Kantian

My, my, what a confused response.

How so? what's the difference between the foundations of Chisolm and Moser and your "axioms?"

You've already mentioned your take of presuppositionalism. You have yet to show how they are distinct at the fundamental level.

I didn't think it would stir this kind of response from you, though, if it was cheap and dull

I'm not trying to win the debate because it isn't much of one so far. Theophilus isn't holding up his end either.

Maybe, but it does show that i've done my homework. I'm not sure what you mean by "confrinting," though, if that doesn't include links that raises related points of contention. And it is true that these guys i have mentioned successfully challenged foundationalism- it has been the most famous dead horse in the 20th century that received the majority of the philosophical flogging. If you have not read the works of the latter wittgenstein, Quine, Gadamer, Sellars, Popper, Dewey, Heidegger, Rorty, or those other guys, then you know you have a lot of homework to do.

It is my reasoning that greater men than I have already covered this topic in a profound sense and it is prudent to mention them.

Here's a couple, for laughs: a foundationalism that adopts the doctrine of "empirically given states" (Chisholm) is easily refuted because they take these immediate, private conscious states as "a priori" true if they are to be described. That brings all the baggage of logical positivist protocol propositions or in other words, phenomenalist metaphysics is taken for granted that facts or things are given to the consciousness in a pre-conceptual, pre-judgmental mode. Sellars wrote his book on this specific refutation of the apodictically immediate knowledge, the "Myth of the Given." Wittgenstein's private language argument demolishes such solipsistic use of language, to the degree that cartesianism is finally dead and buried.

Another is from <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0674843819/qid=1039254270/sr=1-6/ref=sr_1_6/103-6366007-1035015?v=glance&s=books" target="_blank">Bonjour:</a> the "level ascent" argument that is directed against "immediate justified beliefs." Whatever is taken to immediately justifiy a belief is possible only if the subject is already justified in supposing that the putative justifier has "what it takes" in order to do so. Since the justificatin of the original belief relies on the justification of the higher level belief just specified, the justification isn't immediate after all. we do not have any solid support for any higher level requirement for justification, and if this is imposed, we open the "infinite regress" can of worms, because a similar requirement will hold equally for that "higher level belief" that the original justifier was "efficacious."

This feeble charge could be leveled against science as well, and as unsuccessfully as well too. The theories that are fecund or produce the most accurate responses are popular too, methinks. I don't see how the same criteria for success in science be "self-refuting" because you think it's a popularity contest.

If philosophy is dead, that truth has already been found, then why are you doing philosophy? You don't have to speak anymore. It's true that philosophy does not develop in the same way as science does- because it is far more historical, far more reliant on movements, countermovements, while science is ahistorical- because the hypotheses are independent of the thinkers themselves, and their merits are objectively evaluated upon the evidence or fruitfulness in advancing new ideas in other scientific enterprises. Philosophy is a matter of going back to the text of history. If you think you can do philosophy without doing historical study, without exploring where others have gone in their philosophizing, you're merely digging a hole in the ground to hide your opinions, safeguard them from potential criticism. Philosophy is determined by a historical context to a large degree- as well as the pathos of the audience of the time, the ethos of the argument itself, and the ethos of the speaker/writer.

What's that again, the pre-socratic naturalist tradition of reason? Is that Parmenidean? Which of the pre-socratics are you referring to? If i say that philosophy is dependent upon the psychology of its advocates, am i an intellectually bankrupt human being too? *that phrase is familar- have you been catching up on Rand's books lately?*

Why do you suppose that philosophy must be ahistorical, independent of culture, of politics, of psychology, of contingent facts? Philosophy is a human activity, prone to changes and improvement, at least within my colleagues i see new fresh ideas and links that were not there before, not a gift from the divine heavens of reason.

Well, you gotta do your homework and read their books. You can complain, whine, beat around the bush, but in the end, you have to pay your dues and read the books of thinkers. That will help enrich your independent thought, no matter where they are situated to your preferences.

