Thomas Metcalf

The Internet Infidels is posting a <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/bill_cooke/cooke-aijaz/index.html" target="_blank">new atheist/theist debate</a>. I thought I'd post my own response to the theist debator here, to invite responses and to provide an alternative to Cooke's responses.

Aijaz's strategy is to present a two-part cosmological argument and the argument from finetuning, to show that theism is more probable than atheism. I believe his essay can be challenged on all three points. This is his formulation of the first part of the kalam cosmological argument:

This is a familiar argument to atheologians. There are two ways to read the second premise: either it means that there was a time at which the universe did not exist, and then there was a time at which the universe did exist, or that the universe does not extend infinitely backwards in time. Big bang cosmology strongly supports the latter reading of the second premise and is inconsistent with the former reading, so I will take the latter reading to be Aijaz's meaning. Yet, it is hard to see how something could be caused to exist if nothing existed before it. One might formulate an argument this way:

1'. For every caused event, the cause of this event exists in a moment before the event.

2'. No cause of the universe exists in a moment before the universe began.

3'. Therefore, the beginning of the universe was not a caused event.

The first premise of this argument seems just as intuitively persuasive as the first premise of Aijaz's argument. Therefore, I do not think Aijaz can ask us to accept the conclusion of his argument over the conclusion of our argument.

Let us assume, however, that we have accepted the first part of Aijaz's cosmological argument. It does not follow that the cause of the universe was the "first" cause "in history"; nothing prevents this cause from having its own elaborate prior causal chain. We cannot infer that the cause of the universe was, itself, uncaused.

If we were to grant the first stage of Aijaz's argument, we might still not proceed to grant the second stage. Here is his argument:

For this argument to be sound, at the very least, "mechanical" must simply mean "not personal." Aijaz's support for his second premise is that a mechanical cause could not be the "first" cause, because mechanical causes require other mechanical causes. Yet, even if this is the case, there could be an extensive causal chain "before" the creation of the universe; the universe might have been created by a mechanical cause 1,000 "events" after some personal choice. And if we define "personal" simply as "produced by will," we haven't made much progress. If Aijaz asserts that a personal being can cause its own actions and the events that follow therefrom, the atheist may simply reply that the cause of the universe caused its own actions, but is still not sentient or possessing of a will in any way. Further, Aijaz has committed himself to a libertarian view of will, a not-uncontroversial position that he does not bother to defend.

Aijaz continues with a limited description of what it would mean for the necessary and sufficient conditions of the universe to be eternal; even if he is correct that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the universe could not have existed infinitely in time without producing the universe, this is not required for the naturalist; the naturalist may simply believe that the universe does not extend infinitely backwards in time. At the first instant of the universe, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the universe existed; they needn't have existed for a protracted time.

In an attempt to demonstrate that the creator of the universe is intelligent, Aijiz offers a version of the finetuning argument.

But this form of the argument will not be persuasive without independent reason to think that the designer already exists, and Aijaz's other arguments, if sound, would only indicate that something willed the universe into existence. Again, we could construct a parallel argument to show any improbable event evidence of any explanatory hypothesis:

1'. If I run a random number generator that could return results from 1 to googolplex, and receive 598,823, this is not improbable under the hypothesis that there exists a magical elf who loves that number and influences random number generators to return that result.

2'. That result is very improbable under the naturalistic hypothesis.

3'. Therefore, that result is evidence for the elf hypothesis.

I trust that few would really consider that number evidence for any sort of elf hypothesis. The reason is that we have no idea whether there is such an elf in a position to tamper with the results in the first place, just as we have no reason to believe God is in a position to influence the outcome of the universe. Let us consider another parallel argument:

1''. If my neighbor wins the lottery, this is not improbable under the hypothesis that she cheated.

2''. If my neighbor wins the lottery, this is very improbable under the hypothesis that she did not cheat.

3''. Therefore, that my neighbor won the lottery is evidence that she cheated.

This is still not persuasive unless we have a good idea of how likely it is that my neighbor cheated at all. We don't know whether she was in a position to cheat, and we don't know whether God was in a position to control how the universe ended up. No matter how large we make the lottery, we still don't find it surprising enough that my neighbor won the lottery for us to conclude she must have cheated. This example is even charitable to the theist, because we know that my neighbor exists and that she would have clear, understandable motives for cheating.

