strubenuff

I'm looking to discuss the philosophy. I'd like a more in-depth approach then most of the websites I've seen; I'm not sure I'm even clear on the basics. I'm a big fan of Kafka, Nietzche, and the others. Any websites or followers who care to share their views would be appreciated.

sweep

i have a basic idea but someone will have to take the lead.

I think becoming and being are a good start.

MadMordigan

There are many forms and flavours of philosophy that could be called 'existentialist'. Depending on how rigourous one made the definition, Nihilism, Soliphism and Zen Buddhism are all subsets of existentialism.

strubenuff

What is the definition?

sweep

have a read of this assignment and then come back with some questions, bud. I will be happy to discuss more but one of my researched pieces seems to be appropriate at this point in history:

Critically assess Sartre’s view that we are ‘condemned to be free’.

What follows, casts a light on personal interpretations of knowledge. Any ideational content is subject to scrutiny, and it is exactly that, to which the reader must draw their attention. It is the purpose of the author to restrain ones freedom in this matter, ironically, to shed light on exactly ‘how’ we are ‘condemned to be free’. Yet it will also become clear that this meaning is of a particular kind, and cannot be fitted broadly to the matter of freedom as an absolute construct.

According to Warnock (1970), part of human freedom to Sartre was in motivation. Here was emphasised the power of the imagination in creating a world that had not yet been created. In opposition to this, were the advocates of evolution and genetics. By nature, in evolutionary terms, the mind is a function of adaptation to the environment. A person may exhibit complex behaviours, yet they have been motivated by basic biological drives for survival. Ashworth (2000) pointed out a problem with the language of evolutionary theorists. Evolution didn’t seem to have a plan; terms such as ‘selfish and intelligent genes’ gave evolution a sense of purpose. Sartre’s (1993) view paved the way for the consciousness as the source of purposefulness, which was empty but infinite in its capacity for directing attention.

Unlike Skinner (1971), who was under the impression that human action is determined by what he called a ‘history of reinforcement’, Sartre (1993) wrote that it is the ability to view the present, and then to contrast that view with an imagined state of affairs. So, although one is determined by the past in terms of Stimulus control, which to the behaviourist viewpoint is described as the likelihood that one will respond to a given condition, an individual can re-evaluate a condition and construct an imaginary event, leading to a new, future condition. This to Sartre (1993) was motivation for action.

Closely following in Sartre’s (1993) footsteps, his friend and junior, philosopher Merleau Ponty (1962) upheld the notion of being ‘condemned to freedom’. In Merleau Ponty’s (1962) way of speaking, the individual was ‘condemned to meaning’. In particular, Merleau Ponty (1962) was opposed to the behaviourist ideas of stimulus- response relationships. He did not deny that patterns of this kind did exist, only that the response to any stimulus could be deliberate, a choice governed by principled means. One implication of his ideas can be found in the realm of scientific thought. Technology allows the scientist to observe ‘pure phenomena’, an idea embraced in phenomenology, but not to the existential thinker. Phenomena are recorded, categorised and models are constructed, rather like those in cognitive science. Those models create certainty and presuppositions, whose function lies on the definition of ‘reality’. The key issue here is that phenomena are ambiguous and open to reconstruction. Things are only as they seem. Once knowledge is re-organised, ‘things’ take on an entirely different quality.


To Sartre (1993) the consciousness was the source of freedom. In line with Skinner’s (1993) approach, there was no inner being, no essential self. Faced with the prospect of emptiness, or nothingness, the individual sought and identified with tangible objects of consciousness. In other words, to be conscious is to be conscious ‘of something’. Sartre (1993) wrote of the anguish of the human being in his texts when faced with nothingness of being.

Skinners (1971) definition of freedom was construed as an escape from aversive conditions. The rain ‘causes’ one to put up an umbrella or the coldness of winter ‘forces’ people to make shelters and wrap up in animal skins. A prison, as an example of a condition, to Sartre (1993) may not be aversive or acceptable, yet by ones consciousness can be found the ‘cause’ for freedom. Only by construing the prison as aversive, first and foremost, can an individual escape.

