Kim o' the Concrete Jungle

I notice that there has been a lot of talk about truth on the philosophy forum recently. The fact that it is such a controversial and divisive topic, I think, points to some flaw in the way we think about it. The usual definitions of truth might seem very profound and emotionally satisfying, but to my mind, they are all rather impractical and obtuse.

Personally, I favour an entirely pragmatic and practical approach to truth. John Page was on the right track when he wrote, "Truth is a word that represents an abstract value attained when two or more entities are deemed to be identical." This definition, however, has its problems, particularly when he uses the word "identical".

Being the cheerful, throw more fuel on the fire kind of guy that I am, I thought I would throw my own definition of truth into the melee, and see what you all think. In this philosophical model, I will define special meanings for several terms: reality, points of reference, context, and truth. Don't sweat the definitions. If you don't agree with them, simply substitute whatever word you think would fit best (we should be the masters of words, words should not be the masters of us).

My definition of truth relies on my definition of reality: reality is the experience of continuity. When I say something is real, I mean that I experience a continuous perception of it through my senses, and that this agrees with the past perceptions that I can recall from memory. For example, I know that the coffee cup sitting on my desk is real. I have sensory perceptions of it -- I can see it, touch it, and so on. I have memories of it -- I remember buying it in my local K-Mart, I remember drinking out of it about ten minutes ago. I say it is real, because it possesses continuity -- it is recognisably the same cup, it doesn't change, and I should be very surprised if it suddenly turned into, say, a rubber chicken. In fact, my sense of continuity is so strong that if my cup did turn into a rubber chicken, I would at first disbelieve that the transformation took place. I would much prefer to attribute the change to some prankster performing a sleight of hand. For these reasons, I define reality as the experience of continuity.

I also perceive that reality is not uniform. I can differentiate between my coffee cup and the table that it is sitting on. I can also differentiate between my coffee cup and other coffee cups (its the black one, with the writing on it that says, "Save Oxygen: Shut Up!"). Because reality is not uniform, I am intellectually able to divide the universal set of reality, into a great many subsets of reality. My cup is particular subset of reality -- it counts as "real" because it creates a perception of continuity (which, you will remember, is my definition of reality). This brings me to my second definition: a point of reference is any subset of reality that has a baring upon the question we are studying.

Context is the third concept relevant to truth (which I promise I'll get to in a minute). A context is simply the set of all reference points that have a baring upon the question we are studying. Context is important to truth, because later on I will be asserting that truth is contextual.

Now we come to truth itself. Here is my definition: truth is a continuous relationship between all the reference points in a given context. Take special note of the word "continuous". I use it in the same sense here as in my definition of reality. So when we are looking for "continuous relationships between reference points" we are really deducing an additional reference point in reality from a set of known reference points.

My definition of truth is an entirely practical one. It might not sound as sexy or as profound as other definitions, but it is, I think, more useful. It highlights the fact that when we are looking for a "truth", what we really want to find is a statement that possesses a high degree of continuity with our perception of reality. 1+1=2 is true because it is highly continuous. When we put one object with another object there are always two of them, no matter how many times we repeat the exercise. So we say that 1+1=2 is true.

My definition of truth has several consequences, which I will share with you now.

First of all, truth is highly contextual. It is a relationship between the reference points that make up our context. If you take away those reference points, then it ceases to exist. Some people here seem to think of "truth" almost as though it was an object in its own right, like a house brick, or a plank. From my point of view, this is not right. Truth is an abstract concept, entirely reliant upon context. It cannot transcend its context. If you remove it from its context, then it ceases to exist in any meaningful way.

The fact that (DELETE) reality is not uniform (/DELETE), and that truth relies on context, means that truth cannot be absolute or universal. Imagine you place two flags in a field, and these flags are your points of reference, from which you will take measurements. You could come up with the "true" statement that "the flags are twelve feet apart." But what happens to that truth if someone comes along and moves one of the flags? A statement -- any statement -- can only be "true" if its context remains the same.

It gets worse when you start to talk about scientific "truths". The most indisputable (and hence, true) scientific principle would have to be the law of conservation of energy, which implies that mass and energy cannot be created or destroyed. Within its context, it is an indisputable law. But take it out of its context, and starts to break down. In quantum physics it is perfectly possible, within certain limits, for matter to wink into existence from nothing. If the law of conservation of energy does not work outside of its specific context, then what does?

