Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Dr. Retard · 02-22-2002, 09:34 PM

Here is an analogy to the fine-tuning argument:

You run a random number generator (varying from one to a trillion) and get 1093 as a result. You have two hypotheses to explain this result:

N: It was just a natural outcome; the RNG just did like you'd expect it to do and out came the result.

T: There was a magic troll who loves the number 1093 and he somehow rigged the RNG to generate his favorite number.

So you reason: if N were true, there'd be a trillion to one chance against the 1093 result (R). But if T were true, then there'd be a very good chance of R. The probability of R on N is much lower than the probability of R on T. Consequently, you reason that the troll hypothesis is better than the 'naturalist' hypothesis, given the result. The result is strong evidence for the troll hypothesis.

Now, pretty obviously, this is silly reasoning. But if the analogy is a close fit, then the fine-tuning argument is also silly reasoning. So, can anyone give me important, relevant differences between my scenario and the fine-tuning argument? The kind of differences that rescue the argument from refutation?

Also, I know that the natural urge is to tweak my analogy and then say, "Now that would be a good analogy to the fine-tuning argument". But, if you can, try to articulate the differences instead of just making a new analogy.

Thanks.

tronvillain · 02-23-2002, 01:39 AM

While I enjoy arguing against fine tuning arguments, especially probablistic ones, I suspect its proponents would want 1093 to have some significance. For example, it would turn out to be the serial number of the random number generator or something.

Malaclypse the Younger · 02-23-2002, 05:34 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by tronvillain:
While I enjoy arguing against fine tuning arguments, especially probablistic ones, I suspect its proponents would want 1093 to have some significance. For example, it would turn out to be the serial number of the random number generator or something.

Actually, the analogy with the FT argument is more like I went through my house until I found something where 1093 applied (such as the sum of dimensions of my refrigerator in decimeters--counting the handle) and then claimed the correspondence between the hypothetical RNG Troll and my fridge. Law of Fives.

[ February 23, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]

GunnerJ · 02-23-2002, 06:48 AM

Quote:

While I enjoy arguing against fine tuning arguments, especially probablistic ones, I suspect its proponents would want 1093 to have some significance.

This is what I have been saying about the FT argument since day one. The person using it to prove god must to assume that life is signifigant in order to make any god seem plausible in order to "accout" for it. Until the theist using FT demonstrates that a Universe with life in it is qualitatively better than another Universe without life, the argument fails.

Dr. Retard · 02-23-2002, 11:09 AM

Suppose that life is "special" or "significant" in some way that 1093 is not. In what, then, does its specialness or significance consist? What's so special or significant about life?

One answer might be that life is intrinsically valuable. But, first, this would mean that value subjectivists can reject the FTA out of hand. If the FTA only applies to moral realists, that would be an interesting conclusion, especially for those theists who believe that all atheists are subjectivists. And, second, I deny the intuition motivating the claim that life is intrinsically valuable. Remember that the 'life' in question here is merely the physical, functional kind of life we know, not any metaphorical 'mental life'. So grant that consciousness or reason or sentience are valuable; it does not follow that life is valuable. For there is no reason to think that consciousness, reason, and sentience could not be realized in some form besides life. This is especially true for theists, who believe that God posessses these valuable attributes, all without being a form of life.

So I conclude that life's specialness or significance cannot consist in its being intrinsically valuable. FTA supporters must find another feature about life that makes it special or significant.

pug846 · 02-23-2002, 11:58 AM

I�m not exactly sure that your analogy fits. If I were a theist I would argue�

1) That there are in fact numerous potential configurations of physical constants.
2) Only a few of those constants yield universes that could allow for anything we might consider �life.� (I.e., there is only a big crunch, the universe can�t form, tec.)
3) Given that there is an extremely small chance that we see a functional universe, there must be a designer.

I�m not sure I agree with your objection. Let�s make the case clearer for the proponents for the argument. Lets say there are 10^10000 potential configurations of the constants that make up the universe. Further, lets stipulate that only 17 combinations work out to a functional Universe. (The other combo�s never allow the universe to get going�immediate big crunch, etc.) I don�t think it would be unreasonable to then argue that chance can�t explain the phenomena of the Universe.

