luvluv

jlowder, I have been reading Plantinga lately but I'm still a little shaky on the whole possible worlds logic.

It seems to me that Post is claiming that a certain moral property is objective if it would be true in another possible world. Well, how would one go about seeing if it was true in another possible world? And what if, as is the case with a lot of moral situations in this world, there are disagreements as to what is good in BOTH possible worlds. I would imagine there are possible worlds in which everyone agrees on every moral principle, but there have to be a lot more possible worlds where everyone does not agree. So just who would be determining whether or not a moral property was good in both of these possible worlds? It seems kind of circular, because a social darwinist in world 1 would agree with a social darwinist in world 2, while a Christian theist in world 1 would disagree with the social darwinist in world 1, and a Christian theist in world 2 would disagree with the social darwinist in world 2. It wouldn't therefore help us determine what was morally correct in that case.

Can you use the possible worlds scenario, for instance, to decide whether abortion was right or wrong?

I agree with Post's conclusion, that the burden of proof is on the subjectivist, but I would say the only possible source for rationally justifying morals, for determining a TRUE objective morality, would be the existence of an omniscient God.

luvluv

I think the abortion issue is a good means by which we can explore the importance of the rational justification of our values.

If values cannot be rationally justified, then the anti-abortionist who kills doctors is as morally justified as a US soldier killing a Nazi Commander of a concentration camp.

Some of our values say that life begins at conception, others say that life begins at birth. If no one can rationally justify their bvalues, then there is no moral difference between the person who shoots the abortion clinic doctor and the person who shoots the Nazi. They are both proceeding correctly from their value statements.

So Pomp, this is why I think it's important for people to give rational justification of their values, because otherwise everything does come to a show of force.

99Percent

I agree completely. So without involving a god (since god is irrational), what would be a rational justification of moral values?

Synaesthesia

99Percent,
Irrational and, at the heart of it, nothing but the show of force. (Although it's, uh, hidden force...)

SRB

Luvluv
For instance, how would you go about answering the question "Which is more morally good, social darwinism or utilitarianism?" According to the way you are proceeding, it would be an unanswerable question.

SRB
No it wouldn't. If being good is identical to promoting happiness (for example) then utilitarianism is the correct theory about what is good, and social darwinism is mistaken.

Luvluv
What is good to the social darwinist could be bad for utilitarianist (probably not generally, but for the sake of argument). They would disagree because they define goodness DIFFERENTLY because they have different VALUES.

SRB
You here defend moral subjectivism, the view that people do not use moral language in an objective way. Why believe that? As a theist you need to deny moral subjectivism. You should be saying that when social darwinists say, "Killing the weak is good," the proposition thereby expressed is a FALSE one. Above you imply that when social darwinists say "Killing the weak is good" they use the word "good" in a way such that they are not expressing any false proposition!

Luvluv
Given that, if they are both atheists, neither could give a rational justification for why their basis of value is superior to the others, partly because THAT VALUE ITSELF is what defines their notion of "moral superiority".

SRB
Wrong again. To demonstrate which value is morally superior one would need to first establish what is meant by (or referred to by) the term "morally superior." The outcome of that investigation (into the semantic adequacy of various moral theories) decides the issue, not anyone's personal preferences.

Luvluv
The social darwinist would say his morality is better because it fits in better with the values of social darwinism, which is ultimately circular. Therefore, the values of atheists are not rationally justified, they are arbitrary.

SRB
That's the mother of all non-sequiturs. Can you name the rule of inference by which the second sentence is supposed to follow from the first?

Luvluv
A theist is not in any such connundrum because a) Theists do not hold their beliefs to that which can be rationally justified and b) The omniscience of God is a rationally consistent means of justifiying their values.

SRB
Suppose a theist says that a good God disapproves of murder, and therefore murder is wrong. That justification is inadequate because the theist has failed to establish that a good God exists and that a good God holds such a view. It is MORE controversial that "a good God exists and disapproves of murder" than it is "murder is wrong." So such a "justification" is plainly question-begging and no use whatever. One cannot provide an argument to justify one's position using premises that are more controversial than the conclusion one is attempting to establish.