A prisoner can be motivated by its ‘trap’ and the ‘harsh’ conditions within a prison walls, provided the interpretation suits the use of emotive language, such as ‘harsh’. A prisoner might operate, using any available means to escape from those conditions. Alternatively, the prisoner might resign to the conditions present. Skinner (1971) might call this condition, ‘learned helplessness’. To Sartre (1993) this would be termed ‘bad faith’. Sartre’s (1993) explanation of those circumstances, where a prisoner regarded their plight as aversive, may be seen as a re-evaluation of the situation.

There are more striking resemblances between the philosophy of Sartre (1993) and Kelly’s (1991) psychology of personal constructs. Kelly (1991) stated thus:
‘A persons processes are psychologically channelised by the ways in which they anticipate events.’

An anticipation of an event is a predicate of that event. Although a channel is open to review, it remains fixed. In addition, Sartre (1993) spoke of negation. If an individual expected ‘something’, for example a friend, and that friend was not there, that individual would experience a perceived negation. That negation forms part of nothingness, which, although free, would determine a psychological process.

Consider another of Kelly’s (1991) construction corollaries:
‘Persons differ from each other in their construction of events.’

In the same way that Sartre’s (1993) philosophy was viewed as being evaluative with regards to the directionality of consciousness towards the objects of the world, so Kelly’s (1991) statement echoes that notion. An individual, in this sense will see ‘things’ as good or bad. For example, it may be ‘good’ to look at what you have but ‘bad’ to look at what you don’t have. In one way the philosophy presented suggests resignation to a given state of being. But this state will depend on the way one constructs events. In the case where a person has been jailed, to look at what one does not have may be preferable. In other words the individual reconstructs the view in favour of re-evaluation. Rather than resigning oneself to the situation, one takes responsibility and anticipates the changes. Taking responsibility must be contingent on the way one construes an event.

In view of the given text, yet another of Kelly’s (1991) statements seems to make sense:
‘A person chooses for theirself that alternative in a dichotomous construct through which they anticipate the greater possibility for extension and definition of their system.’

In prison, resignation to the conditions present could be seen, in Sartre’s (1993) view, as bad faith. By re-evaluation a person takes responsibility in considering the situation intolerable, or as Skinner (1971) might suggest, aversive. To escape, in terms of Kelly’s (1991) philosophy, can be construed as an extension of a person’s system.

It can be convenient to view freedom in two ways. These entail acting and not acting. Sartre (1993) and Skinners (1971) version of freedom seem to be concerned with acting. One takes responsibility for action, or learns responsibility, and this enables the individual to control their environment. Part of Sartres (1993) philosophy was concerned with obstacles. In line with this construction, Husserl (1964) saw the limitations on freedom as an affirmation of freedom. In order to overcome those things that have an impact upon freedom, the matter, to Husserl (1964), where consciousness was concerned, was not of ‘I think’ but of ‘I can’. To thinkers such as Sartre (1993) and Kelly (1991), perception would play a major part in overcoming obstacles. To Skinner (1971) it would not be necessary to delve into perception, as the source of motivation could be found in the obstacle.

Freedom may also be a case of not acting. In the face of obstacles a person will remain obstinate, and refuse to conquer. For example, for many years the Blue Mountains in Australia were impassable; a route could not be found. When eventually the mountains were conquered, the settlers were puzzled to find massive herds of cows on the other side. These cows had been lost to the very first colonists, but they had not conquered the mountains consciously, they had simply walked around them (Bryson, 2000).

This view runs in a similar vein to Campbell’s (1958) questions on accountability. In Skinners (1971) terms, the colonists were trapped by the mountains and therefore compelled to break through them. From an Existential/Phenomenological stance, evaluation and directed perception would motivate the breakthrough. From Kelly’s (1991) view, perception would also be a key in overcoming the mountains, provided the breakthrough made for an extension of their current construction system. In Campbell’s (1958) view, the colonists were simply taking responsibility. The cows were not responsible but they would need perception in order to be accountable if they were to get through the mountains. Yet ‘being in themselves’, as Sartre (1993) calls something as it actually ‘is’, the cows still had their freedom and materialised, without method, yet by a biological ‘drive’ or ‘motive’ to eat, on the other side of the Blue mountains.

