luvluv

Well, part of the problem JLP is that there probably aren't any that totally fit my conclusion, which is why it is so silly to limit your beliefs to what can be proven. I'll give you the faulty example of the cosmological argument:

1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Sure, this is full of holes, that's part of the problem. I'm not expert in philosophy, but so far as I know there has never been a fully succesful undisputed argument proving the existence of ANYTHING, so I, at the very least, cannot provide you with the argument you are going to have to create.

By truth I simply mean that all of your defintions must be agreed upon, and that rejecting them entails the denial of one of the first principles of logic (law of causality, law of the excluded middle, etc... I'm sure there is a faq on this site somewhere with all the principles of logic on it). For example, if you use "good" in your definition, you must define good in such a way as that no one can disagree with your defintion without denying one of the first principles of logic to establish it's "truth" within your argument.

Again, logically necessary entails what I said above. To really rationally prove your moral code, you must define goodness or badness in such a way that a person would have to deny foundational principles of logic to disupute it. Then, and only then, will it be proven.

Primal

Perhaps your definition of proof is far too narrow. According to what you say we should just fall back to relativism.

As for that argument the hole lies in the first premise "everything that exists much have a cause" I reject that premise as existence at the fundamental level just is.

The flaw lies in assuming everything to exist must have a cause, this is contradictory. Because a causal mechanisms used to create existence would then have to exist before existence.....and absurd proposition. All you are doing luvluv is abandoning evidence when it doesn't support what you believe.

[ November 25, 2002: Message edited by: Primal ]</p>

Carlos

I'm not sure I understand what you're advocating. In our pursuit of the truth, it sounds as if you are suggesting there are only two possibilities: full blown rationalism (a la Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, ...) or accepting every possible claim. You rule out the former, leaving us with the latter. Unless I missed it, you didn't offer any other way in which we can separate true from false. How is it you can understand anything in the face of conflicting claims? I suspect you might support subjectivism - knowledge comes from within, independent of external sources - but I would rather hear it from you.

Your point about reason (logic) being unable to prove the existence or truth of most of what is exterior to us is well-taken. This is not to say that I dismiss the external world, though. The knowledge I acquire through my senses may not be reliable, true - I might be dreaming, influenced by certain chemicals, or even under the control of another being (natural or supernatural). In spite of that, these perceptions are highly regular. While they lack the absolute certainty of logical claims, I trust them because they produce the expected outcome with a very high degree of probability. I sense that I am hungry, I sense that I am holding an apple in my hand. From past experience I know that eating that apple will satisfy my hunger. Empiricism - not just the senses, but also the memories and the experience and understanding - help me make sense of the world. It helps me understand the causal relationships in the external world; to discern the order among the chaos. If it were not internally consistent empiricism could not do that.

That's probably better suited for the Philosophy forum, but anyways...

Neither god nor morality can be proved using reason or empiricism; I think we both agree on that. As I mentioned in my last post, I do hold "beliefs" built on things other than reason. Some are empirically derived, others from values (subjectivism, if you will). These three different types of "belief" are not equivalent, though - which is why I keep writing belief in quotes.

Logical beliefs are correct, absolutely and universally. They can never change. Their domain is limited to conceptual ideas, such as mathematics.

Empirical beliefs are probably correct. They depend very highly on those probabilities; if the beliefs appear to be incorrect then we abandon them and try to find a better explanation. These beliefs are not static; they change over time as our senses and understanding grows. Their domain is the external world.

Value beliefs cannot be said to be correct or incorrect. They are projections of our mind, our psyche; the result of introspection. These beliefs are not necessarily static; they change if we change. Their domain is the individual in question, but not the external world.

I justify my "belief" in morality based on value beliefs. I do not claim them as absolute truths. I am willing and able to alter my sense of right and wrong as I grow and learn. My morality explains who I am, but does nothing to explain who others are or any other part of the external world. If I try to convince someone else of a particular moral choice, I argue about values, not about facts.

How does "belief" in god compare? It is a value belief, since logical and empirical beliefs do not justify it. But the other criteria do not apply. Belief in god is not a statement about the individual, but one of the external world. Belief in god is treated as a universal truth; one that cannot change. In many cases, these beliefs are the result of other people's projections and not one's own.