Luvluv
I'm more inclined to ask "How do you know that that which increases happiness is good?" "How did you come to define goodness in that way?" Ultimately, the atheist will have to come down to "I just do."

SRB
Nope. The atheist can appeal to the semantic adequacy of utilitarianism, for example. Just as he learned that the word "duck" refers to a creature that swims and quacks through an (informal) analysis of how language is used, the same goes for the word "good."

Luvluv
I would think that the fact that they can't be rationally justified establishes that they can't be rationally justified.

SRB
To establish something, one needs premises that are less controversial than one's conclusion. So it is FALSE that the premise "they can't be rationally justified" ESTABLISHES the conclusion "they can't be rationally justified." This does highlight, though, how badly you beg the question.

SRB

luvluv

99percent:

This is my point, I don't believe you can. I mean, you can if you just decide that such a thing as good and wrong exist, but naturalistically that is hard to justify.

SRB:

I think you know that this is not what I am doing. I am not in any way saying that the social darwinist is right, only that there is no way for the atheist to decide which is wrong and which is right rationally. I can say of the social darwinist that he is wrong, given my belief in an omniscient God has perfect knowledge of goodness. You, as an atheist, cannot determine who is right and who is wrong when given competing moral claims. It would come down to values that cannot be rationally justified.

I was operating under the assumption that all of the moral philsophers involved in my hypothetical were atheists. You can substitute any atheist in the world into the scenario and any two competing moral theories. If they conflict on any issue, like abortion for instance, because of their different value statements then they are simply at a dead end. They will have to fight it out, because neither of them can prove their values are "morally superior" since they are naked pressupositions.

Can you describe how they would come to agree on what is morally superior without having anyone's personal preferences involved in the discussion?

The social darwinist's investigation would reveal that his own values were morally superior, and ditto the utilitarian. Now what?

The point of this thread was whether or not the existence of a God solved any of the problems besetting atheistic morality. I claimed that it did because it offered a rational process of evaluating values which was internally consistent. Atheism has no internally consistent system of determining the propriety of values.

In a nutshell:

Given that I believe in God, then I can have a rationally justified notion that my values are the correct ones because of God's perfect knowledge of values.

Given that I do not believe in God, I have no rationally justified means of determining whether my values are the correct ones, or of whether there are any correct values at all.

The theist has somewhere to hang his hat, the atheiest does not. I am only contending that theistic morality is more rationally justified INTERNALLY than atheistic morality. Our moral beliefs are therefore more consistent.

Say this atheist lives in a world equally populated with social darwinists and utilitarians. Precisely half the time he hears the word good it refers to what social darwinism means by good, and precisely half the time he hears the word good it referst to what utilitarianism means by good.

Now what? How could he determine what was truly good, or whether there was such a thing as good at all?

That was a feeble attempt at humour. I only meant to say that I was not relying on the fact that competing moral systems disagree to show that they were not logically consistent or rationally justified. I was using their competition to demonstrate that there was no consistent means of appeal by which one system of value could be compared to another because the underlying value systems cannot be rationally justified.

SRB

Luvluv
I am not in any way saying that the social darwinist is right, only that there is no way for the atheist to decide which is wrong and which is right rationally.

SRB
I agree that you have asserted the latter view, without argument, repeatedly.

Luvluv
I can say of the social darwinist that he is wrong, given my belief in an omniscient God has perfect knowledge of goodness.

SRB
Now you are contradicting yourself. Earlier you said of social darwinists, "they define goodness DIFFERENTLY." Now, apparently, you have changed your mind and believe that when a social darwinist uses the word "good" he uses it in the same way as you (and God) do, and that he is simply mistaken when he classifies certain acts as "good." Which is it?

Luvluv
You, as an atheist, cannot determine who is right and who is wrong when given competing moral claims. It would come down to values that cannot be rationally justified.

