Vorkosigan

The physical world does not have "rational" characteristics. It does have stable, predictable, orderly and repetitive characteristics. These characteristics have enabled evolution to produce minds that deal with it, and other minds, in ways conducive to the evolution of logic.

Michael

boneyard bill

Turtonm writes:

What, then, is a feedback loop? I am indebted to you for this example, but I doubt that you approve of the way I am using it. Nonetheless, when we encounter a human individual using a feedback loop, we call this a rational process. This whole discussion on this thread is an example of a feedback loop. The whole process of debating the meaning of a word or phrase is a feedback loop. And we call this a rational discussion. But when a feedback loop is encountered in nature, we call it an irrational, mechanical process.

My contention is that this distinction: "human, rational, subjective" on the one hand and "natural, irrational, objective" on the other is based on historical factors not logical ones. Logically, therefore, the distinction is arbitrary. I originally introduced this point to save Lewis' rule. But when I think about it, I think it refutes metaphysical naturalism directly. I don't need Lewis' rule.

Vorkosigan

Originally posted by boneyard bill:
Turtonm writes:

What, then, is a feedback loop? I am indebted to you for this example, but I doubt that you approve of the way I am using it. Nonetheless, when we encounter a human individual using a feedback loop, we call this a rational process. This whole discussion on this thread is an example of a feedback loop. The whole process of debating the meaning of a word or phrase is a feedback loop. And we call this a rational discussion. But when a feedback loop is encountered in nature, we call it an irrational, mechanical process.

BB, it seems you've confused "irrational" and "non-rational." Nature is "Non-rational." It doesn't have to posit reasons for what it does, it just is. "Rationality" as a concept cannot be applied to the world outside our brains, except maybe to other brains in that world.

My contention is that this distinction: "human, rational, subjective" on the one hand and "natural, irrational, objective" on the other is based on historical factors not logical ones. Logically, therefore, the distinction is arbitrary. I originally introduced this point to save Lewis' rule. But when I think about it, I think it refutes metaphysical naturalism directly. I don't need Lewis' rule.

Like I said, nature is not "irrational" but "non-rational." Your distinction does not exist.

Metaphysical naturalism is based on observations about the world and is not a deduction from philosophy; thus, the only thing that could refute it is the discovery of something supernatural.

Michael

[ January 28, 2002: Message edited by: turtonm ]</p>

boneyard bill

Turtonm writes:

The two terms have been used synonomously on this thread. Most of the metaphysical naturalists arguing this point have not objected to Lewis' use of the term irrational. If you want to substitute "non-rational" where I have used "irrational," I have no objection. I doesn't alter the point of the argument at all.

But then, what IS rationality? "Rationality" as a concept must be defined. That is just my point. Your claim is based on historical usage, it is not based on logic. For it to be based on logic you must specify those processes or events that must be considered rational. Then you apply them wherever you find them. I don't see how a rational discussion can even take place without engaging in a feedback loop. If a feedback loop is an example of rationality, then it is also an example of rationality WHEREVER we find it. Even if we find it in nature.

If you insist on defining "rationality" as a term that can ONLY be applied to human activity. That is all well and good. Then a feedback loop is a mechanical and non-rational process. But then human "rationality" is simply the term we apply when humans engage in a certain mechanical and non-rational process. In that case, we have no reason trust that process. It is mechanical and non-rational. But if we can't trust that process, then we can't believe the metaphysical naturalist because, by his own testimony, he is engaging in a mechanical and non-rational activity.

Metaphysical naturalism is based on observations and inferences about those observations. Those inferences, according to the metaphysical naturalist, are the results of a non-rational, mechanical process. Why then should we trust them? Because, says the metaphysical naturalist, they were selected by nature as survival mechanisms. But if the same processes, such as a feedback loop, that are evidence of reliable human reason are ALSO found in nature, how can you say that nature is non-rational?

bd-from-kg

boneyard bill:

1. On defining terms.

In my last post I asked you to define a number of phrases and explain what you meant by a number of simple statement that used these phrases. At this point you are batting 000: you haven’t defined or explained a single thing that I asked you to. Here are the main ones again:

Question: What does it mean to say that reliable reason is (or isn’t) integral to nature?