Put differently, I believe the three different schools each have their place. And belief in god, justified by subjectivism, extends beyond the reach of that school.

Jagged

let me give this a go...

so luvluv your position is that:

first of all nothing, nothing, nothing (even god) can be proven. (imho this interpretation renders the word “proof” meaningless – seeing as we have no concept with which to define “proof” - but that is another discussion)

since nothing can be proven:

atheists do not have a way to prove anything, and therefore cannot claim to be rational in their beliefs, moral or otherwise. **(somewhere in here we've assumed that proof is necessary for rationality of belief)**

theists do not have a way to prove anything either, including god, but by making one "existential leap" (believing in god) they can then claim a rational basis for their following beliefs, including morality, inasmuch as they are taking the beliefs from god and/or “god’s word.”

****

interesting. (and took us long enough). i am feeling a lot of déjà vu about this idea, in fact i am almost sure it was included on some philosophy exam i took in college anybody help me?

but it doesn't seem like it has much relevance to anything. i see it as quite a weak argument in fact. you are just “passing the buck” so to speak. you still don’t have any more overall proof than an atheist does, so what does this matter?

also does not this make you feel like a kid who is not allowed to go out of the house without a chaperone? that does not sound very fun to me.

but something else is very much bothering me about this. if this is true, then if you got somehow convinced that god wanted you to, for example, kill someone, NOTHING nothing nothing in this world could convince you otherwise.

that is extremely scary.

it seems to me as if you would be saying “nothing is my responsibility if I’m following orders from the big guy.” you are not to be held ultimately responsible for your actions. this is again sounding extremely scary. in fact it is also sounding extremely familiar. considering a certain recent terrorist attack by fundamentalists who believed god was calling them to exact vengeance.

i don’t think blind allegiance to any authority is really very healthy for you or the people around you. i could go into more depth if you would like.

also, why are you not allowing anyone else's definition of "rational"? why must it require absolute proof? i would say that, even if i am high as a kite on LSD, deciding that I am indeed flying thru a starfield of singing cows, is a rational conclusion if that's what my senses are telling me. Seems to me our senses are pretty much all we got.

if you don't allow even THAT, then what basis does anything have at all? for instance, language? having a discussion with a goal of greater understanding? all meaning breaks down. why bother living at all?

Mr. Webster says:

Rational
1 a : having reason or understanding
b : relating to, based on, or agreeable to reason

Seeing as the operative concepts here are “reason” and “understanding” . . .

Reason
Etymology: Middle English resoun, from Old French raison, from Latin ration-, ratio reason, computation, from reri to calculate, think; probably akin to Gothic rathjo account, explanation
Date: 13th century
1 a : a statement offered in explanation or justification &lt;gave reasons that were quite satisfactory&gt;
b : a rational ground or motive &lt;a good reason to act soon&gt;
c : a sufficient ground of explanation or of logical defense; especially : something (as a principle or law) that supports a conclusion or explains a fact &lt;the reasons behind her client's action&gt;
d : the thing that makes some fact intelligible : CAUSE &lt;the reason for earthquakes&gt; &lt;the real reason why he wanted me to stay -- Graham Greene&gt;
2 a (1) : the power of comprehending, inferring, or thinking especially in orderly rational ways

Understanding
1 a : to grasp the meaning of
b : to grasp the reasonableness of
c : to have thorough or technical acquaintance with or expertness in the practice of
d : to be thoroughly familiar with the character and propensities of
2 : to accept as a fact or truth or regard as plausible without utter certainty
3 : to interpret in one of a number of possible ways
4 : to supply in thought as though expressed

I personally quite like all of these definitions. They emphasize the individual’s ability to think and grasp meaning, not some attempt to define the nature of reality and truth. In light of this I really am uncomfortable with your statement that atheists do not have rational beliefs and theists do. In fact, a strong case could be made that the opposite is true. Atheists reason for themselves, theists do not reason at all, they simply accept what god says without question.

Well we're quite getting into philosophy and semantics here, neither of which are really my idea of a good time, but on the other hand are possibly what's been the heart of the matter all along.