Aijaz offers the popular "firing squad" analogy. However, like Paley's Watchmaker example, it is a bad analogy. In the case of the firing squad, we already know there are people in a position to influence the outcome of the event, but again, we do not know this with the case of the possibility of God. The argument from finetuning is only persuasive to argue that if God exists, then God probably finetuned the universe.

I conclude that Aijaz has not provided any support for theism that cannot be rejected.

[ October 14, 2002: Message edited by: Thomas Metcalf ]</p>

Plump-DJ

Hello Thomas.

Just for balance i'd like to add my response.

Hmmm... i'm not so sure i think the reasoning here works, on a number of levels..

1) You seem to be tieing the notion of causality to the universe's temporal existence. But what pray tell do we do if time itself, or at least the temporal dimension of this universe began? Shall we conclude then that perhaps the universe didn't begin afterall, or shall we suggest it came out of absolute nothingness?

2) And if something comes into existence without anything logicaly prior to it then i propose that this is (A) metaphysicaly absurd and (B) contradicts our shared experience and thus we should reject it.

1) If one accepts that the universe began to exist then they have left the realm of cosmological atheism and entered the realm of a sort of cosmological theism. In otherwords there is something transcendent to our universe that always existed, is uncaused and infinite. That has been the basic position of the theist for the last 2000 years plus, if i'm not mistaken.

2) If the universe did began then it makes God's existence more of a neccesity then if the universe never came to be, but was like God is said to be -- eternal in it's existence, neither coming to be nor ending.

3) A universe which begins echos the opening line of the Bible : "In the beginning God created the heaven's and the Earth" It has theological overtones which many have seen.

I agree with Thomas here. I don't see how Aijaz can show that we need a personal agent to bring the universe into existence given our lack of knowdege about that which came logicaly prior to the universe. I would argue that the best way to make that point would be from the properties of the universe we see and the cause itself. In otherwords ::

1) If the universe has property X,Y,Z and
2) If the universe began from A,B,C
3) Then the cause would need to account for A,B,C and X,Y,Z
4) God is the most likely canditate to give us a sufficent account of A,B,C and X,Y,Z

A,B,C would be things like -- bring time matter and energy into being (meaning power and trancedenace) and X,Y,Z would be refering to the order, structure, balance and 'fine-tuning'' I suppose.

Or something like that perhaps.

Would this not make it an arbitrary neccesity? What are these neccesary and sufficent conditions which could cease to exist? Where do they exist and how can they be neccesary if they cease to exist? With God, at least you have a sort of metaphysical construction behind that. God is eternal and so on and exists neccesarily and provides the sufficent conditions to bring the universe into being. In otherwords those conditions aren't just "floating" in mid air their grounded in something.

We do not need indpendent evidence to conclude that design or teleology is a real property of this universe. We do not need the designers lab notes, much as the SETI group does not need to see the Alien's send the signal before they can conclude that "something is going on".

You can always if you wish, appeal to chance if you like regardless of how unlikely. But as Dawkins himself has said we should not accept too much chance in our explanations. And Alvin Plantinga in his review of "Darwin's Dangerous Idea" asks how this appeal to chance would play in Tombstone or Dodge City perhaps in explaining the "Fine Tuning" we see in the laws of physics? (I assume this is what Aijaz is referring to in his argument)

"Waal, shore, Tex, I know it's a leetle mite suspicious that every time I deal I git four aces and a wild card, but have you considered the following? Possibly there is an infinite succession of universes, so that for any possible distribution of possible poker hands, there is a universe in which that possibility is realized; we just happen to find ourselves in one where someone like me always deals himself only aces and wild cards without ever cheating. So put up that shootin' arn and set down 'n shet yore yap, ya dumb galoot."

Plantinga goes on to say..

"Dennett's reply (which i think is relevant in this case) shows at most ('at most', because that story about infinitely many universes is doubtfully coherent) what was never in question: that the premises of this argument from apparent design do not entail its conclusion. But of course that was conceded from the beginning: it is presented as a probabilistic argument, not one that is deductive valid. Furthermore, since an argument can be good even if it is not deductively valid, you can't refute it just by pointing out that it isn't deductively valid. You might as well reject the argument for evolution by pointing out that the evidence for evolution doesn't entail that it ever took place, but only makes that fact likely."

