Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Bill Snedden · 03-30-2002, 12:04 PM

Once more into the breach, dear friends...

It has been alleged, by spin, punkersluta, and others, that meat eating is immoral.

In this thread, I would ask any vegetarians who agree with this basic premise to outline the system of morality that leads to this conclusion.

I ask this because I have yet to see, despite three threads on this topic, a description of the foundational principles or values that underly an ethical system that would support the contention that meat-eating is immoral. I realize that some of the previous participants may be under the assumption that they have already done so, so let me clarify using an example.

When asked to provide informatin regarding the foundation of his/her moral system, spin offered the following:

Quote:

<strong>Morality involves the benefit and protection of the most possible sentient beings; where conflicts arise, morality involves resolving them with the least damage to those sentient beings.</strong>

However, it should be obvious that this statement cannot actually be foundational as it is the result of prior value judgements. Clearly, "sentience" would seem to be the primary value driving this statement. Therefore, this statement (and apparently spin's moral system) would appear to be based on the value of sentience. But why sentience? Why not conscious self-awareness or moral agency? Of course, I could be wrong in my assessment; perhaps sentience is not the primary value. But, if not, what is? Some further clarification is needed.

Additionally, it was implied that this moral system is objective in nature, however there doesn't appear to be anything self-evidently objective about it. How is the genetic fallacy overcome by merely asserting "sentience" as a primary value?

I'm using spin's contributions as an example because he/she has been the only "ethical vegetarian" that I have seen provide this much information, but I'd welcome thoughts or comments from anyone who would answer the thread title in the affirmative.

Finally, just so everyone is aware, the general level of discourse around this topic has been everything but civil. This thread will be heavily moderated to ensure that it does not degenerate into the same mud-slinging morass as the other two.

Regards,

Bill Snedden

three4jump · 03-30-2002, 04:42 PM

Bill, I have not participated in the previous 1,000+ posts on the subject, but I would be willing to give it a shot. I can tell you what I think, but I don't know how to word it so that it will meet your semantic criterea for an arguable position. Maybe you could re-word it for me and then I could defend it.

"The total human population would experience less suffering and loss if everyone ate little or no meat." That's a statement I am willing to defend, but I'm not sure if it qualifies as a description of foundational principles or values.

Detached9 · 03-30-2002, 08:11 PM

If you think causing unnecessary suffering to others is immoral, then I have difficulty understanding how you could eat meat. Does the pleasure from eating meat justify the amount of suffering inflicted?

I guess that's up to the individual to determine, and probably why I never argue vegetarianism as an ethical necessity.

In other words, this post probably didn't help much.

tronvillain · 03-30-2002, 08:23 PM

Actually, if you think causing unnecessary suffering to others is immoral, then I have difficulty understanding how you could meat either. To me, the value of eating meat (of which pleasure is a part) does justify the amount of suffering inflicted. As you say, that's up to the individual to determine, and I don't have any problem with individuals who say that it doesn't considering me "immoral" in the subjective sense.

pug846 · 03-30-2002, 09:54 PM

Bill, thanks for being so clear in your opening post; hopefully some of the vegetarians will take your advice. I�ll be interested to hear what they have to say.

three4jump said:

Quote:

"The total human population would experience less suffering and loss if everyone ate little or no meat."

I would be interested in hearing you defend that proposition � It�s quite a mouthful. Unfortunately, even if it is true, it doesn�t get you anywhere with Bill�s question. Lets assume it is in fact true; does it follow that we ought not eat meat? I don�t see how you get from this specific fact, to the conclusion that we ought not eat meat. We need some sort of principle, like �we ought to minimize the amount of total suffering in humans.� You need to defend THAT principle to get anywhere with most of us.

If anyone else plans to argue along some sort of utilitarian lines, please define what you mean by �suffering.� And for those of you who feel that eating meat is objectively wrong, do you think an individual would be justified in eating meat if he needed it to survive. Why or why not?

The AntiChris · 03-31-2002, 01:17 AM

A question for moral subjectivists

I'm new to II and only discovered the (formal) moral subjectivism a few days ago. I find that I'm irresistibly drawn to the concept but am still struggling with the full implications of adopting this moral theory. Is it true to say that:

1) It is trivially simple to make the case that meat-eating is immoral for me.

2) It is impossible (irrational?) to argue that meat-eating is immoral for others.

The second statement must surely be false otherwise there'd be no point in this thread?

Could any moral subjectivist out there explain how a case could be constructed for saying "meat eating is immoral for all".

Chris

Pomp · 03-31-2002, 01:35 AM

The AntiChris,

1) It is trivially simple to make the case that meat-eating is immoral for me.

Yes. Say "I think it is wrong to eat meat." You're done. No subjectivist is going to force you to eat meat.

2) It is impossible (irrational?) to argue that meat-eating is immoral for others.