[ November 26, 2002: Message edited by: Jagged Little Pill ]</p>

Dr. Retard

Sorry for the delay, the local unievrsity's computer lab stopped working.

I'm not "entering" a claim of moral realism "into" my worldview. I'm not simply presupposing that atheism entails moral realism. That would be sneaky. I'm not trying to do anything sneaky. If I am doing something sneaky, then it's so sneaky, it's snuck right past even me.

I was merely appealing to my understanding of your argument. I thought this was your argument: Assume that moral realism is true. Now, moral realism entails neither atheism nor theism. So we have atheism and theism as our two possibilities. If atheism is true, we have no means of justifying our moral beliefs. But if theism is true, we have such a means: God could tell us. So if moral realism is true, then theism has an advantage over atheism. Please tell me if this not your argument.

I take it, then, that you agree with me we cannot deduce "p" from "God tolds me he holds the belief that p". We both recognize that there is no logical entailment from the second to the first. Your claim is, instead, that if we justifiably believe "God tolds me he holds the belief that p", then we may justifiably believe "p". There is merely a justification relation between the two propositions. One gives sufficient epistemic reasons for belief in the other. This is your claim, I think.

I should clarify what I was saying:

My claim was not "If you know that God has told you (that he believes) something, that could not possibly provide you with any good epistemic reason for believing it." After all, if God has proven himself a reliable conveyor of truth in domains where we can independently verify his claims, then we may justifiably take his claims in other domains as grounds for increasing our confidence in the truth of these claims (assuming that we may believe that God, like other persons we are acquainted with, behaves more or less regularly).

My claim was "If you know that God has told you (that he believes) something, that in itself does not license you to deductively infer that it's true, and then believe it with the same strength as your original belief that God has told you something." Knowing that God has told you (that he believes) something contrasts with knowing that God believes something. From the latter, you may deductively infer that the something is true, and then you may believe it with the same strength as you believe that God believes it. But you cannot do this with knowledge that God has told you (that he believes) something. There is no deductive route from "God told me (that he believes) something" to "That something is true".

So, I grant that God's telling us (that he believes) some moral claim can, in principle, give us some epistemic reason to believe it. But I deny that, if atheism is true, there is no similar way, in principle, for us to attain some epistemic reason to believe a moral claim. Atheism allows for the possibility that Matthew Lesko possess perfect moral knowledge. So, Matthew Lesko's telling us (that he believes) some moral claim can, in principle, give us some epistemic reason to believe it. We cannot deductively infer that Lesko's claim is true from the mere fact that he makes it. But his making it can, in principle, give us some epistemic reason to believe it.

Incidentally, as your claims for theism's superiority become more and more weak, there is less reason for even 50-50 agnostic moral realists to care. It's not that moral realism's truth entails theism. It's not that, in the real world, the truth of theism would improve our chances of obtaining moral knowledge. It's not that, in principle, the truth of theism would make it possible for us to obtain moral knowledge equally as justified as our belief that God speaks to us. It's just that the truth of theism would make it possible for us to justifiably believe moral claims on the mere evidential basis of our belief that God speaks to us. I can see a 50-50 agnostic moral realist agreeing with your weak claim and saying "So what? What does this have to do with whether God exists?"

Moreover, you simply must support your (sometimes only implicit) claim that the only way to justify a moral belief is by appeal to a belief that God has claimed to believe it (and implicit appeal to beliefs about the reliability of the claims of persons). I take it you believe that, even in principle, this is the only way to justify a moral belief. But this is an extremely implausible claim. When I reflect on my belief that rape is evil, it has no relation to any other beliefs about divine claims or the reliability of claims. You should conclude that my belief is unjustified. But I doubt that more than 100 people believe that rape is evil for such reasons. You should conclude that everyone's belief that rape is evil is unjustified (save these 100 people). Surely there are other ways of justifying moral beliefs.

I've never held that position: the falsehood of a claim simply does not follow from its being unsupported by rational argument and empirical data. I don't know what this means: "That is what I believe I said. Not that emprical data can't prove it one way or the other, but that it cannot be proven PERIOD."