SRB
That's the view you keep repeating but have no argument for.

SRB
To demonstrate which value is morally superior one would need to first establish what is meant by (or referred to by) the term "morally superior." The outcome of that investigation (into the semantic adequacy of various moral theories) decides the issue, not anyone's personal preferences.

Luvluv
Can you describe how they would come to agree on what is morally superior without having anyone's personal preferences involved in the discussion?

SRB
Yes. One looks at various definitions of the word "good" and sees which matches with how people use the word "good." Words gain their meaning from common usage. Analogously, one discovers what the word "duck" means by seeing how people use it. Most people use the word "duck" to refer to a certain creature that quacks, and that's why the word has the meaning it does. Arguably, a great many people use the sentence "X is good" in a way that is interchangeable in meaning with the sentence "X increases happinness." Are you not familiar with how words acquire meanings?

Luvluv
The social darwinist's investigation would reveal that his own values were morally superior, and ditto the utilitarian. Now what?

SRB
What is the social darwinist's analysis of "X is good"? What evidence is there that his analysis of "X is good" matches the reportive (i.e. common usage) definition?

Luvluv
The point of this thread was whether or not the existence of a God solved any of the problems besetting atheistic morality. I claimed that it did because it offered a rational process of evaluating values which was internally consistent. Atheism has no internally consistent system of determining the propriety of values.

SRB
Oh dear. Not only do you keep repeating your unsubstantiated assertions, but you have now regressed into alleging atheists are guilty of being inconsistent. Last time you did that I challenged you to demonstrate the inconsistency and you withdrew your claim. You seem not to have much grasp of the difference between rational debate and rhetoric. Simply repeating your view, and alleging without argument that atheists are guilty of irrationality and inconsistency, or having unjustified beliefs, only sounds impressive to those with a weak grasp of rational argumentation. If you expect me to keep responding you need to do better.

Luvluv
In a nutshell:

Given that I believe in God, then I can have a rationally justified notion that my values are the correct ones because of God's perfect knowledge of values.

SRB
That's a non-sequitur. If your belief in a good God and his opinions is itself unjustified then there is no reason to suppose that your views derived from those beliefs are themselves justified.

Luvluv
Given that I do not believe in God, I have no rationally justified means of determining whether my values are the correct ones, or of whether there are any correct values at all.

SRB
That's the assertion once again, and once again without argument. It's getting rather boring. An argument consists of a set of premises, a chain of reasoning, and a conclusion that is intended to follow from the premises by valid rules of inference. Thus far you have no ARGUMENT at all.

SRB
The atheist can appeal to the semantic adequacy of utilitarianism, for example. Just as he learned that the word "duck" refers to a creature that swims and quacks, through an (informal) analysis of how language is used, the same goes for the word "good."

Luvluv
Say this atheist lives in a world equally populated with social darwinists and utilitarians. Precisely half the time he hears the word good it refers to what social darwinism means by good, and precisely half the time he hears the word good it referst to what utilitarianism means by good.

Now what? How could he determine what was truly good, or whether there was such a thing as good at all?

SRB
For me to answer, you'll first have to tell me what social darwinists mean by the word "good." If a social darwinist says "Killing the weak is good" is he thereby expressing a proposition that is TRUE or FALSE?

[If you are a moral objectivist, you hold that social darwinists mean the same thing as everyone else when they use the word "good". Your questions above suggest that you think social darwinists mean something different to the rest of us when they use the word "good," which unwittingly makes you a moral subjectivist.]

BTW, if every speaker of English took the word "good" to mean "fried chicken," then in THAT case it would indeed be true if someone uttered the sentence "good is a type of food." Do you dispute THAT?

SRB

luvluv

SRB:

I clearly am not contradicting myself. The way he uses the term good is BOTH different from the way God uses it AND wrong. Their is no contradiction involved. It can be both different from God's usage and wrong, and given the definition of omniscience, it follows that if it is different from God's that it must be wrong.

His definition of good may be consistent within his values, but his values are not the correct ones.

