SlateGreySky

Does anyone out there have any opinions on the relation of logos to the language of subjectivity?

Specifically, I want to compare ideas about the role of a rational cosmic structure which unveils itself in human rational capacity with ideas about the language we use to present the idea of "I," "me," or "oneself."

Would people want to deny the existence of logos (a la Heidegger, seemingly), or would they want to affirm its existence and make it somehow commensurable with the idea of self-consciousness and self-reference?

Is it irrational to conceive of a traditional logos while at the same time referring to oneself as an entity distinct from all other entities? Does the word "I" refer at all, or is it self-deconstructive?

Help!

JP2

Have neither the time nor the will for a long response, but:

Firstly, I believe that Heidegger's recognition of the "I" or the "self" came through his own conception of dasein. For him - and I'm not an expert on Heidegger, so I'm not sure if I've got this right - the dasein is not an articificial construct of language, but exists as a very real being among other beings (the mitsein). The dasein alone is the being capable of comprehending being as a "thing-in-itself" (realised only, he postulated, via the recognition and understanding of "nothingness"): thus, Heidegger differentiates between the "self" and the rest of the "what-is" (forget the German phrase) and this rift between the two concepts is reconciled by the former's ability - as an existent being-in-itself - to comprehend the latter.

If we're using the word "I", then, we could quite easily suggest that it is referential - namely, it is referring to a specific being. The question of whether it is possible to consider or refer to specific beings independantly in the context of the greater "logos" is a tough one, though: when we consider a chair as a being, to use an example, we tend to consider it conceptually rather than existentially. For instance, when viewed as an existent being as part of "logos" the chair possesses properties (as part of it's essential "facticity") that we may not usually consider. To "properly" account for the nature of the chair, as part of the logos, we would - at the most generally theoretical level - need to account for all other beings as well - after all, they all exist in relation to the chair and vice versa. We would need to take into account the history of the wood used to make the chair, the specific nature of the carpenter who made it, how it is employed and so forth. Similarly, we must consider its relation to all other beings to properly "know" it's "actual" nature in the sense that the "essential nature" of the chair is bound up - to some degree - with the "essential nature" of everything else. That is, we'd need to consider the chair in relation to all the other objects in the room, the room itself, then the room itself in relation to the house, the individuals who live there, the local climate, the properties of the Earth more generally and then - finally(?) - the properties of the universe - or, more broadly, the "totality" of "what-is".

Thus the question, "Is it irrational to conceive of a traditional logos while at the same time referring to oneself as an entity distinct from all other entities?" is dependant on how you define the word "distinct". The chair is distinct from all else merely in the sense that we "conceive" it to be, but not in the sense that the chair is, in any way, actually "independent" from the rest of all that exists. So then, the same could be said for the self: we can consider it in isolation from the rest of "being" and "beings", yet I think we must still acknowledge that the "self" is affected by all of "being" and all "beings". Whether or not this makes the self essentially "distinct" from everything else is - unfortunately - a matter of semantics. Of course, I could still refer to the dasein in differentiating between the self and the rest of "what-is", but it depends, ultimately, on how valid you believe Heidegger's distiction was to begin with.

Therefore:

I believe that the word "I" is referrential, but the real question is whether it is referring to something essentially distinct (again, a matter of definition) from the rest of the totality of being, or whether it is merely referring to a single or collective "facet" of logos as defined by the unification of and/or necessitated relationships between all of "being" and all "beings" and thus is not really referring to anything distinct at all. If everything is defined as part of the greater "logos", then to what degree can we argue that the self is different from everything else? Does its ability to comprehend being (including it's own being) substantially distinguish it from all other beings to be considered seperately from them? Is it possible to view aspects of the system in isolation from the rest of the system and still properly understand their nature?

I don't understand your use of the word "commensurable" here - did you mean compatible perhaps? :conf:

SlateGreySky

Thanks for the interesting response, particularly the remarks on Heidegger. I don't know his philosophy as well as I should, and your comments were really helpful. :notworthy

I'd like to quote a few of your statements, if I may, to try and illustrate what I believe to be a key linguistic/metaphysical problem with the idea that the word "I" refers when the self (subject) is conceived as an entity distinct from cosmic logos (or even as a "facet" of that logos).

As I understand logos, it denotes the rational structure of the cosmos as reflected in human reason and language. "I" is an element of language that, it seems, refers to the self. Hegel unpacks the word "I" as a kind of self-identification of the subject in the sense-certainty section of Phenomenology of Spirit. Reference in language, however, objectifies that to which language refers, especially if we conceive of "I" as a kind of ostensive name. But then, the subject has become object! If "I" is referential, then it objectifies itself, de(con)structing itself in its own self-reference.

Now, if the cosmic logos is distinct in any real sense from "I"-as-subject, then the logos is objectified. If "I" am subject, then the logic of my own language has distinguished me from the cosmic logos - the very logic and language that were supposed to have been hallmarks of the unified logos with which to begin!

If the subject (self) is affected, then it is an object for that which affects it. Once the subject has been affected, it is no longer subject-for-subject: objectivity has been introduced in its interaction with that "other." This is why I think your point about the distinction of the self from the other is such a crucial one. Interaction with an other annihilates the subject's dominance of consciousness (cf. Hegel's "unhappy" consciousness). Interaction with logos-as-other, then, would seem necessarily to annihilate selfhood. That is why it seems to me that if the traditional ideas about logos are to be retained, "I" needs to be conceived as something other than (more than?) a name for an object (the "self," whatever that means!).

So, this really is the question, isn't it? Only a subject can comprehend, but in its comprehension, it seems to distinguish. Such linguistic distinction, we have seen, seems to lead to objectification. That objectification seems (to me) to annihilate the subject-for-itself. Hence my dilemma.

Any more thoughts? :banghead:

SlateGreySky

Yeah, I guess I did mean "compatible" rather than "commensurable," although maybe both ultimately apply . . . sorry for the confusion.

John Page

I think the "rational cosmic structure" is a figment. Why not "actual human structure"?

Cheers, John