But suppose a rationalist-empiricist agrees with you that rational argument and empirical data cannot support moral claims. Consistency doesn't demand that he abandon his moral beliefs. Here I definitely disagree with you. He can instead abandon the epistemological belief that unjustified beliefs should be abandoned. Because it's so difficult to believe contradictory sets of propositions, such a rationalist-empiricist will likely jettison one of two beliefs: (A) my moral beliefs (e.g., rape is evil) are true, or (B) if a belief is unjustifiable, I should abandon it. He might find (A) more appealing than (B), and just drop (B). He still holds that essential rationalist-empiricist belief that the only kind of justification is support by rational argument and empirical data; he just drops the position that unjustifiable beliefs should be abandoned. There's no contradiction, no inconsistency, in doing this.

luvluv

JLP:

Because theists do not believe that a claim must be proven in order to be believed!

There is a niftly little fail safe in terms of my willingness to kill on God's order, and it is my belief (and experience) that I am perfectly capable of not understanding God's will. If I have doubts, I won't act, and I would always have doubts about God telling me to kill someone because, in my experience with Him in my life, He would not do such a thing. (This is also one reason why I am not a Biblical literalist... I have a hard time believing that God did a lot of the things attributed to Him in the Old Testament).

Carlos:

Well, firstly, this is a false trilmea (which I guess is better than the false dilema that I seemed to be advocating!). I believe in God as a result of both logical and emprical "evidence" even though this does not amount to the total proof requirement of (some) atheists. I have had personal episodes in my life, periods where I thought God "spoke" to me, and periods when following those spoken words lead to tangible, remarkable results. This process has repeated itself to me so many times that I believe that I am rationally justfied in believing that they have a divine origin. Also, there is the actual presence of joy in my life when I am praying, and the actual development of virtues within myself, and the consistency with which the "voice" in my head knows a lot better than I do. For instance, there are many times when I feel God is telling me to do something that I don't want to do, and after a period of time fighting with Him, I consent to do what He tells me and find myself being richly rewarded by results I could have never forseen. When this process is repeated dozens and dozens and dozens of time over the period of years I am rationally justified in holding a belief that I could not prove to you or anyone other than myself.

This is the third (or fourth) way you asked me about. I believe a person is justified in believing things when He has sufficient reason, not when he has total proof. I have sufficient reason to believe in God (though perhaps you don't, I could conceed that. But you could...) and though that reason does not amount to a solid proof, I am justified in believing that.

If you mean subjective in this manner, having personal proof that is unverifable to anyone other than the self, then I would disagree that this is beyond the boundaries of subjectivism. I guess I would call this the personal experience epistemology. If I have an experience that I cannot recreate, like having seen Bigfoot, I am rationally justified in holding that belief even if I cannot prove to anyone that I saw it.

Ironically, in total contrast to what JLP has been accusing me of, my belief in God emerges totally from my willingness to trust myself and my experiences. I believe in my personal experiences over the arguments of the posters here, and therefore I believe.

Dr. Retard:

Well, this is a good (and probably superior) version of my argument, but it is not quite my point. My point, basically, was that if an atheist holds the belief that he can only hold beliefs which have empirical or rational proof, then that atheist cannot have moral beliefs.

That's what I meant by my latter statement that had you confused. It is my position that all of such an atheists moral views are unjustified and unjustifiable.

I'm not following this at all. If I have good reason to believe God tells the truth, then why is "God told me He believes something" any different from "God believes something".

Practically, this is fine, though it falls short of a sound deductive proof. But again, I was not arguing for the practical ability of the theist to determine right from wrong, only that the theist is in a position to be able to justify his moral claim whereas the atheist is not.

Nothing. That was never the question. The question was whether theistic morality is as unjustifiable as atheist morality. I claim that theists can at least propose a means which could allow for a rationally justified belief that there moral values were correct. Atheists have no such means. Or, to be more political, I will believe that atheists have such means when they prove it.

Yes, I certainly should. What is the problem with that?

I also believe that a person can hold beliefs that have not been proven, so that they are perfectly legitimate in believing rape is evil even though they cannot empirically or logically prove it.

Like what?

I agree. I would wish for all of you to choose (B), and then turn again and consider God.

