Marcion

Hello,

I am new to Internet Infidels and I want to start by saying how impressed by the sophistication and civility of the discussions that are taking place here.

I want to get some feedback on an issue in moral theory that has interested me for quite a while - what does it mean to say that someone is morally responsible?

This is really the old determinism vs free will question, but if free will is an illusion, then can we even be said to be "responsible" in the way that most people think of moral responsibility.

I would argue to start that moral accountability requires responsibility, responsibility requires choice and choice requires alternatives.

To show what I mean, here is an example where I would claim that a person is not morally accountable for the results of their action.

Person A is walking down the street, when an earthquake hits, causing him to loose his balance and knock over the person B standing next to him, causing an injury.

I believe that most people would say that person A did not act immorally, as the circumstances were beyond his control (no alternatives, therefore no moral responsibility). If however, Person A decided, sans earthquake, to knock over person B to steal her purse, most people would claim Person A was responsible, he didn't "have to" steal the purse, he could have just walked away.

I guess this is the heart of what I'm trying to get at, I believe that in that moment of decision, there really was no decision, that if you could somehow (warning - thought experiment ahead exactly freeze the environment, and freeze the exact state of Person A's brain, then rewind back to the moment of "decision", that the purse stealing would occur every time.

WhatI am really saying is that effect follows cause, and that effects (future behavior) and are "determined" by those causes (current neural state caused by genetics and environment.

I believe that the only reasonable alternative to this view is the argument (based often on quantum physics), is that effect does not follow cause deterministically, but probabilistically. Even if this is true, it does NOT imply some sort of quantum particle choice, we do NOT select the effects that follow, they are determined randomly or probabilistically

If this determination of effects from the cause is correct (which I'm sure many do not believe , then there is no "real" alternative(Same cause, same effect). When person A is in this position, he will "choose" to steal the purse, as this will follow necessarily from his current brain state.

If the future could not be different, given those realities, then how can we say that he "freely chose" to steal the purse.

I believe that the term "free will" is incoherent upon closer examination, and that we commonly employ it because it is a necesary condition for our moral beliefs (responsibilities) and theories (such as existentialism)

I also believe that the illusion of free will is so powerful because we do not know the causes of our actions, and thus the dawning awareness of our course of action appears to us as choice.

The reason I posted in this forum is because I feel that this has strong implications for moral philosophy. That said, I believe that in practical terms I am unaware of my behavioral causes, and so my moral choices feel very real to me, despite my sophistry.

I know that the view I am putting forward is neither new or original but any criticisms I have heard in the past were unconvincing and I believe failed to look closely at what it really means to "make a choice".

That being said, I have been very impressed by the level of intelligence displayed on this site and stand ready to be persuaded!

Marcion

Sorry, about this post, I just realized that this should have been in the philosophy forum, where there are a number of threads already on free will vs determinism.

Toad Master

Welcome to the forum.

One answer to your question is to continue the thought experiment and imagine that person A is caught and put on trial and convicted of stealing the purse.

Person A then pleads for leniency since, determinism being true, he had no real choice but to steal the purse.

The judge replies as follows: I'm sorry but, determinism being true, I have no real choice but to sentence you to 1 year in prison.

-Toad Master

echidna

Greetings Marcion.

Haven’t been over to Political Discussions yet huh ?

TM is correct IMO. The illusion of Free Will can quite simply be matched with the illusion of morality and the illusion of justice. When it comes to conscious actions, to deny this as Free Will all becomes a bit too solipsistic to be of much practical use and as such I generally think of this more as an illusion of a moral argument.

In reality we all have a consciousness which to an extent can control our actions, deterministically or otherwise. For the purpose of useful discussion, most of us choose to describe this as Free Will. Deniers can refer to the previous paragraph.

Now, where you raise a difficult issue is where one begins to analyse how much influence this Free Will has over one’s conscious actions. For instance in court a murderer can claim the defence that he suffered an abusive childhood & so is prone to violence, or in the near future, others will be able to claim that they possess a genetic combination which biases them towards violent behaviour.

We already have separate legal consideration for those with intellectual disability or children, in that their consciousness is not in complete control of their actions, or that they do not possess the intelligence to comprehend their actions.

But to extend this reasoning to adults without such disability is a very dangerous path. People automatically have a strong tendency to absolve themselves of as much responsibility as possible, to take the path of least resistance. I see nothing to be gained by describing people as purely deterministic machines and ignoring the role of the conscious will and intelligence.

Hey, maybe we’re cheap, but we’re not easy.

FWIW I'm comfortable with this as a MFP topic.

The Other Michael

Hello Marcion,

This thread is proceeding in a fashion that makes it fit in MF&P, so don't worry about that. If it moves into a pure determinism then we'll consider moving it to Philosophy.

cheers,
Michael
MF&P Moderator, Second Class

K

Marcion:

I think one of the problems involved in discussions of these issues is the definition of moral responsibility. If you are talking about an objective moral responsibility, I don't believe it exists. Morals are just a name that we've given to instincts that we've evolved to allow us to cooperate in groups to further our chances of survival.

There are pragmatic reasons that we've evolved an instinct to hold people "morally responsible" for their actions.

