Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Adrian Selby · 04-09-2002, 01:09 AM

"Here's an example, if two valued logic we're accurate there is either a god or there isn't. This being the case, agnostics could not logically exist."--John

Didn't see this point picked up. If agnostics do not think there is enough evidence to be able to go either way, this doesn't mean one can't go either way, they've just taken a stance on the information so far. I'm sure they can agree there is a God or there isn't, but that they're suspending judgement. At least, I don't think their position rules out the fact of the matter, if only because it could be true or false regardless of what they think.

Kim,
I don't see a situation under which the law of non contradiction could allow me to say that there is and isn't a God simultaneously. To say that my inability to conceive of this isn't evidence for it brings into question for me this idea that absolute truth is one of many possible philosophical models. If it is, why are we not using other models, given these models probably couldn't be compared to any external set of criteria. I wonder why it is we all accept that a thing can be itself and not another thing, and we haven't formulated an alternative to this. I wonder whether it is reasonable to assert that because we're human we can't possibly stumble on an absolute truth. Perhaps we oughtn't be arrogant about these things, but what if we have stumbled on an absolute truth. We may certainly be wrong, but on the issue of logical laws I'd say that was skepticism gone too far, and your position is all about reasonableness and reliability. To say that something is merely human does not necessarily stop it from being true.

Whatever it is we sense, corresponding or not to reality, is it true that when we sense x we are not sensing y, and if we believed we were sensing x when we in fact sensed y then it is true that we did? My point being, in order to be able to distinguish between truth and falsehood or even to have sense perception at all, one must look at the description of what the law of non contradiction is and see if it applies. One does not rely on the law, or put it before anything, but one experiences, then notices how the law of non contradiction describes an aspect of experience, that when we experience something, we are not experiencing another thing. It seems to apply all the time, and seems always to have applied. That we don't have the apparatus of infinity to test this presupposition does not mean it cannot be absolutely true. The egocentric predicament doesn't seem to me to effectively rule out absolute truth as a possibility.

Adrian

phaedrus · 04-09-2002, 01:35 AM

Quote:

An ideology is a complex of ideas or notions which represents itself to the thinker as an absolute truth for the interpretation of the world and his situation within it; it leads the thinker to accomplish an act of self-deception for the purpose of justification, obfuscation and evasion in some sense or other to his advantage. Karl Jaspers : The Origin and Goal of History

WJ · 04-09-2002, 06:52 AM

Just an observation, there are so many good points here (tempest/RDB to name a few), I'm being overwelmed by an 'emotive' response

I believe we are back to the establishing(metaphysical)truth between what is in-here v. out-there relative what it means for something to be absolutely true. We know that the cosmos is unknowable, just like we know certain axioms from mathmatics and physics are also unknowable and/or present contradicton (spinning balls precluding the knowledge/truth of which side is red and which side is green.)

For instance, let's say I want to determine the size of a structure to make it stand without falling. I use a mathematical formula to size-up the physical item I want to create. We can agree that the formula may be an absolute truth in its own axiomatic application (idea), before I physically create a structural component in accordance with that math/logical formula. However, I know that a severe wind may cause it to fail, so I over-design it using a similar formula. But where do I stop? Does there exist limitless possibilities for a naturally occuring disaster whereby destruction or failure of my 'truth/idea' is logically possible thus proving it is false? Of course. Can I say then that my true formula is an absolute when I apply it to the natural world? No, I can't.

Point is, in the world of infinite dynamics and cosmological uncertainty, we percieve an absolute mathematical truth as an idea of agreement in our minds. With that comes an element of knowing something is 'out-there' (uncertainty) that at some point, could prove us wrong. Nevertheless, we say... "This structural design is true, it works and it's in accordance with the logic of math".

So, unless I can create perfect conditions, and know that those conditions would not ever change, I do not possess the knowledge of absolute truth from the laws of mathematical knowledge. This is also analogous to Tempest's view that one is not always able to observe, from all angles, the colors of the ball.