Another consequence of this definition of truth, is that truth can never escape from the weaknesses of human perception, because almost all of our understanding of reality must be filtered through our perception. So within truth, there are different degrees of certainty. The most certain truths are the abstract ones, which are drawn logically from abstract philosophical models, like mathematics. The least certain are subjective truths, for which we can find no objective test.

And even abstract truths are not as reliable as you might like to suppose, because they are still bound by their context. The minute you try to make your abstract truth refer to something concrete you introduce unreliability. Why? Well, it is possible for human beings to build abstract philosophical models that are consistent within themselves, but inconsistent with reality of the natural world we perceive. You might say that every model creates a "reality" of its own, which may or may not agree with the "reality" of other models. You might say there are two different kinds of truth: the abstract truths of an abstract philosophical models, and the natural truths that we perceive as the continuities in the world outside of ourselves.

Now lets take another look at truth. Every truth that we can state is, to some degree, abstract. Words are abstractions, so the mere practice of putting a truth into words makes it an abstract truth rather than a natural truth. The only way we can overcome the problems of abstraction, is to test our abstract truths against our continuous perceptions of the world outside of ourselves. But this once again opens up our "perfect" abstract truths to the peculiarities of our senses and the weaknesses of human subjectivity. So we have to conclude that no truth that we can state can ever be 100% certain. We can increase the certainty in various ways (such as by using the scientific method) but we can never entirely eliminate the possibility that our abstract truths (i.e. all of them) are in some way discontinuous.

Now the sorts of people who believe in "absolute truth" would argue that, somewhere out there, there is an ideal abstract model that takes into account all possible points of reference, and that is 100% compatible with every possible natural truth. It discounts the possibility that there might be discontinuities in the world around us. Previously I gave an example where I placed two flags in a field as "reference points" and then moved one of the flags. The change created a discontinuity. Of course, I can make the flag continuous again by tracking its position over time, so it's not really much of a problem. But can I absolutely rule out the possibility that the universe contains discontinuities that cannot be resolved? I don't think I can. So while I agree that this ideal model can exist in theory, I cannot agree that it exists in fact, and I remain skeptical of "absolute truth".

This has been a very long post, so I will summarize my four definitions here at the end.

• Reality is the experience of continuity.
• A point of reference is any subset of reality that has a baring upon the question we are studying.
• A context is the set of all relevant reference points.
• Truth is a continuous relationship between all the reference points in a given context.

What do you think?

[ April 01, 2002: Message edited by: Kim o' the Concrete Jungle ]</p>

jpbrooks

I agree with parts of what you are suggesting (such as the part about the limitation on our ability to achieve certainty). But one thing that I'm having trouble with in your analysis is how "natural truths" can be known outside of any model of reality. Our perception of reality already is a representation of what is really "out there" in the real world. So on what basis are we differentiating a "natural truth" from an "abstract" one?

Also, what are the implications for the truth of the axioms of logic, such as the principle of Non-contradiction, on the assumption that this theory of truth is correct?

And how does the possibility that there may be "discontinuities" in reality that cannot be "resolved" establish that absolute truths cannot exist?

Truth is a characteristic of propositions. It is, in general, the characteristic that is shared by propositions that describe a state of affairs that is or was actual.

[ March 31, 2002: Message edited by: jpbrooks ]</p>

LinuxPup

The "problem" is, you cannot remove it from it's context. I'll use your argument (paraphrased):

I have two flags that are 12 feet apart from each other. It is true that "The flags are 12 feet apart." Now if I move the two flags away from each other, then the previous true statement isn't true anymore. Therefore the truth ceases to exist.

The problem with that, is that it didn't take the full context of the statement. It is completely true that the flags are 12 feet part at that time and place. Notice I said time. That statement is true 10 billion years ago, and it's true today on the other side of the universe.


The problem with your definition of reality is this: reality transcends experience. I have never sensed galaxies on the other side of the universe, but this does not mean they aren't real.


You admit that you have not given any example where truth can not be absolute. What prompts you to doubt the existance of absolute truth?

interesting.

