Alonzo Fyfe

I am working on Part III of my "Ethics Without God" series.

I wanted to post and get comments on a short section of Part III, a part where I argue that there must be a potential science of good and evil.

It is attached.

In case you are interested:

Ethics Without God: A Personal Journey, Part I -- A Rejection of Religion-Based Ethics

Ethics Without God: A Personal Journey, Part II -- A Rejection of Objectivism

Excerpt: Part III. Is/Ought and the Science of Good and Evil

tk

I have thought about the "ought" question a little bit, and I found that there's a distinction to be made between conditional and unconditional oughts.

For example, you say, "If I am going to bake that cake tonight I ought to pick up some flour on the way home from work." There's a condition attached to this statement: the formula is "if I want result R at time t + 1, I ought to do action A at time t." This can be readily converted to an "is" statement analyzable with standard logic: "if I don't do A at time t, at time t + 1 I won't get R."

Consider "We ought to give the prisoner a fair trail and determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, if he is guilty." This has no condition attached.

(At least, on the surface. I suspect such unconditional "ought" statements are really coloured by our personal biases of what's good and bad. For example, we believe in fair trials because we instinctively think law, order and fairness are "good". Thus the above proposition is unconditional in form, but conditional in substance. The search is on for a core set of truly unconditional "oughts" from which we can derive other unconditional "oughts".)

Alonzo Fyfe

Yes, it is the same distinction that Immanual Kant drew between a hypothetical imperative (a goal-dependent ought) and a categorical imperative (a goal-independent ought).

I sought not to discriminate between the two in the piece that I wrote.

It remains an open possibility that different types of 'ought' statements end up in different categories. In fact, I hold that categorical-imperatives properly belong in Option 2 (eliminativist), and hypothetical imperatives belong in Option 3 (scientist).

Still, for moral-ought, the issue in the argument remains untouched. Moral oughts with the capacity to influence physical action (alter the motion of bodies in the physical universe) require that, we must either presuppose some sort of metaphysical dualism, treat all moral-oughts as false and eliminate them from our real-world language, or treat them as real, scientifically knowable and measurable properties.

The problem is not solved by recognizing the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperative. The problem is simply refined and polished a little.

tk

Indeed. My current hypothesis is that the core set of unconditional "oughts" is in fact the empty set, that the currently claimed unconditional "oughts" are false and actually come from our personal preferences and biases that have accumulated in us over eons of evolution.

Alonzo Fyfe

I agree completely. You will find that view come increasingly to the fore as the series continues.

Thanks for reading, by the way. And for your comments.

99Percent

Hello Alonzo, I read all of your three essays and I hope to have some meaningful discussion on some of your objections to objectivism and libertarian thought. I don't claim to be an expert in objectivism, but I offer to help what I understand of it because so far I haven't found anything that makes me reject it as you do.

Lets start with the "is" and "ought" leap. The "ought" comes up because of a value judgement and we as moral beings live and act by value judgements. Humans, being rational as their essence (which in turn throws us another ought at us which I deal with later here) are valuers and therefore their modus operandi is to continously make value judgements on everything. So whenever we communicate what an object is we are in effect conceptualizing, and conveying a value judgement which transforms it this is to an ought. When we say that an object X is such Y, and Z we are categoraizng X and adding value judgements Y and Z.

When we say "A table is a support object" we are also saying a table ought to support things. If a such an object labeled "table" does not comply with its define function we say that this "table" is not working, ie it is bad. If we say "A car is a mode of transportation" then we are implying the value judgement that a car ought to transport people and things. If it doesn't then the car is bad, it is broken, not working, etc. If it does comply with its defined function then the car is good, it is working, etc.

Notice that first we are conceptualizing objects and in the process describing its essence that helps us distinguishes it from other concepts. These distinguising caracteristics is what makes it an ought.

Another example that I remember you mentioned here some time ago: "My car is yellow" so it ought to be yellow. Its trivial because its not relating to a concept but a particular real thing ("My" car). but it is still usefull. If you car is not in fact yellow, (say it has faded in color, or the paint peeled) then there is something wrong with your car, or its not in fact your car, when I see a red car. However if you say "A car is a yellow object", I can immediately reject it because its not a distinguishing essential characteristic of the concept "car".

Now lets look at the objectivist statement: "Man is a rational animal". First we notice that this is a conceptual statement, its stating man as a concept, not a particular thing or object. Next its identifying the relevant essence of this concept - that man is rational, the essence that implies a value judgement and translates to an ought.

So when you say Man is a rational animal you are also saying man ought to be rational in order for it to be a good man, a man that is working correctly. If a particular individual that pretends to be a man acts irrationally then you can say that man is not working correctly, he is in effect bad, not fulfilling his descriptive essence of being a human.

