jlowder

That's a pretty stupid question, isn't it? I would argue that it is about as stupid as the question, "Can Atheists Have Morals?" Even Christian philosophers grant that atheists can know moral principles and behave according to those principles. If someone wishes to deny that theists or atheists can have morals, it seems the burden of proof should fall on them to offer some reason why they could not have morals.

But perhaps there is a more interesting sense of the question. Instead of asking, "Can theists recognize moral principles and behave according to those principles?", perhaps instead we should ask the following question instead:

"Even on the assumption that there exists a supernatural creator of the physical universe, what reason is there to believe that creator is the basis or foundation of morality itself?"

For all the lame attacks made by novice apologists against atheist morality, it is surprising how little discussion one finds about how theism is supposed to solve the problems that <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/atheism/morality-and-atheism.html" target="_blank">atheistic morality</a> allegedly has.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ October 19, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

Bible Humper

Hello Jlowder!

The onus is on the one making the positive assertion!

The answer depends upon what qualifies to be called a "moral", if it is merely conformity to the commonly accepted standards of wrong and right, then it is undeniable that there are many atheists and theists who are "moral".

The link you provided leads to the article <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/whymoral.html" target="_blank">Why be moral?</a> This article does a good job laying out the choices.

Which of these would you choose and why? Please also link to an exact definition of what you mean when you use the word "moral", there is a definate lack of consensus.

To be moral is:
D1: to follow moral rules imposed by others.
D2: to follow God's moral rules.
D3: to follow one's own moral rules.
D4: to follow my (the speaker's) moral rules.
D5: to follow the absolutely right moral rules.
D6: to be loving (i.e., unselfish and altruistic) towards others.

jlowder

I'm undecided between two additional options:

D7: to follow the objectively true (but not necessarily absolute) moral rules

and

D8: to follow the intersubjectively true moral rules.

Why would I choose either D7 or D8? Because I am a moral realist; moral realists must be either subjectivists, intersubjectivists, or objectivists; and I reject subjectivism. For more on the subjectivism vs. intersubjectivism vs. objection distinction, click <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=52&t=000251&p=" target="_blank">here</a>.

With that said, I'd like to point out that the "Why be Moral?" question has nothing to do with this thread. The questions in this thread are, "Can a theist have morals?", and ""Even on the assumption that there exists a supernatural creator of the physical universe, what reason is there to believe that creator is the basis or foundation of morality itself?" Therefore, I respectfully request that any discussion of the "Why be moral?" question happen in <a href="http://iidb.org/ubb/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic&f=52&t=000328&p=2" target="_blank">this</a> thread.

Sincerely,

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ October 19, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

bd-from-kg

jlowder:

Actually there’s a more interesting related question: how can theists know the difference between right and wrong? It’s all very well to say that God “created” morality, but how are we supposed to know what this morality looks like?

The most obvious and common answer is that God revealed the true principles of morality to us. But aside from the fact the He apparently revealed a number of different moralities at different times to various peoples, this doesn’t really help. For how can we know (or even have any degree of confidence) that He told us the truth? Again the obvious answer is that God wouldn’t lie to us because that would be morally wrong. But how do we know that lying is morally wrong? Because God told us so? The circularity here is pretty obvious; it’s exactly like believing that a man is honest because he tells you he’s honest.

A similar attempt is to say that God gave us an “innate moral faculty” that allows us to distinguish between right and wrong. But this faces the same problem: how can we know that this “innate faculty” yields true insights into what’s right and wrong? How can we know that God did not deliberately give us an innate faculty that seems to us to tell us the difference between right and wrong, but that doesn’t do so? Once again, it would seem that we have to rely on God’s “goodness” – i.e., He wouldn’t do that to us, would He? After all, it would be wicked! But how can we know that this would be wicked? Because our innate moral faculty tells us so? Around the circle we go again.

