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Old 04-18-2003, 07:21 AM   #21
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Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
I am not sure what I would be agreeing to here. One interpretation is that, when I see a person with fists clenched, face red, shouting I AM NOT ANGRY! I am to take him at his word and assume that he is not in denial of his own emotional states. Why should I assume that relevant evidence to the contrary is to simply be dismissed?
You shouldn't

I simply meant, let's not include people like this who are unaware/in denial of their own emotional states because - imo - that only that confuses the issue. Let's assume we're talking about people who don't not claim not to be angry when they are obviously angry. I don't think we need to include them, do we?

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Also, these claims were made about subjectivists. The claim is that when you follow somebody who claims to be a subjectivist into a substantive moral argument, such as a debate over the proposition, "There should be a separation between church and state," they act in every way like people who hold that this is an objectively true claim and those who hold a contrary position are mistaken. They use the same types of evidence, employ the same types of arguments, and draw the same types of inferences.

In light of this, when they clench their fists and shout I AM NOT AN OBJECTIVIST, I think that it is perfectly legitimate to suggest that the evidence says otherwise.
Yes it is - but let's exclude these folks.

When we talk about subjectivists let's talk about people who really are subjectivists rather than de facto objectivists who claim otherwise.

Unless you are saying that all subjectivists are objectivists but don't realize it. If you think so then I'm happy to discuss that. But if not then let's limit this so that if we say 'subjectivists' we are talking about those who really are subjectivists.

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Last, would not say that subjectivists are "in denial," only that they have made a mistake. To be "in denial" the evidence against subjectivism must be so blatant and obvious that any who refuse to see it must be engaged in some sort of self-deception. Though I do not believe that subjectivists provide an accurate account of moral claims, I do not believe that the evidence against subjectivism is blatant and obvious.
So - are all subjectivists really objectivists then? I didn't think so. I think some people truly don't assume 'objective moral values' when they discuss issues. They truly mean 'this is my preference/this is what I think is best'. They may believe it strongly and back it up with evidence why they think what they do but nevertheless they don't claim it's 'objectively good' in some way that can be demonstrated.

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The purpose of my analogy was to simply illustrate a link between what a person claims is happening (even when talking about their own behavior) and what is happening in fact.
Ok, but I still want to know whether you are purporting to describe all subjectivists or only the less aware ones.

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I think I qualify, as long as you understand that I am a level-2 objectivists, and not a level-3 objectivist.
Is level 2 that the state of the world as it is gives rise to certain objective moral values i.e. they are tied into the way the world is, rather than being 'transcendent', as it were?

So - if 'murder is objectively wrong' it is so because of the way the world is. In a different world it might not be wrong because its objective wrongness is tied to the real world we live in. Is that what you mean by level 2 and not level 3?

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This is the wrong question. The right question is "Why should we make it that people who care about the well-being of others?"

(Or, alternatively, "Why should people care about preserving the separation of church and state?" or "Why should we cause people to have an aversion to torturing children?")

The practice of morality is the practice of causing people to have a certain set of desires and aversions. We pick the desires and aversion they SHOULD have according to the criteria of what desires and aversions will better allow people generally to live in harmony with others -- desires and aversions that will make people generally better off.
But that sounds subjective to me, not objective. If you pick what desires and aversions people should have then you are subjectively making the determination. If you say your choices are based on what's 'objectively right or wrong', how do you know what's objectively right or wrong?

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If a person is generally asking a question like, "Should I or should I not torture this child?" then the art of morality has already failed on that person. Morality aims at creating people who would never ask such a question.
But how do you know that torturing children is objectively wrong? How do you know that's not just your preference?

(I think it is but I don't see how you know it's objectively wrong)

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At this point, the only option left is to threaten any who we find acting contrary to how a good person would act. At this point, we leave the institution of morality and enter the institution of law. Yet, even here, the distinction between morality and law is not a clean break. It still makes sense to ask, "What laws would a person with good desires support?" If a good person has an aversion to mixing church and state, then a good person would be adverse to laws that mix church and state.
How do you define a 'good person' though?

[b]Maybe my real question is - if there's such a thing as 'objectively good', how can you be sure you've correctly understood what is objectively good? What if you're wrong? How do you know you don't have a defective 'detector of what is objectively good'?

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"Wanting stuff", while paying no attention to the "stuff" that is wanted, is not what I am talking about. I am talking about the distinction between good wants and bad wants. Good wants are wants that are harmonious with other wants, while bad wants are wants that generate conflict with other wants. The desire to rape is a bad want. A desire to protect children from those who would harm them is a good want.
Why is the desire to rape bad? And when you've given reasons, how do you know your reasoning is correct?