Walrus

John Page · 04-09-2002, 08:28 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Adrian Selby:
.....Didn't see this point picked up. If agnostics do not think there is enough evidence to be able to go either way, this doesn't mean one can't go either way, they've just taken a stance on the information so far.

Agreed. I was pushing back on the Bill's suggestion that if the LoNC is invalid it must be considered simultaneously true and false. This violates the LoI for prop logic.

I hope I haven't offended Bill on the agnostic example - take a look at his home page. Clearly, one can be undecided.

I'm also hoping Bill comes back to explain how he thinks semantics overrides the laws of logic in the case of a logical paradox. Sounds like the semantics involved would point to a more sensible logic.

I'm liking the revolving ball exercise more and more - it shows that one can make a true statement that is wrong without also being false.

Cheers.

Adrian Selby · 04-10-2002, 02:38 PM

John, finally, I refer to your earlier post to me, from page 1.

You conclude, with reference to a point of mine, early in the post that "truth/identity relations are assigned (subjectively and internally) by individuals according their internal concepts describing reality."

So through communication we can arrive it statements that we can mutually define as true, but as you say later, because these things are only representations, we could be wrong.

Later on in the post you say this

"But we can explore through numerous points of view to generate spatial and temporal knowledge, again comparing with the observations of others. Also we can investigate through devices that provide us different impressions that our direct senses. e.g. microscope. In this way our objectivity is greater, our knowledge becomes more complete and our truths about reality stronger."

If truth is internally constructed, I do not understand how knowledge could be 'more complete' except intersubjectively. But if all humans are doing is agreeing with each other more or less on what statements are true, then by what criteria could we be said to be sure that objectivity and truths about reality were becoming stronger? Is this only 'stronger' in terms of the increase in the numbers of people that agree on any given truth statement? Only if identity relations are assigned by humans, I expect this is what generates your conclusion about the inherent arbitrariness of the lnc, then is it not possible that a thing can have a given identity. Only if a thing's identity is generated through our perceptions and agreements regarding our perceptions, then where perceptions differ, and the spinning red and green ball example is a good one, a thing's identity is pretty much what we all agree it is.

This seems to rule out the possibility that a thing can have an identity independent of our knowledge of it or our statements about what we perceive as its identity. Its an interesting question for me to determine how a thing can have an identity independent of how we define it, but for it to hit our perceptions at the first instance of observation proves, if we're not hallucinating, that it exists, and if it exists in itself, then it has qualities in and of itself, and so it has an identity, i.e. our senses would determine what those qualities were from our point of reference, but we might be right or wrong, or more right or wrong. We could however, be sure that it has an identity and that a statement that encapsulates that truth would be objectively true, if only we could frame it, or know that we had framed it.

While this possibility exists, it offers one source for arbitrating between competing views of the identity of an object. To think cheesily about the 'wavicle' it might be that someone thought 'it' was a particle, and someone else thought 'it' was a wave, they then realised the data could be interpreted either way. But if someone had full intersubjective and consistent agreement on the thing as particle, but after a breakthrough someone gained the same level of agreement on this thing being a wave, then if a third came along and said something else that gained intersubjective agreement, how would we know we weren't completely off base again, awaiting a 4th and 5th interpretation. Is it only consistency with regard to data that we hold to be the arbiter between explanations of the thing? That a more consistent explanation across experiments and observations = a better explanation? Why consistency, is this itself an arbitrary choice, to suggest that consistency of observation with regard to a thing is what allows us to call statements that reflect that consistency true? Why not say that the more inconsistent statements are about a thing the more we truly know it? After all, if the lnc is simply an axiom held arbitrarily, then there are no grounds for using consistency of explanation and observation for creating relational statements and labelling them true, except insofar as those grounds are arbitrarily agreed.

