ManM

Pomp,
When a theist claims that the atheist has no sound basis for morality, I think he is saying that there are no acceptable systems of moral thought that are compatible with atheism. Those arguments aim to show that the atheist is being inconsistent when he acts morally. I believe the original topic was meant to sweep away all such arguments by using the moral atheist as evidence. I am simply pointing out that the existence of moral atheists does not shield atheism from criticism.

[ November 02, 2002: Message edited by: ManM ]</p>

luvluv

I agree with ManM. Theists say that any moral law is in the same epistimelogical boat as the existence of God, so the atheist is being inconsistent when he believes in one and denies the other. Doesn't mean they can't actually BE moral, only that they cannot rationally justify that morality.

Vorkosigan

Neither can theists, if it comes to that. There's no rational reason to believe in gods, so any reference to one as support for a particular morality is ipso facto irrational.

Atheists are not being inconsistent when we discuss moral laws. We simply deny that they derive from any gods. A "law" could well be a social agreement between groups or individuals. Thus, an ethical statement could derive its force from social rather than metaphysical arrangements.

Vorkosigan

Pomp

ManM,

When a theist claims that the atheist has no sound basis for morality, I think he is saying that there are no acceptable systems of moral thought that are compatible with atheism.

That's a pretty presumptuous claim. I suppose that how defensible such a claim is, though, will depend on how we define "acceptable." It's quite obvious that nontheistic systems of moral thought are acceptable to those who practice them. I suspect that you're stacking the deck by assuming that, to be considered an "acceptable" system of moral thought, and system of thought must meet the narrow criteria that happen to define theistic moral systems.

luvluv,

Theists say that any moral law is in the same epistimelogical boat as the existence of God, so the atheist is being inconsistent when he believes in one and denies the other.

Similar to my above point, this will probably depend on how one defines "moral law." If we agree that a standard of moral behavior can be called a "moral law," then it is plain that moral laws are not in the same epistemic boat as god(s) at all. People demonstrably do act in accordance with such laws all the time. The difference, as I've said before, is that moral laws, by most accounts, do not exist in the same sense in which you claim your god exists. There is no epistemic difficulty in observing that certain principles do motivate human behavior, as there is in claiming that an objectively undetectable being exists.

[ November 02, 2002: Message edited by: Pomp ]</p>

luvluv

Vork:

Well, a)that's not true. There are rational reasons to believe in God even if you do not find them compelling. B) The morality we derive from God is rationally consistent with our position. Any morals an atheist decides upon are, within his worldview, utterly arbitrary and totally non-binding.

I totally disagree. An atheists morals come down to brute force, pure and simple. What if an individual refuses to adhere to certain social arrangements? What if one group of people decides slavery is permissable arrangement a neighboring one decides it isn't? Who's right? The final arbiter in the athiest's case is force.

Furthermore, you could never say of any act, including child rape, that it was wrong, only that your society did not prefer it. But then your society might not prefer fireworks, and there's nothing really to distinguish the preferences because, rationally, you cannot use the word wrong or immoral, because you can't prove such concepts have any objective meaning.

Pomp:

[QUOTE] There is no epistemic difficulty in observing that certain principles do motivate human behavior...QUOTE]

Right but there is no RATIONAL JUSTIFICATION for this fact. It's in the same boat as the statement "Harry enjoys his sailboat". There is no emprical or rational justification for the fact that Harry likes his sailboat, he just does.

Certainly, you can simply state that humans have certain predilections, but you can't say of any act "this is wrong", only "I dislike this" and once you admit that morality is simply a matter of taste, two cultures cannot even rationally debate ethics without the argument becoming circular. We could say, of a country engaging in a practice we do not like, that in their own self-interests they should stop it or we will invade them, but then any act that any weaker country engages in could be similarly pronounced against their self-interest and therefore also wrong. If we decided we would invade every country who has tea at noon, instead of at 2, and suddenly having tea at noon would be against the self-interest of every country. It simply lends itself to a cycle of brutality.

Theists, on the other hand, recognize the existence of objective moral principles and even if we cannot prove this to each other we are, in theory, capable of rational debate on what is right and what is wrong divorced from self-preservation. An atheist, of course, can also do this but he will be at that point inconsistent.