And actually, God was never involved in the example. I said that the social darwinist and the utilitarian defined goodness differently, and asked, on those grounds, how they would resolve their differences given their different standards of value.

You are obviously an intelligent fellow so I can't see how you fail to understand that this solves precisely nothing. Say the meanings of good and bad were reversed, would we be anymore knowledgable about what really actually constitutes that quantity which we now call "goodness"? We could call it "Blue Suede Shoes" and you would still have to rationally justifiy why your definition of "Blue Suede Shoes" is better than mine if they happen to differ. Saying "because that is what people mean when they say "Blue Suede Shoes" solves precisely nothing, because those people could all disagree. There could be a hundred differnt definitions each held by an equal number of people. Who is correct?

And what are definitions but the opinions of other people? And why should their opinions matter more than that of the two persons involved? And why would the utilitarian be willing to change his view of what is right and wrong based on a dictionary that could have been written by a social darwinist in the language of a people who happen to be largely social darwinists? The semantic issue solves nothing at all.

Would you deny that, whatever we happen to call the color blue, the color blue actually has the quality which we now refer to as "blueness" and that it would have this same property if we called it red or purple or orange? It would LOOK the same, and have exactly the same wavelength as it has now, only our term for it would change. When we are discussing good, particularly between competing moral claims, we are discussing whether or not their is a quality underlying what we refer to as "goodness" which has the same properties no matter what we call it. The same qualities which now constitute what we call good would attend if what we called good were called "rubber duckies". Therefore what the word good happens to mean does not establish what actually is good.

In the antebellum South, most southerners would have said that slavery was good, and so was it therefore good?

This whole debate has been about whether moral values can be rationally justified GIVEN one's pressupostions.

All right, let's do this. It is up to me to prove that God exists right? Then it is up to you to prove that value statements can be rationally justified, if you hold that they can. So how about you prove it? The same goes for anybody.

As a side question, do you believe that the existence of God can be proven? If not, isn't that because no one has ever done it? Then aren't I justified in not believing that values can be proven on the basis that no one has ever done it? Formally, this amounts to this:

1) If the truth of an idea has not been proven, one is rationally justified in not believing in that idea.

2) An objective system of value which does not refer to God has not been rationally justified.

3) Therefore, one is rationally justified in not beliving in an objective system of value.

That's a start. So I'll now state that I do not believe that there is any way that an atheistic system of value can be rationally justified.

I am not involved in the discussion, so you can't ask me. I asked you to provide a means by which the two atheists could resolve their dispute. You'll have to ask them what they mean.

Let's take the experiment a little further. Let's further assume that the two atheists are the only two people left on the planet after a nuclear war, and that all dictionaries and records of what people meant by certain words have gone up in smoke.

Now, resolve their dispute.

Why, exactly, could I not say that what he means when he says good is incorrect, and thus be a moral objectivist?

Can we agree, though, that whatever we called fried chicken it would have an independant quality, let's call it fried chickenness, which it would have regardless of what we called it? And how would we decide whether "what we mean when we said fried chicken" was more accurate than "what someone else means when he says friend chicken"?

It would be easy in terms of fried chicken because is an actually existing entity which can be quantified. If "goodness" is a quality which exists whether we call it good or fried green tomatoes, then how do we know that what I mean by good is more refelctive of the independant property of "goodness" than what you mean when you say good? It isn't easy to cross check it in this case, because the only existent which you have to verify it would be humans, all of whom may differ in their definitions.

jlowder

I know what it would mean to ask, "Which is correct, social Darwinism or utilitarianism?" I do NOT know what it would mean to ask, "Which is more morally good, social Darwinism or utilitarianism?" The latter question is ambiguous since the meaning of "morally good" is determined precisely by social Darwinism, utilitarianism, or whichever normative theory is correct.