So, I think the best route to go at this point would be object to the odds being what they are, etc. I don�t know that I have a problem with their methodology, which is what your argument is attempting to poke holes in.

Malaclypse the Younger · 02-23-2002, 12:06 PM

Quote:

3) Given that there is an extremely small chance that we see a functional universe...

The chance that we would see a (life) functional universe is 100% in the absence of a any kind of designer or a designer only naturalistically powerful. This is the weak anthropric principle.

The chance that we would see a life functional universe in the presence of a supernatural designer is arbitrarily small since a supernatural designer (by definition) need not create a life functional universe to instantiate life.

pug846 · 02-23-2002, 12:11 PM

Whoops � that�s not what I wanted to say.

I don�t think your objection can stand if I change the wording of the premises slightly.

So, we now have.

1. There are a large number of potential combinations of physical constants.
2. Only a few of these constants would allow a Universe to form.
3. The Universe we see is all there is - there isn't a process that allows for other big bangs and an infinite amount of combonations to form.
3. Given that the odds of a functional universal forming as a one shot chance are so small, we can conclude it was designed.

Framing the argument like this reflects the intent of my example. If you accept the premises, I think the conclusion validly follows. (Premise three is usually implied somewhere...)

Thoughts?

[ February 23, 2002: Message edited by: pug846 ]

quotheraven · 02-23-2002, 12:35 PM

..."When a fool gives any wisdom,he is the only one not aware of it."

Malaclypse the Younger · 02-23-2002, 12:46 PM

Quote:

Given that the odds of a functional universal forming as a one shot chance are so small, we can conclude it was designed.

By this reasoning, we can conclude that any singular event with a small a priori probability was designed. This is obviously false, and we can see that the conclusion results from employment of inverse implication, which is fallacious.

The problem is that it's obviously true that if the universe was designed then we would see a life friendly universe. However, it is false that if the universe were not designed then we would not see (or it would be unlikely that we would see) a life friendly universe. Thus we cannot conclude a designer from our observation of an a priori improbable life friendly universe.

To make an evidential case, we must defend three premises:

P1: h->e
P2: ~h->~e
P3: e
-------
C: h

In this case:

D1: H is the proposition that the universe was designed for life
D2: E is the proposition that the universe is life-friendly

P1: H -> E: If the particular constant values of the universe were "caused" (its constants designed or coerced by some more subtle natural law), we would observe it to be life-friendly
P2: ~H -> ~E: If the particular constant values of the universe were a product of chance (non-caused), we would observe it to be non-life-friendly
P3: E: We actually observe the universe to be life-friendly
-------------
C: The universe was designed

Obviously P2 is false. It is not the case that if the universe were the product of chance, we would observe it to be non-life-friendly--If the universe were non-life-friendly, we would would not exist to observe it.

The probabilistic case is more complicated. I won't go into it in detail, but the probabilistic case depends on the a priori probability of the hypotheses (that the constant values were caused) being significantly higher than the a priori probability of any specific set or range of values. However, since any possible set or range of values might have been caused, we must assume a priori that the probability of a specific cause is equal to the probability of the range of values that would have been caused, which leads us to conclude (using Bayes' Theorem) a ~0.5 value (i.e. uncertainty) for the probability of the hypothesis under the evidence.

Now if there were another piece of evidence dependent on a the existence of some sort of cause (and independent of the observation of a life-friendly universe), we could plug the previous 0.5 value as the a priori probability of the hypothesis. However, no such piece of evidence has so far been presented.

