Kip

I have argued about freedom on this message board earlier. Since then I have read more books and digested the issue futher. I wrote an essay about my current position on the controversy and you can read that essay here:

http://www.ece.utexas.edu/~werking/determinism.htm

Comments are welcome.

Nowhere357

Holding my breath takes effort, and is an application of my free will. Eventually I will need to breath regardless of will; that does negate the fact that will was applied in the first place.

"For example, the man may be able to resist his secretary regardless of whether or not he is wearing a blue or red shirt, but he may be unable to resist if his bloodstream contains more testosterone that day, or if the secretary wears an especially flattering dress. But how can his ability to resist her in that other world be relevant to the question of whether or not he is free to resist her in this world? The man's ability to resist his secretary, in all of these worlds, is a function of testosterone, or perfume, or fashion, or mood, but never will."

Here you seem to acknowledge that the man DOES HAVE the ability to resist - and that ability is affected by things like testosterone.

I like the thought experiments. The first one (with men A,B,C) does seem to point to hard determinism. Man C is "forced" to do X down the road. In that case, his free will is seen to be illusory. However, I don't see the logic in saying that therefore ALL application of will is therefore illusory; only that some is (which we already know).

The robot thought experiment is also very good. You say "At some point A will seem to be conscious, whether or not A truly is conscious, or has a subjective experience of observation, is irrelevant to this argument." If I accept this premise, then I think your conclusion follows. I submit that the only way to tell if a robot is conscious, is if it demonstrates free will! If a robot is conscious but has no free will, then there is no way to demonstrate that it's conscious, and its consciousness is of no meaning.

Hard determinism denies that man is (can be) responsible for his actions. You say "I maintain that this feeling of freedom is a subtle illusion that results from the heterogeneous nature of the human brain and that those who feel insecure about the consequences of scientific materialism mythologize this illusion into a false doctrine." First, by theory, the poor guy has no choice! Second, I think denial of free will is denial of moral responsibilty. Yikes!

When I look out to the world, I agree your position holds. There is another direction to look, however - inward, to the subjective world we are all aware of. It's clear to me that I make choices all the time. I see no difference in assuming that my free will is illusion, than in assuming my body is illusion.

I enjoyed the article, and appreciate the opportunity to respond.

Now Here

Kip

"Holding my breath takes effort, and is an application of my free will. Eventually I will need to breath regardless of will; that does negate the fact that will was applied in the first place."

There is freedom of action. My essay discusses freedom of the will, both external and internal. I agree entirely that humans can possess freedom of action and that this freedom can be denied (for example if I handcuff your arm). But freedom of the will seems to be a more subtle and profound notion than this. Philosophers do not usually think of "free will" as being something that a person may or may not have depending upon physical restraint, but rather as a inherent and unique quality of human beings. Most compatibilists dispute this definition but now, of course, the dispute becomes semantics.

"Here you seem to acknowledge that the man DOES HAVE the ability to resist - and that ability is affected by things like testosterone. "

But I never denied that a man may possess the ability to deny his secretary. Obviously the fact that men often do resist demonstrates the ridiculousness of this statement. Indeed, a man will always either resist or submit. What I am denying is that the man has the ability to do BOTH.

"The robot thought experiment is also very good. You say "At some point A will seem to be conscious, whether or not A truly is conscious, or has a subjective experience of observation, is irrelevant to this argument." If I accept this premise, then I think your conclusion follows. I submit that the only way to tell if a robot is conscious, is if it demonstrates free will! If a robot is conscious but has no free will, then there is no way to demonstrate that it's conscious, and its consciousness is of no meaning. "

That, apparently, is the most controversial statement in the essay and I was simply too lazy to provide an argument. The tacit assumption, which I feel must be true, is epiphenomenalism, the thesis that consciousness is a product of the brain. Given epiphenomenalism, subjective consciousness is a purely subjective window through which the agent experiences the world. I maintain that this purely passive quality is irrelevant to the question of freedom of the will.

"Hard determinism denies that man is (can be) responsible for his actions. You say "I maintain that this feeling of freedom is a subtle illusion that results from the heterogeneous nature of the human brain and that those who feel insecure about the consequences of scientific materialism mythologize this illusion into a false doctrine." First, by theory, the poor guy has no choice! Second, I think denial of free will is denial of moral responsibilty. Yikes!"

That is a fair enough criticism. This is a question of psychology as much as philosophy. Whose motives are more questionable? I do not pretend to hide my denial of MORAL responsibility but I do maintain that a notion of responsibility, that is relevant to deterrents, is both necessary and just.

