Malaclypse the Younger

True indeed. Without evidence that the constants could have been different, which would seem to require either a total understanding of the laws of physics or the observation of another universe (neither of which appear particularly likely in the foreseeable future), the Fine Tuning Argument remains entirely academic.

It's really only useful as an academic exercise in understanding probability theory and/or to illustrate the subtle (and unsubtle) ways that theistic arguments subtly undermines rationality to bolster its essentially nonrational presuppositions.

Wizardry

In addition,

The Fine-Tuning argument must, in order to be effective, establish that life has some objective value. Otherwise the argument becomes equivalent to this:

I win the one-time, grand prize lottery. This is a highly improbable event. It might of been the result of a fix by government officials.

I justify the conclusion mathematically:

P(L|C) = 10^-50
P(C) ~= 1

P(L|F) ~= 1
P(F) = One in a billion -> 10^-9

10^-50 >> 10^-9

I conclude that winning the lottery was most likely the result of a fix.

This argument would hold true for any winner. Therefore, no matter who wins, the lottery can most reasonably be assumed to be the result of a conspiracy.

Please show why (1)this is a non-sequitur (2)this is not analogous to the Fine-Tuning Argument (3)this is a good analogy and valid argument and proves that God exists in all possible realities.

Photocrat

Why? Or better yet, how? The power effecting that change would, in effect, change the laws of physics... You cannot simultaniously live & not live!

Most of us define 'omnipotent' as 'able to do any logically possible thing'; yet this seems as though you're asserting that supernaturalism entails a contradiction... ? By experiment, if I wished to know whether I could live in such & such an environment, went there & found that I could live in it, I would be quite surprised to hear someone tell me I should've died. In other words, my experimentation would not reveal the 'true' laws of physics in which I should die. As far as I need be concerned, those laws would not exist as I would have no way of discerning that I 'should' not survive...

Vorkosigan

This whole discussion of probability is based on vast misunderstanding of a universe like our own that operates by selectionist processes acting under constraint.

the reason the material processes we call life Texist within a narrow band is because they are evolved to fit that band, like everything else in the universe. How could life as we know it exist outside of that band? Arguing for Design is like arguing that my waist became 32 because all my underwear is size 32. Actually, I bought my underwear to fit my waist. Likewise, life fits in a narrow band because that is all the room it has. If the band were wider, life would fit in a broader band.

In any case, this brings up another problem. Let's suppose the "narrow band" was a heck of a lot wider. You could still make the same argument. Thus, under Design, there is no universe in which this argument could not be made, except one without physical law, perhaps. No matter how wide the band, it is still a finite band, and thus amenable to the Design Argument.

Let's make a REAL analogy about Design:

Let's imagine a place, a rocky and forbidding land far from the sea where no rain ever falls. One day the climate changes. Rain begins to fall. A river forms.

Now, automatically and instantly, selection processes begin to operate. The river cannot flow up into the mountains, because gravity makes it go down a slope. It has a certain evaporation rate that is easily calculated based on the specific heat of water and the width of the river and other factors. It cannot evaporate at any other rate; it is constrained by the factors that control that behavior. It flows at a certain speed (disregarding chemical and other effects) based on the slope of the land. If the land is flat, it flows slowly. If the slope is steep, it flows quickly. It can't behave in any other way. Those are constraints. If it meets rock of varying hardness, it cuts through the soft rock first. If it flows into a basin, it forms a lake and then continues out the other side. It cannot flow down one side and then up the other; it is constrained to fill the basin first. If it is forced into a narrow canyon, its scouring power increases. The power of its scouring force also depends on the composition of the river bottom (silt? large rocks?) and other factors. If it meets a cliff, it forms a waterfall. The shape of the river is thus constrained by physical factors. It is selected for by those factors.

Along comes the Design supporter. She takes one look at the river and says: "Darn! Look how well that land suits the river! I'll bet anything that land was designed for that river!"

