jlowder

If Smith asked me to do that, my reply would be, "And how should I know what is of no value and what is valuable?"

In the first place, it seems to me that "value objectivists" could use this fact about ordinary usage of the term "value" as evidence for value objectivism and against value subjectivism. The argument would proceed as follows. The fact--if it is a fact--that old photos can have value before anyone knows about them is epistemically more likely on the assumption that values are objective than on the assumption that values are subjective.

Second, as you wrote above, the photos would be of value to Smith if he knew about them. That much is clear. But I don't know if the photos had value prior to Smith's valuing them, on the assumption that value requires a valuer. That's what I'm trying to determine. Again, if value depends on a valuer, then what would it mean to say that the family photos had value before Smith knew about them? This isn't obvious to me, and I think it deserves an explanation. Is your point similar to that advocated by ideal observer theorists, who I interpret as believing that something has value if and only if an ideal observer who was fully knowledgeable, fully rational, etc. would assign a value to the thing in question? That would be one way to make sense of what it means to say that value depends on valuers, but something can have value now even if there is not yet a valuer who knows about the thing and has assigned value to it. And if that is not what you mean, can you please explain what you do mean?

I agree that that the person doing the cleaning should not throw away the photos merely because Smith doesn't know about them. One should at least inform Smith about the photos so that he can decide whether he wants to keep them or not.

However, I do not know how to assess your remarks about the correspondence between moral judgments and values. I am attracted to moral objectivism, which I take to presuppose objective moral values, though I am far from certain about the truth of moral objectivism. I think moral intersubjectivism is attractive also. So when you refer to my "choices" regarding the "existence" of values, I think it is important to keep this in mind. My starting point--albeit one that I am deliberately questioning in this thread--is that there are objective values, including objective moral values. So when I suggest that value subjectivism might lead to the conclusion that a thing does not have a value now if no one has assigned a value to that thing at any point in time up to now, I'm discussing the implications of a view I do not hold.

Again, I will evaluate this on the assumption that value requires a valuer, since that is what we're exploring. Given that assumption, I think it is perfectly consistent with ordinary usage to say that its contents do not have any value now since Johnny does not value them now and has not yet valued them in the past, but the contents will have value at some future time since Johnny will assign value to them when he gets older.

I'm not sure what "this" refers to. Again, if it is the case that the old chest has value now, despite the fact that Johnny wouldn't care about the chest now, even if he did know about it, then that would seem to undermine the idea that value does require a valuer. It would instead seem to support either value objectivism (e.g., "Johnny ought to value the old chest") or a form of value subjectivism that does not necessarily entail the existence of a valuer, namely, an ideal observer theory with respect to values (e.g., "The chest has value now, since IF there were an ideal observer or IF Johnny himself was fully rational, fully knowledgeable, etc., then the ideal observer or Johnny would assign it value").

In any case, the appeal to common sense is a double-edged sword for those who reject moral objectivism or, for that matter, theism. Many, if not most, people believe it is "common sense" that moral objectivism is true and that God exists.

Again, I have asked for opinions about the relationship between values and morality. I also asked for opinions on whether values are objective or subjective. It doesn't follow that I am therefore trying to "derive moral implications from the definition I arrive at." That's not only a non sequitur, but your conclusion is false. On the contrary, since I already (tentatively) hold to moral objectivism (but am attracted to intersubjectivism), the whole point of this exchange was to test my moral objectivist assumptions by examining the arguments for and against value objectivism in a generic sense (i.e., about both moral values and nonmoral values).

On the assumption that values require valuers, I don't know how I would answer your questions. I do not see any contradiction in saying that whether those items have value is a contingent fact, one that ulimately depends on whether Johnny later in life decides that those items have value.

This is a problematic analogy, since it makes reference to money. Most people would say that money does not have any intrinsic value, but instrumental value.

It probably would seem absurd to anyone but a philosopher. But, in THIS example, I would say the value of the trust depends solely on whether Johnny uses it to go to college. My reason for saying this has nothing to do with whether values require valuers. Rather, it has to do with intrinsic vs. instrumental value as applied to money. If Johnny dies or chooses not to go to college, I would say the trust fund is wortheless, since money has no intrinsic value and since the trust fund has no instrumental value.

Again, I think this particular example or analogy is complicated by the issue of whether money has intrinsic or merely instrumental value. Virtually no one believes that money is instrinsically valuable. Instead, virtually everyone believes that money is instrumentally valuable. So if Johnny dies or doesn't go to college, the money in the trust fund can't be used for anything and becomes literally worthless.