Why is the desire to protect children good? And when you've given reasons, how do you know your reasoning is correct?

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There is an objective right answer to the question of whether a want is good or bad.
Ok, that makes you an objectivist. But how do you know there is and how do you know you've ascertained the correct answer?

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Sure, what I want and you want are subjective(2). But moral claims are not assertions of what I want or you want. They are claims (ultimately) about what we (note, plural) should want.
But how do you know what we should want?

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Or, I should say, if you look at actual moral debates (over issues such as separation of church and state) it makes far more sense to see them as debates over what we should want then competing assertions about what each participant in the discussion does want.
I understand that, but how does each side know what we 'should' want? And how do they know they are correct?

Helen
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Old 04-18-2003, 07:29 AM   #22
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Originally posted by DRFseven
Pretty much for a lot of people, except that for many, there is a fallacy involved in that there is no logical reason to leap from acknowledging the presence of an instinct to asserting that the instinct is therefore something that should be furthered or that it should be an objective goal. Yes, I strive to live, but why does that mean I should live? It doesn't.
Ok - I am following you so far...

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Also, people don't actually do moral things out of a sense of hoping to enhance chances of survival; they do them because it feels right at the time to do them.
Yes, I understand that also.

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And finally, not everybody wants to survive all the time.
True - but, fwiw, I feel a moral obligation that when someone is not wanting to survive because they are mentally ill (clinically depressed), we should help them get better and see if they still don't want to live, rather than letting them commit suicide.

When someone is in chronic pain that cannot be alleviated and is not going to go away, then I have a hard time saying they must be kept alive regardless of their wishes.

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Helen: Ok - but what does it describe about something? What does it mean, that the something is 'good'? What additional information does that give us?

None. That's the nature of an objective good. It's like pointing the moon out to a toddler and saying, "That's the Moon!" What's "moon" about it? Nothing; we just decided it would be called "moon", and so it is the moon. "Moon" means that thing up there. "Good" describes that thing you were told was good; it's not good for any reason, as in the case of subjective goods.
But...I don't think most people would say 'good' is meaningless, because they surely have a reason and meaning in mind when they call something 'good'. It's not just 'a name'. It means and connotes something to them, surely.

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Exactly; good is a value judgement applied against a standard. In addition, many people understand that their parents instilled in them feelings of right and wrong that are attached to certain behaviors and they use the reasoning you mentioned above to justify and modify those feelings throughout their lives.
I see that. My question continues to be: how do those atheists who believe in an 'objectively correct/right mral standard' know that it's objective and how do they know they've correctly understood what the objective standard is?

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Old 04-18-2003, 07:32 AM   #23
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At this point, I think I can describe a couple of places where the objectivist/subjectivist debate goes astry.

When I enter into a moral argument, I am naturally going to enter with the assumption that what I do want and what we should want are the same thing. I do not want to hear that I am not a good person (that what I want is different from what we should want) and I am going to be resistant to any arguments against it.

Therefore, when one observes a moral argument, one is going to see a natural correlation between what each participant does value, and what each says we should value.

What the 2nd-level subjectivist does is turn this natural correlation into a law, and says that moral statements are nothing more than assertions about what each individual participant wants.

2nd-level subjectivism does, in fact, make sense of the correlation between moral claims and the values of each participant. However, it does not make sense of the debate itself, nor does it make sense of significant differences in the moral way that people the way people use moral statements compared to the way they use personal-preference statements.

2nd-level objectivism, on the other hand, can account for the correlation with personal preferences along with the phenomena of moral debate and the differences between moral claims and preference claims in common language. In this way, 2nd-level objectivism is a better moral theory.

Level-2 subjectivists can and do add epicycles upon epicycles to their theory in order to account for these differences. However, there comes a point where the weight of all of these complications and epicycles will cause the theory to collapse. At that point we are advised to switch from a "me-centered" theory of morality to an "us-centered" theory.

Another mistake that I think leads both objectivists and subjectivists astray is a false dichotomy. Many people see the debate between objectivism and subjectivism as a requirement that they adopt either 2nd-level subjectivism or 3rd-level objectivism.

2nd-level subjectivists look at the absurd ontology of the 3rd-level objectivists and say, "That can't be right, so 2nd-level subjectivism must be correct."

3rd-level objectivists look at the self-centeredness of 2nd-level subjectivism and say, "That can't be right, so 3rd-level objectivism must be correct."

I look at these and say, "A pox on both your houses. Each of you is correct in that the view you oppose has significant problems with it. Each of you is wrong in holding that the view you accept is the only alternative. A combination of 2nd-level Objectivism and 3rd-level Subjectivism handles all of the objections on both sides.