William Lane Craig put the post-modernist dilema thusly: an atheist can live consitently, but not happily or he can live happily, but not consistently. He was saying if you truly acted out your position, that humans are essentially worthless accidents and that life has no meaning, you will be unhappy, but if you pretend it has meaning or that any meaning you try to give it is "real" then you will be inconsistent.

SRB

luvluv
I totally disagree. An atheists morals come down to brute force, pure and simple. What if an individual refuses to adhere to certain social arrangements? What if one group of people decides slavery is permissable arrangement a neighboring one decides it isn't? Who's right? The final arbiter in the athiest's case is force.

SRB
That's nonsense. The reportive definition of "morally right" clearly does not make it true that "X is morally right" means the same thing as "X is what the most forceful group wants." If you disagree, I suggest you listen to how people use moral language. Furthermore, people would continue to use moral language in exactly the same way even if it turns out that God does not exist. In fact most objective theories of ethics are compatible with atheism (e.g. intuitionism, utilitarianism, ideal observer theory, etc.)

luvluv
Furthermore, you could never say of any act, including child rape, that it was wrong, only that your society did not prefer it.

SRB
Why believe that? Can you provide an argument, preferably in labelled steps?

luvluv
Theists, on the other hand, recognize the existence of objective moral principles and even if we cannot prove this to each other we are, in theory, capable of rational debate on what is right and what is wrong divorced from self-preservation. An atheist, of course, can also do this but he will be at that point inconsistent.

SRB
Demonstrate the inconsistency! Asserting that it exists is insufficient. You need to attempt to derive a contradiction (i.e. a statement of the form "P & ~P") from the proposition "Some actions are morally wrong and God does not exist," using deductively valid inferences and statements that are true by definition. Until this is done, all you have come up with is hot air.

Will you actually attempt to provide the derivation, or will you skip that part, and offer the same empty assertions elsewhere at a later date?

luvluv
William Lane Craig put the post-modernist dilema thusly: an atheist can live consitently, but not happily or he can live happily, but not consistently.

SRB
The same goes to WLC. He needs to "put up or shut up." In his extensive writings on the impossibility of an objective theory of ethics that is compatible with atheism, he is yet to offer any clear argument to that effect. You seem to have picked up his habit of going round asserting, without argument, that there is no way this can be done. The theories I mentioned (intuitionism, utilitarianism, ideal observer theory) are all clear counterexamples to his thesis that atheism entails the falsity of objectivist ethics. However, even if I could come up with no counterexamples, or if those counterexamples were no good, it would not follow that the derivation I requested actually exists.

SRB

Pomp

luvluv,

Right but there is no RATIONAL JUSTIFICATION for this fact. It's in the same boat as the statement "Harry enjoys his sailboat". There is no emprical or rational justification for the fact that Harry likes his sailboat, he just does.

You're close, but you're failing to distinguish between a value and a principle. Values cannot be justified (although they can be explained). Principles can be justified (in a consequentialist system, anyway) by observing how well they serve the values of those who adhere to them. In the sailboat example, the value would be "Harry enjoys his sailboat" and the principle would be "If Harry enjoys his sailboat then Harry ought to keep the hull clean, the sails mended, etc." Anyone who holds the value in question has a compelling rational reason to ahdere to the principle(s) derived from it. A more relevant example might be the value "Harry enjoys Tom's cooperation and companionship" and the derived principle "If Harry enjoys Tom's cooperation and companionship, then Harry ought not lie to Tom, cheat Tom, steal from Tom, etc."

Certainly, you can simply state that humans have certain predilections, but you can't say of any act "this is wrong", only "I dislike this" and once you admit that morality is simply a matter of taste, two cultures cannot even rationally debate ethics without the argument becoming circular.

Once again, morality, by nearly any view, is not "simply a matter of taste." MOrality is a matter of our actions having objective and predictable consequences that impact our values (or tastes, if you prefer).