I believe it is perfectly consistent with ordinary usage to say that the money is worthless if Johnny dies or does not go to college. The money can't be used for anything else and ordinary usage presupposes that the value of money is directly related to what it can be used for.

I guess I am somewhat surprised to find you making this statement. I thought you were included within the group of people who maintained that value does require a valuer.

See above. Again, I would say that the fund has value, but my assumption is that value objectivism is true. Again, my purpose in starting this thread was to question that assumption, as well as to determine what it means for something to have value in the absence of a valuer. Moreover, your reference to "most people" doesn't undermine the idea that value requires a valuer. "Value requires a valuer" is consistent with "The trust fund has value because other people (besides Johnny) assign it value."

As should be very clear right now, *I* am not saying that Johnny's fund really doesn't have value when he's one year old. (On the contrary, I think it does.) What I am saying is this: on the assumption that value requires a valuer, I don't see how it makes any sense to say that Johnny's fund really has value when Johnny is only one year old.

I haven't arbitrarily assigned a meaning to the word "value." My original question was designed to determine the nature of values, which serves to implicitly define what "value" means.

I am NOT arguing for one definition of "value" over another on the grounds of the implications it has in moral terms. I am simply testing my belief in moral objectivism against the objections to value objectivism.

I think this is an example of "six one way, half a dozen another." Moral objectivism and value objectivism go hand in hand. If there are objective moral values, moral objectivism is true. If moral objectivism is true, objective moral values exist. I see no a priori reason why one must start with one and not the other.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ November 15, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

Pomp

I'm addressing bd-from-kg's latest post in this response, but this preliminary comment also applies to jlowder's comments, as well as to several others:

I think quite a bit of the confusion here stems from the unstated assumption that, even if value requires a valuer, it is still something that rests with the thing valued. In other words, the discussion thus far has focused upon how the presence of a valuer might lead to a thing "having value." I propose that this is an unproductive assumption to make, and that we would be better served by looking at the issue, not from a "things have value" standpoint, but from an "agents value things" standpoint. That is, I propose that value would be more usefully regarded as an attitude held by a valuer rather than a property possessed by a thing. With this starting assumption in mind, I'm going to tackle bd-from-kg's post and, hopefully, demonstrate how this view clears away the ambiguities of the previous view.

OK, let’s consider this. Suppose that there’s a set of old family photos in John Smith’s attic that he doesn’t know about. If he knew about the photos, he would value them greatly. But he doesn’t know, so he doesn’t value them at all. Now suppose that Smith asks you to redd up his attic. He wants you to throw away the stuff that’s of no value to anyone but keep the valuable stuff. Should you throw away the old photos? Of course not! You’d say that they were valuable to Smith, even though he doesn’t value them. This is simply a fact about the way the word “value” is actually used.

Except for a quibble about language usage, I agree. The quibble will be important later though, so here it is: Like most people do when speaking casually (i.e. when not speaking in philosophical jargon), Smith is using a linguistic shortcut. What he means when he asks you to "keep the valuable stuff" is probably closer to "compare each item to the sorts of things that I usually value, and keep it if it seems to fit in that pattern" than to "keep the things that are valuable to me" since, obviously, he doesn't actually value anything in the attic that he doesn't know about. Due to linguistic convention, however, he just says "keep the valuable stuff" and trusts you to figure out that you're supposed to keep stuff that seems like he might value it, regardless of whether or not he already values it.

It also corresponds the more or less universal moral judgment that it would be wrong to throw away the photos merely because Smith doesn’t know about them. If your purpose in exploring the question of when values “exist” is to connect it to moral questions, you’d better keep an eye on the implications of your choices on moral issues.

I agree. I would propose that we hold this common judgment because we understand that Smith's intent is for you to keep things that are similar to things that he already values, and that throwing away things that he would potentially value based on a linguistic technicality is disingenuous and violates the spirit of your agreement with Smith. Stated another way, what Smith actually values in this case is a proxy who will filter things he might want from things he might not for him and, if you throw away things that he might want, you are not fulfilling his value.

Now let’s take this a step further. Say that Smith is actually a one year old boy, Johnny, and that his parents have just died. Since Johnny is only a year old, he won’t remember anything about his parents, but the chest containing the photos not only contains photos of his parents and their families, but a treasure trove of other information about them. Of course, Johnny not only doesn’t know about any of this, but he wouldn’t care about it if he did know. Now once again you’re assigned the task of clearing out the attic, saving the valuable stuff and throwing out the junk. Would you throw away this old chest on the grounds that it contains nothing that anyone values? Of course not. You’d say that its contents are valuable to Johnny because when he gets older he will value them greatly.