(And even if the meaning of "morally good" in the question were specified, the question might still be odd. For example, suppose we adopt a utilitarian approach to defining "morally good." In that case, the question "Which is more morally good, social Darwinism or utilitarianism?" becomes "Which produces more utility, social Darwinism or utilitarianism?" However, that is a matter we need not pursue here. )

I am happy to agree that social darwinists and utilitarians have different values. However, I do not understand why you believe it follows that there is no objective fact of the matter, or no way to rationally settle the debate between social darwinists and utilitarians. (At most, only one side could be right. Moreover, both could be wrong and some other normative ethical theory could be true.)

I interpret your remarks to mean that you believe the following: "For an atheist, there is no non-question-begging way to justify one normative ethical theory over another." Is this an accurate interpretation of your position? If so, why do you hold that view? Why would an atheist have to appeal to "THAT VALUE ITSELF" in order to justify one normative ethical theory over another?

I understand your position. However, I do not see an argument for your position. I also do not understand why you feel that theism, unlike atheism, can somehow solve or avoid this alleged problem. How can theists "rationally justify" their normative ethical theory without providing a "circular" argument?

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ November 10, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

SRB

Luvluv
I clearly am not contradicting myself. The way he uses the term good is BOTH different from the way God uses it AND wrong. Their is no contradiction involved.

SRB
Is your idea that what social darwinists mean by "good" is "that which leads to a society of able-bodied people"? If so, when a social darwinist says "killing the disabled is good," what he means is "killing the disabled leads to a society of able bodied people." Since the latter proposition is definitely true, you are committed to saying that by using the former sentence the social Darwinist is expressing a true proposition!

If you deny this is your position, some clarification is called for on the matter of what you think social darwinists mean by "good." This is your example, after all. What you should have said is that social darwinists mean the same thing by the word "good" as the rest of us, but are mistaken in some of their empirical beliefs about what promotes that good.

Luvluv
It can be both different from God's usage and wrong, and given the definition of omniscience, it follows that if it is different from God's that it must be wrong.
His definition of good may be consistent within his values, but his values are not the correct ones.

SRB
Your view here is that different groups of people mean different things by the word "good," and that makes you a moral subjectivist.

SRB
To demonstrate which value is morally superior one would need to first establish what is meant by (or referred to by) the term "morally superior." The outcome of that investigation (into the semantic adequacy of various moral theories) decides the issue, not anyone's personal preferences.

Luvluv
You are obviously an intelligent fellow so I can't see how you fail to understand that this solves precisely nothing. Say the meanings of good and bad were reversed, would we be anymore knowledgable about what really actually constitutes that quantity which we now call "goodness"? We could call it "Blue Suede Shoes" and you would still have to rationally justifiy why your definition of "Blue Suede Shoes" is better than mine if they happen to differ. Saying "because that is what people mean when they say "Blue Suede Shoes" solves precisely nothing, because those people could all disagree. There could be a hundred differnt definitions each held by an equal number of people. Who is correct?

SRB
If a hundred different people use a certain word in a hundred different ways then the word would have no objective meaning. Moral objectivism presupposes that people generally mean the same thing when they use the word "good" (even if they disagree on the empirical matter of which acts promote that good).

What do you think determines the adequacy of definitions of words, pray tell, if not how people use language?

Luvluv
And what are definitions but the opinions of other people?

SRB
Reportive definitions are certainly NOT anyone’s opinions! Reportive definitions are determined by how people actually use language, not by their own opinions about how they use language.

Luvluv
And why should their opinions matter more than that of the two persons involved? And why would the utilitarian be willing to change his view of what is right and wrong based on a dictionary that could have been written by a social darwinist in the language of a people who happen to be largely social darwinists? The semantic issue solves nothing at all.

SRB
If all English speakers were social Darwinists then it certainly wouldn't follow that the reportive definition of "good" is something that makes social darwinism true.

Luvluv
Would you deny that, whatever we happen to call the color blue, the color blue actually has the quality which we now refer to as "blueness" and that it would have this same property if we called it red or purple or orange? It would LOOK the same, and have exactly the same wavelength as it has now, only our term for it would change.

SRB
I don’t deny that. I quite agree.