This is a misuse of a fallacy because i am not concluding that a short number of people represent the beliefs of an entire set. Rather i am saying that their ideas are the predominant themes in current philosophy literature- just look at the number of times these guys are subjects of dissertation topics. These guys are merely the spear-heading names of the movement of the yes-men in the profession. If they are the dominant themes that have influenced the course of philosophy, then it stands to reason that the current status of philosophy is dictated by a large part, these big names who are prominent within the literature. The names i mention are highly respected and ranked in the fields of philosophical research, not the lunatic fringes of crackpot science. They are the dominant names in contemporary philosophy, as far as i am concerned, because they are all we talk about in philosophy classes, the books we all read (ask yourself why are there more peer-reviewed articles and books about these names than any other thinkers). For example in any book on contemporary philosophy the rogue's gallery i have named get heavy action in the index. I guess you are not going to admit that Karl Popper, Ludwig Wittgenstein, W. V. O. Quine, Hans Gadamer, Francis Lyotard, Richard Rorty, Paul Feyerabend, Emanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze adequately represents the modern state of philosophy, just because they are mathematically a small number of so-called "professors" of philosophy in the world. Rather a pitiful claim, i gather because modern philosophy has realized that foundationalist epistemology is dead, a philosophical mistake. Neville's book, <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0791411524/ref=sr_aps_books_1_2/026-3047889-6181207" target="_blank">"Highroad around Modernism"</a> is worth a look too.

The belief that "A man landed on the moon" is not a "non-inferred" belief because you already make a lot of inferences from what is immediately present within your consciousness. This is not philosophical enough because you have to make the distinction between what is present within your consciousness, and the proposition that a man did land on the moon. The contents within your consciousness is something far more fundamental and basic- you see swathes of color- white and grey, and experience other sources of data- repetitive sounds, etc etc. What you immediately perceives, i.e. the contents of sense-data leads to a number of inferences that several discrete impressions are a "man" and a "moon" and that the man is "moving" on the moon, which is an interpretation based on the inferences of a number of isolated impressions.

I'm not going to touch this one, and let Theophilus or a brave presupper argue his case. However, you have not succeeded in showing how a bare minimum of immediate justified belief is actually a collection of facts about the world, a proposition.

That is not what i wrote. How did you manage to infer "arbitrariness" from my understanding of what the foundationalist has to do?

Nope. I assume no such thing, one- because i haven't a clue what constructivism is, but merely whatever is philosophically sound should prevail over the dogmas of common sense.

I could, but why bother when better men than i have done a better job at it? If you asked me what i thought of it, then i could oblige you. I always thought it showed a respect for the topic and a desire to increase the knowledge by referring books and articles and links in a course of discussion.

Why does "coherentism" have to stand on something?

First of all. coherentism, without privileged starting points, doesn't bother answering the question of "beginning." These questions of "where to begin" is misleading, because when we consider such question we already have beliefs, and there's no perfectly reliable strategy that will help us what to keep and what to dump. We start with the vast collection of "already formed beliefs" or "patterns of reasoning and habits" of inference.

As for pragmatism, foundationalism is an utterly vain enterprise. A pragmatist sees his problem like a sailor does in a leaky boat who replaces the worn out parts one at a time, whereas the foundationalist fancies himself as a cloistered occupant of a perfectly impregnable fortress of metaphysics. Pragmatists assume some sort of naturalism because they usually see human beings from the evolutionary biologist perspective. We find ourselves in the world, already within beliefs and are in the process of discovering or losing or fucking up.

By reading David Hume and emerging from the rationalist dogma of Leibniz and Christian Wolff, Kant discovered a solution to the inherent skepticism of empiricist principles.

You can ask. But soon enough your question "why" will be no longer identical to the particular questions of "why." I'll explain, but please indulge yourself, Primal

I don't think that's the case. Not everything requires justification, when all beliefs are more likely to be interdependent in a Leibniz fashion of "pre-established" harmony than a vertical, skyscraper one like the foundationalist assumes.


I don't follow you here.

Come again?

Must've missed it.

I'm doing philosophy, asking questions, because i have not heard your interpretation of "rational foundationalism." You shouldn't be so worried about the refutation, because i found plenty of material on the web that helps your case.

The strong evidence are the books of the people i have named. Get a'cracking.

~el fin~

[ December 07, 2002: Message edited by: Kantian ]</p>

Primal

It lies in our methods of justification and our exact systems. Your question assumes too much: try positing one on the mark. I never said the difference lay in our exact axioms.


And I already showed how they are. Is your reasoning really that shallow?

Presuppositionalism: starts with God.

Foundationalism: starts with axioms of raw sense and noncontradiction.