I'm struggling to get at the point here, and time has run out on me. But if the lnc was arbitrary then I don't understand why I can't have experiences that are self contradictory, such as seeing something float and sink. I tend to see a thing, or an event and I'm not seeing the opposite of that event, whatever it is. If the lnc merely describes the act of experiencing, then wouldn't we have to have an experience A that was simultaneously NOT A for us to refute its status as something that is objectively true or certain, or rather, a whole slew of such experiences given the commonality with which we tend to find an experience is not simultaneously not that experience?

I hope a more cogent thinker can see the thrust of this.

Adrian

John Page · 04-10-2002, 03:37 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Adrian Selby:
If truth is internally constructed, I do not understand how knowledge could be 'more complete' except intersubjectively. But if all humans are doing is agreeing with each other more or less on what statements are true, then by what criteria could we be said to be sure that objectivity and truths about reality were becoming stronger? Is this only 'stronger' in terms of the increase in the numbers of people that agree on any given truth statement?

Partial response as follows:

Without the involvement of another person, and therefore not intersubjectively, an observer can singly inject some "objectivity" by:

1. Reflecting on their observations and try to make their understanding of this body of knowledge consistent and coherent. This is what Rodin's "Thinker" is doing. (OK, I know, its a statue, but it helps to reinforce my point because you are now considering whether my analogy is valid against your body of knowledge).

2. Conducting something akin to a scientific experiment. This provides more knowledge to reflect on and make internally coherent etc.

I argue that the truths get stronger as a function of a) the amount of information that we have about reality and b) how well we have analyzed that information into a coherent body of knowledge.

Take a look at this chart <a href="http://www.reconciliationism.org/reality.htm" target="_blank">of reality quadrants</a>, objectivity increases as you move the horizontal bar upwards.

In answer to the last question quoted, no. It would depend how many of those concerned had studied the subject matter suffciently (objectively?) to reach a valid conclusion.

Cheers!

John Page · 04-10-2002, 05:36 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Adrian Selby:
This seems to rule out the possibility that a thing can have an identity independent of our knowledge of it or our statements about what we perceive as its identity.

Yes, you could say the identity is an inextricable part of our knowledge of "it".

Quote:

Originally posted by Adrian Selby:
Its an interesting question for me to determine how a thing can have an identity independent of how we define it, but for it to hit our perceptions at the first instance of observation proves, if we're not hallucinating, that it exists, and if it exists in itself, then it has qualities in and of itself, and so it has an identity, i.e. our senses would determine what those qualities were.....

When "it" first hits our perceptions it a "something" that we "know not what". You might consider that each "quality", when perceived has an identity. The mind correlates the sense data comprising these "qualities" to form higher level identities, or aggregates. i.e. we don't know beforehand which "somethings" can be repeat associations with other "somethings".

I maintain that the "truth" of an identity arises by deeming a match between the mental template for the archetypal thing and the actual thing being experienced. Note that I do not differentiate between conscious and unconscious knowledge - hence an aggregate can already be formed before we become consciously aware of it. (e.g. we just consciously experience a "tree") The presence of an identity just means "there is something" in the mind, what it is considered to be depends on context and detail. (e.g. Christmas tree, fake tree, evergreen etc.)

Quote:

Originally posted by Adrian Selby:
.....Is it only consistency with regard to data that we hold to be the arbiter between explanations of the thing? That a more consistent explanation across experiments and observations = a better explanation?

Yes and yes.

Quote:

Originally posted by Adrian Selby:
Why consistency, is this itself an arbitrary choice, to suggest that consistency of observation with regard to a thing is what allows us to call statements that reflect that consistency true? Why not say that the more inconsistent statements are about a thing the more we truly know it?

No, it is an observation that observational consistency is more likely to yield a "reliable" rule. Its the truth about truth, if you will.
Inconsistencies are useful when we are looking for exceptions - once understood they can produce refinements of our understanding.

Quote:

Originally posted by Adrian Selby:
After all, if the lnc is simply an axiom held arbitrarily......