In fact, the river flows to fit the shape of the land. Likewise, in our universe, all the things in it fit the constraints that shape them. What you are arguing is the exact opposite: that the constraints are there to fit the things in the universe -- that the shape of the land was determined by the future shape of the river.

In other words, this whole discussion about probability is based on a complete misunderstanding of constraints and selection processes. It terms of my analogy, the whole probability question asks: what is the probability that the land is shaped so that the river will have that particular shape? It is not that the answer is hard to arrive at, it is that the question is wrong, wrong, wrong.

Michael

HRG

Nice illustration. I used to present a similar "design argument":

"See, how well the Seine fits exactly under the bridges of Paris. The river must have been planned that way!"

Regards,
HRG.

Kenny

Actually, I don’t think that’s quite right either. Or, at least, I don’t think that’s the best way to interpret P(E) in Bayes’ Theorem. For any set of evidence, E, and any hypothesis, H:

P(E) = P(H)P(E/H) + P(~H)P(E/~H)

P(E) thus amounts to a weighted average of the probability that E will occur on all possible hypotheses. Now, how this plays out or how P(E) is to be interpreted depends on the situation.

Say, for instance, you are given a coin and you want to evaluate, H, the hypothesis that the coin lands on heads half of the time (i.e. its a fair coin), and let E be the evidence that for a given trial, the coin lands on heads:

P(E/H) = 1/2

P(E) = (1/2)P(H) + P(~H)P(E/~H)

Now, given that we know most coins are fair, P(H) should probably be given a fairly high value, but lets just assign it a value of 1/2

P(~H) = 1-P(H) = 1/2

P(E) = 1/4 + (1/2)P(E/~H)

But, what of P(E/~H)?

Well P(E/~H) is just an average over all bias hypotheses, and since we have no reason to pick one bias hypothesis over another, all the various bias hypotheses should average each other out such that P(E/~H) = 1/2.

Thus, P(E) = 1/4 +1/4 = 1/2

So, in this case, it does turn out that P(E) is equal to the probability that E would obtain by “chance.” However, this might not always be the case. If we had prior information indicating a particular bias for the coin, for instance, the values assigned to P(H), P(E/H), and P(E/~H) would be different and P(E) would likely turn out to be something other than 1/2.

Bottom line is that P(E) is not necessarily best interpreted as the probability E will occur by random chance, though it can be in certain situations.

God Bless,
Kenny

Tercel

Wizardry,

You suggest that if it was true that the physical constants could not hold different values to what they do then the FT argument would fail. The case you describe, I call “necessity” since it alledges that the physical constants are the way they are of necessity and not be any other way. Now this is all very well, but your suggestion that this means the FT argument fails is unwarrented and suggests to me that you misunderstand exactly what the FT argument is ultimately trying to prove.
It is not trying to prove God, or that there was an intelligent creator. The FT argument is about showing a given atheist position to be inconsistent, or at least showing it to be unevidenced.
Now it is a common claim of many atheists or naturalists is that nothing exists beyond this physical universe, that is to say what we see is what there is and there is no supernatural, no other worlds etc. Equally, it is common for them to embrace “chance” as the ultimate reason for our existence. Where did we come from? Answer: We evolved via the process of Evolution. Why is the universe the way it is? Answer: Random chance.
The FT argument should demonstrate that acceptance of these two ideas is unreasonable. Because of Fine Tuning the probability that both these claims are true is tiny. So tiny in fact that the theistic claim of a divine creator looks absolutely certain by comparison.
Now this doesn’t disprove atheism or prove theism. It only shows that this one position is unacceptable. There are effectively two possible positions which remain for the atheist:
* Necessity
* Many-many worlds
Either the idea of “chance” as the cause of all can be dropped in favour of Necessity: the universe had to be the way it is and could never have been any other way. Or alternatively the idea that there is nothing outside our universe can be dropped in favour of advocating that there are many-many universes out they - say 10^250 or even an infinite number.