HRG

Bill Jeffery and Mike Ikeda have shown how the fine-tuning argument can be inverted (and have made the argument Bayesian-quantitative). They start from the fact that life exists in our universe:

1. If our universe was not fine-tuned for life, continous supernatural interventions would be required to make life nevertheless possible. Thus the supernatural exists.

2. If our universe was fine-tuned for life, the supernatural need not exist.

3. Our universe is fine-tuned for life.

It is easy to deduce from 1. and 2. that the observation 3. decreases the probability that the supernatural exists.

Regards,
HRG.

SRB

HRG:
Bill Jeffery and Mike Ikeda have shown how the fine-tuning argument can be inverted (and have made the argument Bayesian-quantitative). They start from the fact that life exists in our universe:

1. If our universe was not fine-tuned for life, continous supernatural interventions would be required to make life nevertheless possible. Thus the supernatural exists.

2. If our universe was fine-tuned for life, the supernatural need not exist.

3. Our universe is fine-tuned for life.

It is easy to deduce from 1. and 2. that the observation 3. decreases the probability that the supernatural exists.

SRB
Although I don't find the fine tuning argument persuasive, I don't think this objection works. It is epistemically possible for the existence of life in the universe to be insensitive to the initial conditions and constants of the universe. If that had been the case, nobody would be inclined to propose that any fine tuning went on. So statement 1 is false.

SRB

Thomas Metcalf

Thanks for your response.

Originally posted by Plump-DJ:

"1) You seem to be tieing the notion of causality to the universe's temporal existence. But what pray tell do we do if time itself, or at least the temporal dimension of this universe began? Shall we conclude then that perhaps the universe didn't begin afterall, or shall we suggest it came out of absolute nothingness?"

Well, this argument depends on the fact that time itself began at the big bang. The argument is intended to suggest that time's existence cannot be caused, or at least that the idea of time's existence being caused is highly counter-intuitive.

"2) And if something comes into existence without anything logicaly prior to it then i propose that this is (A) metaphysicaly absurd and (B) contradicts our shared experience and thus we should reject it."

We have experience of indeterministic events, and we have no experience of things "coming into existence" when there wasn't a time at which they did not exist. Therefore, I don't think we can appeal to our shared experience here.

"1) If one accepts that the universe began to exist then they have left the realm of cosmological atheism and entered the realm of a sort of cosmological theism. In otherwords there is something transcendent to our universe that always existed, is uncaused and infinite. That has been the basic position of the theist for the last 2000 years plus, if i'm not mistaken."

I don't think one commits oneself to theism if one posits something transcendent to our universe and uncaused. This thing need not be intelligent, personal, very powerful, or anything like that. In fact, I disagree that it must have "always existed" (this makes no sense if it's transcendent to the universe) or that it must be infinite.

"2) If the universe did began then it makes God's existence more of a neccesity then if the universe never came to be, but was like God is said to be -- eternal in it's existence, neither coming to be nor ending."

I think whether the universe's beginning provides evidence at all for God is precisely what's at issue here.

"3) A universe which begins echos the opening line of the Bible : 'In the beginning God created the heaven's and the Earth' It has theological overtones which many have seen."

Well, of course. It also echoes "The universe began, and God does not exist." Why should we believe the Bible and not that statement?

"1) If the universe has property X,Y,Z and
2) If the universe began from A,B,C
3) Then the cause would need to account for A,B,C and X,Y,Z
4) God is the most likely canditate to give us a sufficent account of A,B,C and X,Y,Z

"A,B,C would be things like -- bring time matter and energy into being (meaning power and trancedenace) and X,Y,Z would be refering to the order, structure, balance and 'fine-tuning'' I suppose."

This seems to be a form of the Affirming the Consequent fallacy. "If God, then account of A, B, C, X, Y, and Z, therefore if account of A, B, C, X, Y, and Z, then God." God is a candidate for such an explanation, but that hypothesis seems to violate Ockham's Razor. In addition, we do not know that whatever caused A is the same "person" as what caused B, C, X, Y, or Z.