Your reply was:

But the “example of a feedback loop” not only doesn’t answer this question, it doesn’t begin to offer a hint of an answer. (See below.) Instead of trying to explain once again why you think that naturalism has failed to show that reliable reason isn’t integral to nature, (or offering examples of obscure relevance) please define what you mean by “reliable reason is integral to nature”.

Question: What do you mean by “the naturalistic description of the world makes no room for reliable reason”?

But you never do.

Question: What do you mean by “rationalist terminology is pretty forbidden in a naturalistic description of the world”?

That isn’t an answer. Once again, please define what you mean by “rationalist terminology” and give an actual example of such terminology that you think is “forbidden in a naturalistic description of the world”?

Question: What do you mean by a “rational principle”? What would it mean to say that “order is a rational principle”?

So far, no answer.

Question: What do you mean by saying that the universe has a “reliably reasonable character”? How would you distinguish between a universe with a reliably reasonable character from one that does not?

Using the phrase yet again is not exactly the same thing as defining it.

And by the way, I would never say anything like “the naturalist has accounted for the reliably reasonable character of the universe”. Unlike you, I do not use vague, ambiguous terms without making some attempt to define them.

If you aren’t going to define your terms there is no point in continuing this discussion.

2. On Lewis’s rule

When I pointed out that your “logical demonstration” of Lewis’s Rule was circular, you replied:

Then would you be kind enough to restate the argument correctly?

You further “explained”:

Yes, it is. Feel free to use it as a premise. Now show how it implies Lewis’s Rule.

3. Lewis and “naturalism”

When I offered an extended quote from Lewis to show just what he meant by “naturalism”, you replied:

The implication here is that Lewis used the term “naturalism” with different meanings in different places. This may well be true. However, the citation I originally posted was from Chapter 3 of Miracles, and he did not define “naturalism” there. The reason is simple: he had just defined it in Chapter 2, in the passage I quoted in my last post. He was laying the groundwork for the remainder of the book by defining certain key terms – a practice that you would do well to emulate.

So instead of referring repeatedly to “naturalism as defined by C.S. Lewis”, why don’t you tell us what you mean by naturalism? Define what it is that you are attacking; that you claim is “inconsistent”.

4. On “feedback loops” and “rational processes”

You say:

This is a pointless example. The term “mechanical” is being used here in a quite different sense from the one naturalists have in mind when they talk about “natural mechanisms” or say (as some do) that “nature is a mechanism”. What the naturalist means is simply that natural processes are following predictable, discoverable natural laws. The results can be quite complex; for example, a human being playing chess at a very high level.

Although any rational process involves feedback loops, very few feedback loops can be said to have anything to do with a rational process if the term “rational” is to retain any semblance of its normal meaning. For example, a while back a burner on my stove was damaged, causing a small bit of it to resist an electric current much more than normal. As a result, it became very hot. The heat damaged this segment further, increasing its resistance further, making it get even hotter, etc., until it disintegrated. This is an example of “a positive feedback loop”, but I doubt that anyone would call it a rational process. Another example: The deer population in a wild area sometimes gets unusually high. As a result, the deer provide abundant food for predators such as wolves. The wolf population grows, with the result that wolves are soon killing more deer than usual. So the deer population drops, providing a lot less food for wolves. So the wolf population drops, etc. This process often continues through several cycles before an equilibrium is established (if it ever is). A negative feedback loop, yes, but a rational process? I don’t think so.

In fact, I have no idea what “feedback loops” that are “encountered in nature” (by which I presume you mean that they are found outside of any brain and are not a result of things being arranged or designed by a being with a brain) you would consider to be part of a “rational process”. Could you give an example?

But in any case, a naturalist does not make a distinction between processes that occur in brains (or that are designed by beings with brains) and other natural processes. All of them are equally natural. All are “mechanical” in the sense of being governed by natural laws. Since naturalists make no such distinction, they can hardly be accused of making an arbitrary distinction.