[ February 23, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]

02-22-2002, 09:34 PM	#1
Dr. Retard Senior Member Join Date: Mar 2001 Location: Tucson, Arizona, USA Posts: 735	Fine Tuning analogy Here is an analogy to the fine-tuning argument: You run a random number generator (varying from one to a trillion) and get 1093 as a result. You have two hypotheses to explain this result: N: It was just a natural outcome; the RNG just did like you'd expect it to do and out came the result. T: There was a magic troll who loves the number 1093 and he somehow rigged the RNG to generate his favorite number. So you reason: if N were true, there'd be a trillion to one chance against the 1093 result (R). But if T were true, then there'd be a very good chance of R. The probability of R on N is much lower than the probability of R on T. Consequently, you reason that the troll hypothesis is better than the 'naturalist' hypothesis, given the result. The result is strong evidence for the troll hypothesis. Now, pretty obviously, this is silly reasoning. But if the analogy is a close fit, then the fine-tuning argument is also silly reasoning. So, can anyone give me important, relevant differences between my scenario and the fine-tuning argument? The kind of differences that rescue the argument from refutation? Also, I know that the natural urge is to tweak my analogy and then say, "Now that would be a good analogy to the fine-tuning argument". But, if you can, try to articulate the differences instead of just making a new analogy. Thanks.

02-23-2002, 12:11 PM	#8
pug846 Veteran Member Join Date: Mar 2001 Location: Somewhere Posts: 1,587	Whoops � that�s not what I wanted to say. I don�t think your objection can stand if I change the wording of the premises slightly. So, we now have. 1. There are a large number of potential combinations of physical constants. 2. Only a few of these constants would allow a Universe to form. 3. The Universe we see is all there is - there isn't a process that allows for other big bangs and an infinite amount of combonations to form. 3. Given that the odds of a functional universal forming as a one shot chance are so small, we can conclude it was designed. Framing the argument like this reflects the intent of my example. If you accept the premises, I think the conclusion validly follows. (Premise three is usually implied somewhere...) Thoughts? [ February 23, 2002: Message edited by: pug846 ]</p>

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02-23-2002, 01:39 AM	#2
tronvillain Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2000 Location: Alberta, Canada Posts: 5,658	While I enjoy arguing against fine tuning arguments, especially probablistic ones, I suspect its proponents would want 1093 to have some significance. For example, it would turn out to be the serial number of the random number generator or something.

02-23-2002, 11:09 AM	#5
Dr. Retard Senior Member Join Date: Mar 2001 Location: Tucson, Arizona, USA Posts: 735	Suppose that life is "special" or "significant" in some way that 1093 is not. In what, then, does its specialness or significance consist? What's so special or significant about life? One answer might be that life is intrinsically valuable. But, first, this would mean that value subjectivists can reject the FTA out of hand. If the FTA only applies to moral realists, that would be an interesting conclusion, especially for those theists who believe that all atheists are subjectivists. And, second, I deny the intuition motivating the claim that life is intrinsically valuable. Remember that the 'life' in question here is merely the physical, functional kind of life we know, not any metaphorical 'mental life'. So grant that consciousness or reason or sentience are valuable; it does not follow that life is valuable. For there is no reason to think that consciousness, reason, and sentience could not be realized in some form besides life. This is especially true for theists, who believe that God posessses these valuable attributes, all without being a form of life. So I conclude that life's specialness or significance cannot consist in its being intrinsically valuable. FTA supporters must find another feature about life that makes it special or significant.

02-23-2002, 11:58 AM	#6
pug846 Veteran Member Join Date: Mar 2001 Location: Somewhere Posts: 1,587	I�m not exactly sure that your analogy fits. If I were a theist I would argue� 1) That there are in fact numerous potential configurations of physical constants. 2) Only a few of those constants yield universes that could allow for anything we might consider �life.� (I.e., there is only a big crunch, the universe can�t form, tec.) 3) Given that there is an extremely small chance that we see a functional universe, there must be a designer. I�m not sure I agree with your objection. Let�s make the case clearer for the proponents for the argument. Lets say there are 10^10000 potential configurations of the constants that make up the universe. Further, lets stipulate that only 17 combinations work out to a functional Universe. (The other combo�s never allow the universe to get going�immediate big crunch, etc.) I don�t think it would be unreasonable to then argue that chance can�t explain the phenomena of the Universe. So, I think the best route to go at this point would be object to the odds being what they are, etc. I don�t know that I have a problem with their methodology, which is what your argument is attempting to poke holes in.

02-23-2002, 12:35 PM	#9
quotheraven Junior Member Join Date: Feb 2002 Location: Here or there--depending on how you look at it... Posts: 9	..."When a fool gives any wisdom,he is the only one not aware of it."

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