Malaclypse the Younger

As noted by tronvillain in the other thread:

No morality: Having no beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of any action

Subjective morality: Having subjective beliefs (opinions) about the rightness or wrongness of some actions.

Objective morality: Having evidential beliefs (rational conclusions) about the rightness or wrongness of some actions.

Note that even moral value subjectivists have objective (evidential) beliefs about strategies for fulfilling commonly held values. For instance, it is evidentially provable that the nontoleration of theft fulfills the (subjective) value of maximizing one's material propserity, through an iterative Prisoner's Dilemma analysis.

99Percent

Malaclypse The YoungerIf objectivism is true, then the two statement "person Y1 believes 'X is right'" and "person Y2 believes 'X is wrong'" is indicative of a contradiction, because the embedded predicates 'X is right' and 'X is wrong' have definite (and opposite) truth values independent of the beliefs of persons Y1 and Y2. If objectivism is true, then either Y1 and Y2 believes a falsehood, which is irrational.

The question needs to be expanded in order to differenciate between objectivist and subjectivist beliefs of morality.

"Person Y1 believes 'X' is wrong for himself" and Person Y2 believes 'X' is right for herself". This way it ceases to be an objectivistic contradiction.

Alonzo Fyfe

Well, there are two types of subjectivity being discussed here. The differences are:

A moral eliminativist holds that the only type of 'ought' statement that makes sense is practical-ought (what is good for the agent). Moral-ought statements should be eliminated from our vocabulary as either nonsensical or false. Eliminativists often point to game theory (iterated prisoners' dilemma and the like) for holding that individuals in fact have a strong practical-ought reason to be concerned with the interests of others. But this concern is only contingent. If an agent finds himself in a position where he can benefit in causing harm to another, then he practical-ought to inflict that expense on another. One of the things we all practical-ought to do is to create an environment where no other can benefit from doing us harm.

Individual subjectivists still accept the use of moral-ought statements, but their form of subjectivism ultimately makes moral-ought statements indistinguishable from practical-ought statements. While they agree with the eliminativists that all moral statements that refer to intrinsic values are false (and should be eliminated), they hold that there is still a type of moral ought that makes sense -- one that is grounded on the (subjective) tastes and preferences of the agent. In practive, because of this reliance on the tastes and preferences of the agent, the individual subjectivist and the moral eliminativists do not differ in practice, only in the words they use to describe that practice.

Intrinsic value theorists (often misleadingly called 'objectivists' hold that moral-ought refers to a property intrinsic to certain acts and traits of character -- a type of 'ought-to-be-doneness (or, in the case of character traits) an 'ought-to-beness') that we can sense when we contemplate the act or trait of character in a calm and reflective moment. They use thought experiments (intuition) to isolate key variables in order to determine where these qualities can actually be found. Individual subjectivists correctly point out that these 'intuitions' do not pick up on intrinsic value properties 'ought there', they pick up on the evaluator's own sentiments (desires). There is no evidence for the existence of these intrinsic value properties.

Additive subjectivists distinguish between practical-ought and moral-ought. While practical-ought pays attention exclusively to the agent's own reasons to do or forbear from some act, moral ought is grounded on all of the reasons that exist, regardless of who has them. Because moral-ought and practical-ought sum different value sets, they sometimes yield different answers. So, what a person practical-ought to do and what he moral-ought to do may differ.

Individual-subjectivists object that the additive-subjectivist's moral-ought is motivationally innert; it lacks the power to effect an agent's action independent of the agent's own desires. But individual subjectivism also has no way to magically effect a person's actions other than through his own desires. So, both accounts are equal on these grounds -- both equally assert that no such magical power to get a person to consider the effects of his actions on others exists.

Often times, the debate between the individual-subjectivist and the additive-subjectivist turns into a debate over which has the right to claim the therm 'moral'. Because of the subjectivity of language, no logically compelling argument can be provided for giving exclusive permission to use the word to one group or the other. All that can be provided are reasons of convenience.

Two reasons of convenience favor the additive subjectivist.

(1) The fact that the individual-subjectivist's moral-ought is indistinguishable from practical-ought means that we already have a term for describing everything that the individual subjectivist wants to describe using the term moral-ought.

(2) The additve-subjectivist's use of the term makes better sense of the practice of using moral terms to describe cases where an agent looks only at the reasons he has for doing or forbearing from some act, ignoring the reasons that exist (the reasons that his victims have) for his doing or forbearing from some act. This tends to be an important part of the common use of moral terms that would have to be abolished under individual subjectivism.

Again, these are not logically compelling reasons why the additive-subjectivist is necessarily right and all others are necessarily wrong. The subjectivity of language means that no such argument can ever be found for any of the theories listed above. And if we require that a debate on the subject must be a quest to provide such an argument, then it is a foolish debate where all who participate must necessarily fail.

[ March 31, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Malaclypse the Younger

Actually, this is not the case. I can subjectively believe that "X is wrong for others", and someone else can believe "X is right for others"; since they are both subjective beliefs, they are still not in contradiction, although they are in opposition.