Did I really have to spell that out...or are you simply nitpicking for lack of anything substantial to say?

Well I prefer to keep immature statements out of philosophical arguments. Especially ones of such poor quality as your own. They only make things less interesting and more juevenille. But I'd assume you know all about being juevenille Mr."Transcedentalist".

Geee How conveniant...couldn't be that you really have no argument. It's also kind of interesting how you would make such a long rant just after saying you don't want to debate. If this post isn't an argument; what is it? Oh yes, a pseudological rant. You really should work on your subtelty in such matters.


Well that's precious. So since you read a lot of technical work, you think you are atuomatically right and can rely on authority instead of actual reasoning and evidence. I've done my homework too, however I did not forget to attend to my own actual reasoning in doing so.


Perhaps I don't have to solely rely on links....


Big words, but little to show for it in the way of evidence. Perhaps what you are saying is true; perhaps not as all you have is empty assertion. In either case its irrelevant. Philosophy is not about popularity: please get that through your high school mentality.


Yes, I have not read them. Though I have read quote a bit about them. So what? Are you suggesting we substitute supposed authority for evidence? I smell a fallacy brewing.

i.e. you are incapable of doing so. Just admit it instead of changing the subject and speaking about philosophers you admire endlessly.

Is this a joke? That's sort of begging the question isn't it? First sensation cannot be a priori by definition. Second, why can't the judgementts or concepts be immediate?


Yes and Wittgenstein is being "rejected" by quite a few in the modern field. As is his petty "linguistic analysis" movement both in philosophy and psychology. The whole "private language" definition only works if certain facts about language are true i.e. accepted as given. Why can't language be private and subjective? "Just can't." Sorry not good enough: that sounds like an assumption to me.

[quote] Another is from Bonjour: the "level ascent" argument that is directed against "immediate justified beliefs." Whatever is taken to immediately justifiy a belief is possible only if the subject is already justified in supposing that the putative justifier has "what it takes" in order to do so. Since the justificatin of the original belief relies on the justification of the higher level belief just specified, the justification isn't immediate after all.{/quote]

I would contend that the immediate belief does not require justification at the higher level in the epsietmic sense: since the belief is justified immediately. Causally this would be required: but not epistemically. Again this entire "refutation" is based on many assumptions. Why exactly must I justify a higher level belief in the epistemic sense before I accept an immediate belief? I would argue instead the higher level belief does not "justify" the lower level ones as that would be presuppositionalism: but instead the higher level belief was inferred from the immediate beliefs.

It's only reasonable to conclude that to have a justified claim: the subject must be justified in making the claim in some way, if and only if, logic is a given.


I'd say its because the so-called "higher level" justifications were not really "justifications" at all; for what could you really infer from the statement "this subject is in some sense justified" in a vaccuum?

I'd say instead it was a derivative from already established standards: and is solid in being derived from those standards.


Nope science is likewise not a popularity contest but a matter of method. A laymen's accepting knowledge of science may require some recognition of expert testimony: but not necessarily popularity.

And in case you don't know this: science is very different from philosophy. Often times as science is based on years of research we must take claims of data at face value via testimony. Philosophy goes by reasoning though, which is accessible to anybody at any time in a reasonable amount of time.


This confusion reaches to the furthest depths. Just because strong theories are popular among scientists does not mean they are considered stron theories mainly because they are popular, that is reverse causation. They are established due to how they satisfy certain epistemic standards and then become popular to those in the field because of that. In essence then popularity is a side effect and not the method of justification.


Who said it was dead and the task was complete? False dillemma I see. Forget quarter: I should take a shot for every fallacy you make. It'd prolly get me even more fucked up .

Just because philosophy does not reduce to fadism and promote change for its sake doesn't mean ite very dies: first because I doubt we've found the total philosophical picture yet: second because truths and methods of past generations must be forever carried forward.

Philosophy in essence doesn't die due to its lack of fadism any more then mathematics does.


Interesting definition of historical and ahistorical. In which case I would say philsophy is ahistorical according to your definition. In reality though I'd say science was far more historical in that thinkers build constantly on the ideas and theories of previous thinkers. It's interesting to see how you can likewise label science as objective and ahistorical; when science relies on an underlying philosophy. An underlying philosophy which according to you kant, cannot be objective and ahistorical.