"Would this not make it an arbitrary neccesity? What are these neccesary and sufficent conditions which could cease to exist? Where do they exist and how can they be neccesary if they cease to exist? With God, at least you have a sort of metaphysical construction behind that. God is eternal and so on and exists neccesarily and provides the sufficent conditions to bring the universe into being. In otherwords those conditions aren't just 'floating' in mid air their grounded in something."

Again, just because God would be an explanation, doesn't make Him a good explanation. These purported necessary and sufficient conditions could be anything; I simply must continue to show that they need not be a God.

"We do not need indpendent evidence to conclude that design or teleology is a real property of this universe. We do not need the designers lab notes, much as the SETI group does not need to see the Alien's send the signal before they can conclude that 'something is going on'."

But we do need to know that whatever "designed" the universe is the same being that "caused" the universe. No one has demonstrated that.

"You can always if you wish, appeal to chance if you like regardless of how unlikely. But as Dawkins himself has said we should not accept too much chance in our explanations. And Alvin Plantinga in his review of 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea' asks how this appeal to chance would play in Tombstone or Dodge City perhaps in explaining the 'Fine Tuning' we see in the laws of physics? (I assume this is what Aijaz is referring to in his argument)"

I'm not talking about the many-universes hypothesis. I'm saying we're wrong as soon as we posit "not chance" to explain something of exceeding improbability, unless we already have evidence for what we think would be the agent of "not chance." If your neighbor won the lottery, would you assume she cheated?

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by HRG:

"Bill Jeffery and Mike Ikeda have shown how the fine-tuning argument can be inverted (and have made the argument Bayesian-quantitative)."

I would be interested to read this article. I could probably find it eventually on my own, but do you know the citation offhand?

Vanderzyden

Premise 2 is unlikely to be true since it fails to account for the causation of the fine-tuning. It is problematic whether we consider the finely-tuned parameters themselves or the context (i.e. the universe) in which they are tuned.

From where, or what, does the fine-tuning originate?

In particular, premise 2 fails on the acceptance of Big Bang cosmology.


Vanderzyden

Plump-DJ

My understanding is that all MEST (Matter, Energy, Space and Time) which i would call the universe came from or emerged from something else and that is being used to argue for the neccesity **or** increased likelyhood of God's existence. If you suggest it had no cause (MEST) yet began nonetheless you are in my view suggesting that an actual came from a complete absence of any potentiality since potentiality lies in things which exist. In otherword's stuff from non-stuff. That is absurd.

Couple of points.

1) If there is something else (this transcendant of which we speak) from which the universe came then anything capable of bringing such an effect like this into being is going to require a bit or pre-existent gusto. I can't see how you could deny that.

2) God does not mean personal agent who loves us etc etc. God has been thought of as both personal and impersonal. When i speak of "a sort of cosmological theism" i do not mean that we end up with the Triune Christian God or anything like that. However If the universe began then it does seem to lead us to the basic position of the theist for the last 2000 years. (hence a sort of Cosmological Theism) More on this point below.

3) I think we can saftely say that if the universe is not eternal, then there is something else which comes under the category of eternal or "always-existent." If it's not the universe, then it's something else. We're still left in a sort of cosmological theism here granting the universes beginning.

Unfortunetly i don't think your appraisal here is the same one that other's have come to in regards to the beginning of the universe. Stephen Hawking said the origin of the universe has theological impliciations or overtones, Einstein saw it, so did lots and lots of others. They did not see "Hey the universe began and God does not exist." Instead they saw the obvious need for an eternal transcendant from which the universe came from. This is like granting the basic position of the theist for the last 2000 years or more. It's saying "Yes you were right here in regards to this fundamental point on the nature of things"

I'm not so sure i see the problem. If the universe has certain properties that we agree upon and the universe came to be then something must be able to account for it. This is not purely deductive, the reasoning I was trying to employ was to say that accepting those properties of the universe (let's say there's evidence for design for example) and the nature of it's beginning (Power) makes God's existence more likely, then not.

To posit the notion of an uncaused universe is to assume that a contingency exists non-contingently, which is a contradiction in terms.
Wether God is a good explanation or not is beside the point I think.