Again, I agree but with the same quibble. We understand that we are to keep things that Johnny is likely to value at some point regardless of whether or not he values them right now.

The wrong way is to start by setting out to define “value” in a completely abstract way and trying to derive moral implications from the definition you arrive at. The right way is to think about the moral issues first and then define “value” so that it corresponds to what you consider to be valid moral principles. This is the right approach (IMHO) even if you’re only interested in arriving at a “personal moral code” that works for you. There is no way that you should allow some abstract conception of value control your moral code rather than the other way around.

This is where I disagree. You seem to be suggesting that we decide on moral principles first and then go back and look for ways to justify them, rather than starting from what we can observe or reason out and adopting principles that are supported by the evidence.

OK, first let’s consider the last example again. You don’t actually know that Johnny will grow up. would you say that the contents of that chest are valuable now only if he grows up? Or that they’re valuable now because he probably will grow up?

This apparently vexing question is moot if we adopt the "agents value things" perspective. The contents of the chest have no value because things do not have value.

Here’s another example. Suppose that there’s a law that sets up a trust fund for every child to be used to help pay for his college education (if he goes to college). There’s every reason to think that Johnny will want to go to college, and that he won’t be able to afford it without the money in the trust fund. Now the law provides that no one but the designated beneficiary should benefit from the fund, if the beneficiary dies or chooses not to go to college the assets in his fund are destroyed. Now, is Johnny’s trust fund valuable?

Under the "agents value things" perspective, of course not. There may, of course, be people who value the trust fund like, say, a relative who cares for Johnny's future financial security.

It seems absurd even to ask the question. Yet Johnny doesn’t value it in the least, and (assuming that no one else cares whether Johnny goes to college) no one else has any reason to either. So if we say that there must be a valuer in order for something to have value, we get the paradoxical result that the fund is actually of no value whatsoever. This is completely contrary to ordinary usage. So if we are taking common usage as our guide, we must reject the idea that something must be valued in order to have value.

I would question the wisdom of taking common usage as our guide. As noted above, common usage is typically linguistic shorthand of one sort or another. When we unpack it and try to express the same sentiments in more precise language, we often find that things cannot mean what they appear to mean on the surface. This is a topic we've disagreed on in the past. I think it behooves us to accept that common usage is often paradoxical or incoherent and move beyond it when we speak precisely, while you seem to think it important to discover ways in which common usage can be justified.

Moreover, it is possible that Johnny will die before he even cares whether he will go to college, although we have no way of knowing this. But supposing that it happens to be true, would you say that the fund has no value? Again, this seems to be clearly contrary to ordinary usage. Most people would say that the fund has some value so long as it’s possible (so far as anyone knows) that Johnny will want to use it to go to college. So here we have a case where something has value even though there is no valuer – past, present, or future.

We have no such thing, IMO. We have a case in which people say that something has value, not necessarily a case in which something really does have value. It is possible, even likely, that people will say that a thing has value when they value it or when they think that someone else values it, or even when they think that someone else ought to value it. This says quite a bit about their attitudes and opinions, but very little about the thing itself.

Of course, you are free to say that you personally don’t use the term “value” in this way; that you would say that Johnny’s fund really doesn’t have value when he’s one year old, or if he is going to die before he cares about going to college.

I would think that the burden of proof would be on the person (or, in this case, majority of persons) asserting that it does have value, and that they would offer evidence beyond "our ordinary language carries a built-in assumption that this is true."

But if you’re going to arbitrarily assign your own meaning...

Why do you think that the assignation of meaning must be arbitrary if it is not aligned with what most people think? I find a definition of value so that it represents an attitude rather than a property is far from arbitrary, in that it retains enough of the common meaning to be useful while eliminating the ambiguity and paradox. Likewise, jlowder's meaning, although it differs form mine in making value a property of things, appears carefully chosen to investigate the implications of value requiring a valuer. You may reasonably disagree with the utility of these definitions, but I hardly see how you can call them arbitrary.

...the original question is absurd: how can the rest of know whether or not you’re going to arbitrarily choose a personal, private meaning of “value” under which values cannot exist independently of valuers? And if you argue for one definition of “value” over another on the grounds of the implications it has in moral terms...

What if we argue for one definition over another because one of them is more parsimonious than the other?

...you’re doing exactly what I think you should have been doing from the start – namely, using your moral code to determine your definition of “value” rather than the other way around.

And, again, I think this is getting things precisely backwards, in that you start with a conclusion "X is right, Y is wrong" and then build definitions that support that conclusion, rather than building defensible definitions and investigating what sort of principles follow from them.