Not impossible, but very, very difficult. Usually, a subjectivist eats meat because the pleaseure and nutrition (s)he derives from it outweighs any negative consequences (s)he may incur by doing so, such as empathic discomfort at the animal's pain. In general, you'd have to demonstrate either that eating meat has negative consequences that the subjectivist in question was previously unaware of (maybe it's really bad for us, maybe meat farming fouls the environment beyond belief), or else show that the values (pleasure and nutrition) that cause the subjectivist to eat meat somehow contradict other values the(s)he holds and, therefore, ought not be held. You'd have a very difficult time showing any subjectivist that (s)he ought not enjoy pleasurable tastes or that (s)he ought not value nutrition, so you're probably better off taking the ither path and demonstrating some significant negative consequence of meat eating.

Could any moral subjectivist out there explain how a case could be constructed for saying "meat eating is immoral for all".

I would personally never say "X is immoral for all." I might say that X is immoral for most people in most situations, but subjectivist theories, in general, do not produce categorical imperatives such as "X is immoral for all."

tronvillain · 03-31-2002, 01:44 AM

Those towards whom this thread is directed tend to not be moral subjectivists.

Now, it depends what you mean by "meat-eating is immoral for others" since it is potentially just an extension of "meat-eating is immoral for me." It would seem difficult to construct a case for saying "meat eating is immoral for all" unless everyone who existed possessesd certain common subjective values, which does not appear to be the case.

Tom Piper · 03-31-2002, 01:44 AM

One of the underpinnings of Peter Singer's animal-rights position is what he calls the principle of equality.

POE: It is unjust to treat beings differently unless there is a relevant difference between them that justifies the differential treatment.

Speciesism, according to Singer, is "a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of another species".

According to Singer, "we should give the same respect to the lives of animals as we give to the lives of those humans at a similar mental level".

So, as we can see, mere difference of species is not a relevant difference, as far as Singer is concerned. If, for example, there are individuals in the universe like Vulcans (Mr. Spock, from Star Trek) or beings like Yoda and like chewbakka (sp?) (from the 'Star Wars' films, these individuals would be entitled to the same rights that humans qua humans have. To do otherwise would be to discriminate-- to withold rights, etc., for no good reason.

Singer happens to think that (the relevant) 'mental level' is to be understood in terms of 'sentience' the capacity for suffering. One can consider traits/characteristics/features other than sentience so defined . However, one will be constrained by human paradigms-- whatever feature at whatever level secures entry into the 'protected' circle for humans will, if satisfied by non-humans, secure entry for the non-humans as well.

On this model, it is clear that some non-humans will be 'protected' in the way that humans are. It is just a matter of what your paradigm is for human entry-- the human fetus at viability, humans at birth, humans at two years of age, humans of average IQ, humans any IQ (IQ irrelevant), ...

Whatever your paradigm and the consequent characteristics, if you can't do _____ to humans with just those characteristics, then you can't do it to non-humans with those characteristics either.

So, having sketched at least a rough approxmation of Singer's position (if anyone wants to add details or corrections to the characterization of Singer, please feel free to do so), let the assault begin!

Tom

Pomp · 03-31-2002, 01:50 AM

I've read Singer, and I do admire his willingness to apply his reasoning consistently. My objections to his argument are, first, that he doesn't give any compelling reason why we would accept the POE and, second, that he doesn't give any compelling reason why we ought to accept sentience as the morally relevant trait, rather than, say, the capacity for abstract thought.

It's been a while since I've read any of his work, so I apologize if I'm misrepresenting him here.

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03-30-2002, 04:42 PM	#2
three4jump Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2001 Location: Useless Bay Posts: 1,434	Bill, I have not participated in the previous 1,000+ posts on the subject, but I would be willing to give it a shot. I can tell you what I think, but I don't know how to word it so that it will meet your semantic criterea for an arguable position. Maybe you could re-word it for me and then I could defend it. "The total human population would experience less suffering and loss if everyone ate little or no meat." That's a statement I am willing to defend, but I'm not sure if it qualifies as a description of foundational principles or values.

03-30-2002, 08:11 PM	#3
Detached9 Regular Member Join Date: Mar 2001 Posts: 341	If you think causing unnecessary suffering to others is immoral, then I have difficulty understanding how you could eat meat. Does the pleasure from eating meat justify the amount of suffering inflicted? I guess that's up to the individual to determine, and probably why I never argue vegetarianism as an ethical necessity. In other words, this post probably didn't help much.

03-30-2002, 08:23 PM	#4
tronvillain Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2000 Location: Alberta, Canada Posts: 5,658	Actually, if you think causing unnecessary suffering to others is immoral, then I have difficulty understanding how you could meat either. To me, the value of eating meat (of which pleasure is a part) does justify the amount of suffering inflicted. As you say, that's up to the individual to determine, and I don't have any problem with individuals who say that it doesn't considering me "immoral" in the subjective sense.

