ex-xian

My understanding of Hegel is pretty shallow, show please be mercifull if my ignorance is glaring...
The way I understand it, dialectic rests upon thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. That is for every proposition, there is it's contradition. The solution is to find a synthesis between the two opposites.

My question is this, is the dialectical method subject to its own method. That is, for dialectic, there is an antithesis, and a synthesis would have to be found. But this synthesis would be something that is necessarily other than dialectic.

So what does this mean for the method?

JP2

That's a fairly good point actually. If the dialectic states that everything must have an antithesis, then is the dialectic itself subject to its own logic? I suppose that, really, we would first have to find an antithesis to the Hegelian dialectic - what would it be comprised of then?

If the dialectic states that each thesis has an antithesis, a conflict occurs, and that a synthesis arises as a result, then the antithesis to the dialectic - if we were to suppose that the two were absolutely contradictory - would state that no thesis has an antithesis and that no conflict can ever occur. If we understand the dialectic properly, then we can see that this presumption is somewhat unfounded - if we examine any given argument or debate, or, more generally, the evolution of human understanding, we can see that theses do, invariably, have an antithesis, and that through a systematic process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, ideas can evolve, and by proposing the "antithesis" to any given thesis (or statement in the case of debates/arguments) we can arrive at a closer conception of what is "true" by dismissing statements that are in any way fallicious.

If we were to suggest that the dialectic were untrue (by proposing its hypothetical antithesis) then we are left with the situation that suggests, essentially, that no thesis can have an antithesis, thus every thesis is true, thus whatever we say is - a priori - correct. Thus, if my definition of the antithesis to the dialectic is accurate, then by proposing it we are essentially dismissing any possibility of attaining a higher grasp of truth by deeming any given idea true and without antithesis, when - even with the most primitive grasp of the concept of truth - we can say that this is untrue. Besides, the antithesis to the dialectic - in this sense, so long as we can say it is the antithesis that suggests that contradiction/conflict does not occur - would appear to suggest that ideas (including the dialectic itself) are without antithesis, and thus, a priori, correct. The dialectical antithesis itself would seem, then, to condone the infallibility of the dialectic in the first place. Perhaps then, if Hegel were here, he would argue that the dialectic has attained the "absolute ideal" and has evolved to the point where it is without antithesis.

Or perhaps I''ve just gotten back from a club at 6.40am and am too drunk to adequately answer this question (I fear that my division of the dialectic and its antithesis is a tad too dichotemic). Who wants (the logical antithesis to) another beer then?

Waning Moon Conrad

Interesting question with elegant answer.