We could say, of a country engaging in a practice we do not like, that in their own self-interests they should stop it or we will invade them, but then any act that any weaker country engages in could be similarly pronounced against their self-interest and therefore also wrong. If we decided we would invade every country who has tea at noon, instead of at 2, and suddenly having tea at noon would be against the self-interest of every country. It simply lends itself to a cycle of brutality.

Suggesting that the immediate use of force against any nation that displeases one's own nation is an effective strategy for pursuing one's own interests is overlooking, for example, that little incident with the airplanes and the skyscrapers. It is rarely, if ever, in one's self-interest to make enemies unnecessarily.

Theists, on the other hand, recognize the existence of objective moral principles...

No they don't. Theists believe in an omniscient, omnipotent father figure and make the claim that the subjective preferences of that figure ought to be considered objective principles. If you want to define yoru moral system so that your god's preferences define what is moral, I have no problem with that, but I do have a problem with your attempting to claim that this is somehow less arbitrary and subjective than a moral system based on anyone else's preferences. Further, assuming that your god does, indeed exist, how does this affect a consequerntialist moral theory, other than by adding an infinitly negative consequence to performing acts of which your god does not approve and an infinitely positive one to performing acts of which he does?

...and even if we cannot prove this to each other we are, in theory, capable of rational debate on what is right and what is wrong divorced from self-preservation. An atheist, of course, can also do this but he will be at that point inconsistent.

First of all, I want to clarify your usage of "self-preservation." Do you think that anyone is arguing that there are no good reasons to do anything other than stark survival, or do you recognize that many, if not most, of us are making the broader claim that there are reasons to do things that are in our self-interest, which we usually define broadly enough to include the interests of those we care about, the society in which we live, etc. I'd prefer that we stick to the latter term, as it makes this clear.

Second, as I said to ManM, that is a very presumptuous claim to make. Do you have some convincing argument that there can be no reason, other than the existence of a god of some sort, for anyone to do anything that is not in their self-interest? There are several moral systems that are compatible with atheism that purport to do this very thing. I happen to think that they are all mistaken, but not simply because they do not recognize the existence of an omnipotent lawgiver/enforcer, and I don't presume that no such system will ever present a convincing argument.

Third, assuming that you'll accept the clarification I presented with respect to self-interest rather than self-preservation, I object to your implicaton that a moral system must, to be a moral system, provide reasons that are "divorced from self-{interest}." You're stacking the deck against moral theories you don't like by holding them to standards that they don't claim to meet. Further, I've yet to see a compelling reason why we ought to adhere to a theistic moral system that does not also reduce to self-interest.

William Lane Craig put the post-modernist dilema thusly: an atheist can live consitently, but not happily or he can live happily, but not consistently. He was saying if you truly acted out your position, that humans are essentially worthless accidents...

That's a strawman, and WLC (and you, given how long you've been here) ought to know better. Very few atheists claim that humans are an "accident" (rather, that they are the result of predictable natural laws), or that thay are worthless (rather, that they have worth to themselves and each other).

...and that life has no meaning, you will be unhappy, but if you pretend it has meaning or that any meaning you try to give it is "real" then you will be inconsistent.

So, to clarify, meaning that I give to my own life is not "real," but meaning assigned to me by an omnipotent creator is "real?"


Edited because I forgot to respond to a paragraph.

[ November 03, 2002: Message edited by: Pomp ]</p>

mfaber

What rational reasons are there to believe in God? So far, I haven't seen you list even one. If they truly were rational, one WOULD find them compelling.

One of the most thoroughly obnoxious attitudes exhibited by some Christians (and I'm going to concentrate on Christianity here because luvluv is one) is the notion that somehow Christianity invented and patented morality.....

MORALITY®, a wholly owned subsidiary of the TRUE Christian ™(Addendum: Be advised that after 2 millenia, we Christians are still quarreling, often violently, over just who owns the rights to the trademark,i.e. we haven't come to a non-violent consensus on just what constitutes the TRUE Christian, thousands of variants don't you know!).

