Keith Russell

John:

Yeah, it's tautological, but I don't see it as paradoxical...which would be similar to a contradiciton, not a repetition (or tautology).

Keith

Mr. Sammi

Even though there may be multiple instantiations of the I-characteristic, i think most philosophers wish to posit a single sane I.

What may be the issue here is the sum of the I-characteristic as a whole , WHICH MAY BE greater than the sum of itz parts.

Is the I that likes ice-cream NOT the same I that hates wrong-doing? If it is not then the confusing complex of multiple personalities comes to fore. I am assuming that personality is the outward and interactive presentation of the I-characteristics which are instantiatiable.

The difficulty with multiple me's is whenever the topology of I grows or changes my reaction or response may differ.

Sammi Na Boodie ()

Mr. Sammi

Further to this, thinking that we do think is called reflection. This is the use of thought and memory. This is equivalent to thinking we have thought.


Sammi Na Boodie ()

John Page

I agree - LOL, a paradoxical tautology is a contradiction and would give rise to a paradox, thereby proving that one can have a paradoxical tautology ad nauseum.

Cheers, John

Theli

Here's the problem:
If you think you think, then you must think or you could not make that claim.
First you display certainty of yourself thinking, and then uncertainty of the same thing. All in the same sentence.
Another paradox comes in your uncertainty of your own existence. If you don't exist, you cannot question your own existence. But you did.

[ December 05, 2002: Message edited by: Theli ]</p>

Mr. Sammi

Theli, you are using a folk interpretation of think. I think that is possible BUT in a philosophy class that is a no no. This is the interpretation where the action one describes is : 'I think that is so' indicating an uncertainity of the result of the thought BUT not uncertainity in the thinking process itself.

Sammi Na Boodie ()

Prodros

Smarko,

Having read the chapter you posted, I must say that there is very little in what you have to offer that strikes me as anything new.

The notion that there is no 'self' (or 'I') seems to be nothing more but Hume's argument against Descartes' cogito warmed up: introspection can reveal no 'self'; the best you can achieve through introspection is a bundle of ideas/thoughts.

Your discussion on the "pincushion concept" seems to be nothing more than Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances: the reason we call the diverse things such as chess, football, soccer, etc. games is in that they share some resemblances. While there is no essential feature in common to all of them, there still are similarities that warrant all of these things being called 'games'. Furthermore, your point that the 'self' should be regarded as a superconcept seems rather dubious to me. In my view, there is no such entity as 'self'; we merely reify such a concept from observing various instances of thoughts in our mind. However, I must confess that I am a nominalist when it comes to entities such as the 'self'.

(I apologize for being unable to present my criticism without an appeal to the concepts that you try to account for.)

Prodros...

Ps. Joka tapauksessa olisin kiinnostunut lukemaan lisää yrityksestäsi. Milloin aiot julkaista kirjasi Suomessa?