Vorkosigan

In practive, because of this reliance on the tastes and preferences of the agent, the individual subjectivist and the moral eliminativists do not differ in practice, only in the words they use to describe that practice.

This strikes me as a caricature, because the subjectivist ascribes a strong social element to moral behavior that is simply not present in your formulation. Subjectivists put great weight on negotiation, tolerance, and social contracting. Morals can come from many places, and do not reside entirely in individual tastes and preferences.

Intrinsic value theorists (often misleadingly called 'objectivists' hold that moral-ought refers to a property intrinsic to certain acts and traits of character -- a type of 'ought-to-be-doneness (or, in the case of character traits) an 'ought-to-beness') that we can sense when we contemplate the act or trait of character in a calm and reflective moment. They use thought experiments (intuition) to isolate key variables in order to determine where these qualities can actually be found.

ROTFL. Objectivists typically rely on authoritarian formations that derive values from other-than-human sources and attempt to compel others to obey their moral will. The difference between objectivists (or authoritarians or absolutists or intrinsic value theorists) and subjectivists lies not in the source of morality (all are equally subjective), but in their attitude toward others. Objectivists kill with great abandon precisely because their attitude toward morality authorizes compulsion.

But the individual subjectivist also has no way to cause an agent to do what he practical-ought, so the provides no reason to prefer one theory over the other. Both forms of subjectivism are equal here. However, individual subjectivism is just as incapble of getting a person to consider the welfare of others when he has no reason (or desire) to do so. Thus, this inability does not provide a reason for preferring one account over another.

This is extremely incorrect. Moral subjectivism offers numerous routes for consideration of the welfare of others (it's good to see you finally getting around to mentioning the existence of other people in these formulations). Precisely because the subjectivist has no place to stand and compel others to her will, as an authoritarian does, she must consider the welfare of others in going about her behavior in society. You can illuminate this error by re-phrasing it to say: the individual subjectivist has no reason NOT to consider the welfare of others, whereas the objectivist has a whole moral system that is based on something other-than-human that encourages him to discount the welfare of others.

Instead of relying on this sterile philosophical discourse, why not see how the two groups behave in practice? Which group has caused more evil?

Two reasons of convenience favor the additive subjectivist.

(1) The fact that the individual-subjectivist's moral-ought is indistinguishable from practical-ought means that we already have a term for describing everything that the individual subjectivist wants to describe using the term moral-ought.

This is not a fact, but a caricature of the individual subjectivist position. As we discussed above, subjectivists take a different view.

Michael

Malaclypse the Younger

Alonzo Fyfe

Your nomenclature appears overcomplicated and mixes several different types of analysis.

For instance it seems that your construction of "addititive-subjectivists" trivially maps to "individual-subjectivists" by merely assuming that the individual-subjectivist fulfills his own value of maximizing others values. Indeed most apparently additive-subjectivists will report that they do indeed value the maximization of the values of others.

Your category labelled "intrinsic-value theorists" are simply those who report an subjective opinion or objective conclusion about acts themselves rather than the consequences of an act. It is important to note that this intrinsic/pragmatic dichotomy appears in both subjectivists and objectivists. For instance, as a subjectivist I strongly dislike lying--even if the pragmatic consequences of lying are benign or beneficial, for myself or others, I would prefer the truth. This is a subjective opinion about the intrinsic value of an action.

I much prefer the simpler nomenclature of three independent dichotomies:

• subjective/objective, which references the presumed source of a moral belief
• value/strategic: which references the presumed applicability of a moral belief
• intrinsic/pragmatic, which references the object of a moral belief

As a subjectivist, I maintain that objective beliefs about values are logically unsupported. Upon close examination, supposedly objective beliefs about values reference an arbitrary subjective belief-set, a set of beliefs that could be different or entirely opposite without entailing a logical contradiction.

More importantly, there is no structural or metaphysical difference between people who have a value about others' values and those who do not; that is merely the presence or absence of a particular value.

To actually use subjectivist moral philosophy to model human behavior, we can assume that people hold various paraconsistent sets of subjective moral values and usually behave rationally when attempting to fulfill them. This approach has a lot of power, because it predicts that we can objectively identify internal contradictions in people's value sets, predict that we will observe feelings of guilt, shame and apparently irrational behavior in people with these contradictions, and that we can change their value sets by pointing out the internal contradictions.

That subjectivism has such an obvious application to both conflict individual behavior seems powerful evidence that it is actually true.

Besides being (to my knowledge) logically unsupported, moral objectivism appears to have no scientific value. If moral objectivism is true, we must simply assume that people are predominantly irrational to the point of insanity; that moral conflicts, whether small or large arise because one of the participants is simply insane. However, objectivism gives us no methodology for deciding which of the participants is insane or how to correct that insanity.