I think studying history helps in philosophy: but it is not necessary. It merely provides a short cut and allows you to view the pitfalls of others. As well as aknowledge methods you use implicitly that previous thinkers have examined and made explicit.

Just like math, one could in theory develope a whole new system. However we instead teach already developed systems of math. Does this mean math is historical? Does this mean math is determined by either culture or popularity? Nope. It just means that looking into what previous thinkers already discovered via analysis provides a short cut.

This does not mean math is determined by history but that history helps us attain knowledge of math at a faster pace. You are confusing the fact that it may be pragamtic to study the history of a subject in learning of the subject: with the idea that all matters in the subject are determined by cultural force.


Prove it. Pathos? Ethos? Again making unwarranted leaps. i.e. philosophers have pathos and ethos, and philosophy is cultural so philosophy is determined by culture.

In this sense then since any person that tries philosophy has to use language,breath air and eat food: philosophy is determined by language,food and air.

I'll use an argument similiar to yours Kant to hammer in this point: just try doing philosophy without eating,breathing or using language.


Well to the first: yes.

Second: Thales,Anaximandor,Pythagoras,Parminedes etc.

Third: Yes again.


Yes Kant I am a devout, and faithful follower of Ayn Rand. And I am a communist-monarchist too. That's right McCarthy.

Nothing like focusing on the irrelevant Kant....what's next, my ethnicity? My height? My weight?


Kant science is likewise a human activity that you just said was ahistorical. We forget the past so quickly?

Why do you suppose all human activities just because they are contained in history are determined by history? If we wish to use the vaguest sense of history as causality in general: yes philosophy is determined by this as is every single human activity. If we limit ourselves to culture and mere opinion though i.e. fads and feelings: then no Kant, philosophy is not a matter of majority decision or personal feelings solely.


One who: Whines? Complains? Beats around the Bush? Looks llike you are confusing the board with the profile of your online dating ad again.

Actually Kant, as I see philosophy as fairly independent from "history" I don't see why I have to read every single, rather lengthy book in order to form my own beliefs on the matter. Philosophy isn't about how many authors you recognize; though I admit that does help. I would rather develope my own ideas for the moment, and study an over-view of the respective authors positions.

And that's the beauty of philosophy: how open it is to the lay men. That's what makes it different from science and math.One doesn't need to read all that to use philosophy: and to substitute one's reading for one's reasoning is to betray the very spirit of philosophy.


It may help enrich it, but it is not needed for it.


How many? And I would say many of the above have foundationalist tendencies anyways, are in this matter, cryptofoundationalists, especially Popper. BTW, how many transcedentalists are there?


Prove it.


Yes you repeat yourself a lot; I know that. You use a lot of conjecture too: I know that as well. But I wanted proof. Even if you are right, though I doubt philosophers have abandoned foundationalism totally(most I imagine are stuck between foundationalism and constructivism): you must prove it. Yes those names are mentioned in texts, along with many,many others. I have a philosophy text here and those are only a few games among many: strangely though some of your "leaders" were not mentioned at all: Lyotard,Levinas, and Deuluze to name but a few. Leaving you with what? 7 names? There are almost 50 or so mentioned in this text alone. Hardly an overwhelming majority I'd say. (Which is odd seeing as you are so focused on what the majority has to say Kant.) And this is only the biggest, there are probably many, many more philosophers and thinkers not at all mentioned.

Kant the point is, if you just list names its too easy to pick and choose. Especially with a subject which requires as much depth per subject as whether they were foundationalist or not.

The book likewise present foundationalism as a legitimate viewpoint in contrast to constructivism. With the author taking the foundationalist position. Hardly a sign of foundationalism being dead I'd say. Lastly foundationalism can be found in philosophy quick reference on quick stidy guides.

I suppose it is "dead" in the sense that materialism and idealism as well as atheism are: you can name a dozen or so of any who do not adhere to the group at any time. However this does not 1) Refute or establish any viewpoints. 2) Prove that it is extremely, or exceptionally unpopular.


Major misreading. I said noninffered or in the sense that man landed on the moon. I know the idea that man landed on the moon is inferred. I meant it takes faith to believe in, in that you have to trust testimony.


Because it is immediatley justified....if I could show it another way then it'd be inferred not immediately justified.

This statement bears absolutely no relation to the point I made as well about presuppositionalism being emprically different then foundationalism Kant. =/


So do you admit then that there are no starting points or that, some starting points are not arbitrary?