Carlos

Fair enough - I'm willing to believe there might be more to it than rationalism, empiricism and subjectivism (or relativism, as Primus suggested; that's probably the more correct term). I'm not well enough versed in philosophy to know of others , though - unlike JLP, the only thing I remember from philosophy class is that I skipped it more than any other class <img src="graemlins/banghead.gif" border="0" alt="[Bang Head]" /> <img src="graemlins/banghead.gif" border="0" alt="[Bang Head]" /> <img src="graemlins/banghead.gif" border="0" alt="[Bang Head]" /> . What other theories of knowledge are there?

To a degree I agree with "a person is justified in believing things when He has sufficient reason, not when he has total proof." It's just that I am very picky in defining/using the word belief. Based on the kind of evidence (whether it be sufficient reason, total proof, or something else) I will accord the belief a certain status. As I said before, I don't treat all beliefs as equals.

I should also point out that, to me, senses are more trustworthy than innate or personal revelations. A burning bush (even if no one else saw it) would be more trustworthy than a message from god spoken only to yourself. Why do I feel this way? Because the senses mainly inform us of the external world (external to the self), whereas personal revelations reflect the inner self. The external world is full of other things I consider real, making it harder to introduce a fake. Any meddling by unnatural forces would stand out. The inner self is defined by the individual; it can be torn down and reconstructed much more easily. How does one tell the difference between revelations discovered by the self and revelations granted by god? Couldn't the self generate the same revelations as god (and vice versa)?

When I say "I believe x is moral", it is just another way of explaining "this is the kind of person I am." I define myself. I can speak on the subject of myself with greater authority than anyone else, not because I know more about myself than others do, but because I am the one in control of myself.

Hmm, I look at what I've written and I realize I'm rambling. Alas, it's late and I need to get some sleep. I will try to keep up with the discussion but will likely be slow in responding. I'm away visiting family who, um, wouldn't be too receptive to the idea of me posting here.

luvluv

Carlos:

Well, as I said my personal revelations WERE verified externally. Again, in obeying what I believe to be God's voice, even when I REALLY, REALLY didn't want to, I have found myself to be blessed far beyond my imagination. External verification has been essential in the development of my faith. God has asked me to sacrifice things in faith to him and I have seen tangible, external rewards for doing such things, generally rewards that I could not have possibly forseen.

Dr. Retard

I think you're defending the the following: Observation, scientific methodology, and logic cannot, in any way, justify moral beliefs. Rationalist-empiricist folks say that the only way for a belief to be justified is by these means. So, if rationalist-empiricist folks are right about that, moral beliefs cannot be justified.

But, it looks like rationalist-empiricist folks are obviously wrong: for, our philosophical beliefs are often (so it seems) arrived at via means other than observation, scientific methodology, and logic. We seem to appeal to brute beliefs, unsupported mental frameworks, action- and belief-guiding norms, etc. The rationalist-empiricist folks might (1) bite the bullet, and say that all philosophical beliefs are unjustified; but this might leave them open to self-refutation, in that their criterion of methods of justified beliefs looks to be itself unjustified by their own standards; this would be a lot like positivism's problem; or (2) claim that, properly understood, observation, scientific methodology, and logic can together incorporate all the justifying methods we appeal to in philosophy; this is a rich conception of rationalism-empiricism that finds more than meets the eye in the standard justifying methods; I suspect this would be Quine's approach.

Now, I'll just make a claim: Ethical and meta-ethical beliefs seem to be a lot like philosophical beliefs. How? In that they're not arrived via obviously rationalist-empiricist methods (observation, etc.); they seem to be arrived at via the other ways mentioned above (appeal to brute beliefs, etc.).

So, if rationalist-empiricist folks are worried about justifying moral beliefs (for these reasons), then they should also be worried about justifying philosophical beliefs in general. If, upon realizing this, they maintain their moral worries and become worried about justifying philosophical beliefs in general, then they should be worried about their own worry -- which means they shouldn't be terribly worried to begin with.