I don't think lnc is arbitrary, experience has a lot to do with it. Propositional logic is a formal system that provides a method for deducing strong truth-functional values. (It does have some weaknesses, though, see the Liar Paradox thread I started proposing refinements to its implementation).

Quote:

Originally posted by Adrian Selby:
I'm struggling to get at the point here, and time has run out on me. But if the lnc was arbitrary....

Again, not arbitrary. However, any system proposing a priori axioms is exposed to weakness because they may be the result of imperfect or incomplete understanding. Specifically, if the axiom is a tautology, it cannot sensibly claim to hold any absolute truth - for the same reasons certain explanations of god are invalid. If the axiom is not a tautology, I think there must be some input assumption which needs to be tested etc.

Cheers!

tempest · 04-11-2002, 09:37 AM

John Page
"I argue that the truths get stronger as a function of a) the amount of information that we have about reality and . . . "

This is so hard to talk about isn't it?
I agree with this statement and yet I have to disagree with this statement.

"truths getting stronger." Whatever truth is, if it is at all, once we say "truth" we are at full strength, like being pregnant.

So I'm going to change the quote to "truth is a function of the amount of information that we have about reality.."

truth is information about reality.

This is agree with, but what has been accomplished with this definition?

How about, truth is verified facts about reality. truth is verity. truth is demonstrated fact. truth reflects reality.

I don't want to give up, but what can we say that isn't either meaningless, illogical or unprovable?

I like to look at truth in opposition to the lie. It's not very ontological of me, but it's a little epistemological.

I tell my brother I will meet him at the house.
My brother understands what this means and goes to the house to meet me.
When I said these words, I was lying because I knew in my mind that I would not be going to the house.
This was only a lie for two reasons.
1. My brother took the words "I will meet you at the house" to serve one purpose.
2. I took the words "I will meet you at the house" to serve another purpose.

So when I ask for the definition of truth itself, I might get "truth is meaning what you say" or "using words that reflect your reality". In other words, truth is an objectifying my reality for another's mind.

But I could say "truth is nothing more than the illusion of one's perception of what is other" Truth does not exist until I say it does, because the same words told my brother one thing, while they meant something else to me. The only objects there are, are physical, like "me" "meeting" "brother" and "house". My brother's organization of these objects is his illusion, and my organization of these objects is my illusion, and the reality between us is, whatever object that may be, is similarly nothing more than material to illude us.

But I can't say that, because the lie worked. My brother did go to the house. There was meaning and truth present in the moment I used words to lie. There was one meaning in my brother, another meaning in me, and the truth that I knew the difference enough to use those particular words to reach the desired effect.

So, it seems to me, that we can't escape divorcing truth from ourselves, our minds, reality and words. Somehow, truth must be objective.

When we see that we've been lied to, we see two things at once in the same object. We see the words - we see their meaning, and we see how they were used by the liar to have a different meaning. The objects present in the lie are words and two distinct meanings, one true, the other false. So we are using truth to reflect the reality of a particular meaning of a sentence.

This level of abstraction leads me to wonder if objective truth is separate from the subject knowing this truth. Truth may not have being, or life without my mind knowing the truth, but if there is truth in mind, there is an object for me that I do not possess. Truth must be an object that can be "seen" by many people simultaneously the same, and if the particular truth is simple, it can be fully possessed by many simultaneously.

My father knows that I lied just a completely as my brother, once I admit the truth. This is objectivity. somehow.

John Page · 04-11-2002, 10:45 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by tempest:
John Page
....This is so hard to talk about isn't it?
I agree with this statement and yet I have to disagree with this statement....

truth is information about reality....

Tempest:

I have the same kind of problems with truth etc. This has driven me to suggest an explanation, part of which is in the <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=56&t=000130" target="_blank">Liar Paradox Explanation Thread</a>.