Well all I can say to that is "shit". Try reading an into book. Seems like for all your heavy reading, you've neglected the basics. But just to help a poor soul out: constructivism is the view that all axioms are a matter of personal or cultural preference, with none being any more "true" then another.


How is common sense dogmatic? Seems we take the vaguest definitions of possible. And use them in absurd ways as well, as church or religious dogma never seems sensical. Perhaps you lack knowledge of what dogma is Kant?

Also isn't the idea of soundness borrowed from logic and its axioms?

I see, why actually reason for yourself and present your views on the board when you have proof surrogates? Well Kant, you're just so....slick.


Yes, but in debates over philosophy it is more important that you,yourself put forward the reasoning behind your beliefs and the evidence in support of such beliefs. Otherwise the whole subject will be swallowed in proof surrogates and apeals to authority.


Because otherwise it rests on nothing and is then worthelss. It stands on ideas of coherence and ideas being compatible with eachother: this assumes coherence and compatibility are the keys to knowledge.


Yes, but I'm not asking for how beliefs form but how they are justified. How does coherentism justify itself and its standards? Saying "we don't concern ourselves with begginings" is just side-stepping the issue.Ultimately they must decide on truths somehow, and if by certain principle; justify those principles.

Ah, but then how did they establish evolution, the fact that we are in the world, and even the idea that we are human beings? Ignoring tough questions does not make them disapear.


Yes but how did he establish his "solutions"? I'm not asking for an actual listing of who inlfuenced Kant and where he came from and what he think he did: I'm asking for how he justified his own principles and beliefs. Was it all inferred or were some noninferred?


Why don't you explain yourself now?


So some are just arbitrarily accepted and some have to be justified? Sounds like picking and choosing.

Its funny how you then impose on foundationalism very strict and even, ludicrous standards of evidence; but then allow other philosophies to just accept beliefs without proof. Isn't this the "faith" your author accused foundationalists of having?

If a belief is inferred it had to be inferred/justified in a given manner, by another principle, that is what inference means. However if a belief is not inferred, it must be noninferred/assumed. And either assumed to be true/justified or false/arbitrary.


Answering the "why?" at only a single-step/immediate level does not answer the "why?" for the given chain of reasoning.

That's like someone asking "why can octopi comoflauge themselves?" we can go into proximate caeses; their body chemistry and pigment. But we can go into more ultimate causes, like their genes or evolution.

Likewise answer "why?" level questions at the proximate level, or giving only proximate standards: only side-steps the request for an explanation of ultimate standards. It really then is a red herring.

Interesting; how a genius so above us poor, dogmatic foundationalists could miss a point so obvious. Wonders never cease.


Helps mine or your case? In any event I don't substitute web material for argument even when I may see it as useful. Questioning is good for philosophy but you seem to confuse it with refutation. In any case, I describe enough to answer your questions in my other post on the philosophy thread.


So nobody can disgaree with the great Kant and should assume foundationalism is wrong until they have read at least a dozen, 1000 plus page books? Such a reasonable request Kant. Maybe you are just unwilling to, as you so often say "put up ot shut up" and must hide behind your books and others who argue(perhaps even think) for you. If you really understood what you had read in those books you should have no trouble presenting the arguments on this thread...or is it a matter of faith?

In any case, references are no substitute for good argument, nor are proof surrogates refutation. Not in any subject and especially not in philosophy.

Bill Snedden

&lt;message deleted&gt;

Oops...somehow I thought I was in another forum! My bad...

Bill Snedden

[ December 08, 2002: Message edited by: Bill Snedden ]</p>

Jobar

Kantian, Primal- if you wish to carry on a discussion of the topic here instead of in the Philosophy forum, I will not move it, although I believe it would be somewhat more appropriate to Philosophy instead of EoG.

However, if you prefer to carry on a dirt-kicking match more appropriate to a kindergarten than to a university philosophy department, I will move it to Rants&Raves.

Do I make myself clear?

Devilnaut

And far be it from you to attempt to clarify!

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Kantian:

"I'd like to hear your opinions, perspective, and conclusions on the works of presuppositionalists- if for nothing but pure entertainment. "

I don't consider myself extremely qualified, unfortunately. I usually just respond as I did above, that my hypothesis is more parsimonious than the "God" hypothesis. To borrow an analogy from a friend, I could even say I believe in Epistemo, a limited, stupid person whose existence somehow produces epistemic foundations.