DRB

The original question seems to have sucked in a lot of folks.
Value is something that is esteemed for good or bad.
If you wish to change the subject to morals and ethics I see people biting at the bit.
But value by definition has to have someone or something giving worth.
Believing something deserves value is still an imposition of someone or something.
Morals are subjective in that they are what we should hold in value or esteem.
Ethics are what we do with our morals.
Morals also requires someone or something in that morals must be defined. We all have morals but by what standard or who's?
DRB

Amos

So life has no value to you?

Gravity

Right. So we have a set up to manipulate mentally that will involve values. I'm with you.

And I am to assume my avatar in this siutation is aware of this.

Right. So we have a social situation and my avatar is the one who is going to make this distiction. Now, when you say "of no value to anyone" your really implying just john correct? If you mean "of no value to John or yourself" that might change to situation. But for now I will assume you mean just John.

So its up to my avatar and his mental facilities to distinguish between 'of value' and 'of no value' to John and execute the appropriate action to each. So I will have to try and graph a proxy of John's value judgement over my own if I want to have some method to this. My empathic model desprately depends on knowledge of Johns value making decisions.

A question:

Will past results indicate a correlation to the present John? For example, if I have observed John motivated to learn and obtain information on and pieces on Grandfather Clocks, will that past evidence of what John values be present in John's current judement? I know that I have observed both extended trends and drastic changes in both my own and others judgements through time.

Since I am assumed to be motivated to carry out these decision with as much accuracy as possible I would need the greatest amount of information practically available to me(if John needs this down by today, it would be slightly imprudent to set up and follow through with a four month period of tests to determine what are the trends in John's value judgmens!). A simple way to do this is to ask for properties that are common to what John deems valuable beforeahnd. Another is to simply give John a specific example, but you might extrapolate properties that John does not find valuable. John might point to a thing and declare it valuable. John might consider it valuable because it 'looks expensive', and you my incorrectly think that John values it because it 'reminds him of his youth', thus start to distinguish things incorrectly. John would have to be careful to communicate the reason why he values it.

This is where we get a little tricky. As a participator in this experiment, I am privy to knowledge that my avatar doesn't have access to.

If my avatar does not know that John values those photos how is he supposed to distinguish them as valuable?

If my avatar does know that John values those photos, how did he come to posses such information?

John could not have told my avatar as you have set it up since you made it clear that John is unaware of those photos.

Thus some other method or instance must have occured for my avatar to know that John would value those photos.

For example, if John had mentioned and/or described those photos before and made it clear that he did value them, only now he has forgotten about them(to correlate the example with your situation) my avatar would be able to distinguish them as valuable to John even though John doesn't remember them(and if John hasn't changed his mind about their value).

Also fact that I am privy to the information that John doesn't know about the photos is also important, because how is my avatar supposed to know?

If John, after my avatar has put the photos into the valuable bin, comes to inspect my work and noticeds the photos he:

A. Still Values Them - then the fact that my avatar have correctly judge what John values is due to coincidence. (That the past evidence of John's value{he told my avatar} coincidently is the same as John's judgement value, he could have changed his mind but didn't.) Quite a fortunate coincidence.

B. Does not Value Them As he once did - then my avatar has made an error in his proxy judgment through no falt of his own except that he didn't think to get the most current trends in John's value judgements, common human error.

But how about something a little less clear cut then John having told my avatar he values those photos. For example, if my avatar has observed a trend in Johns value judgments that indicate a interest in photography. Then we have a situation where my avatar knows that John likes photography(and thus photos seem to have some value to John), and even though John know about this specific instance of photos(and my avatar doesn't know that john doesn't know about them), my avatar could still correctly deduced that John values these(that is if John still likes photography. Remember, up to date information is vitale to constructing an accurate proxy of John's value judement.)

No, it wouldn't be universal. It would be coincidental. See above.

Agreed.

Whoa there partner. You've changed things. In this your assuming johnny will value them. You want me to assume johnny is going to assign interest in anything that has a connection to his parents. And thus it is only rational for my avatar to assign interest when distinguishing objects as his proxy.

But the reality is that Johny may not grow up and judge them as valueable. You can not assume this in his stead. You are subsituting your values for one he might or might not have. No longer are you building a value judgment proxy from information glenned from Johnny and using it as is, you are injecting values from your own judgmens and creating a hybrid to use. Although in this situation where doing so does little explicite harm, so the contrast looks to be trival, no fair bd.

Here are the situations.

You: Save the stuff
Johnny: Grows up and values it.
Result: score one for coincidence.