03-31-2002, 01:17 AM	#6
The AntiChris Veteran Member Join Date: Mar 2002 Location: UK Posts: 5,932	A question for moral subjectivists I'm new to II and only discovered the (formal) moral subjectivism a few days ago. I find that I'm irresistibly drawn to the concept but am still struggling with the full implications of adopting this moral theory. Is it true to say that: 1) It is trivially simple to make the case that meat-eating is immoral for me. 2) It is impossible (irrational?) to argue that meat-eating is immoral for others. The second statement must surely be false otherwise there'd be no point in this thread? Could any moral subjectivist out there explain how a case could be constructed for saying "meat eating is immoral for all". Chris

03-31-2002, 01:35 AM	#7
Pomp Veteran Member Join Date: Aug 2000 Location: Indianapolis area Posts: 3,468	The AntiChris, 1) It is trivially simple to make the case that meat-eating is immoral for me. Yes. Say "I think it is wrong to eat meat." You're done. No subjectivist is going to force you to eat meat. *2) It is impossible (irrational?) to argue that meat-eating is immoral for others.* Not impossible, but very, very difficult. Usually, a subjectivist eats meat because the pleaseure and nutrition (s)he derives from it outweighs any negative consequences (s)he may incur by doing so, such as empathic discomfort at the animal's pain. In general, you'd have to demonstrate either that eating meat has negative consequences that the subjectivist in question was previously unaware of (maybe it's really bad for us, maybe meat farming fouls the environment beyond belief), or else show that the values (pleasure and nutrition) that cause the subjectivist to eat meat somehow contradict other values the(s)he holds and, therefore, ought not be held. You'd have a very difficult time showing any subjectivist that (s)he ought not enjoy pleasurable tastes or that (s)he ought not value nutrition, so you're probably better off taking the ither path and demonstrating some significant negative consequence of meat eating. Could any moral subjectivist out there explain how a case could be constructed for saying "meat eating is immoral for all". I would personally never say "X is immoral for all." I might say that X is immoral for most people in most situations, but subjectivist theories, in general, do not produce categorical imperatives such as "X is immoral for all."

03-31-2002, 01:44 AM	#8
tronvillain Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2000 Location: Alberta, Canada Posts: 5,658	Those towards whom this thread is directed tend to not be moral subjectivists. Now, it depends what you mean by "meat-eating is immoral for others" since it is potentially just an extension of "meat-eating is immoral for me." It would seem difficult to construct a case for saying "meat eating is immoral for all" unless everyone who existed possessesd certain common subjective values, which does not appear to be the case.

03-31-2002, 01:44 AM	#9
Tom Piper Junior Member Join Date: Feb 2002 Posts: 78	One of the underpinnings of Peter Singer's animal-rights position is what he calls the principle of equality. POE: It is unjust to treat beings differently unless there is a relevant difference between them that justifies the differential treatment. Speciesism, according to Singer, is "a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of another species". According to Singer, "we should give the same respect to the lives of animals as we give to the lives of those humans at a similar mental level". So, as we can see, mere difference of species is not a relevant difference, as far as Singer is concerned. If, for example, there are individuals in the universe like Vulcans (Mr. Spock, from Star Trek) or beings like Yoda and like chewbakka (sp?) (from the 'Star Wars' films, these individuals would be entitled to the same rights that humans qua humans have. To do otherwise would be to discriminate-- to withold rights, etc., for no good reason. Singer happens to think that (the relevant) 'mental level' is to be understood in terms of 'sentience' the capacity for suffering. One can consider traits/characteristics/features other than sentience so defined . However, one will be constrained by human paradigms-- whatever feature at whatever level secures entry into the 'protected' circle for humans will, if satisfied by non-humans, secure entry for the non-humans as well. On this model, it is clear that some non-humans will be 'protected' in the way that humans are. It is just a matter of what your paradigm is for human entry-- the human fetus at viability, humans at birth, humans at two years of age, humans of average IQ, humans any IQ (IQ irrelevant), ... Whatever your paradigm and the consequent characteristics, if you can't do _____ to humans with just those characteristics, then you can't do it to non-humans with those characteristics either. So, having sketched at least a rough approxmation of Singer's position (if anyone wants to add details or corrections to the characterization of Singer, please feel free to do so), let the assault begin! Tom

03-31-2002, 01:50 AM	#10
Pomp Veteran Member Join Date: Aug 2000 Location: Indianapolis area Posts: 3,468	I've read Singer, and I do admire his willingness to apply his reasoning consistently. My objections to his argument are, first, that he doesn't give any compelling reason why we would accept the POE and, second, that he doesn't give any compelling reason why we ought to accept sentience as the morally relevant trait, rather than, say, the capacity for abstract thought. It's been a while since I've read any of his work, so I apologize if I'm misrepresenting him here.

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