Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Philip Osborne:

"1. If it is for some state of affairs x to obtain, then God can cause x to obtain (Definition of omnipotence)

"2. If God cannot cause x to obtain, then it is logically impossible for x to obtain. (Contrapositive of 1)

"But it is traditionally held that omnipotence does not entail the ability to do such things as make square circles, etc. So if causing some gratuitous evil cannot be caused to exist by God, then it is not possible. And if it is not possible, then not being able to do it does not contradict omnipotence."

I would say here that it is God's moral nature that prevents gratuitous evil, and necessary moral limitations are still limitations. If I believe, for moral reasons, that I ought never tie my shoes, then the state of affairs in which I tie my shoes is logically impossible. So not being able to tie my shoes is not a limitation on my omnipotence.

I agree that God cannot cause gratuitous evil to exist, but this is for two reasons: gratuitous evil is impossible, which is a limitation on anyone, and God's moral nature does not allow him to create gratuitous evil -- which is a limitation on God. We can say "If gratuitous evil were possible, God would still be unable to bring it about," and I think this should provide some reason to doubt God's omnipotence. Suppose I am defined as unable to draw circles; my brain simply is unable to cause me to do that. I cannot draw a square circle, but even if it were possible to draw square circles, I still couldn't. I would say this is still a limitation on my power.

One way in which God's moral nature still conflicts with omnipotence, independent of gratuitous evil, is that God cannot bring about the state of affairs in which someone or other freely chooses evil. This is (1) a logically possible state of affairs and (2) a state of affairs that a being can bring about. Morriston has a paper in which he examines omnipotence and God's moral perfection in these ways, with (in my opinion) persuasive results.

I believe, as I think you do, that the apologist ought to adopt omnipotence* instead of omnipotence for God.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Taffy Lewis:

"The reason is that it doesn't seem to be true that (P) Some object or state of affairs which contains no evil is necessarily better than one which does...

"The purpose of my example is to demonstrate that (P) is not true. My example also undermines variations on (P) such as:

"(P') Some object or state of affairs with less evil is necessarily better than an object or state of affairs with more evil."

But I think we can accept that a situation with less evil is better than one with more evil, ceteris paribus. What sort of omnipotent is God?

Vorkosigan

Taffy, non-existence is not an "object."

Philip Osborne

"Suppose I am defined as unable to draw circles; my brain simply is unable to cause me to do that. I cannot draw a square circle, but even if it were possible to draw square circles, I still couldn't. I would say this is still a limitation on my power."

Remember that the thesis of omnipotence says that God is capable of doing whatever actually is logically possible. We don't have to assume that "If x is possible, God can instantiate x" is the same as "If x were to be possible, God would be able to do it." If we accept the former and deny that the latter follows from it, I don't think your square circle counter-example gives us any reason to doubt God's omnipotence.

"One way in which God's moral nature still conflicts with omnipotence, independent of gratuitous evil, is that God cannot bring about the state of affairs in which someone or other freely chooses evil."

An alternative solution to this problem would be to argue, as Richard M. Gale does, that God's omnibenevolence is contingent. That is, God does not have to be morally perfect; He simply chooses to be so in the actual world.

I think there are other points here that can be addressed, but I do not have the time to do so now.

Sincerely,

Philip

Answerer

I prefer think that either evil is with God at the beginning of time or God created it. I don't think evil could just appear out of nowhere, this is absurd. But if evil is not created by God, it must be equally powerful as God, himself(as we can see above)which is unlikely, therefore, that remains the only possibility of God creating Evil, itself.

Volker

I think you forgot that you can do evil on two different paths:

1. You can do something evil.
2. You do not prevent something evil from being done.

Say, you see someone drowning, and though you could help him, you just stand there, doing nothing. You will be held responsible for not helping.

So, you say, god cannot do evil, but that is logical impossible - god can do evil by not helping. Especially when you consider that god is omnipotent. So even when you think that he can't do evil himself, than you say he can do only good things. So why don't he do good things and prevents evil?

And so you're back to the problem (again).

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Philip Osborne:

"Remember that the thesis of omnipotence says that God is capable of doing whatever actually is logically possible..."

I think we have two possibilities here: either God is essentially omnibenevolent or accidentally benevolent. If He is essentially omnibenevolent, He is unable to bring about the logically possible and bring-about-able state of affairs in which a person freely chooses to do evil.

If He is accidentally (or contingently) omnibenevolent, He is choosing not to allow gratuitous evil, and this is a self-imposed limitation -- therefore, gratuitous evil is not really logically impossible, just logically impossible as long as God retains His choice. Another problem with this position is simply that God appears to be essentially omnibenevolent.

Philip Osborne

"If He is accidentally (or contingently) omnibenevolent, He is choosing not to allow gratuitous evil, and this is a self-imposed limitation -- therefore...."

I would argue against the contention that God cannot bring about a state of affairs in which someone freely chooses evil, but given my limited access to the computer, I simply do not have the time. So, I will have to settle on my undercutting defeater for now.

I'm not sure what your criticism is. Even if God chooses never to allow gratuitous evil, such evil is still always possible in the actual world, because it is always possible for God to choose otherwise than He has. So if you are arguing that my proposal violates S5, I think that argument fails. If you are arguing that non-essential omnibenevolence does not meet the requirements of theism, I would say that many theists might think it preferable to have a God who is good because He chooses to be so than a God who is good because He cannot be otherwise, and there seems nothing unreasonable in this preference.

Sincerely,

Philip

[ September 30, 2002: Message edited by: Philip Osborne ]</p>

K

This logical impossibility argument holds no water. It is not logically impossible to do a gratuitously evil deed.

As with God, we can not do anything that is logically impossible. We can perform gratuitously evil deeds. Therefore, gratutouly evil deeds are not logically impossible.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Philip Osborne:

"Even if God chooses never to allow gratuitous evil, such evil is still always possible in the actual world, because it is always possible for God to choose otherwise than He has."

Then it seems God's moral perfection limits Him; there are logically possible states of affairs He cannot bring about. It may be that theists prefer a God who chooses to be good, but I think this is compatible with an essential property of omnibenevolence; if God chose to do something evil, He would not be God anymore. If this is true, there is no possible world in which God brings about the state of affairs "someone or other freely chooses evil," but God is constantly choosing to do good.