In view of this impossible dilemma, some theists say that “right” acts are not right because God commands (or wills, or approves of) them, but that He commands then because they are right. But that implies that right actions are right independently of God’s will or approval; that is, their rightness is logically independent of God’s existence or His will. But in that case God is not the creator, or source, or ground, of everything that is, because there is at least one thing (namely morality) whose existence and nature is independent of God’s. This fundamental dualism in the ultimate nature of things is generally considered to be incompatible with the standard “omnimax” conception of God. And the reason is obvious: if there are two things that exist independently of one another, why not more? Why can’t the universe itself for example, exist independently of God?

None of this is original, of course; Plato got there a couple of thousand years ahead of me.

By the way, I'll be gone for the next three days and will be unable to answer any responses until I get back.

jlowder

What is "interesting" is a matter of preference. With all due respect, I do not find that particular question (about theistic moral epistemology) terribly interesting, since most theists will appeal to some sort of holy text as God's revelation to humankind.

If a revelation were from God, who by definition is morally perfect, then it would follow that the revelation would be honest. The question is whether there is any reason to believe there exists a supernatural being who has, among other things, the property of moral perfection and hence is an honest being.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

bd-from-kg

jlowder:

Well, it seems that you've already brought up the epistemological question in your OP. For example:

Besides, my comments are quite relevant to the question of whether it is reasonable to believe that God is "the basis or foundation of morality itself". If this implies (as I argue) that it is impossible to know anything about morality, it would seem to be a pretty self-defeating belief.

This idea is no more helpful than the ones I discussed. If we cannot know whether God is honest, we cannot know whether He would deliberately "inspire" a false text, or lead people to believe that a false text is inspired.

With all due respect, I think that you've missed the point completely. The conclusion that God is honest only follows from the premise that God is morally perfect if honesty is a component of moral perfection - i.e., if honesty is virtuous. But if God is the basis or foundation of morality, then the only possible ultimate source of knowledge about what is virtuous is God Himself. If lying is wrong because God commands (or wills or approves of) it, it follows that it could be otherwise (just as God could have created a different universe but chose to create this one). That is, it is a contingent fact that lying is wrong. But if it is a contingent fact, we can only learn of it, ultimately, through God. He has to let us know that lying is wrong; otherwise we will never have a clue that it's so.

But how can we trust this information (regardless of the route by which it is transmitted from God to us) unless we can know independently of it that God would not lie to us? And how can we possibly know this independently of God unless the moral principle that lying is wrong is itself independent of God? But if God is the basis or foundation of morality, this principle is not independent of God. So we can never know it. And therefore we can never know any other moral principle either.

Thus the idea that God is the basis or foundation of morality is self-defeating. If it is true, we can never know anything about morality, or even have any rationally justified beliefs about it.

[And now I really am leaving for a few days.]

[ October 20, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

jlowder

Out of curiosity, what does 'bd-from-kg' mean?

Right, but in context, I made it clear that epistemology wasn't what I wanted to talk about since it (the ability of nontheists to have moral knowledge) is regarded as a non-issue by virtually all professional philosophers, including Christian philosophers.

You can't use moral epistemology to prove a point about moral ontology. My post focused on moral ontology. The conclusion of your argument was that even if God exists and even if God were the basis of morality, there is no way in principle of knowing the difference between right and wrong. That is an argument for moral skepticism. That is not an argument against God as the ontological foundation of morality.

Part of the concept of God is that God is, by definition, a loving being. A loving being would not deliberately inspire a false text, or lead people to believe that a false text is inspired.

Okay, you have now got me interested in your argument. But I still don't consider this relevant to this thread, since my opening post was concerned with moral ontology.

Anyway, I'll respond to your argument, but I really would like to focus on the ontological question in this thread. You claim that if God were the basis of morality, then it would be "a contingent fact that lying is wrong." However, I'm not nearly as sure as you are about that. There is a long tradition in theistic ethics that God only acts in accordance with His nature. So the conclusion, "If God is the basis or foundation of morality, then it is a contingent fact that lying is wrong," follows if and only if were metaphysically possible that God could lie to us. If it is metaphysically impossible for God to lie to us, then it would be a necessary truth, not a contingent fact, that lying is wrong. So the key question here is this: is it metaphysically possible for God to lie to us (assuming God exists)? Unfortunately for your argument, I think the answer is "no." The concept of God entails that God's nature is necessary, and hence it is not even possible for God to have any nature other than the one he actually possesses. If you ask, "Yes, but how do we know that honesty is part of God's necessary nature?", then I would respond, "Because God is necessarily loving and a loving being is honest."