Of course accepting either of these breaks what seems to be another “atheist axiom” (so to speak): That convincing evidence is required before any belief is had - and until then one is to disbelieve. So often the atheists will accuse the theists of believing in their deities without evidence. (I would dispute that of course, and say there is definitely evidence, whether the evidence is found to be convincing is up to the individual) But neither Necessity or Many-many worlds has any evidence whatsoever in their favour. So if the atheist is to accept one of these hypotheses, they do so on nothing more than blind faith: Exactly like the theists they so detest for doing this. Or perhaps far worse, since the theists do actually have evidence sometimes.

In summary, the point of the Fine-Tuning argument is to demonstrate that the possibility that there exists only one universe which is the way it is as a result of chance is not even remotely likely compared to the other possibilities.


In your next post you give an analogy which looks to me exactly the same as that given by Dr Retard at the beginning of the thread save you’ve replaced the magic troll with government officials. Why don’t you have a read of my posts to Dr Retard.
But in summary the problem in the analogy is P(L|F). It should equal 10^-50 in the analogy. But for some reason you’ve got it equal to approximately one.
Look at it this way: What’s P(L|F) measuring? Well F is that the government officials fixed the result of the lottery. L is that you won the lottery. So, P(L|F), is: given that government official are fixing the lottery, what is the probability that they’ll fix it in your favor (as opposed to someone elses). Well, unless the officials are your friends, they are no more likely to fix the results in your favor than they are for any given other person. Therefore P(L|F) is equal to one in the number of possible outcomes of the lottery = 1 in 10^50.
Compare to the FT argument where P(E|D) -the equivalent of P(L|F)- is pretty close to 1 (that is to say it’s within a few orders of magnitude thereof).

Tercel

Malaclypse the Younger

Tercel

Yet again you demonstrate your deficiencies in basic logic and the interpretation of probability theory.

You simply have no idea what you're talking about. If the constants are as they are by necessity, the fundamental premise of the FTA is simply false and the argument is unsound.

Since metaphysical naturalism is (obviously) a metaphysical position, it is not claimed to be evidenced. So showing the position is unevidenced is pointless.

It is not yet shown that the FTA proves the atheist position inconsistent. These are two very different assertions. You are not being precise. The only way to prove atheism inconsistent is to show that there is a sound evidential argument for the existence of a god. The only way to prove metaphysical naturalism inconsistent is to show that the assumption of naturalism leads to a contradiction. The FTA does neither.

It does not. You merely state that you personally assume it does. It does not.

No. It is impossible to assign a reasonable a priori probability to the existence of a creator.

It simply does not.

Those are interesting possibilities. However the possibility that this universe arose by chance is still viable.

True indeed. Which is why most atheists (myself included) consider these possibilities speculative.

Depends on what you define as "evidence". Under my definition of evidence, there is none for a creator.

These hypotheses are indeed speculative.

Again, this is only true if you arbitrarily assume a probability for a creator to be higher than the probability for the creation of the universe. However, there is no reason to assign any probability to the existence of a creator, either higher or lower than that of the chance creation of the universe.

We have. They're logically deficient. The deficiencies have been pointed out. Your only rebuttal is to claim bias if your arbitrary numbers are not assumed. This is not an evidential argument.

Again you demonstrate your deficient understanding of probability theory. The claim is, [b]if[/i] the lottery is fixed [b]then[/i] the chances of my winning are nearly one. This is an obviously true statement.

F is the hypothesis that the government has fixed the lottery in my favor.

Since we have no knowledge of what a creator would or would not do, P(E|D) is unknown. Any value is arbitrary. We are willing, however, to assume a definition of a creator as one that is interested in creating life. But that assumption is no more or less "reasonable" than the assumption that a government official might rig the lottery in my favor.

