Kenny

Well, if you think that “Being ugly, fat and stupid” is just a plausible a candidate for properties of “excellence” as “Being knowledgeable, powerful, and morally good,” then I don’t know what to say except that you have stripped language of having any sort of normative meanings <shrugs>.

All the argument asserts in its definition of excellence is that knowledge, goodness, and power are excellent making properties such that having these properties to their maximal degree (being omniscient, morally perfect, and omnipotent) makes for maximal excellence. If you can’t see, at least, some intuitive plausibility in that, I don’t know what else to say, except that these definitions and premises hold a great deal of intuitive warrant for myself and many others.

No, the argument seeks to demonstrate that such a being exists.

No, the argument makes certain intuitive appeals to concepts such as “excellence and greatness”

Our intuition does have some baring on the nature of reality, or, at least, we must believe it does if we want to engage in any sort of rational discourse. In fact, some of the most certain things we know (such as 2+2=4) are known intuitively. Basic epistemic methods such as induction or reliance on memory or belief in other minds are grounded in intuition.

How so?

Define what you mean by “presupposed beliefs.” I think you will find that any sort of rational argument relies on, at least some, very basic presuppositions. The idea of wholly neutral perspective, as modern philosophy has shown repeatedly, is woefully epistemically naïve.

If the concept of a necessary being is coherent and X is a necessary being, then there is nothing illogical in saying that “possibly X” implies “X.” In fact, that is precisely what follows logically in terms of modal logic. A necessary proposition is, by definition, true in all logically possible worlds. If a necessary proposition is logically possible, then it is true in at least one logically possible world. But, if a necessary proposition is true in at least one possible world, then it must, by it’s necessity, be true in all possible worlds. In terms of Modal logic, “Necessarily X” follows from “It is possible that X is necessary.”

This argument is dealing with purely modal considerations of logical possibility and logical necessity. Probability need not enter the picture.

Huh? In terms of the structure of the argument, this premise is simply unpacking the definitions.

Well, again,in terms of the argument's structure this is true by definition. It is true that definitions are a special form of a tautology, but I don’t see how that’s a problem.

The conclusion follows modally from the premises. So far as I now, no one in the philosophical community disputes this argument on the grounds that it is modally invalid.

I didn’t come up with it. Alvin Plantinga, a well known philosopher did. Since this argument has also been debated and discussed a great deal within contemporary philosophy of religion, I wish I could take the credit for it, but, alas, I can't.

God Bless,
Kenny

[ July 21, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>

Automaton

Kenny, Plantinga's ontological argument is not valid, it is circular.

• "No one who didn't already accept [the ontological argument's] conclusion [that there is a maximally excellent being] would accept [its] first premise [that there is a possible world in which there is a maximally great being, which by definition of maximal greatness is a being that exists in, and is maximally excellent in, every world]" (Plantinga 1974)

And he notes in his writing that there is no reason not to accept the counter argument, that in some possible world maximal excellence is not exemplified, thus "maximal excellence exists" is a not a modally necessary statement, thus it is not really maximal excellence and hence, does not exist.

I do not accept that any necessary being is possible, without it being demonstrated first that it is necessary, because &lt;&gt;[]p is the same as []p.

Furthermore, even if it were valid, it is not sound by a long shot. It misapplies existence, it misapplies necessity, it misapplies perfection, it analytically tries to perform a necessarily synthetic task, etc.

Theli

Kenny...

The problem here is that "Maximum Excellence" is frankly bullshit.
Why should a being that you refer to as M.E be more probable to exist than any other being?
And what relevance does those attributes have on the being's probability?

So, it is just a coinsident that the argument has those particular attributes that your supposed god happens to have?
And, again... Why those attibutes?
What relevance do they have?

I can't help you with that. Why should I consider them plausable?
And more plausable than any other attributes.
What you mean is "possible". But possible isn't "probable". And it isn't "necessary".

These statements was not based on your god-argument.
They were a reply to this text posted by you:

If “maximal excellence” were defined as “being stupid, ugly and fat,” the argument would indeed maintain a valid logical structure but all of it’s intuitive support would be gone.

No it doesn't. Intuition might have baring on our knowledge of reality (we should fully rely on it, though). But it doesn't change the reality around us.

Strawman. 2+2=4 is a logical/mathematical statement based on hypothetical values expressed in a system invented by us. It doesn't have any positive existensial claims.
It doesn't say that this and that exist in our reality.
Why should intuition have any baring when contemplating on things we haven't discovered any evidence for yet?
I would say "fantasy" would be a better word for that.

I'll give you an example. Your definition of ME. You favored those attributes, without any apperant reason except for being a christian.

Yes, but not as extreme that they would fully control the conclution of the argument. If they were, the argument would be a tautology. Wich this clearly is.

This has nothing to do with your argument. It might be usefull just for yourself, but it shows nothing when presented to someone who doesn't believe what you believe in.

But your argument has to show that. And it can't do it if the attributes of X is not necessary for the argument to work.

ok, keep going.

And here we have the problem again. What this comes down to is that something that is possible is necessary. A claim wich is insane when put into practice.
We have no reason to assume that something exist simply based on it's possibility.
And we have definitly no reason to claim that it exist based on a possibility.

If that is so, then what baring does Modal logic have on reality. It cannot explain/prove anything as it supposes that possible = necessary.

Are you basing your knowledge of our world without "probability"?
You might be suprised at how little that can be known with 100% certainty. It all comes down to probability.

It is still a hypothetical claim. It explains the nature of a hypothetical being. Not X.

No, there was no problem.

But it is. It still claims that something described as possible in the first premise has become necessary in the conclution, independent of it's attributes. So, in fact. Everything we can imagine must exist, and is a necessary. And you don't see a problem with this line of thinking?