You: Save the stuff
Johnny: Grows up and does not value it.
Result: Oh well, not harm done except for a stuffy attic.

You: Don't save the stuff
Johnny: Grows up and values it.
Result: Well, Johnny may or may not be satisfied with your reasoning for pitching his parent's stuff, and on the other hand he might feel compelled to rip the sockets out of your eyes.

You: Don't save the stuff
Johnny: Grows up and does not value it.
Result: Man, those two are cold. At least in my opinion.

Its not quite as black and white as your examples seem to make it appear. See above.

Well there is a way to pigeon hole it, at least to some degree.

If a developmental physicologist(if that is the correct term) or anyone who basically studies the intristic mechanisms of our mind empirically and presents evidence that we humans all tend to value objects or at least information that relates to our parental units(i.e. it is of benefit in evolutionary terms that an offspring finds such and such interesting intristically and here's the data to persuade you). Then that would be a grand thing for us socially. We wouldn't have to blindly assume pieces to proxy another's value judgements, we would have some evidence to make at least a reasonable guess, since that there is some common(intersubjective not objective you naughty, naughty moral objectivits)things we hold valuable intristically.

Hey, how about those objective values?

Looking over this thread I see a lot of things that I find intersting. For example, if values are subjective in nature(something I concurr with) is it rational to project those values onto objects?

That somehow implies values are a part of that object or thing and are one of it's properties objectively detecable. (i.e. puppies are lovable, your mission if you choose to accept it, is to then emperically demonstrate puppies have the properity 'being lovable' without human context.)

If subjective values are more similar to reality works then its not the object which demonstrates 'lovablility', its the valuer who is the medium of the value(Sam find puppies lovable, is it then possible to objectively demonstrate this?)

Dear Me,

Stop rambling.

Love,
Me

[ November 16, 2002: Message edited by: Gravity ]</p>

Dr. Retard

Not quite, because the labels can mislead. I'll aim here to use sufficiently cumbersome labels as to head off confusion:

Here are three conceptions of value:

* Plain Non-normative Conception of Value: What certain people desire.
This is the anthropologist's conception of value. You can go out and observe people's actions and claims, and infer what it is that they value. This is in the same vein as economic value: agents' behavior in choosing among alternatives reveals their preferences, which in turn constitute what it is they value. Also note that, on this conception, value is relativized to people and their desires.

* Dispositional Non-normative Conception of Value: What certain people are disposed to desire.
This is a slightly more theoretically ambitious version of the previous conception. We may ask what it is about people that makes them act and speak in value-revealing ways -- presumably it's something about their nervous system that disposes them to behave in these ways. But this something about their nervous system is still present, whether or not the person gets a chance to reveal the fact by behaving accordingly. Presumably there are many things that, given the right opportunity, we would desire like mad, this despite the fact that we have no such opportunity at present, and so do not desire. And, assuming that we do in fact value such things -- assuming that these things count as values -- despite our not desiring them, the Plain Conception above is false. This Dispositional view captures the idea that such things count as values, not because we do desire them, but because we would desire them, given the right opportunity. On this conception, value is relativized to people and their dispositions to desire.

By these two conceptions, I sure hope that everyone in the world is a realist about values. If anything is true, it's that there are things that we (are to disposed to) desire.

* Normative Conception of Value: What people ought to desire.
Whenever there is a value, certain ethical obligations fall upon us, according to this conception. If the well-being of children is a value, then we ought to desire the well-being of children. If we in fact despise children, then our malevolent affections are ethically objectionable. By the Non-normative Conceptions of Value, the destruction of children counts as a value (for us, anyway), due to the mere fact that we desire it (and a fortiori are disposed to desire it). But if the well-being of children is a value by this conception's lights, then our despite of children does nothing to change the fact. Values by this conception I will call normative values.

By this conception, there are plenty of realists and plenty of anti-realists. I would guess that most anti-realism stems from a general rejection of the truth of normative claims, since such claims are of course implied by realism about normative values.

Now here are some doctrines:

* Normative Subjectivism: People ought to desire something only if (at least some) people really do desire it.
In order for something to merit the allegiance of our desires, on this conception, it must really be desired. Contrapositively, if nobody desires something, then it has no claim on our desires. So suppose two Normative Subjectivists wonder whether we ought to desire that some tree be preserved. They look at the facts and conclude that nobody cares a whit about the tree, much less does anyone desire that it be preserved. They then infer, by appeal to Normative Subjectivism, that preservation of the tree does not count as a value. This doctrine can be altered by bringing in dispositions to desire, so that the test is stronger: to reject something as a value, one must show not only that it isn't desired, but also that no one is disposed to desire it.