My usual response to presuppositionalists is simply to question how a person could, by its very existence, produce epistemic foundations. And if it's just a brute fact, then I'll respond that the universe itself does and that's a brute fact.

It would be helpful to offer an alternative account of epistemic foundations, of course. I'm not a transcendental idealist, and I find material idealism to be somewhat appealing, but my epistemological position is probably closest to Hume's. We can trust induction because "nature is uniform" is a good explanation for the incorrigible use of induction by pretty much every animal on the planet. As for foundations for logic, well, logic is analytic and there's no reason to doubt we can successfully define the words in our languages. I don't know whether the "laws" of logic are valid (i.e. true under every interpretation), and I don't really care; I don't notice myself behaving as if they were or they weren't, and I see no arguments for abandoning them.

By the way, I was glad to see you cite BonJour elsewhere in the thread. I learned everything I know about Kant from him last spring, and he's one of my favorite professors.

Kantian

Hard to find fault with that because if you are relying on empirical principles, e.g., that one does not infer anything beyond what is proportionally necessary for the cause of the event, then the "event" of the universe itself cannot lead to the inference that it was the result of an act of a divine being, or any form of a theistic god. So, with certain empirical assumptions the "Epistemo" being is much more plausible than the omnipotent/omniscient/omnipresent being as a candidate for creation/design of the universe.

Yes, that fundamental question of existence (Why is there something rather than nothing) leads to various answers- and the theological one merely pushes the goalpost and delays answering the question. If the theist considers God immune from epistemic impurities, or of the need of justification, then the atheist or the heretic may claim equal status for the universe itself.

Which Hume do you think is the correct interpretation- the skeptical one Kant sees in his Critique, or the naturalist of contemporary philosophy?

If i remember Hume, he resolves empiricism in a modified form of skepticism, correct? That our entire [synthetic] knowledge is based on "animal faith," i.e. that the events in the future will remain consistent with the events of the past. I'm not sure how far i can push the skeptical reading of Hume and remain justified though.

Far as i am concerned, logic is a matter of tautologous statements, and tautologies are notorious for a lack of contribution to empirical knowledge. But there's a Hegelian strain of rhetorical philosophy that persuades otherwise.

Excellent! I first came across Bonjour in my class Theory of Knowledge, by Professor Wallis. He had a slide show of running dialogue between the relevant thinkers and cartoon characters given heavily tongue-in-cheek humor that really helped his lectures. I think he took that slideshow down, but here is a <a href="http://www.csulb.edu/~cwallis/phil100/phil100.htm" target="_blank">sample.</a> As for Bonjour on Kant, what do you make of <a href="http://www.terravista.pt/Nazare/5474/Articles/art73.html" target="_blank">this?</a>

~transcendentalist~

[ December 09, 2002: Message edited by: Kantian ]</p>

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Kantian:

"Which Hume do you think is the correct interpretation- the skeptical one Kant sees in his Critique, or the naturalist of contemporary philosophy?"

I'm really pretty undecided on this one, which is rare for me. It seems clear that a straight solution can be drawn out of what Hume has written, but whether he had a straight solution in mind is unclear (and I find it somewhat of a less important question). At the very least, he was explaining why humans continue to use induction, but I confess I don't see a straight solution explicit there. The theory of evolution wasn't available to Hume, so he didn't have a particularly persuasive example of how the "harmony" between our ideas and nature was effected. I suspect if he'd known about it, he would have cited it. In my reading of Hume, at least, he took his skeptical solution to be a justification of the use of induction, but not an epistemic justification -- but he wouldn't have minded seeing one.

"Excellent! I first came across Bonjour in my class Theory of Knowledge, by Professor Wallis. He had a slide show of running dialogue between the relevant thinkers and cartoon characters given heavily tongue-in-cheek humor that really helped his lectures." (Emphasis original.)

I would love to see BonJour as a cartoon character. He's an imposing, almost intimidating speaker in person.

"As for Bonjour on Kant, what do you make of this?"

I'll have to take a look at that article. BonJour's a smart guy, but I recognize that he often disagrees with accepted opinions. I'm glad I have the knowledge to begin to evaluate the articles in question.