In fact, your last question seems to assume that there is a dichotomy between “rational” and “mechanical” processes. This is a misconception. According to the naturalist, all processes are mechanical, but some of them are also rational. As to which ones deserve the designation “rational” (in other words, what the term “rational process” means) to a naturalist this is basically arbitrary. (That isn’t so in your case, because you’re using the term “rational process” in an argument that purports to prove something, and in that case it is necessary to define just what you mean.) To a naturalist “rational” is not an attribute that a process has instead of having a purely physical, mechanical character; it is simply a word that is useful to describe certain aspects of some physical, mechanical processes. Naturalists do not believe that “mechanical” process magically change into “rational” ones at some point, but that in a few cases clearly nonrational processes evolve into ones that have some minimal “rational” characteristics, and (in very rare cases) into ones that produce what would generally be described as “rational behavior”. But at every stage the processes involved are “mechanical” in the sense that they are simply the result of the operation of natural laws.

5. The remainder of your post

There’s not much to say about the rest of you post except that it is pretty much meaningless in the absence of reasonably clear definitions of the terms you’re using.

Thus:

I have no idea whether this is the “crux of the issue” because I have no idea what you mean by “the universe possesses rational characteristics”. Until you define what you mean by this, there is no point in discussing the question.

I have no idea what “similar structures in nature” you could be talking about. But in any case, since I myself am the product of the very same “irrational” processes, any system that I construct, however “logical” or “rational”, is also the product of “irrational” processes. And if a process that could be plausibly described as “rational” were to be found in nature outside of any brain and seemingly not the product of any brain, that would be very interesting, but it would hardly “refute” or disprove naturalism.

Agreed, at least if you replace “physical” with “natural”. And your point is?

Once again, it depends on what you mean by saying that the physical world has rational characteristics.

In short, you are simply going to have to define your terms if you want to have a meaningful discussion. If you don’t do so in your next post, don’t expect a reply.

Oh, and could you spell out clearly the “logical argument” that you think “sustains” Lewis’s rule? I’m kind of slow, so it would help if you would list each premise explicitly and indicate exactly which previous steps each step (other than the premises) is based on, and what rule of inference is being used. Undefined vague, ambiguous terms may not be used.
_________________________________

P.S.: I was struck by your comment in a reply to Turtonm:

It seems to me that you’ve lapsed into total incoherence here. According to naturalism, the distinction between “human” and “natural” is indeed arbitrary; in fact it is nonexistent: everything human is “natural”. Naturalism does not assume that humans are uniquely rational; at most this is a provisional conclusion based on evidence. If it turns out to be false, this will not threaten naturalism in any way. And I have no idea what the subjective/objective distinction has to with this discussion at all. How anyone could imagine that any of this could conceivably “refute” MN is beyond me.

Clutch

Hey folks, getting back to the original topic, in the interests of "closure". I thought the crux of the matter was raised in scilvr's claim:

The person who really seemed to see the centrality of the point was Michael Turton, who pointed out that evolution does not (generally, at least) produce specific beliefs in organisms; it produces mechanisms of belief-fixation. It may be that any particular case of behaviour is explicable via a wide class of false beliefs (provided one tells a sufficiently strange story about the other beliefs and desires of the agent). That's just the familiar problem of mental state ascription given the holistic character of intentional psychology. But what sort of cognitive mechanism would arbitrarily settle, case by case, upon one of indefinitely many such false beliefs, all for the purpose of mirroring the effects of true belief? The truth, to wax Mulder-esque, is out there -- what a cheap and effective way of exploiting its survival-relevance, to be sensitive to it, and to represent it accurately!

Here, moreover, is the kicker. The objection scilvr raises is hardly incoherent; an evolutionist might well predict that, in at least isolated cases or particular domains of reasoning, we might observe a tendency to reason badly but effectively by the standards of our evolutionary history. That is, the fully-fledged scepticism does not follow, but an occasional predilection for loose heuristics over precision is predictable. And whaddya know? Things like our naturally dreadfully imprecise reasoning about probability, risk, cause, and so forth, seem to make a lot more survival sense in a short life lived among dangerous predators in a small tribal/family group. (A lot of evolutionary epistemology pursuing this follows on from a famous set of psych results from Kahneman and Tversky, in case anyone's interested.) So the initial objection is very slightly correct, in that there is evidence from limited, identifiable and correctable cases that human belief-forming mechanisms are evolved!

Eudaimonist

A number of good points have already been made in defense of metaphysical naturalism. I especially liked some of bd-from-kg's earlier comments.

I'd just like to add that I'd be far more worried about the reliability of my powers of reason if I didn't believe in metaphysical naturalism.