* Normative Objectivism: There could be at least some values that people ought to desire, even though they in fact do not.
This is the complement of Normative Subjectivism. According to this doctrine, just because no one desires something, it is does not follow that no one ought to desire it. Perhaps people should desire it, even though no one in fact does. Regarding the tree, a Normative Objectivist might say, "Who cares if people happen not to desire the preservation of this tree -- preserving the tree is valuable all the same! The fact that people don't care about it does not settle the question."

* Normative Opinion-Dependence: People ought to desire something only if they think they ought to.
This doctrine is plain weird, and I don't know anyone who holds it. The idea is that nothing can be worth desiring, unless people believe that it's worth desiring. So if everyone in the world rejected the existence of normative values, then that rejection would thereby banish normative values from existence. And then if someone came to the conviction that normative values really do exist, then (perhaps) normative values would spring back into existence.

* Normative Opinion-Independence: There could be at least some values that people ought to desire, even though they don't think they ought to.
This is the complement of Normative Opinion-Dependence. The idea that the existence of normative values does not hinge on our meta-ethical opinions, but is instead independent thereof. Normative Subjectivists and Objectivists should both sign on to this doctrine. For illustration, let's say some anti-realist (AR) denies the existence of normative values, and meets a Normative Subjectivist (NS):

NS: Rape is terrible!
AR: Isn't it though! I loathe it with every fiber of my being.
NS: As well you should.
AR: Well, I don't agree with that.
NS: What?
AR: Don't get me wrong, I really don't like rape. But I recognize that desires cannot be correct or incorrect. There's nothing such that we ought to desire it. Though I certainly wish everyone shared my desires.
NS: Well, maybe you don't think you ought to desire the end of rape, but you most certainly should. Trust me, your desires are the right ones to have.

Even though people like AR deny that normative values exist, that mere fact doesn't settle the question of whether they do. Maybe they exist, maybe they don't. But our opinions on the matter don't determine the right answer, by this doctrine.

* Plain Values Imply Valuers: If something is a value, then there are some people who desire it.
Let's operate under the Plain Non-Normative Conception of Value: Then this doctrine is analytically true. By the conception, if something is a value, then certain people desire it; in which case, there are some people who desire it. QED, no problem. (And, of course, a similar proof goes through with the Dispositional Non-Normative Conception, if we change the Plain Values Imply Valuers doctrine to a Dispositional version). Now, let's operate under the Normative Conception of Value. If Normative Subjectivism is true, then the Plain Values Imply Valuers doctrine is true. By the conception, if something is a value, then people ought to desire it. And by Normative Subjectivism, people ought to desire something only if (at least some) people really do desire it. So, if something is a value, then (at least some) people really do desite it, and then there are some people who desire it. QED, again. If Normative Objectivism is true, then (depending on how exactly you phrase things), the doctrine is either false, not necessarily true, or not obviously true. (Similarly, for Dispositional variants).

Of course, this is all artifically precise. Perhaps we're not concerned with (being disposed towards) desiring X, so much as X giving us pleasure, or X being a goal, or X animating our behavior. There are many conative attitudes (one of the many phrases in currency) we can bear towards putative values.

[Edited to add: In one of the appendices to Parfit's Reasons and Persons, there is discussion of what makes a person's life go well. There are Hedonic, Desire-Fulfillment, and Objective List Theories. The first two more-or-less correspond to Normative Subjectivism, and the last to Normative Objectivism. Maybe this will be helpful.]

[ November 16, 2002: Message edited by: Dr. Retard ]</p>

Dr. Retard

You're using a non-normative conception of values. And a perfectly fine conception it is. But other people use other conceptions -- normative conceptions with straightforward ethical implications. If you don't believe me, go find some books on value theory. You won't find any anthropological theory about how it is that people come to have desires and affections. You'll find ethics and lots of it.

It's a shame we don't have a built-in linguistic distinction between "affection-eliciting" and "affection-deserving".

Pomp

Dr. Retard,

You're using a non-normative conception of values. And a perfectly fine conception it is. But other people use other conceptions -- normative conceptions with straightforward ethical implications.

The question, though, is how can you justify a normative value? What about value X gives us the grounds onwhich to say that Smith ought to hold value X if he does not already hold it?

It's a shame we don't have a built-in linguistic distinction between "affection-eliciting" and "affection-deserving".

I agree that we use a very imprecise language in most cases, but I don't think that such a distinction can be usefully drawn. What would it even mean to say that something is "affection-deserving?" See my previous post to you. Does the fluffy kitten deserve the mouse's affection?

