http://world.std.com/~twc/strawson.htm


I also think that the so-called "Pessimist" view has the most merit (but I would call it the Objective view).

"(A) One is the way one is, initially, as a result of heredity and early experience. (B) These are clearly things for which one cannot be held to be in any way responsible (this might not be true if there were reincarnation, but this would just shift the problem backwards). (C) One cannot at any later stage of one’s life hope to accede to ultimate responsibility for the way one is by trying to change the way one already is as a result of heredity and experience. For one may well try to change oneself, but (D) both the particular way in which one is moved to try to change oneself, and the degree of one’s success in one’s attempt at change, will be determined by how one already is as a result of heredity and experience. And (E) any further changes that one can bring about only after one has brought about certain initial changes will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by heredity and previous experience. (F) This may not be the whole story, for it may be that some changes in the way one is are traceable to the influence of indeterministic or random factors. But (G) it is absurd to suppose that indeterministic or random factors, for which one is ex hypothesi in no way responsible, can in themselves contribute to one’s being truly or ultimately responsible for how one is."

"in order to be ultimately responsible, one would have to be causa sui - the ultimate cause or origin of oneself, or at least of some crucial part of one’s mental nature."

Strawson concludes:
"And yet the facts are clear. One cannot be ultimately responsible for one's character or mental nature in any way at all."

So we are not free agents, and we cannot be morally responsible for what we do.


And Strawson says:
"A strange minority says NO and YES (we can be morally responsible for what we do even though we are not free agents). This view is rare, but it has a kind of existentialist panache,

Guess what? I take the NO and YES stance in a way. Although I believe that we are NOT at all ultimately responsible for what we do, people must nevertheless be held responsible for their actions.

The pleasure/pain principle preceded homo Sapiens. It can be seen operating in higher forms of animal life - especially the social animals. It forms the basis by which order is maintained within the troop or pack. Animals are not morally responsible for their actions either, but they learn to behave in socially acceptable ways or suffer the consequences.

Although it would be beneficial for society to recognize that people are not ultimately responsible for their behavior, we must be held responsible anyway, and penalized for wrong acts. Otherwise, a sort of anarchy and chaos would develop and civilization would collapse.