Another aspect of freedom that makes the ideas of Skinner (1971) and Sartre (1993) seem distinct, is that of Morality. As Campbell (1958) pointed out, one has no real responsibility in being compelled to act. What one cannot help one cannot blame. When one is punished for acting out of choice, freedom is taken away. Yet in controlling a particular behaviour by means of aversion, changes occur only at a motivational level but not the personal evaluation of that behaviour. Sartre’s (1993) stance encompasses the evaluative side of behaviour, but it is in that evaluation of action that Sartre (1993) argued freedom was lost.

What, then, ‘could’ be concluded from Sartres (1993) statement: ‘We are condemned to be free’? Think for a moment and you have a choice to either conclude that people are condemned, as in they have no choice, or that people are not condemned. In one sense you have no choice but to choose. In choosing not to choose you are also making a choice, and yet again one falls into the ‘trap’ of freedom. Attach yourself to any particular way and you have condemned yourself into making that choice by placing one value above another, which was free in the making, yet determined by way of it’s relative value.

From another angle, that of compulsion and motivation, no amount of evaluation may change what has been given. Soldiers will fall apart on the battlefield regardless of whether they construe a situation as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. No amount of planning may alter a situation. Sometimes responsibility evades the grasp of individuals. In this case the individual is not free to act in certain ways. As G. K. Chesterton put it:

‘I do not believe in a fate that falls on men however they act; but I do believe in a fate that falls on them unless they act.’

In other words freedom lies in the will; people may not act however they please but do so according with that will which is chosen. To will is not to think, but to do. Yet by Sartres (1993) view action begins with thought, to become intolerant of a lived state, then to change that state by acting. People are both free and determined.


REFERENCES

Ashworth P (2000) Psychology and human nature. Psychology press.

Bryson B (2000) Down Under. Black Swan.

Campbell C A (1951) Is freewill a pseudo problem? Mind, LX 240 (446-465)

Husserl E (1964) The idea of phenomenology. Cited in Warnock M (1970) Existentialism. Oxford University press.

Kelly G A (1991) The psychology of personal constructs. Routledge.

Merleau-Ponty M (1962) The phenomenology of perception. Cited in Warnock M (1970) Existentialism. Oxford University press.

Skinner B F (1971) Beyond freedom and dignity. Harmondsworth. Penguin.

Sartre J P (1993) Essays in existentialism. New York: Citadel press.

Warnock M (1970) Existentialism. Oxford University press.

Defiant Heretic

The basic definition of existentialism is the belief that there is no greater meaning of life. If we wish for there to be a meaning to our own lives, we must create it ourselves.

EvilTeuf

I used to be, but then I got on antidepressants.

Seriously, though, existentialism seems to be the philosophy of choice for people having a shitty week.

On Kafka: I did a study on this a while back for my college course, and he's basically a proto-Existentialist, albeit one of a heavily mystical bent.

[ August 11, 2002: Message edited by: EvilTeuf ]</p>

AtlanticCitySlave

I lean towards existentialism, although I part company with them on some areas. However, since Sweet as a Nut has already given a rather large response, I thought I would suggest Yalom for an existential approach to therapy. He has written Existential Psychotherapy, which I would recommend highly (despite the cost). While he says from the outset he's not interested in arguing for a philosophical position, you can at least get a very good taste of what to expect when tackling Sartre and the rest of them (I personally found Being and Nothingness a hard read).

WJ

Yes, I fit in the catagory of a religious existentialist. Some of them are; Keirkegaard, Pascal, Kant-agnostic...

strubenuff

Sweet as a nut,
Unfortunately, I don't think I've grasped what it is you were trying to tell me. I understand "condemned to freedom" ("You have no choice but to chose"), and acting as an affirmation of freedom. I don't follow that. Could you rephrase it? What is the existential view of morality?


Via subjective truths? Understanding "my death" and "my existence" are supposed to further me from nothingness, give my life a concrete meaning, right? Is "my death" the realization that I could potentially die at any point, and should therefor view the future as only a possibility? "I shall attend. Set a place for me, but you must make room for the contingency that a tile falls and strikes me dead, for in that case I shall not attend."

Perhaps, a shitty life...

How does is religion combined with the existential philosophy?