I liked your above quoted definition, if I could modify it slightly "A truth is an accurate statement about reality". Unfortunatley we can't verify this without understanding reality and whether our minds perceive it accurately. Catch 22.

Cheers!

dostf · 04-11-2002, 04:40 PM

John/Tempest:

"A truth is an accurate statement about reality". [QUOTE]- John
- this "reality" is the human itself

I maintain that the "truth" of an identity arises by deeming a match between the mental template for the archetypal thing and the actual thing being experienced. quote-john
- a reasonable assertion for how the mind identifies and orders sensory input, but not "truth"

The mind/reason is in the prison of the five senses. It necessarily compares and organizes, then surmises. It is useful for our protection and functioning-but will never "live truth".

There is no "reality" "outside" of human being. Our mind cannot grasp this as it separates and contrasts in order to comprehend. That is why all "expressable truth" is only "part" of the "whole" that is human.

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04-09-2002, 01:09 AM	#71
Adrian Selby Senior Member Join Date: Jan 2002 Location: Farnham, UK Posts: 859	"Here's an example, if two valued logic we're accurate there is either a god or there isn't. This being the case, agnostics could not logically exist."--John Didn't see this point picked up. If agnostics do not think there is enough evidence to be able to go either way, this doesn't mean one can't go either way, they've just taken a stance on the information so far. I'm sure they can agree there is a God or there isn't, but that they're suspending judgement. At least, I don't think their position rules out the fact of the matter, if only because it could be true or false regardless of what they think. Kim, I don't see a situation under which the law of non contradiction could allow me to say that there is and isn't a God simultaneously. To say that my inability to conceive of this isn't evidence for it brings into question for me this idea that absolute truth is one of many possible philosophical models. If it is, why are we not using other models, given these models probably couldn't be compared to any external set of criteria. I wonder why it is we all accept that a thing can be itself and not another thing, and we haven't formulated an alternative to this. I wonder whether it is reasonable to assert that because we're human we can't possibly stumble on an absolute truth. Perhaps we oughtn't be arrogant about these things, but what if we have stumbled on an absolute truth. We may certainly be wrong, but on the issue of logical laws I'd say that was skepticism gone too far, and your position is all about reasonableness and reliability. To say that something is merely human does not necessarily stop it from being true. Whatever it is we sense, corresponding or not to reality, is it true that when we sense x we are not sensing y, and if we believed we were sensing x when we in fact sensed y then it is true that we did? My point being, in order to be able to distinguish between truth and falsehood or even to have sense perception at all, one must look at the description of what the law of non contradiction is and see if it applies. One does not rely on the law, or put it before anything, but one experiences, then notices how the law of non contradiction describes an aspect of experience, that when we experience something, we are not experiencing another thing. It seems to apply all the time, and seems always to have applied. That we don't have the apparatus of infinity to test this presupposition does not mean it cannot be absolutely true. The egocentric predicament doesn't seem to me to effectively rule out absolute truth as a possibility. Adrian

04-09-2002, 06:52 AM	#73
WJ Senior Member Join Date: Feb 2002 Posts: 812	Just an observation, there are so many good points here (tempest/RDB to name a few), I'm being overwelmed by an 'emotive' response I believe we are back to the establishing(metaphysical)truth between what is in-here v. out-there relative what it means for something to be absolutely true. We know that the cosmos is unknowable, just like we know certain axioms from mathmatics and physics are also unknowable and/or present contradicton (spinning balls precluding the knowledge/truth of which side is red and which side is green.) For instance, let's say I want to determine the size of a structure to make it stand without falling. I use a mathematical formula to size-up the physical item I want to create. We can agree that the formula may be an absolute truth in its own axiomatic application (idea), before I physically create a structural component in accordance with that math/logical formula. However, I know that a severe wind may cause it to fail, so I over-design it using a similar formula. But where do I stop? Does there exist limitless possibilities for a naturally occuring disaster whereby destruction or failure of my 'truth/idea' is logically possible thus proving it is false? Of course. Can I say then that my true formula is an absolute when I apply it to the natural world? No, I can't. Point is, in the world of infinite dynamics and cosmological uncertainty, we percieve an absolute mathematical truth as an idea of agreement in our minds. With that comes an element of knowing something is 'out-there' (uncertainty) that at some point, could prove us wrong. Nevertheless, we say... "This structural design is true, it works and it's in accordance with the logic of math". So, unless I can create perfect conditions, and know that those conditions would not ever change, I do not possess the knowledge of absolute truth from the laws of mathematical knowledge. This is also analogous to Tempest's view that one is not always able to observe, from all angles, the colors of the ball. Walrus