Kim o' the Concrete Jungle

A natural truth is a truth we derive by looking at the world outside of us and noting the continuities we perceive. This is like saying, "I know my cup exists, because I can see it on the table in front of me." An abstract truth is a truth we derive from an abstract philosophical system, like mathematics. For example, we can, according to the rules of mathematics, deduce that if 1+1=2, then 2-1=1. We can do that without seeing, touching, or physically perceiving anything outside of ourselves. I suppose the difference is one of degree. An abstract truth is at least one step removed from a natural truth.

Abstract truths are useful, because they allow us to deduce the existence of things that we cannot directly perceive. On the other hand, they are not 100% reliable, because we know that abstract philosophical models can exist that do not match with "reality" (i.e. the perception of continuity in the world outside of us, which are the same perceptions that lead us to natural truths). For example, a Christian philosophical model would assert the existence of a God who loves us and who made the world, but this philosophical model does not agree with any natural truth I have ever observed (which is just another way of saying, I have seen no evidence for the proposition).

I've a feeling, now, that I shouldn't have introduced this distinction into my analysis. I fear it is only going to cause confusion.

I would advance the opinion that logic depends on continuities. Here is an example of a logical statement: If A=B and B=C, then A=C. We know this is a logical statement, only because repeated experimentation with it continuously produces the same results -- it is a continuous relationship. Similarly, we know we can use various other arrangements of the same formula -- such as, A=C and B=C, therefore A=B -- because they show the same perceived continuities. I think you will find that a perception of continuity lies behind most of the rules of logic.

The advantage of logic, is that by using it, we are able to deduce abstract truths from natural truths, and by so doing, obtain knowledge of things we cannot directly perceive. So my notion of truth is not in any way meant to replace logic, and because it works at a lower level than logic, I don't think it interferes with it.

First of all, it would not be a discontuity in "reality", but a discontinuity in the physical universe. From my point of view, there could not be a discontinuity in "reality", because I have defined reality as a perception of continuity. Did I really use the word reality? If so, I'll have to go back and change it.

An "absolute truth" would have to be a universal truth -- a statement that would be true no matter what context you looked at it in. It would have to be a statement that could never be "false" under any circumstances. If an "absolute truth" is limited to its context, like a normal, everyday truth is, then why call it "absolute"? Why would you need to differentiate it, if it is not different?

The possibility that our universe might contain discontinuities works against "absolute truth", because if there are insurmountable divides, then we cannot guarantee that a statement which is true under some conditions, is also necessarily true under others. Therefore it is not "absolute".

Let me give you one example which makes me suspect that discontinuities could indeed exist in the universe. Quantum physics is very different from Newtonian physics. The quantum world contains phenomena that flat out contradict Newtonian physics. According to the latter, it should never be possible that something would behave like a wave under some circumstances and a particle under others, and yet that's what photons do. And I have already previously given the example of the Law of Conservation of Energy, which in Newtonian physics is irrefutably true, but which seems to be somewhat malleable in the quantum world.

I can't imagine how you could ever completely reconcile quantum physics with Newtonian physics. And this has huge implications for philosophy. So far, we have managed to avoid those implications, because everyone swans around pretending quantum physics doesn't exist, or that it's wrong. I, on the other hand, accept the evidence and go where it leads me. And the evidence leads me to conclude that there is a huge gulf between the sub-atomic world and the material world, such that the truths of one do not apply to the other, and that no "absolute" truth applies to both.

"Absolute truth" is an exceedingly weak philosophical stance. (I think I've said this several times already.) Let us count the ways:

• It is unparsimonious. We do not need to assume the existence of this magical, mystical, fairy-bullshit deity called "absolute truth" to explain the way the universe works. Mundane, every day old observation-based, and context-limited truths are quite sufficient.
• It doesn't agree with the evidence. Is there any truth anyone has ever defined in the entire history of civilization that is absolutely 100% certain? Very few sensible scientists would ever claim to be 100% certain about anything. On the other hand, aren't there a great many theories whose advocates tout as "absolute truths", but which have later proved to be incorrect? Phrenology would be one such theory. If nobody can succeed in formulating even one "absolute truth", why is there any reason to give it any credence?
• The theory of "Absolute Truth" makes absolutist claims. This is a problem for its advocates, because they must show good cause as to why the theory would apply in every possible circumstance. On the other hand, just one counter-example (like the incompatibilities of Quantum and Newtonian physics I explained earlier) is enough to see the whole edifice come tumbling to the ground -- because if our so called "absolute truths" are not universally true in every circumstance they are not absolute, but contextual.
• The only argument anyone ever seems to advance in favour of absolute truth is this: "Absolute truth is true because if you say absolute truth is absolutely false then you are making a self-refuting statement." However, this argument presupposes the existence of an absolute truth to prove the existence of an absolute truth. It is a circular argument, and thus fallaceous. Furthermore, I am perfectly able, as I am doing now, to point out the weaknesses and contradictions of the "absolute truth" theory, without having to resort to any absolutist claims.