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ October 23, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

jlowder

In an effort to encourage discussion on this thread, I thought it would be interesting to discuss what <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/adolf_grunbaum/index.shtml" target="_blank">Adolf Grunbaum</a> has to say about the theistic implications of morality in his excellent essay, "<a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/adolf_grunbaum/poverty.html" target="_blank">The Poverty of Theistic Morality</a>." He writes:

Grunbaum then discusses the moral permissiveness of theism with respect to the problem of evil. After discussing various failed theodicies for the Holocaust, Grunabum makes the following observation.

In other words, if theism requires us to believe that no matter what evils occur in the actual world, God still exists and has some reason for allowing them, this empties all content from a theological foundation of ethics and shows how bankrupt the entire enterprise of theistic ethics really is.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

Plump-DJ

To JJL...

I would agree, sort of. However i'm not so sure how atheism solves it either, if that is what your are hinting at? I can at least initialy see how theism may solve it. But if i am stuck with atheism and nothing else then i cannot ignore the "Dawkins-esque" reductionism which flows from that. That includes me (the self) and all of my moral beliefs. They are the products of socio-biological evolution (what other option is there???) and the idea that a moral compass developed by this process could point towards something which is "objectively good or true" (holds regardless of wether i belive it or not) seems very unDarwinian. As Rorty wrote..

"The idea that one species of organism is, unlike all the others, oriented not just toward its own increated prosperity but toward Truth, is as un-Darwinian as the idea that every human being has a built-in moral compass--a conscience that swings free of both social history and individual luck."

If i could not reconcile my own moral "intuitions" and "experience" on non-theistic grounds (and given the Dawkins-esque reductionism which flows from that i at least cannot) i only have 1 other option.

Well isn't that just a tad overly simplistic. What about free will and the issue of
Deontic constraint? To me it seems you cannot have moral agents making honest and meaningful choices unless one allows for "bad stuff to happen." This would at least account for the existence of "bad stuff" proliferated by mankind and in my view most of the really bad things are "maintaned" by ourselves.

In the end though it's a tough moral choice isn't it? And what then is a Goodly God supposed to do if he feels like spreadin' some lovin' by creating us? Perhaps not bother with the whole thing in the first place.

And to me words like "Evil" and "Good" have always implied something a litte bit more ontologicaly significent or meaningful then I think atheism allows for.

[ October 23, 2002: Message edited by: Plump-DJ ]</p>

jlowder

I had written:

In reply, Plump-DJ writes:

How? Please, do tell.

Why can't anyone who posts on this thread actually stick to the question at hand? For the sake of this discussion, it doesn't matter what atheism entails. The point at issue here is how <strong>theism</strong> provides a basis for morality. Attacking atheism is completely irrelevant in THIS thread. Even if (for the sake of argument) atheism logically entailed nihilism, that still wouldn't answer the question of how theism provides a basis or foundation for morality. (Note: I am willing to discuss your concerns about atheism, just not in this thread. If you want to pursue the meta-ethical implications of atheism, I would be happy to discuss that in the thread on <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=52&t=000328" target="_blank">atheistic metaethics</a>.)

I wrote:

Plump-DJ replies:

What about free will and deontic constraint? I don't want this thread to degrade into a debate over the problem of evil, so I will try to focus the discussion here on Grunbaum's argument and an alleged theistic basis for morality. I think your reply misses Grunbaum's point. Grunbaum's point is that if theological ethics can justify God's passively allowing the Holocaust and other evils to occur, then theological ethics are morally <strong>bankrupt.</strong>

Jeffery Jay Lowder