HelenM

I'd like to understand this position better. I find it very confusing to think about. I don't think I even am sure what it is.

I was going to ask specific questions but I think I am too confused to do that yet. So could I start by asking someone to define it for me please?

Feel free to post links (to articles or other threads) that are relevant - preferably concise, well-written and easy to understand ones

Helen

Alonzo Fyfe

The problem is, asking for "the atheist position" is a bit of a presumption.

It is like asking for "the atheist position" on the evolution of humans. These types of issues are a matter of looking at the available evidence and drawing conclusions, with some disagreement over what conclusions are best supported by the evidence.

Many atheists do not support the idea of an objective ethics. Like God, they argue that an examination of the way the universe works does not support the claim that there exists such a thing.

Where "objective morality" is understood to mean "intrinsic moral value," I share that view.

Others argue that an "objective morality" can be deduced by reason from an examination of the universe. We can deduce that life has intrinsic value in a way similar to the way we can deduce that there are black holes.

Personally, I think that there is some confusion over the concept of "objective morality." The way some subjectivists use the term, "Jim has a belief that the earth is round" is not an objective statement because it is talking about Jim's beliefs. Yet, other than its subject matter, it is no less objective than a statement like "Jim has a broken leg." To call the belief statement "subjective" while the broken leg statement is called "objective" simply makes no sense to me.

It confuses the whole issue of whether morality can be "objective" or "subjective".

By the way, religious ethics is no different. Though people often talk about an objective religious ethic, in fact it is difficult (if not impossible) to find two theists in perfect agreement over how to account for, or what is contained within, this theistic objective ethic.

Ensign Steve

Helen,

Maybe you will find some of the material in this thread helpful. Specifically, some of the replies on page two from myself, Alonzo Fyfe, and especially jlowder.

jlowder said two things that really struck a chord with me:

and

These quotes look a little funky out of context, but if you have the patience to read the thread, I think they will make sense. It's only two pages, anyway.

Good luck! I hope you find what you're looking for.

Pyrrho

It might be useful to think about this in the opposite way:

Suppose that you know what a god wants (i.e., you know a god's will). What do you need to know before this information about a god could give you knowledge of what is good? Won't you need to know that the god is good in order to know that what the god wants is good? If you know that that god is good, you must already know what it is to be good. (If you don't know what it is to be good, how could you know whether that god is good or not?) If you already know what it is to be good, then you don't need god (or anyone else) to tell you what goodness is.

The above is, more or less, Plato/Socrates' reasoning from the Euthyphro.

Basically, whether there is a god or not is irrelevant to ethics.

HelenM

Ensign Steve,

Thanks - 'objective moral truths are out there to be discovered' is an interesting idea.

If you believe some things to be intrinsically 'good', can you define 'good' for me?

And thanks to everyone who responded so far for the other comments; yes, I understand that "Jim thinks such-and-such is wrong" describes Jim possibly having a subjective morality (but maybe not - maybe he thinks it's intrinsically wrong) but the statement is an objective statement of fact about Jim's thoughts. I did get that far

I think I'm confused over how those who believe in objective morality define 'good'.

Helen

Alonzo Fyfe

Actually, disagreements between different theories are disagreements over which theory best defines terms such as "good".

A theory is a package of definitions, and competition between theories is a competition over which package of definitions best explains and predicts accounts in the real world.

So, the fact is, people with different objective moral theories have different definitions of good.

For example, I argue that good describes obectively true statements about relationships between states of affairs and desires. Recall my earlier argument that statements about mental states are as objective as statements about broken bones.

Different definitions of good are distinguished by three criteria:

(1) Which desires are relevant in this particular evaluation.
(2) What type of relationships are relevant.
(3) What states of affairs are being evaluated.

The word "health" is a value-laden word that describes the relationship between some part of physical or mental functioning and relates it to the desires of the agent. We can tell objectively if a person is healthy or sick.

"Moral good", I argue, ultimately evaluates desires according to their relationship to all other desires. A desire is good if it is compatible with the fulfillment of all other desires; bad (evil) if it is in conflict with all other desires.

Somebody who defends a different theory will offer a different "package of definitions" and argue that his package better explains and predicts events in the real world than my "package of definitions."

Consequently, objectivists do not share a common definition of "good".

HelenM

Thanks for your response .

Regarding what I quoted above: but, aren't desires often in conflict? When they are, which desires are considered pre-eminent?

Moreover, why do you consider 'good' simply in terms of 'desire'? Does 'desire' pre-empt 'necessity' in determining 'good'? [It's a long shot, but] suppose I want you to give me all your money and you are willing, but you need the money yourself, would it be 'good' for you to give it to me? I don't see that it would although it would meet your desire criteria, wouldn't it?