Is absolute truth absolutely false? This is not a claim I can logically make, within the context of my philosophical system. Are there good reasons to doubt absolutism? Yes. Can you build a truth model that avoids absolutism? Yes. Can you get by without notions of "absolute" truth. Again, yes. To put it another way, I do not worship at the altar of "absolute truth". I did not become an atheist just so I could trade a Jesus God for an Absolute Truth God. So don't expect me to bow before its idol.

[ March 31, 2002: Message edited by: Kim o' the Concrete Jungle ]</p>

jpbrooks

Thanks for your reply, Kim.
I have some matters to take care of here at home right now, and will post my response later.

LinuxPup

1. Under what contexts is your statement false?

2. Our knowledge of the truth makes no bearing on it's validity. Let's say we're living hundreds of years ago, and we say, "The earth is flat!" Of course the earth isn't flat, so was that "absolute truth" destroyed? Of course not, because it wasn't true to begin with. The earth didn't morph from a form of flatness to being round based on our beliefs. Our beliefs changed, not the truth.

3. Just like you just did.

4. One doesn't need to show that an absolute truth is indeed true, for it to be true. However, in order for us to *know* it's true, it is of course handy for one to show to the best of one's ability, through testing, that the proposition is true. Example:

Let's say I'm walking down the street and magicly the proposition "pi(r^2) equals the area of a circle" pops into my head. Let's say I don't know if this is true, and nobody else does either. Does this mean it isn't true? Of course not. So what do I do? I test the proposition to see if it is indeed true, and if it passes tests continuously, it is safe to say "Yup, that equation is true."


5. Actually your argument is invalid, like I said earlier, "Our beliefs changed, not the truth." Do you believe that (1/2)(base)(height) = Area of a triangle in euclidean geometry? Do you believe it's true in every way? If so, you believe in absolute truth, if not, explain.


6. And these reasons are? You admit you cannot come up with a *single* one, yet you believe this illogical dogma. Explain.

7. You said, "Yes", you can build a truth model that avoids absolutism. Is that absolutely true? If not, explain what cases it's not true under.

Please respond to my 7 points given. I'm anxious to see your response.

John Page

You guys are arguing about defnitions. Definitions are circular without reference to reality (as has already been mentioned in this thread).

How about looking at how a "truth" comes into being? Then we might be able to objectively determine the nature of such truth.

Back to my definition. "Truth is a word that represents an abstract value attained when two or more entities are deemed to be identical."

Here's a generalized process:-

1. We receive sense data x that informs us about an entity A. x is thus the representation of A.
2. We receive sense data x' that informs us about an entity A'. x' is thus the representation of A'
3. By internally storing/transmitting the data x and x' they can be compared.
4. If these data are sufficiently alike, our comparison/detection process will have deemed that A and A' are identical.
5. This 'identicalness' result/assumption is "a truth".

Note: A and A' are not absolutely identical, this would violate the Law of Identity. To say that A = A is a highly misleading representation of the Law of Identity.

Hence my definition of "the truth." Our minds do the deeming. Same as computers do the deeming when comparing the contents of two registers.

The above process does not require any continutity, only capture of a state to derive the "instantaneous" truth value. I agree with Kim on context, context is equivalent to the inputs to a truth derivation. (Note: Since absolute truth would require a mind that has access to every point in spacetime etc., I don't think we'll find an absolute truth anytime soon - that's for sure )

Summary - Truth literally is abstract and therefore a subjective result of the mind perceiving it.

[ March 31, 2002: Message edited by: John Page ]</p>

John Page

LinuxPup:

I think there is some confusion between "reality" and "truth" between your posting and others.

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What I say is true is different than what you say is true than Kim etc. Ergo, the truth is what you believe internally, its subjective. Reality is outside you, non-subjective. Perhaps, under my terminology you meant something like:

Our beliefs changed, not the history of reality

Cheers!