The bottom line is that 10^-50 is not really even "unimaginably" low. Lower probability events routinely happen. The assumption of a probability of a creator need not be higher than this number. There is nothing "reasonable" (deriving from known facts) about the a priori assumption of 10^-18 or any other number, higher or lower. My assumption of 10^-10000 is no more arbitrary or less reasonable than yours.

Kenny

Not necessarily (pun intended). First, Tercel’s argument is fairly modest in that it does not claim that FT proves theism, only that it forces the atheist to take a position which has no evidential support - namely that the constants are either necessary or that there are infinitely many universes.

Second, there are various philosophical notions of probability. There is for instance, “objective probability” which is measure of the number of “possible worlds” in which a fact holds true as opposed to the number of possible worlds in which that fact does not hold true. It is conceivable (but not necessarily possible in a modal sense) that that our universe, with its set of constants, is the only possible world (or, perhaps, the only possible world given certain broad physical constraints assumed to hold). If that were the case the objective probability of the universe having the set of constants it does would be one. However, there is another sense in which this does not seem very likely. After all, we can imagine many different types of universes, and even model them to a certain extent via computers, which seem to be logically consistent.

This brings us to a second type of probability, which I will call “epistemic probability.” Epistemic probability is simply a measure of how much confidence we should place in a particular belief based on the evidence. For instance, I believe that Goldbauch’s conjecture is true, even though no one has managed to prove it, because all known examples seem to conform to it. In one sense, Goldbauch’s conjecture is either true or false and the objective probability is either one or zero, but in another sense, I can say that Goldbauch’s conjecture is probably true (in the epistemic sense) based on the available evidence.

In terms of the distribution of the physical constants, we do not know whether they are necessary or not, and, given the evidence we have, it seems epistemically unlikly that they are. The hypothesis that the physical constants are necessary, then, just becomes one of many hypotheses to condition on the available evidence, and it can be argued that it is epistemically more likely that the constants were designed that it is that they are necessary.

BTW, it seems to me that your objection to the fine tuning argument here could be used in reverse to refute atheological evidential arguments against the existence of God (such as the problem of evil) given that these arguments generally aim to show that it is unlikely that God exists given certain evidence. But, if God, as defined by classical theism, exists, He exists necessarily. The objective probability of His existence, therefore, must either be zero or one. If the premises of the FT argument are invalidated by the possibility that the distribution of the physical constants might be necessary, then so are such atheistic arguments. You cannot have your proverbial cake and eat it too.

God Bless,
Kenny

[ March 03, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>

Malaclypse the Younger

Kenny

Quite the contrary. It makes the atheist take a position of fact: That it is possible that the odds of this particular universe forming are 10^-50. Events of this order of probability are unremarkable: The specific ordering of a single deck of cards has a probability 17 orders of magnitude smaller.

Tercel's argument has force if and only if there were evidential support or other reason for assigning any a priori probability for the existence of a creator.

But he is merely introducing this probability as an assumption, and claiming that his arbitrary assumption is "reasonable" and alternative assumptions are "biased". This is simply ludicrous.

This is true. However, Tercel is not using any of the interesting philosophical notions of probability.

He is merely proving that your conclusions are dependent on the assumptions. Drawing any kind of interpretive conclusion from such an "argument" is obviously circular.

Actually you cannot even say that. Goldbach's Conjecture has been demonstrated only for a finite number of examples. It is untested for an infinite number of examples. The a priori probability that we can believe Goldbach's Conjecture on the basis of example is literally infinitesimal.

There are three issues. First, even if the low probability for the constants is stipulated, the FTA fails to conclude anything. Second, if it is true that the constants are necessary, the FTA is unsound--an obvious conclusion that Tercel perversely denies. Third, we have no way of having, by example, any epistemic confidence in the range of actual probabilities; indeed, it has been asserted without rebuttal that one could reformulate the laws of physics so that the odds of a life-friendly universe are arbitrarily high or low.

Since I don't use those arguments probabilistically, I'll happily give up that cake.

[ March 03, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]</p>