Helen

Alonzo Fyfe

I have two disclaimers to offer first.

(1) The theory that I defend is one option among many, and any problems that may be found in this view does not entail that all other views are similarly flawed. So, this would not be a test of objective morality per se, but simply one example of an objective morality.

(2) Because I reduce moral claims to claims about desires, some would object to my even saying that this is an "objective" theory at all. Anything that reduces value claims to claims about brain states is a "subjective" theory. I have given my objection to this claim above -- statements about brain states are as objective as statements about broken legs -- but others would still object that "this is not what 'objective morality' means.

Now:

Yes, desires can be in conflict. This is how good desires are distinguished from bad desires. Good desires generate less conflict than bad desires. A desire to help others is a good desire, a desire to rape others is a bad desire. When desires conflict, we look for the desire that generates the least conflict over all (all things considered, not just in this instance).

A desire to give you ALL of my money would, in fact, be a desire that generates a great deal of conflict all things considered, It would come into conflict with (e.g., my desire to eat, to have shelter). Indeed, I might even have more money to give you if I took some of that money and invested it (e.g., in a business or in my education).

Such a desire would not be good.

But a more moderate desire -- a desire that I give to those who most need it a portion of the surplus that I may have after my own desires are fulfilled for the most part -- would be the least conflicting.

In my case, I invest 25% of my income so that, when I die, I can leave it to an institution that will promote criticial thinking (teaching logic) to Junior High School children. I believe that this is the most charitable act that I can perform because, no matter what problems future generations will face, they can deal with those problems better if they know how to think clearly.

HelenM

Granted.

Yes - that's one reason I'm confused. After all 'desire' is inherently a subjective thing isn't it?

I don't think anyone disagrees that someone's feelings/desires can be stated/established/verified as a matter of objective fact, do they? So I don't see how that alone can constitute 'objective morality'. People who believe in subjective morality presumably would agree that the fact of them having certain subjective opinions/feelings about morality is an objective one.

If desires are 'objective' then I think the 'objective morality' dilemma has merely been translated into an 'objective desires' dilemma.

Ok, so moral decisions are made by minimizing conflicting desires. How do you know your desires are 'objective'? If not then the result of minimizing them will vary from person to person, won't it? And so the resulting moral decisions will be subjective, won't they?

Fair enough .

I'm in favor of promoting critical thinking also.

take care
Helen

Alonzo Fyfe

I agree that there is a lot of room in this area for confusion.

If one holds that desires are subjective, but that statements about desires are objective, then one relevant question about an objective morality concerns whether a person making a moral claim are simply expressing their feelings (the way that a person may wrinkle their nose at the smell of cooked liver), or making a statement about some type of objective, knowable relationship in the world.

Subjective(1) vs. Objective(1): Emotivists hold to the first theory, that moral claims are nothing more than grunts of approval or disapproval. The problem with emotivism is that it leaves little room for debate. If you are eating liver and onions, and I am turning my nose up at it, what do we have to debate about? Yet, people routinely engage in moral debate, and if you read through any debate they take themselves to be disputing a matter of objective fact. This suggests that those people making moral claims are not simply offering emotes but at least take themselves to be making objective statements, even if they are merely statements about desires.

Subjective(2) vs. Objective(2): Even if we take moral claims to be objective claims about desires, we still have room for a second "subjectivist/objectivist" distinction. The subjectivist in this sense holds that moral claims are claims about the agent's own desires -- that the person making the claim is making a statement about what he or she sees value in. The objectivist in this sense holds that moral claims are not claims about his or her own desires, but about a broader set of desires most of which are not his. In other words, the subjectivist in this sense holds that "X is right" means "X is good for me," while the objectivist holds that "X is right" means "X is good for all of us, all things considered." Relative to the speaker, the first example is subjective (because it is a claim about the agent's desires only), where the second is objective (because it is a claim about things that are substantially external to the speaker, namely the desires of others.

Subjective(3) vs. Objective(3): Of course, there is the third classic distinction between "subjective" and "objective" where "subjective" means "having to do with mental states" and "objective" means "independent of mental states." Note that this is not far from the previous distinction where "subjective" means "having to do with the speaker's mental states" and "objective" means "independent of the speaker's mental states." Because of the similarity between these two definitions it is easy to get them confused.

So, when you ask about an "objective morality" one does have to start asking, "What do you mean by objective?"

I believe in an Objective(1) morality (moral claims are not grunts of approval and disapproval but are substantive expressions about the world)

I believe in an Objecitive(2) morality (moral claims are claims about interests other than the interests of the person making the claim; morality is a social invention that concerns 'us' and not just 'me').

I do not believe in an Objective(3) morality (moral claims that are not claims about at least SOMEBODY'S interests and desires refer to nothing in the real world).