Kim o' the Concrete Jungle

LinuxPup,

After reading your post, it has become perfectly clear to me that your self-confirming "absolute truth" theory is indeed a circular argument, and that, furthermore, you are trapped in this circularity, endlessly recycling the same idea, over and over, without change or development, ever since you first posted on the subject.

Your first point seems to be yet another attempt to force my idea into your absolute truth model. You're looking for an excuse to say, "look, you make absolutist claims as well, so you must secretly believe in absolute truth on the sly." I make no absolute claims. You might always assume that every claim anyone ever makes is an "absolute" claim, but frankly, that's your problem, not mine. Obviously, if you can come up with a functional definition of your "absolute truth" that makes it different from ordinary truth, and that explains something that can't be explained in any other way, then your definition will obviously be parsimonious. But I would still argue that "absolute" is a very poor choice of words.

Your second point bares directly upon why I think "absolute truth" is not a useful concept. Medieval people were perfectly justified in claiming that the earth is flat, because the evidence they could see appeared to confirm the hypothesis, and there was no evidence to the contrary. If you or I had lived in those times, and had to do without the evidence available to modern people, our claim that the earth is round would not be justified. The available evidence didn't point that way.

It just so happened that medieval people believed, as you do, that their "apparent" truths were "absolute" truths. This made them unreceptive to contrary evidence. So their maintained their flat earth belief long after it was justifiable. Your notion of "absolute truth" requires that an "absolutely true" statement transcend the available knowledge, the peculiarities of language, and the cultural context of its time and place. Can you name me even one supposed "absolute truth" that does? I find it highly unlikely that anything anybody could believe could be independent of thier knowledge and their time. How could you be justified in calling any statement an "absolute truth"? And if you can't call any statement an absolute truth, then why would you make that distinction?

Let's say you have the following definition: a flat surface is any surface which, when you lay a spirit level against it, causes the air bubble in the spirit level to move to the center. The whole of our context is this definition, a spirit level, and the correct procedure for taking a reading from a spirit level. If you measured the earth with a spirit level, making the necessary adjustments to account for the irregularities (i.e. hills and valleys), then you would have to conclude that, in this context, the earth is flat.

It is true. I defy you to say otherwise. The conclusion follows necessarily and logically from this particular functional definition of "flat". Of course, you can change the context by including gravity as a point of reference. Gravity would give a different explanation of the behavior of a spirit level, which would logically point to a spherical earth. So you see, by changing the context, you changed the truth.

But no person predating Newton could have included "gravity" in any explanation of the behavior of a spirit level. If you had said, "the bubble of a spirit level moves to the center when the spirit level rests at a ninety angle to the centre of a large mass," you would have been demonstrably wrong. Someone would have pointed a spirit level at the nearest large boulder and proved you wrong. If you had insisted that this was the one and only "absolutely true" explanation for the behavior of a spirit level, then you would have to have concluded that a spirit level was useless for building houses, because it could never produce a "truly flat" surface.

Under these circumstances, the definition and context I outlined in the first instance is the correct one. Gravity is no valid part of the context. In fact, if you insist on including gravity as part of the context, this makes your definition disfunctional. And yet, gravity makes a huge difference to what you might logically conclude is the shape of the earth. If you don't include gravity, then the statement "the earth is flat" is true. If you include gravity, then the statement "the earth is spherical" is true.

When I say that "truth is not absolute but contextual", I do so to overcome precisely this problem. You create this problem in the first place by insisting that truth must be absolute -- i.e. true at all times and in every circumstance. Would you argue with someone who said that the sea is flat? Technically, it's not flat but curved. But if you argued this point, people would accuse you of obtuse, and they would be right. You know perfectly well what is meant when someone says that the sea is flat: it is flat in the "spirit level" sense, not the "round earth" sense. This is just one example where people routinely adjust their judgement of what is "true" depending on the context.

And it's no good trying to get around this by saying, "ah, but the real truth is something else entirely, that takes into account both of these contexts." More than likely, any third theory would be irrelevant to either set of circumstances. If someone in Egypt had said "the sea is apparently flat but actually curved", they probably wouldn't have come up with the idea of using water in a channel as a sort of spirit level when they were building the pyramids.