[ March 31, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

Any caricaturization found in the distinctions that I gave above are being read into it. I allow that individual-subjectivism puts great weight on negotiation and the like. Yet it is still the case that all of this weight, however great, is contingent. It is still the case that there will be instances in which some subjects will find themselves in a position to gain at the expense of others. And when this happens, individual-subjectivism says "go with the personal gain whatever the cost to others."


To do so would be to commit the logical fallacy "ad hominem circumstantial." It would be attacking the holders of a view rather than the view itself.

There are sufficient problems with intrinsic value theory that I do not need to pull out an informal fallacy to attack it.

Subjectivists also have no place to stand when it comes to compleling others not to consider the welfare of others. The subjectivist commandment 'thou shalt not force thy morality on others' is as groundless as any of the authoritarian-ethics commandments you condemn.

Vorkosigan

Any caricaturization found in the distinctions that I gave above are being read into it. I allow that individual-subjectivism puts great weight on negotiation and the like. Yet it is still the case that all of this weight, however great, is contingent. It is still the case that there will be instances in which some subjects will find themselves in a position to gain at the expense of others. And when this happens, individual-subjectivism says "go with the personal gain whatever the cost to others."

It DOES NOT say this. It simply says that morals are made between people. There is nothing in subjectivism that compels one to take advantage of another person, even when it is possible.

Please explain why, if this is true, societies run by tolerant subjectivists are so much more livable than those run along objectivist/intrinsic/authoritarian lines. Perhaps there's some aspect of subjective ethics that has escaped you.

To do so would be to commit the logical fallacy "ad hominem circumstantial." It would be attacking the holders of a view rather than the view itself.

Nice dodge! Alonzo, we're talking about ethics. You can't separate holders and views. Ethics is about how views influence holders. There is no other way to discover the consequences of ethical views, except to see how their holders behave. What you are avoiding facing is that there is something about subjectivist morals that does not fit the claims you make above.

Subjectivists also have no place to stand when it comes to compleling others not to consider the welfare of others. The subjectivist commandment 'thou shalt not force thy morality on others' is as groundless as any of the authoritarian-ethics commandments you condemn.

The confusion you're having is attempting to understand ethics in terms of some ultimate ground. It is an assumption of objective ethics that there is some ultimate ground -- obviously you're still trapped by the ideal of intrinsic values even as you deny the idea of them.

Subjectivists deny the existence of ultimate ground -- that is the whole meaning of subjectivism. Ethics exist only in networks of other ethics, and between people who hold them social beings. There isn't any ultimate ground, nor do I need one to say that morality is something one ought not to force on others. It is precisely the lack of "ground," their ad hoc nature, that makes subjective ethics so superior.

The lack of ground gives me no moral leg to stand on in order to take advantage of others I am contracting with. There is nothing in subjectivist ethics that permits individuals to screw others, while there are positive values such as negotiation and tolerance, that mitigate against it.

Michael

[ April 01, 2002: Message edited by: turtonm ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

First, I repeat that there are different types of subjectivism, and I am raising this objection only to individual-subjectivism where the only values that a person pays attention to as an end in themselves are his own. Others have value only insofar as they are useful (through cooperative effort) as a means to obtaining the agent's goals. (That is to say, others are treated as a means only -- allowing for the possibility that it is sometimes very practical to take very good care of one's tools.)

I am a subjectivist, and would deny agree with you that there is nothing in subjectivism (broadly construed) that requires this conclusion, it is only required in some forms of subjectivism (those that make essential reference only to the values of the person performing the action.)

Let's try it this way. There is nothing in individual-subjectivism that compels a person NOT to take advantage of another where they can do so, and practical-ought dictates taking advantage of another where it is useful to do so.

Alonzo Fyfe

So, if a bunch of subjectivists were to go on a rampage and blow up buildings, shouting 'death to all worshippers,' and created a world in which the only peaceful people were worshippers of some diety, in this world you would hold that subjectivism is false and God really does exist.

Ethics is about a great many things, including the ontology and empistemology of value. To presume that it is only about the consequences of ethical views is to beg the question in favor of consequentialism. Consequentialism is only one subset of possible ethical theories -- which include divine-command, intrinsic value, contractarian, deontological, and others.

Or, let us try it this way. Whatever your system of ethics happens to be, consideration for the welfare of others is either necessary or contingent. If it is contingent, it may be causally necessary, or it allows for exceptions.

My objections are against all forms of subjectivism that makes the welfare of others a contingent part of morality. And there is no causal law of nature that says that consideration for the welfare of others is causally necessary in making these contingent evaluations, which means that consideration for the welfare of others allows for exceptions. Then the question becomes, "what should a person do when they find themselves encountering one of these exceptions?"

If I can gain by taking advantage of others, and have no (contingent) moral reason not to, then why not do so? You can't give me a reason not to take advantage of others, I have sufficient reason to do so, the reasons for taking advantage of others outweigh the reasons against, so I should go for it, and you have no grounds for saying that I should not.

[ April 01, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>