Whatever caused the universe would have to be the causer of the universe's properties. If deisgn is a real property of the universe then this cause must account for that.

Depends on the odds. If the odds are astronomical then yes.. for practical purposes you can certainly say "Not Chance". Just look at the example I gave to illistrate the point. There is nothing inherintly wrong or impossible about getting 4 aces and a wild card, lots of times in a row. But if you did -- forgive me if i smell a rat and suspect the more likely explanation is that you're cheating or that "something more then chance" is going on.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Plump-DJ:

"If you suggest it had no cause (MEST) yet began nonetheless you are in my view suggesting that an actual came from a complete absence of any potentiality since potentiality lies in things which exist. In otherword's stuff from non-stuff. That is absurd."

That is not an equivalent statement of my position, I don't think. I don't think the universe came "from" anything. For y to come from x, x had to exist before y.

"1) If there is something else (this transcendant of which we speak) from which the universe came then anything capable of bringing such an effect like this into being is going to require a bit or pre-existent gusto. I can't see how you could deny that."

Imagine a being named McSingularity. The only ability this being has is to produce a singularity. (The universe began its expansion and development from a singularity.) Would you say a being who can only perform one action is omnipotent?

"2) God does not mean personal agent who loves us etc etc. God has been thought of as both personal and impersonal. When i speak of 'a sort of cosmological theism' i do not mean that we end up with the Triune Christian God or anything like that. However If the universe began then it does seem to lead us to the basic position of the theist for the last 2000 years. (hence a sort of Cosmological Theism) More on this point below."

I don't see how it leads to anything of the sort. The cause(s) of the universe could be limited, mindless, impersonal, contingent, weak, stupid, and multiple. These are all inconsistent with anything resembling the God of the monotheists.

"3) I think we can saftely say that if the universe is not eternal, then there is something else which comes under the category of eternal or "always-existent." If it's not the universe, then it's something else. We're still left in a sort of cosmological theism here granting the universes beginning."

I do not think "Godlike" follows in any way from "eternal" without a lot of extra attributes.

"Unfortunetly i don't think your appraisal here is the same one that other's have come to in regards to the beginning of the universe. Stephen Hawking said the origin of the universe has theological impliciations or overtones, Einstein saw it, so did lots and lots of others. They did not see 'Hey the universe began and God does not exist.' Instead they saw the obvious need for an eternal transcendant from which the universe came from. This is like granting the basic position of the theist for the last 2000 years or more. It's saying 'Yes you were right here in regards to this fundamental point on the nature of things'"

Of course it has theological implications, because it denies that the universe came about theologically. Einstein did not believe in the God of classic monotheism, and Hawking does not. Most cosmologists are atheists. The basic position of theism is far more than "the universe's existence does not extend infinitely backward in time."

"I'm not so sure i see the problem. If the universe has certain properties that we agree upon and the universe came to be then something must be able to account for it. This is not purely deductive, the reasoning I was trying to employ was to say that accepting those properties of the universe (let's say there's evidence for design for example) and the nature of it's beginning (Power) makes God's existence more likely, then not."

Still, no one has argued successfully that whatever caused the universe is the same thing that designed the universe. Therefore, one can't argue that a Causer/Designer exists, only that something caused the universe and something designed the universe. To confirm God, one has to find a way to tie them together.

"To posit the notion of an uncaused universe is to assume that a contingency exists non-contingently, which is a contradiction in terms.
Wether God is a good explanation or not is beside the point I think."

The universe is not a necessary being, I don't think. Is that what you're claiming?

"Whatever caused the universe would have to be the causer of the universe's properties. If deisgn is a real property of the universe then this cause must account for that."

Only the ultimate cause. Someone could have pressed a button and said, "Okay, guys, go for it," and the universe developed as it happened to develop.

"Depends on the odds. If the odds are astronomical then yes.. for practical purposes you can certainly say 'Not Chance'. Just look at the example I gave to illistrate the point. There is nothing inherintly wrong or impossible about getting 4 aces and a wild card, lots of times in a row. But if you did -- forgive me if i smell a rat and suspect the more likely explanation is that you're cheating or that 'something more then chance' is going on."