1. I believe person's actions are wholly determined by the sum of their past experiences as represented by their particular brain structure and their current inputs. But, by holding offending individuals morally responsible, society has an input to guiding their future action.

2. Threat of punishment is an input that may deter someone from committing an "immoral" act.

3. Restricting the freedoms of dangerous individuals can protect other members of society from harm.

4. The most pathological offenders are not given the chance to procreate. Therefore they are less likely to pass on their genes to subsequent generations.

Given this list of pragmatic reasons for moral responsibility, it is clear that it only works in cases where the brain state is the motivator behind the act. If society can not reasonably believe that holding someone morally responsible for an act will protect itself from a future act, then it makes no sense to do so. Therefore, in your example, holding person B responsible for stealing the purse would make sense while holding person A responsible for accidentally killing someone would not.

dk

Forgive me for jumping in here with my two cents K
dk: I’m going to play devils advocate here.
<ol type="1">[*]K: I believe person's actions are wholly determined by the sum of their past experiences as represented by their particular brain structure and their current inputs. But, by holding offending individuals morally responsible, society has an input to guiding their future action.
dk: I’ll take this to mean that a person is born a blank slate without intellect, and somehow creates a copy of the world in their head, and then by some miracle process acquires intelligence to make sense of sense-experience. If a person is born without innate intellect then how does experience create intellect? If intellect is innate then how can we know whether concepts, forms and ideas are acquired (created/active) or innate (discovered/passive)? I believe people are born, and that experience activates intellect, and that intellect is predisposed to know. Further a fetus clearly possesses a concept of self, or self consciousness. What do you think a fetus dreams about?[*]K: Threat of punishment is an input that may deter someone from committing an "immoral" act.
dk: As a practical matter the threat of punishment is only effective if it generates fear in the criminals psyche. This implies that effective laws force innocent people to live in fear, which is of course unjust, even counterproductive. A person that lives in fear might respond violently to some benign sensory input, and in so doing commit a crime.[*]K: Restricting the freedoms of dangerous individuals can protect other members of society from harm.
dk: Restricting the freedom of dangerous individuals also causes hostility sometimes vented when they are released. I don’t see anything practical about prisons.[*]K: The most pathological offenders are not given the chance to procreate. Therefore they are less likely to pass on their genes to subsequent generations.
dk: Many prisons permit conjugal visits. You need to visit a prison, the vast majority of inmates love to talk about their kids.[/list=a]
I’m still waiting for a list of pragmatic reasons.

[ August 26, 2002: Message edited by: dk ]</p>

K

dk:

1. The reason I referenced the representation on an individuals particular brain structure is precisely because I believe that they ARE wired differently. So they are not a blank slate to begin with. However, if a particular brain was given no sensory information whatsoever (not just the sight and hearing), I find it extremely implausible that anything remotely resembling intellect would materialize. I think it is a mistake to separate the brain from the body that provides it with input. Also, a fetus is immersed in a ton of sensory stimulus.

2. Fear doesn't have to be the only input to prevent someone from doing something. It only has to be less beneficial to the individual than the antisocial act. For instance, some states have a very large fine for littering. Is it reasonable to suppose that people living in those states live in fear because of this? No, it's just more beneficial to throw trash away rather than risk being caught littering.

3. I was talking about freedom restriction in general, not specifically the prison system of one particular country. For instance, not letting pedophiles work with children, revoking driver's licenses of hazardous drivers, etc. Also, for dangerous criminals, a true life sentence would protect the rest of society from them. Included in this category would by the death penalty, incarceration until the person rehabilitation (assuming a viable rehabilitation plan), or possibly exhile to let another country deal with the problem.

4. Again, I'm not talking about a particular penal system and I was referring more to things like the death penalty, castration, and exhile.

Marcion

From the responses I have received so far it looks to me like you agree for the most part with the Deterministic Hypothesis, but feel that free will is a useful and necessary illusion for the concept of justice. I/m not convinced yet of that, and I believe that it may be possible to have deterrent justice without the "necessary illusion" of free will

Justice (as I conceive of it) includes, among other things,the ability to prevent acts of aggression against others. Many also believe that it includes punishing such acts after they occur. I believe that determinism is problematic for this second concept of retaliatory justice, but I would like to look more closly at deterence.

I believe that under a utilitarian system of justice you could still punish for crime based on the fact that punishment clearly deters some crime, and that the benefit to society is greater than the cost to those punished.

I think my question to the group is whether it is possible to come up with a more individually focued theory of justice ( a more rights based approach - not utilitarian) that can reasonably punish for crime even with a deterministic understanding of human action?

[ August 26, 2002: Message edited by: Marcion ]

[ August 26, 2002: Message edited by: Marcion ]</p>

echidna

Simple. No.

Deterrence works. Hey, crucify me as a bad citizen, but I don’t speed (excessively !!) because I’ll get fined. I rationally know and understand all the reasons why not & yet if I can, I’ll do it when I consider the reasons inappropriate. Only deterrence prevents me, and the rest of Melbourne for that matter.

Given that rationalising to potential criminals won’t work, your other option is imposing behaviour controls which prevent all crimes from being committed. Possible to a small degree, but let’s not get too carried away.