Dr. Retard

That is a good question, but I think it might be the big one, too big for this thread! A related big one would be what it even means for something to be such that we ought to desire (or whatever) it, which question your second sentence below asks.

I'm sorry I didn't respond to your post -- I should have. I'd say that normative values don't have to be non-relative (absolute?). Perhaps the mouse ought to fear the fluffy kitten -- and if it does in fact fear it, then good for the mouse for having an appropriate reaction. But a grown man ought not fear the fluffy kitten -- and if he does in fact fear it, then shame on him for having an inappropriate reaction. To say that one thing can merit a certain response is not to deny that it can merit different responses from different agents (the fluffy kitten is fearsome to mice and lovable to humans, not just feared by mice and loved by humans).

bd-from-kg

To all:

Wow. I go away for a couple of days and find that a single post has stirred up a hornet’s nest.

Rather than dealing immediately with the individual responses it may be more productive to start with some general points that were raised by more than one person.

1. Several people have assumed that this entire discussion is predicated on the existence of objective values, or in other words that there is an inherent property of “valuableness” that some things have, and that to say that a thing is “valuable” or “has value” must necessarily mean that it has this property. But this is an elementary error based on a naïve understanding of language. If I say that Twinkies are tasty, I’m not attributing an intrinsic property of tastiness to Twinkies; I’m just saying that I like them. If I say that “The Simpsons” is a great show, I don’t mean that it has an intrinsic property of “greatness”; I just mean that I really like it. Examples of this sort can be multiplied endlessly.

But such statements (when they don’t attribute inherent properties) don’t necessarily just mean that the speaker has some attitude toward the thing in question. For example, Jones, who detests babies, might say that a baby is adorable without implying that he personally adores it. He might mean simply that it has qualities that would be likely to cause most people to adore it. Or, if I say that this $100 bill is much more valuable than this $1 bill, I don’t mean that the first piece of paper is inherently more valuable than the second, but I also don’t mean simply that I happen to like it more, or think it more attractive, or that I have any other relationship to it. I mean that society has adopted the convention of treating the first as being more valuable than the second. Of course, because of this convention the first is more valuable than the second, but this is not an inherent value.

The simple fact is that in the English language, saying “A is B” (where A is a noun and B an adjective) does not necessarily mean that A has the inherent property B; it can mean any of a number of other things. A great deal of confusion results if one supposes that it always means that one is attributing the inherent property B to A. Thus saying that A is valuable or has value does not necessarily mean that one is attributing a property of valuableness (i.e., an objective value) to A.

As for me, I don’t believe that there is any such thing as an inherent property of valuableness, or in other words that there are objective values. If you reread my posts carefully you’ll see that nothing of the sort was assumed or implied. But not everyone agrees, and the structure of “values language” is carefully designed to accommodate more than one interpretation. Just the same, values language has a definite logical structure which is essential to its purpose and function, and therefore any interpretation which is incompatible with this logical structure is out of court.

2. The essential feature of the logic of “values language” is this: A thing is valuable (or has value) if and only if, other things being equal, one should try to preserve it or bring it into existence. If one thing is more valuable than another, faced with a choice one should (other things being equal) try to preserve or bring into existence the more valuable thing in preference to the less valuable.

Moreover, the “should” here usually has to do with what action appears likely to be “best” based on available information – i.e., it is relative to the probable or foreseeable consequences rather than the actual ones. Thus, in this sense we “should” keep an emergency fund, which would therefore be said to be have “value” because circumstances might arise in which we would need it. Perhaps some people would say that such a fund might be valuable, but only if it’s needed, but the great majority would say that it is valuable because it might be needed.

From this point I’ll refer to this relationship between “value” statements and “should” statements as the “values/prescription nexus” or the VPN. This is not a moral principle or theory; it doesn’t even apply only to “normative” values or uses of “should”. It is simply a description of how values language works. To say that something is valuable but that one should not (other things being equal) try to preserve it or bring it into existence simply doesn’t make sense.

Thus my contention is simply that the VPN is an accurate statement about how value language is used as a matter of fact, and that it’s used in this way because of its purpose and function. If someone wants to use value language in ways that violate the VPN I wouldn’t say that he’s wrong (there is no such thing as an “objectively correct” definition or usage of a word) but simply that he’s using terms like “value” in a personal, private sense that has nothing to do with its normal purpose and function. So if someone here is inclined to challenge the VPN, I’d advise him not to waste is time. We’re clearly using “value” terms in completely different ways, and there’s no point in arguing about whether this novel way is “better” than the standard way.