04-10-2002, 02:38 PM	#75
Adrian Selby Senior Member Join Date: Jan 2002 Location: Farnham, UK Posts: 859	John, finally, I refer to your earlier post to me, from page 1. You conclude, with reference to a point of mine, early in the post that "truth/identity relations are assigned (subjectively and internally) by individuals according their internal concepts describing reality." So through communication we can arrive it statements that we can mutually define as true, but as you say later, because these things are only representations, we could be wrong. Later on in the post you say this "But we can explore through numerous points of view to generate spatial and temporal knowledge, again comparing with the observations of others. Also we can investigate through devices that provide us different impressions that our direct senses. e.g. microscope. In this way our objectivity is greater, our knowledge becomes more complete and our truths about reality stronger." If truth is internally constructed, I do not understand how knowledge could be 'more complete' except intersubjectively. But if all humans are doing is agreeing with each other more or less on what statements are true, then by what criteria could we be said to be sure that objectivity and truths about reality were becoming stronger? Is this only 'stronger' in terms of the increase in the numbers of people that agree on any given truth statement? Only if identity relations are assigned by humans, I expect this is what generates your conclusion about the inherent arbitrariness of the lnc, then is it not possible that a thing can have a given identity. Only if a thing's identity is generated through our perceptions and agreements regarding our perceptions, then where perceptions differ, and the spinning red and green ball example is a good one, a thing's identity is pretty much what we all agree it is. This seems to rule out the possibility that a thing can have an identity independent of our knowledge of it or our statements about what we perceive as its identity. Its an interesting question for me to determine how a thing can have an identity independent of how we define it, but for it to hit our perceptions at the first instance of observation proves, if we're not hallucinating, that it exists, and if it exists in itself, then it has qualities in and of itself, and so it has an identity, i.e. our senses would determine what those qualities were from our point of reference, but we might be right or wrong, or more right or wrong. We could however, be sure that it has an identity and that a statement that encapsulates that truth would be objectively true, if only we could frame it, or know that we had framed it. While this possibility exists, it offers one source for arbitrating between competing views of the identity of an object. To think cheesily about the 'wavicle' it might be that someone thought 'it' was a particle, and someone else thought 'it' was a wave, they then realised the data could be interpreted either way. But if someone had full intersubjective and consistent agreement on the thing as particle, but after a breakthrough someone gained the same level of agreement on this thing being a wave, then if a third came along and said something else that gained intersubjective agreement, how would we know we weren't completely off base again, awaiting a 4th and 5th interpretation. Is it only consistency with regard to data that we hold to be the arbiter between explanations of the thing? That a more consistent explanation across experiments and observations = a better explanation? Why consistency, is this itself an arbitrary choice, to suggest that consistency of observation with regard to a thing is what allows us to call statements that reflect that consistency true? Why not say that the more inconsistent statements are about a thing the more we truly know it? After all, if the lnc is simply an axiom held arbitrarily, then there are no grounds for using consistency of explanation and observation for creating relational statements and labelling them true, except insofar as those grounds are arbitrarily agreed. I'm struggling to get at the point here, and time has run out on me. But if the lnc was arbitrary then I don't understand why I can't have experiences that are self contradictory, such as seeing something float and sink. I tend to see a thing, or an event and I'm not seeing the opposite of that event, whatever it is. If the lnc merely describes the act of experiencing, then wouldn't we have to have an experience A that was simultaneously NOT A for us to refute its status as something that is objectively true or certain, or rather, a whole slew of such experiences given the commonality with which we tend to find an experience is not simultaneously not that experience? I hope a more cogent thinker can see the thrust of this. Adrian