Of course you can reject the statement by declaring that man's essence is not reason, but then we can discuss that instead.

Alonzo Fyfe

Greetings:

To answer your claim, I would first like to distinguish between two differen types of terms. One type contains certain ends, goals, objectives, or purposes as a part of their meaning. The other type, does not.

Distinctions here are best explained by looking at specific examples. The example that I would like to use here is the difference between 'club' and 'stick'. The word 'club' has a purpose or end built into the meaning of the word. When the word 'club' was invented, the inventor said (probably not in so many words), 'we shall use the word 'club' to refer to things according to their ability to perform this particular purpose.' But, when they invented the word 'stick', they did not do this. They simply said, 'we will use the word 'stick' to refer to those things that have this particular set of properties.'

What you say about 'ought' applies to all things where a purpose is built into the meaning of the term -- it makes sense of the way we talk about a good club.

But there is no such thing as a good stick. An object, that lacks the properties of 'stickness' is not considered a bad stick because of this absense. It is simply not a stick.

For all man-made objects (clubs, tables, cars), I believe that you are going to discover a purpose or end built into the meaning of the term -- namely, the end or purpose for which it was constructed. People who build things, build them for a reason, and it is a simple task to invent a language that imports the reason for which a thing is built into the very meaning of the words used to refer to those built things. Of course, nothing prevents humans from inventing a language where they import a purpose into the meanings of words they use to identify natural objects. Consequently, while every word referring to a man-made object contains a purpose as a part of its meaning, not every word that contains a purpose as a part of its meaning refers to a man-made object.

Between these two, I would argue that the word 'man' is more like the word 'stick' than the word 'club'. There is no end or purpose built into the term, it simply refers to something that has a particular trait. Something that lacks that trait may reasonably be said to be less of a man, or merely man-like. But not that it is a bad man. And particularly not an evil man.

To import a 'purpose' or 'end' or 'goal' into the term man (the way it is imported into the term 'table' or 'car' or 'club') is to beg the question. We may, at this point, as who's purpose, who's end, who's purpose? Why these purposes or ends? Why not some other? What is particularly wrong with selecting some other end or purpose?

Ultimately, by (unjustifiably) importing an end or purpose (or a prescription, or an ought-judgment) into the definition of the word 'man', you end up begging the question. You build into your assumptions the very proposition that needs defending. In doing so, of course, everything else you would want to say seems to follow logically and it is absurd to see how anybody can argue against it.

I hold that the word 'man' has no prescriptive meaning. Its meaning is purely descriptive. And none of your prescriptive conclusions can follow from a purely descriptive term.

99Percent

But there are natural objects that are prescriptive and we have them right with us when we are born!

For example we have ears whose purpose and reason are to hear and listen. "Ears ought to hear". We have feet whose purpose "Legs ought to walk". We have a heart who gives us life "Heart ought to pump blood". And we have a brain that gives us reason. "We ought to think".

So each individual is born with the natural things that give him value from the moment he realizes his existence. From these things he then builds and values and values other man made things. The means and reason are for his own.

We also live in society and we value other human beings when they are rational ie, they are working correctly, that are therefore good. Of what use is it to coexist with a madman for example, or an idiot who you can't communicate, or a criminal who only understands through the use of force? With a rational human being you can communicate, trade human produced values and coexist peacefully.

Adrian Selby

"Ears ought to hear" doesn't sound equivalent to "Ears doing hearing is good."

Ears certainly ought to hear if there's nothing wrong with them, but aren't there many ears in the animal kingdom that no longer serve that function?

I think you're confusing different senses/uses to which the word 'ought' is put, if you're trying to lead from a fact to a value.

Alonzo Fyfe

If you wish to categorize reason as a useful natural tool in the manner of ears, feet, and heart, you will get no disagreement from me. That is exactly what it is -- a useful natural tool.

They may be natural objects, but their value is no different than the value discussed above for man-made objects. Like tables, cars, and clubs, these natural abilities acquire their value strictly as tools -- strictly because of their usefulness to the person whose ears, feet, heart, and reason we are talking about. They have the most value when they are the most useful; less valuable to the degree that they fail to be useful.

The only way that the definition of man can become prescriptive, rather than descriptive, is if we conceive of man the same way we conceive of ears, feet, tables, and clubs. As something useful to some end -- an effective tool -- and can start to answer questions like, "Effective for what end? For whose purpose?"

Is man qua man a tool? If not, then the definition of man is descriptive.

[Note: I did, by the way, explicitly state that nothing prohibits us from inventing a language where prescriptive definitions are used for natural things -- where a purpose is built into the very meaning of the term.]