Only if you already know someone is in a position to monkey with things. The cards analogy doesn't really mirror the situation, because we already know people cheat at cards sometimes, and we assign a specific meaning to "five of a kind," something important to the people dealing and receiving the cards.

Suppose there are 52 cards in a deck, plus one wild card. The chance of receiving "five of a kind" in aces if you dealt yourself a hand of five cards is about one in 35 million. This is not a very likely hand. But suppose you ran a random number generator that could produce results between one and 35 million -- actually, let's make it a million times less likely and bump it up to 35 trillion -- and you end up with 9,238,438. Is this persuasive evidence that someone was cheating? I don't think anyone would say it is. The moral: improbability is only interesting if you already have evidence that someone might be monkeying with it somewhere.

Plump-DJ

Thomas...

Yes logicaly that is true. If the universe (MEST) began it had to come from something else I can't see how you can deny that if that is what you're doing.. Any other statement in my view (ie Stuff from non-stuff) is just nonsense. Just out of curiosity do you accept the cosmological models which posit a beginning to the universe? That is all matter, energy, space and time "came to be"?

I never said it had to be omnipotent. I'm saying you must have something transendant which can generate universes (bring into existence something which wasn't there before, containing all sorts of stuff like matter, energy, time and space). That's gonna take some gusto. That's gonna take some potential. Secondly It's only half the case being made for the nature of the cause. If a person argues successfully or makes a valid inductive argument that leads one to think Teleology is a real property of the universe, then the cause must account for that. This makes God's existence far more likely then not because you have an entity capbable of 1) Generating universes from beyond our dimensions of space and time (Power) and 2) generating all this apparentTeleology and order. It's not deductive -- it just makes his existence far more likely then not accepting those premises.

It's more then that. It's eternal and it's transcedent to this finite derived universe and this just happens to mirror the basic position of the theist for the last 2500 years.

This not what the atheists were saying about the universe. The atheists were saying the universe "Just Is". (Bertrand Russell as an example said something like the universe "Just Is" in his debate with Copleston. That's only 50 or so years ago) Why can't It's existence (The universe) be neccesary or non-contingent. So who needs God? Thomas Aquinas believed the universe came into being because he was a Christian Theist, although there was no scientific evidence or reason to conclude as much 1000 years ago. Now we know better and the evidence seems to point to a temporaly finite universe. Leading one to either A) posit stuff from non-stuff (which is absurd) or B) Accept that there is something else transcedant to this finite derived universe. This argument won't bring you to "God", as a personal entity --- it's not meant to. It's meant to argue for the basic *fundamental* position of the theist (vs the funadamental position of the atheist) for the last 2000 years. Hence the Theological (rather then Atheological implications)

I really can't see where you would draw that reasoning from? Wether Einsteni believed in a personal God is beside the point. The point is that he, among many others saw *Theological* implications (not Atheological) from a universe which began. (There are quotes aplenty here ) The reason is quite simple in my view. Because it lead them to the basic position of the theist for the last 2500 years. It lead them to think of a cosmic maker of universes, who exists beyond our dimensions of space and time. None of this stuff says "God of the Christians and Jews" but it's very condusive to that position. That's the point in my view.

Well i simply have to disagree.

If you accept the universe began (Power) and that it contains design (Intellect) then you've only got 1 option. God. How many things can we think off that have the power and intellect to create universes? You would really be avoiding the obvious here in my view. That is exactly why people who don't want to accept God's existence will focus on the second part of the case and try and argue "We just don't know" in regards to the fine-tuning of various laws.

Well no -- if it began it couldn't possibly be "neccesary being" since it emerged from something else. (The singularity i assume)
Hmm. I think i've forgotten what it was I *was* objecting too.....

I don't think your analogy relates to the situation we find ourselves in in this universe. Given the card example -- if you got it once, i wouldn't care less. If you got it again, i would start to smell a rat. If you got it again, i would be certain you were cheating despite my lack of any independant evidence. (ie seeing you swap cards or something) I don't need independant evidence and i don't think anyone would state that I do to infer that "somfin else waz goin on".

[ October 19, 2002: Message edited by: Plump-DJ ]</p>