In a natural universe there is natural cause and effect, which is a mindless process that doesn't have any innate desire to fool anybody.

In a universe with supernatural entities that can meddle with natural cause and effect through will alone, I'd have to worry that there are "demons" or "gods" out there that wish to meddle with the cause and effect of my brain at any moment, tricking me into thinking I am being rational when I am not.

I feel far more cognitively safe in a metaphysically natural universe.

But my favorite example for the reliability of reason is simply to note that we've successfully put men on the Moon. If our powers of reason were not reliable, I'd expect we'd have had far more difficulty than we actually did. We were depending on many abstractions and logical conclusions for our success.

[ January 29, 2002: Message edited by: Eudaimonia ]</p>

boneyard bill

bd-from-kg writes:

You're quite right. I can't expect to make myself understood until I first define my terms. I've been running off with new inspirations before doing the grunt work of precise definition and careful development. I apologize for my impetuousness. I'm going to go back to my earlier point and present a step-by-step argument. Let me begin by defining what I mean by reason.

A rational statement is a statement of a necessary relationship. Reason, or a rational condition, is any condition which entails a necessary relationship. Now I made the statement that creatures capable of reliable ressoncannot arise in a universe that cannot be reliably reasoned about. Therefore, the universe has rational characteristics. You responded that the universe can be reliably reasoned about because it possesses order, and that metaphysical naturalism fully accounts for this characteristic through the metaphysical axioms of the principle of induction and Occam's Razor.

Now there were two possibilities open to me at this point. One was to show that the accessibility of the universe to reason necessarily entails the presence of reason. The other possibility was to show that reason is necessarily present in some other way. I originaly intended to pursue the first alternative but was side-tracked by the realization that I had to defend Lewis' rule. Then the example of the feedback loop arose and this made the second alternative seem more attractive. But, as you have pointed out, none of these approaches can work until I first define what reason is. I will attempt to continue the line of reasoning using the first alternative. You have stated that the universe is accessable to reason because of order. Now the question arises, is this order a necessary condition for the universe to be accessable to reliable reason? (This is why I asked if you were claiming that order was a rational principle). Let us define order as a discernable pattern of relationships.

I understand the principle of induction to be, essentially, analysis. We can understand an object or an argument better by examining its parts, while Occam's Razor is an argument for why the simplest explanation should be preferred. It would seem, therefore, that both of these axioms assume the existence of order.

So order is a necessary condition for these axioms to apply, and therefore a necesssary condition for human reason to be reliable. But if this is true, then order is also a rational condition. And if order is a rational condition, then reason exists in nature and not just in the human mind.

The presupposition that human reason is reliable, therefore implies that the universe itself is ordered and rational. The theist (at least those in the tradition of Greek philosophy such as Roman Catholics and Anglo-Catholics like Lewis) is not in the same boat as the metaphysical naturalist since the theist hs been claiming all along that order is evidence of reason.

But even if human reason is related to order, the metaphysical naturalist can still claim that this combination of order and reason is still the product of irrational processes. But that brings us back to square one. Why should she trust her reason? And why should we trust her reason. If the presupposition that human reason is reliable implies a rational and ordered universe, how can we attribute any reliability to claims regarding a disordered or irrational one? It seems highly improbable that human reason could be reliably applied to such a universe. Still, it would not be impossible. We have established that the metaphysical naturaaalist and the theist are not in the same boat. But we have not defeated metaphysical naturalism.

So do I need to turn now to a defense of Lewis' rule? I don't think so. This is where the original Lewis post plays a crucial part because what he says of naturalism there is what I am trying to refute. Lewis characterizes metaphysical naturalism as a "total system," and it is a system that is said to be irrational.

But we can't deal with the term "reason" in isolation from what is being reasoned about. If we say we can rationally determine such and such about a system because the system is ordered, then the reason being applied and the order being discerned are aspects of the same process. In this context, "reason" and "order" carry the same meaning. This, of course, is basically a restatement of what I have said in more precise form above.

So what can it mean to speak of an "irrational system"? The term "system" includes within its meaning the concept of order. So the term "irrational system" would appear to be a contradiction. Of course, we can't say that an irrational system is impossible. We can only say that if the system is both ordered and irrational, the presupposition of reliable reason is necessarily false.