I think you're also defending this: It is impossible for a (rationalist-empiricist) atheist to hold justified moral beliefs. In contrast, it is possible for a theist to hold justified moral beliefs -- here's how: the justification could consist in the combination of (i) divine revelation, justifiably trusted because of (ii) belief in the truth of what God says, which is in turn grounded on (iii) a universal, though qualified, trust in what other people say, which trust seems reasonable enough. However, this possible justification does not hold for many believers, or quite likely any. In the real world, and in general, atheists and theists both have unjustified moral beliefs.

You also say "the theist is in a position to be able to justify his moral claim whereas the atheist is not", but to be completely precise, I think you should have said, "the theist could imaginably be in a position to be able to justify his moral claim whereas the (rationalist-empiricist) atheist could not (not without thereby becoming a theist, anyway!)."

But (1) if this is all you're defending, it doesn't look that bad for an atheist. Suppose logic seems unable to prove or disprove some mathematical conjecture. The greatest mathematicians are stumped (I'm not sure whether, to make the analogy tight, anyone (say, Paul Cohen) must have proven the conjecture's undecidability under some system). You arrive on the scene and say, "Ah, well, if God were to exist, we could ask God and he could tell us the answer." After a preliminary dispute over whether to trust God, everyone agrees that we could place at least some trust in God's word, especially if he were to first show himself to be a reliable conduit of truth. But then it hits us: Who cares? So what, if, conceivably, a theist could get the answers straight from God himself? Is this supposed to tell us anything interesting about the real world?

And (2), I don't think it can be defended. My Matthew Lesko example tries to show that we cannot rule out a (rationalist-empiricist) atheist having a justified moral belief via a similar revelatory method. For it is conceivable both that Matthew Lesko have infallible moral knowledge and that we can justifiably place some trust in his word. In which case, we (rationalist-empiricist) atheists can obtain justified moral beliefs.

Here's the difference: "God believes p" entails "p". This is analytic; to doubt the entailment would be to exhibit linguistic incompetence. In contrast, "God told me He believes something" does not entail "p". Now, one way to derive "p", using "God told me He believes something", is to use the crucial premise "God never speaks falsely about his beliefs". If you have good grounds for believing that premise, then (ceteris paribus) you have good grounds for believing "p". But this is maybe a probabilistic inference, or perhaps a matter of epistemic warrant, or something else besides strict analytic entailment. To the extent that you're uncertain about the crucial premise, you should be uncertain about p. In contrast, the first inference doesn't allow for any uncertainty. Another way of putting the point: If trust in a person's word cannot be justified, then we could never justifiably arrive at p, via God's belief-report, though we could still arrive at p via God's belief.

[ November 29, 2002: Message edited by: Dr. Retard ]</p>

luvluv

Totally agree with everything you've said above.

Well, inasmuch as theists do believe that God communicates with them, it is totally possible that they could claim to have rationally justified moral beliefs. For instance, I personally believe that God has told me (in a personal manner) that it is morally wrong to purposely hold onto resentments and unforgiveness. He never spoke to me audibly, but I did get the internal moral compulsion that I know, from repeated experience, to be coming from the source I call God which has never failed to be correct in dealing with me. So I can (and do) claim to have the rationally justified belief that unforgiveness is a moral wrong.

You are justified in not believing me, but my belief is rationally justified.

Well, it is impossible for the rationalist-empricist atheist to justifiy his belief in Mathew Lesko's moral infallibility. God, by definition, has infallible moral knowledge. Matthew Lesko, by definition, does not. This would be a claim Matthew Lesko is making about himself or one that has been made on his behalf. So if the rationalist-empiricist atheist cannot claim to believe something without verifying it, how would he go about verifiying the claim of Matthew Lesko?

1) God holds told me he holds the belief p to be true.
2) God is omniscient.
3) An omniscient being cannot hold a false belief.
4) God never lies about his beliefs.
5) Therefore, P is true.

What is wrong with this argument? Is it that 4 is not an established fact, and it is not implied in the defintion of an omniscient God. If I added the ability of omnibenevolence, would that help?

1) God is omniscient.
2) God holds the belief that p is true
3) It is impossible for an omniscient being to hold a false belief.
4) God is omnibenevolent.
5) God told me p is true.
6) An omnibenvolent being would not lie about his beliefs.
7) Therefore, p is true.

Which premise would you dispute? Probably 6, right? As I've argued before, omnibenevolence is hard to describe.