You can add this to my list of reasons as to why "absolute truth" is a weak philosophical position. "Absolute truth" is disfunctional. It doesn't help people to understand the world around them, it prevents them from understanding it, in the same way that young earth creationists just can't get their head around what the theory of evolution actually says.

Your third point isn't really a point, just an accusation. It's not that I am making absolute claims, it's just that you are choosing to interpret them that way. You're the one with the problem, not me. It is not really my fault that I am constricted to using a language (English) that assumes absolutism. It's full of words like: all, none, yes, no, right, wrong, true, and false. Be assured that I am constantly aware of the fact that I can only ever state a "truth" (in my sense of the word), to within a certain degree of probability, and that any truth I do claim is entirely dependent on its context.

Onto your fourth point. You're the one who's claiming that some sort of "absolute truth" exists. I would say that, in fact, you do actually need to prove the validity of this hypothesis. In particular, you need to show why the "absolute" part of it is justified. Truth is fine and dandy with me. But does every mundane truth have to have this mystical "absolutist" twin you keep talking about? I think you are claiming much more than the evidence allows.

And because you don't seem to have realised it, I am talking here about the concept of "absolute truth" itself, not any particular instance of it. You seem completely incapable of thinking of the concept as a separate thing in itself. This leads me to suspect that you have never really examined the concept philosophically, and that consequently, you may not have a very sophisticated understanding of it as a concept.

On to your point five. You said the magic words, "in Euclidean Geometry". Okay, what about spherical geometry? Is the same equation true there? Even though you don't realise it, you're pretty much admitting my point, that truth is not absolute but contextual. The weakness of your "absolute truth" is that you will just assume that the context is always the same and barge on through. The strength of my system is that you are always obliged to consider context, because any statement which is "true" in one particular instance, may not be "true" in another instance if the context is different.

As it is, you think of your equation as an absolute truth. And because you think it is an absolute truth, you are also tempted to think that it will always give the right answer whenever you use it. You would probably not even think to ask whether the triangle is on a flat surface or a sphere. This is one instance where a person who thinks that truth is absolute, is in greater danger of making an error than a person who thinks that truth is context limited. Dare I use the word "disfunctional" again?

Onto your point six. I have now explained this at great length. My flat earth example, I think, shows the sorts of logic problems that an assumption of "absolute truth", as opposed to contextual truth cause.

Your point seven is the same as your point one, so we have finished.

I have gone to a great deal of effort to explain the particular notion of truth from which I work. I have given you functional definitions. I have given you examples. I have explained things repeatedly, in the simplest and most direct language I can muster. I have addressed a great many of your criticisms. Now I would ask some questions of you.

Have you taken the time to try and understand anything I have written here? Or have you just scanned my posts looking for holes to punch in my arguments?

Do you understand yet that your notion of "absolute truth" is not a natural law of the universe, but only a completely arbitrary philosophical assumption that you have made?

Do you understand what I mean when I say truth is not "absolute" but "contextual"?

Do you understand what I mean when I say, a truth is derived from the points of reference that serve as its context?

Do you not agree that sub-atomic particles that wink in and out of existence is contrary to the law of conservation of energy?

Do you not agree that the mysterious, instantaneous communication between particals at the quantum level is contrary to Einstein's theories that imply nothing can move faster than the speed of light?

Do you not agree that a photon which sometimes acts like a particle and sometimes like a wave must work to a very different set of rules than the ones that govern normal, atomic matter?

How exactly would you propose to reconcile quantum physics with standard physics?

Do you think that scientists will ever be able to reconcile every apparent discontinuity and construct a unified theory of everything?

If so, why do you think they haven't succeeded at it yet?

Why do you think you need "absolute truth" to explain the workings of the universe?

How exactly is an "absolute" truth different from an ordinary truth?

Why do you think you need to differentiate between an absolute truth and an ordinary truth?

What is your definition of an absolute truth?

Do you understand why I imply that contextual truth and absolute truth are mutually exclusive?

Do you acknowledge that it is very difficult for human beings to actually know any absolute truth about the natural world?

Will you admit the possibility that many things people say are "absolutely true" might actually be untrue?

Do you understanding that assuming "absolute truths" exist to prove that "absolute truths" exist is a circular argument, and thus, invalid?

Do you understand why I do not find your notions of "absolute truth" very compelling, or very useful?

MichaelC.