Luvluv
When we are discussing good, particularly between competing moral claims, we are discussing whether or not their is a quality underlying what we refer to as "goodness" which has the same properties no matter what we call it. The same qualities which now constitute what we call good would attend if what we called good were called "rubber duckies".

SRB
I agree.

Luvluv
Therefore what the word good happens to mean does not establish what actually is good.

SRB
That’s wrong, and is a non-sequitur to boot. It is true, however, that what is meant by the word "good" does not resolve the empirical issue of what is most likely to promote the good.

Luvluv
In the antebellum South, most southerners would have said that slavery was good, and so was it therefore good?

SRB
No, because what the word "good" means is not determined by anyone’s opinions, but by how people use language. The southerners may well have used the same meaning of "good" as everyone else, but held empirically false beliefs about which actions are most likely to promote that good.

Luvluv
This whole debate has been about whether moral values can be rationally justified GIVEN one's pressupostions.

SRB
Well if one can presuppose things without argument or justification no matter how radical and controversial, as you apparently allow, then I could just as well presuppose that morality is objective and God does not exist. So from THOSE presuppositions I am "rationally justified" in believing that morality is objective. Why is your position any more reasonable than the one I just outlined?

Luvluv
All right, let's do this. It is up to me to prove that God exists right? Then it is up to you to prove that value statements can be rationally justified, if you hold that they can.

SRB
I have explained precisely how to do this. See above.

Luvluv
As a side question, do you believe that the existence of God can be proven? If not, isn't that because no one has ever done it?

SRB
That depends how "God" is defined. Some definitions of "God" make the utterance "God exists" meaningless, some definitions of "God" result in a contradiction, other definitions make "God exists" empirically disconfirmed (e.g. by the existence of suffering), while other definitions merely leave the proposition "God exists" merely lacking any evidential support. That’s a debate for another time and place.

Luvluv
Then aren't I justified in not believing that values can be proven on the basis that no one has ever done it?

SRB
I think so. Moral subjectivism is in certain forms a defensible view (as is moral objectivism).

Luvluv
Formally, this amounts to this:
1) If the truth of an idea has not been proven, one is rationally justified in not believing in that idea.
2) An objective system of value which does not refer to God has not been rationally justified.
3) Therefore, one is rationally justified in not beliving in an objective system of value.
That's a start. So I'll now state that I do not believe that there is any way that an atheistic system of value can be rationally justified.

SRB
To establish (2) you would need to refute many books that defend naturalistic analyses of "X is good." Until you do that, premise (2) is not proven.

In any case, the conclusion of this argument is hardly the same as what you said and implied earlier. What you say here is quite compatible with atheists holding a justified view that moral objectivism is true. After all, two people can both have a justified belief in the truth of two incompatible propositions.

Luvluv
I am not involved in the discussion, so you can't ask me. I asked you to provide a means by which the two atheists could resolve their dispute. You'll have to ask them what they mean.

SRB
If you want a response you will need to answer my question. The example is yours, and there is only you who are present who can tell me what it is supposed to be all about.

Luvluv
Let's take the experiment a little further. Let's further assume that the two atheists are the only two people left on the planet after a nuclear war, and that all dictionaries and records of what people meant by certain words have gone up in smoke. Now, resolve their dispute.

SRB
Social darwinists are typically utilitarians. They think that people would be happier overall if the disabled were killed off. The dispute between the two individuals is not about what "good" means, but may well be about whether there would be more happiness overall if disabled people were killed off. That is an empirical matter.

SRB
If you are a moral objectivist, you hold that social darwinists mean the same thing as everyone else when they use the word "good". Your questions above suggest that you think social darwinists mean something different to the rest of us when they use the word "good," which unwittingly makes you a moral subjectivist.

Luvluv
Why, exactly, could I not say that what he means when he says good is incorrect, and thus be a moral objectivist?

SRB
If groups of people use some meaning of "good" at variance with your definition then they could say "X is good" and you could say "X is not good" and there might well be no conflict in the propositions thereby expressed.

SRB