Now I suppose the metaphysical naturalist still has a way out of this difficulty. She can say that the univers is reliably rational now but was caused by irrational processes. The rational arose from the irrational. Order arose from disorder. Don't we see this in nature all the time? Yes, we do. But when we come to understand the reasons for this, the disorder becomes part of a larger, orderly process. The unexplained becomes explained. The irrational becomes rational.

In any case, if the universe arose from irrational causes, we can't know anything about them. The presupposition of reliable reason entails order and if order is lacking, our reason is not reliable. So once again, either reason is reliable and possible because of the orderliness and rationality of nature, or it is not reliable at all. Either way, metaphysical naturalism fails.

But I can imagine one more response. The metaphysical naturalist canclaim that I am just amking a semantic distinction. Order should be called rational and if you do so, the universe is rational and naturalism fails. But we don't have to accept that.

I'm certainly making a semantic distinction. But as I have already pointed out, in the context of metaphysical naturalism, order and reason carry the same meaning. So I am arguing for an accurate description of what we know in place of the present inaccurate one. This is a non-trivial distinction.

I don't think this addresses all of the questions you've raised, but it should clarify a whole lot of the points I've been trying to make.

Jon Curry

I've only briefly skimmed this thread due to my late arrival. But I would like to explain the problem for the naturalist a little differently, because from what I'm seeing the responses don't seem to deal with what is in my mind the central issue. Bd, if you have dealt with what I'm about to say, please point me to it and I will interact with it.

The discussion seems to be centering around Lewis' rule, and the question seems to be, why should we accept it. I think this is a poor way to formulate the issue. Lewis doesn't just accept it. He assumes it is false and follows the logic to its conclusion and concludes that it results in absurdities. So he accepts the rule. Yes, this is what presuppositionalists often do, but this neither makes Lewis a presuppositionalist nor does it justify presuppositionalism in general. It's a perfectly valid form of inference, no matter who uses it. The argument is.

If A then B.
Not B.
Therefore, not A

I would like to re-phrase Lewis' argument. Please let me know if this has been dealt with, and if so please let me know where. Another theist (or supernaturalist) may have stated what I'm about to say also and I may have skipped it.

Assume naturalism is true. All processes are the result of natural, physical interactions. If this is true, then my thoughts are nothing but physical interactions (neurons firing, etc). Now, if nothing exists in the universe except these physical processes (nothing supernatural) then determinism is true. The wheels of the universe were set in motion, and based upon those motions I ended up with certain thoughts. You can believe that some of those interactions were chaotic or random or whatever. This doesn't change the fact that my thoughts are basically the sum total of all those physical interactions in the past that lead to my current conclusions. The basis for my thoughts is not simply what corresponds to reality. The basis for my thoughts is the physical processes that lead me here. If this is the case, then I have no reason to think that my thoughts correspond to reality. If they do, that is a mere coincidence. The basis for my conclusions is the physical interactions, not reality.

One man is a naturalist. If naturalism is true, he was determined to believe that naturalism is true based upon the physical interactions that lead to his conclusions. Another man is a theist. He was determined to believe in theism by the physical interactions that lead him there. If the naturalist is right, then he has no reason to trust his thoughts. He was determined to believe in this determinism.

The same is true of Muslims and Reformed Christians that deny free will. If determinism is true, then our thoughts are determined. If our thoughts are determined by God and not by a correspondence to reality, then we have no reason to trust them. The Reformed Christian must affirm that the Muslim was determined to believe in Allah by God and he was determined to believe in the God of the Bible by that same God. There is no way to justify your belief.

So if you are to affirm that we can be justified in our beliefs, you must reject naturalism. You must also reject deterministic theistic systems. This is why Lewis adopts what is being called "The Rule." Because a denial of the rule results in the conclusion that we cannot have knowledge (and I define knowledge as "justified belief.")

Francois Tremblay

How exactly does determinism denies the obvious fact of free choice ? You are confusing the two levels of discourse. That metaphysical determinism is true doesn't mean that we don't have a consciousness evolved enough to have an epistemic free will. It's a complete non sequitur.

I would rather say that the problem is on the side of the dualist, and the supernaturalist. If his mind is not caused by reality, then how can one trust it, theoretically, to give us knowledge of reality ? It just doesn't accord with experience. Before complaining about non sequiturs, these people should answer this and related serious objections.