This attitude shows a willful ignorance, or at best, an incredibly myopic view of philosophy, world history and other religions. Nonreligious,humanistic moral systems predate Christianity: (just a few examples)

1) Epicureans, Skeptics and Stoics of classical Greece and Rome
2) The Confucians of ancient China
3) The Lokayata, India's materialist philosophers (1000 BCE)

What are called the "common moral decencies" are found in cultures throughout the world...Judeao-Christian morality is NOT UNIQUE. For instance, the principles in the TenCommandments were laid down by Hammurabi (Code of Hammurabi) before Moses. Confucius stated the Golden Rule more than 500 years before it was attributed to Jesus. Buddha also stated a more elaborate version of the Golden Rule ("the Eight-fold Path) also more than 500 years before Christianity saw the light of day.


<a href="http://www.fragrant.demon.co.uk/golden.html" target="_blank">THE GOLDEN RULE, MANY FAITHS</a>

The truth is that we humans are group animals and there are just some things that one cannot do if the group is to remain a cohesive unit. It simply makes good sense to abide by the "common moral decencies" such as the Golden Rule (treat others with the same consideration that you havethem treat you), people should not lie, steal, or kill, and they should be honest, cooperative,and generous. These principles work for the simple reason that they are conducive to human welfare(altruism works!).

<a href="http://www.theunityofknowledge.org/the_evolution_of_altruism/title_page.htm" target="_blank">THE EVOLUTION OF ALTRUISM</a>

<a href="http://citd.scar.utoronto.ca/ANTB25/SCMEDIA/Readings/irons.html" target="_blank">THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY</a>

There is absolutely no need to derive meaning for these principles from God or the supernatural (no invisible, megalomaniacal, blackmailing, bribing Sky Daddy/Thingy need apply). Humanity and life are of value simply because they exists. Life has only the meaning that we give it and are willing to WORK to achieve. It is our human values (the willingness to abide by thecommon moral decencies and apply them to EVERYONE) that give us rights, responsibility, and dignity. People who observe these principles for no other reason than they are convinced that it is in their best interests to do so are ultimately more reliable than those who "obey" out of fear of retribution to come and/or postmortem bribery from God (the Cosmic GODfather presents us with the "Original Deal We Can't refuse"---Believe in Me or Burn!)

Anyone who has debated the existence of God with a Christian (or many other theists of various persuasions) is sure to have been presented with some variant of the following proposition: "If God does not exist, then there is no reason not to do x " where x is some kind of crime or immorality. I am reminded of what an Christian missionary said to me the other day, "there would be no reason for him to remain faithful to his spouse, to care for his children, not rob banks, not be a rapist, etc", if God did not exists (only his God-fear kept his "innate" depravity in check). Such assertions are meant to imply that atheism is a path to evil, and Christianity (insert other theist worldview) a path to good. In fact, they actually prove just the opposite.

Consider the following scenario, that somehow, someone comes up with a conclusive disproof of the existence of God. What would happen to my proud-of-his-righteousness missionary if God did not exist? Why, there would no reason for him to be faithful to his wife, not commit crimes, etc.!!! So in the face of proof that God does not exist, my "religiously correct" missionary would apparently give in to whatever lusts he might feel, would wreck what should have been a close, loving family and go on a crime spree.

How about atheists? What would a conclusive disproof of the existence of God do to my moral stature? Considering that I don't believe in God to begin with, the answer is that a disproof of the existence of God would not cause me to change my moral views at all, i.e. I will continue to observe the "common moral decencies". However, the prospect of all of those Christians (and other "God-fearing" theists) released from their God-fear should fill one with great trepidation.............


[ November 03, 2002: Message edited by: mfaber ]</p>

ManM

Pomp,
My purpose was to address Jamie_L's specific counter-argument. My work here is done.

jlowder

Agnostic philosopher Paul Draper once defended an argument for metaphysical naturalism and against theism based on precisely that alleged fact (that, on average, theists are not more moral than atheists). If that alleged fact is true, then it would seem to be more likely on the assumption that naturalism is true than on the assumption that theism is true, and hence provide some evidence for naturalism and against theism. Why? Because, on the assumption God exists, God is supposed to be a source of moral strength. Therefore, we would expect, on average, that theists would be more moral than naturalists.

However, Draper no longer defends such an argument because he doesn't believe he can prove the empirical claim crucial to the argument: that, on average, religious people are not more moral than nonreligious people.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ November 03, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>