04-11-2002, 09:37 AM	#78
tempest Junior Member Join Date: Apr 2002 Location: United States Posts: 11	John Page "I argue that the truths get stronger as a function of a) the amount of information that we have about reality and . . . " This is so hard to talk about isn't it? I agree with this statement and yet I have to disagree with this statement. "truths getting stronger." Whatever truth is, if it is at all, once we say "truth" we are at full strength, like being pregnant. So I'm going to change the quote to "truth is a function of the amount of information that we have about reality.." truth is information about reality. This is agree with, but what has been accomplished with this definition? How about, truth is verified facts about reality. truth is verity. truth is demonstrated fact. truth reflects reality. I don't want to give up, but what can we say that isn't either meaningless, illogical or unprovable? I like to look at truth in opposition to the lie. It's not very ontological of me, but it's a little epistemological. I tell my brother I will meet him at the house. My brother understands what this means and goes to the house to meet me. When I said these words, I was lying because I knew in my mind that I would not be going to the house. This was only a lie for two reasons. 1. My brother took the words "I will meet you at the house" to serve one purpose. 2. I took the words "I will meet you at the house" to serve another purpose. So when I ask for the definition of truth itself, I might get "truth is meaning what you say" or "using words that reflect your reality". In other words, truth is an objectifying my reality for another's mind. But I could say "truth is nothing more than the illusion of one's perception of what is other" Truth does not exist until I say it does, because the same words told my brother one thing, while they meant something else to me. The only objects there are, are physical, like "me" "meeting" "brother" and "house". My brother's organization of these objects is his illusion, and my organization of these objects is my illusion, and the reality between us is, whatever object that may be, is similarly nothing more than material to illude us. But I can't say that, because the lie worked. My brother did go to the house. There was meaning and truth present in the moment I used words to lie. There was one meaning in my brother, another meaning in me, and the truth that I knew the difference enough to use those particular words to reach the desired effect. So, it seems to me, that we can't escape divorcing truth from ourselves, our minds, reality and words. Somehow, truth must be objective. When we see that we've been lied to, we see two things at once in the same object. We see the words - we see their meaning, and we see how they were used by the liar to have a different meaning. The objects present in the lie are words and two distinct meanings, one true, the other false. So we are using truth to reflect the reality of a particular meaning of a sentence. This level of abstraction leads me to wonder if objective truth is separate from the subject knowing this truth. Truth may not have being, or life without my mind knowing the truth, but if there is truth in mind, there is an object for me that I do not possess. Truth must be an object that can be "seen" by many people simultaneously the same, and if the particular truth is simple, it can be fully possessed by many simultaneously. My father knows that I lied just a completely as my brother, once I admit the truth. This is objectivity. somehow.

04-11-2002, 04:40 PM	#80
dostf Regular Member Join Date: Mar 2002 Location: toronto canada Posts: 498	John/Tempest: "A truth is an accurate statement about reality". [QUOTE]- John - this "reality" is the human itself I maintain that the "truth" of an identity arises by deeming a match between the mental template for the archetypal thing and the actual thing being experienced. quote-john - a reasonable assertion for how the mind identifies and orders sensory input, but not "truth" The mind/reason is in the prison of the five senses. It necessarily compares and organizes, then surmises. It is useful for our protection and functioning-but will never "live truth". There is no "reality" "outside" of human being. Our mind cannot grasp this as it separates and contrasts in order to comprehend. That is why all "expressable truth" is only "part" of the "whole" that is human.

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