3nd-level subjectivsm/2rd-level objectivism holds that moral claims are not statements of the form "I like" or "I want", but statements about what it is best for US to want.
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Old 04-18-2003, 07:41 AM   #24
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Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
A combination of 2nd-level Objectivism and 3rd-level Subjectivism handles all of the objections on both sides.
Could you describe this combination for me? If you already did then please consider that you are recapping at this point . Like I said, I get very confused by this topic so I appreciate as much clarity and specificity as you are able to give.

Edited to add: actually is this it? You are saying the world being objectively the way it is makes some things objectively good. You are not saying they simply are objectively good...just...'because'...(or because God who is good says so, although I'm not talking about theists, really)

Analogy: you are saying that you have two sides of a triangle and the angle between and so the length of the third side is therefore defined/known to be x inches. You aren't saying "the length of side 3 just...'is' x inches'.

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Old 04-18-2003, 08:35 AM   #25
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Originally posted by HelenM
Could you describe this combination for me?
Level 3 subjectivity/objectivity concerns whether moral values are independent of any mental states. Level 3 subjectivity says that moral values depend on mental states, Level 3 objectivity holds that moral values are independent of mental states.

Level 2 subjectivity/objectivity concerns wither moral values are independent of the speaker's mental states. Level 2 subjectivity says that moral value depends on the speaker's mental states, level 2 objectivity says that moral values are independent of the speaker's mental states.

The combination of Level 3 subjectivity and Level 2 objectivity says that moral values are dependent on mental states, but not those of the speaker.

People who make moral claims are not making claims or who engage in moral arguments are not making claims or arguments about what is "good for me", but claims and having arguments about what is "good for us." -- depending on "our" desires, and not just those of the speaker.
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Old 04-18-2003, 11:04 AM   #26
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Originally posted by HelenM
True - but, fwiw, I feel a moral obligation that when someone is not wanting to survive because they are mentally ill (clinically depressed), we should help them get better and see if they still don't want to live, rather than letting them commit suicide.

When someone is in chronic pain that cannot be alleviated and is not going to go away, then I have a hard time saying they must be kept alive regardless of their wishes.
Of course, I agree, but my point was that survival cannot be the universal objective goal because at any point in time, there are those who do NOT want to survive and who actually end their own lives. They are certainly not being compelled by a survival instinct when they do that.

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But...I don't think most people would say 'good' is meaningless, because they surely have a reason and meaning in mind when they call something 'good'. It's not just 'a name'. It means and connotes something to them, surely.


That's because morality is a subjective affair, after all. People learn to believe that things are right and wrong, and, often, they learn that it's wrong to believe that morality could be subjective. They learn that morals based on opinions can't be right because what is good is objectively good. They take their internalized feelings of right and wrong as evidence that knowledge of good and bad "is born" or "comes naturally".

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I see that. My question continues to be: how do those atheists who believe in an 'objectively correct/right mral standard' know that it's objective and how do they know they've correctly understood what the objective standard is?


The same way that theist objectivists know; they can just tell.
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Old 04-18-2003, 11:12 AM   #27
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Originally posted by DRFseven
Of course, I agree, but my point was that survival cannot be the universal objective goal because at any point in time, there are those who do NOT want to survive and who actually end their own lives. They are certainly not being compelled by a survival instinct when they do that.
Ah, but couldn't an objectivist say that those who do not want to survive have an impaired whatever-it-is that causes everyone else to want to survive. How can you prove otherwise?

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That's because morality is a subjective affair, after all. People learn to believe that things are right and wrong, and, often, they learn that it's wrong to believe that morality could be subjective. They learn that morals based on opinions can't be right because what is good is objectively good. They take their internalized feelings of right and wrong as evidence that knowledge of good and bad "is born" or "comes naturally".
Are you saying this is circular reasoning?

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The same way that theist objectivists know; they can just tell.
Actually, theist objectivists know because God reveals it to them

But, how do they know it was God revealing it to them? They can just tell

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Old 04-18-2003, 11:14 AM   #28
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Originally posted by Alonzo Fyfe
The combination of Level 3 subjectivity and Level 2 objectivity says that moral values are dependent on mental states, but not those of the speaker.
Don't you mean "...dependent on mental states including those of the speaker"? Why is the speaker excluded?

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Old 04-18-2003, 12:19 PM   #29
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Double post, sorry.
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Old 04-18-2003, 12:21 PM   #30
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Originally posted by HelenM
Don't you mean "...dependent on mental states including those of the speaker"? Why is the speaker excluded?

Helen
Actually, you are correct. The speaker is not excluded. Yet, the speaker's desires make up only a small portion of the whole set, such that including or excluding the speaker's mental states has a minimum effect on the whole.
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