As Dr. Retard has pointed out, there are a number of “conceptions of value”. One of the distinctions he makes is between a normative and non-normative conception. I’d prefer to say that there are normative and non-normative uses of value language; it’s common for the same person to use it both way in different contexts. But the difference between the two is actually very simple: the normative and non-normative usage of “value” correspond to the normative and non-normative usage of “should”. Thus, one should (in the non-normative sense) try to preserve something or bring it into existence if and only if it has value (in the non-normative sense), and similarly for the normative sense.

3. Since there are different moral theories, so there are corresponding notions of what sorts of things are “valuable” in the normative sense (Of course there will be corresponding differences about what it means to say that something has value, but this needn’t concern us here.). Thus an objectivist who subscribes to a consequentialist theory will say that something is valuable if it is either desirable in itself or might lead to or produce something that is. An advocate of a deontological theory might say that virtue or justice is the only thing that is intrinsically valuable, and other things have value only insofar as they tend to produce these things. A subjectivist might say that something has value if he desires it for its own sake, or if it produces something that he does. A noncognitivist might say that something has value if he recommends preserving it or bringing it into existence. All of these correspondences are consistent with the VPN.

4. At this point it should be clear why I said earlier that “The right way [to define “value”] is to think about the moral issues first and then define “value” so that it corresponds to what you consider to be valid moral principles”. No one in his right mind would start by postulating principles like “there can be no value without a valuer” and then allow his moral theory to be constrained by them (via the VPN). In fact, I daresay that no one has ever actually followed such a wacky procedure. To a nonobjectivist, a “value” is simply a “marker” whose only purpose is to help us think more easily about moral (or practical) questions by introducing something for our reasoning to be about. This isn’t essential to thinking about such things, but it’s helpful given the way the human mind works.

5. Now we are finally in a position to revisit the original question: do values require valuers?

For a moral objectivist the answer is clearly “no” (with respect to moral values, of course). Something has value if and only if someone ought to try to preserve it or bring it into existence, and whether anyone ought to do this is independent of anyone’s feelings, attitudes, or beliefs. thus moral values exist independent of these things as well, which is to say that they do not require valuers.

For non-objectivists the meaning of the question is entirely different. Since acts are not objectively “right” or “wrong”, neither do “values” objectively exist. Thus the only reasonable way to answer this question is by referring to the VPN. That is, the conditions under which a non-objectivist would say that a “value” exists depends on the conditions under which he would say that someone “ought” to try to preserve something or bring it into existence (regardless of what exactly he means by “ought” here).

Now suppose that one takes the position that for something to have value at time T it is necessary that someone from the set of “morally relevant” beings value it at time T. (By a “morally relevant” being I mean anyone who “figures in” to the determination of what one “ought” to do. According to egoists, for example, this set consists only of oneself, while to a utilitarian it comprises at least of all humans.) What sort of moral position is one now committed to? Well, obviously one is committed to saying that it is never true that anyone ought to try to preserve something or bring it into existence unless someone actually values it right now.

In fact, for this to make sense at all it must be a corollary of the stronger claim that a thing is valuable just to the degree that someone values it. To illustrate the difference, consider a newborn baby. According to the view we are considering, his having a happy life has value, or is valuable, only if, and just to the degree, that his parents (or some other adults) place a value on it; the fact that the baby will predictably value it is irrelevant – i.e., it doesn’t make it a whit more valuable. But to say that it has value is to say that it matters. (Again, if you disagree with this you’re simply using the word “value” in a personal, private sense that has nothing to do with the way it is normally used or with its usual purpose and function.) So on this view, whether the baby has a happy life matters only if, and to the extent, that someone cares whether he does. This has the paradoxical implication that if his parents (and other adults) don’t care what kind of life a baby leads, they are not to be blamed or criticized for their callousness, because under these circumstances it doesn’t matter whether he has a happy life or not; it cannot be said that anyone should try to help bring it about.

This even applies to one’s own life. For example, suppose that you’ve become hooked on heroin, and as a result don’t care about the fact that the remainder of your (predictably short) life is likely to be miserable if you don’t stop using it. Also, let’s suppose for a moment that no one else cares what the rest of your life is like either. Then (according to this theory) you would be right not to care: your future has no value since no one in fact values it. The fact that you would care about your future if you were to kick the habit is irrelevant.

It’s hard for me to believe that anyone actually agrees with this principle, or at any rate that they would hold it if they thought it through. And therefore I conclude that the idea that there can be no values without valuers, at least in this strict sense, is untenable. Later, in my reply to jlowder, I’ll discuss whether it is reasonable to hold that nothing can have value unless someone values it at some time, even if it’s not at the same time that it has value.