Has this argument ever shown it's face outside religion? With a different being/claim?
I see some special pleading going on here.

Automaton

1. In some possible world W, there exists an unlimited being X, that knows (knowledge implies truth of known proposition) there is no God.
2. If X is unlimited, if it exists, it would have to have unlimited existence, and thus would exist in every possible world.
3. In W, X exists.
4. Thus, in W, X exists in every possible world.
5. One can't in some possible world exist in every possible world, and in another, not exist in every possible world.
6. Thus, X exists in every possible world.
7. Thus, in every possible world, it is true that there is no God.
8. If something does not exist in any possible world, then it is impossible.
9. Therefore, God is impossible.

This is based on the same "intuitive postulate" that something must be assumed possible until proven impossible, and on the same notion of existence, and the same possibility to have unlimited existence, from simple attributal unlimitedness, that the ontological argument for God is based on. The rest is merely modal axioms such as universal necessity, and the principles of possible worlds semantics. To deny any of the former listed premises would be to deny the logic that holds up the ontological argument.

Automaton

And one more thing Kenny, you do seem to place an awful amount of stock in these "intuitive" premises. What if I posit the argument:
1. If donuts are evil, God does not exist.
2. Donuts are evil.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.
And to some guy named Bob the premises seem intuitive. What would that have to do with anything? Simply claiming that premises are intuitive does not entail support for said premises.

Why do people take ontological arguments seriously? They are about as convincing as one of my arguments that proves I am, in fact, God.

Kenny

I would like to see the full context of this quote because I’m not sure that Plantinga is referring to his ontological argument but to an argument such as the earlier one I provided (my “God exists or 2+2=5” argument was lifted from an example given by Plantinga to illustrate the complexities of determining what makes for a good argument). Plantinga does concede in his writings that the key premise of his OA (maximal greatness is instantiated in at least one possible world) is unlikely to be accepted by someone who is not a theist, but also argues that this premise can and does have intuitive warrant for many theists and thus confers warrant toward belief in God for such theists.

More later...

God Bless,
Kenny

Kenny

I’m curious as to how you are defining “unlimited” because, in terms of my understanding of the terms, if X were “unlimited” X would be God, which, in turn, renders the first premise absurd (in no possible world can a rational being know that it does not exist). But, no matter, I recognize that it is possible to parody the ontological argument, but I do not believe that this renders it unsound or means that it cannot confer warrant for theism to certain persons.

I never stated that this was some sort of intuitive postulate. As far as I can see, such a postulate should not be held because it would lead to absurdities. The intuitive grounds for the key premise in the OA involves intuitions concerning “excellence and greatness.” Affirming the key premise involves the intuitive recognition of the possibility of perfection or “maximal greatness.”

God Bless,
Kenny

Kenny

If Bob really thought that such premises were “intuitive,” I would most likely consider Bob to be insane or at least have some sort of cognitive malfunction. But, what does that have to do with my intuitions or human intuition in general? Human beings rely on intuition a great deal in finding out things about the world.

Agreed, and if the premises of the OA do not seem intuitive to you, then there may be no way for me to convince you of them. However, that does not mean that said premises are not intuitive for me or even that they are not warranted for me. And this brings us back to the original thread topic. I picked the OA because it’s a perfect example of the point I was trying to illustrate. Just because the premises of the argument convey no intuitive warrant for you or are not accepted by you does not mean they convey no intuitive warrant for others. The fact that you are not willing to accept the key premise of the OA does not mean that the OA is not sound or even that it is irrational for someone else to believe it is. The OA illustrates how differing intuitive and intellectual commitments influence how one might judge the soundness of a particular argument.

That all being said and the point being made, I concede that the OA is not very valuable in terms of convincing non-theists. As you pointed out, Plantinga himself concedes that and when he formulated the argument he did not intend it to be so convincing.

God Bless,
Kenny

Synaesthesia

Kenny,
Kenny, the question here is not whether the argument is valid, of course it’s valid! The point is that the ontological argument assumes what it sets out to prove, namely (4), 'the instantiation of a being with maximal excellence’ or in other words ‘the existence of God’. The ontological argument is a fancy piece of sophistry, nothing more.

Here it is again, in case it's unclear: The question is “Does god exist”? Premise 3 defines Maximal Excellence in terms of god’s putative qualities. Premise 4 asserts that God, defined in 3, exists. The conclusion is that God, defined in 3 exists.

The sleight of hand is simply made more explicit when simplified. Validity is not the same thing as begging the questions you intend to answer.

[ July 21, 2002: Message edited by: Synaesthesia ]</p>

rainbow walking

Hi Kenny,
In your statement above I have highlighted the particular claim that you use to support your contention that your argument was sound. Rather than go through the entire process of rebuttal again I’ll let you instruct yourself:

Kenny earlier: As far as the first premise, “God exists or 2+2=5,” is concerned, recall that all that is required for an “or” disjunction to be true is that one of the disjuncts be true. If God exists, then “God exists or p” is true for any proposition one wishes to substitute for p.

rw: I certainly hope you are not arguing that 2+2=5 as a true proposition. If not, that only leaves us with “God exists”. Thus, by the rules of an “or” disjunction you have indeed asserted the presence of the conclusion in the first postulate of P1 and your argument is unsound. If you attempt to distance yourself from “God exists” as an assumptive truism, then neither postulate in P1 is true and your argument remains unsound.

Your qualifying “if” does not exonerate you from the assumption nor lead us soundly to your conclusion “then”.

But I get your point that, from your perspective, the argument appears sound. The only problem being, your perspective is not, itself, sound.
And that, I think, is the entire purpose of logic to establish...yes?