"When I look out to the world, I agree your position holds. There is another direction to look, however - inward, to the subjective world we are all aware of. It's clear to me that I make choices all the time. I see no difference in assuming that my free will is illusion, than in assuming my body is illusion."

Human intuition and common sense are notoriously fallible guides for life. You say that you do not recognize a difference between denying free will and the existence of your body. I recognize a tremendous difference. But I am sure how I could argue that point?

jpbrooks

Hello Kip! Nice essay.

Though I am a determinist, I am not a hard one. Nevertheless, I agree with you on our "feeling of freedom of the 'will'" being a kind of "illusion" that results from our limited awareness of all of the factors that determine/influence the choices we make.

However, I'm not certain that the examples in your essay provide overwhelming support for the "hard" version of determinism.

For instance, in the example concerning the man and his secretary, suppose we alter the situation so that instead of having one secretary, we give her two or three more identical sisters and dress all of the sisters in identical seductive outfits. Furthermore, we can stipulate that all of the secretary's identical sisters will behave the same way that the secretary behaves, but none of the women will speak to the man until he chooses one of them to (let's say) "date". Now, according to hard determinism, as you have described it, the man should be unable to make a choice as to which woman to date because all of the determinants of his choice that are relevant to hard determinism, for each woman, are apparently equal. No one woman has any relevant feature that would make her more attractive to the man than any of her sisters. Yet, it seems unlikely that a "normal" human being would be unable to make a choice in that situation.
Thus, in the thought experiment where:

"C is manipulated exactly as B was except that the manipulators were not malicious brain surgeons but the external environment of the fetus changing according to the laws of nature._ In this context our intuition may be that X is not responsible for X, and yet sufficient conditions for responsibility, according to the compatibilist, were satisfied." ...,

the fetus' ability to choose alternatives without regard to their possession of qualities that would normally influence or determine the fetus' choice(s) (as the man in my altered version of your example above making a choice from among his secretary and her identical sisters), is what will eventually make the fetus morally responsible for his or her actions.

In the thought experiment involving the robot, to move from providing all of the embellishments that we know how to give the robot to make it make choices in the same manner that a living human being would, to an atom by atom replacement of the robot's atomic structure with that of a human, is to make a tremendous "leap" that skips over any possible differences between nonliving mechanisms and living conscious brains that would give conscious brains the power of "self determination".

King's Indian

Hello, Kip. Interesting essay.
I'll take some time to digest it, in order to see if I can think of any questions good enough for it. In the meantime, I'm interested to hear your thoughts on how you personally apply your position in everyday life. As an example: do you, once you've finished such an essay, disown it as a consequence of a rigorously circumscribed interaction between your body (inc. brain) and your environment? (We may take names, personal pronouns etc. as convenient fictions no less mechanically generated). As a matter of fact, surely you can take no pleasure in the many compliments that I’m sure your essay will attract. Of course, it will make you feel good, but your warm glow will have to be rigorously disallowed as anything other than the whistle of a steam engine. There are deeper points than this: how do you incorporate a sense of responsibility, particularly for those who seem to lack such, and get up to all sorts of self-gratifying nastiness? One, after all, can't judge the moral value between different types of clocks.
Take care,
KI

Keith Russell

Kip:

If hard determinism is 'true', there would be no way for you to verify whether you're a hard determinist because it's the correct viewpoint--

--or simply because you had no choice but to be one.

Keith.

Nowhere357

Kip,

"There is another direction to look, however - inward, to the subjective world we are all aware of. It's clear to me that I make choices all the time. I see no difference in assuming that my free will is illusion, than in assuming my body is illusion."

"Human intuition and common sense are notoriously fallible guides for life. You say that you do not recognize a difference between denying free will and the existence of your body. I recognize a tremendous difference. But I am sure how I could argue that point?"


IMO these two statements capture the "heart" of the issue between them.

The notion of looking "inward" is key. I said there is "no difference between denying my free will, and denying my body." Your reply is that you see a huge difference. I agree! That is looking "outward". I see the same huge difference, as I try to understand the world. The "free will" of all others can be seen as "illusion" (when I look outward). MY free will, however, I can "directly access", and I can no longer see it as "illusion" (when I look inward).

Both viewpoints (subjective and objective) are valid. Note that science itself has no meaning without the subjective viewpoint. Knowledge requires a knower. Therefore, my perception of free will is at least as valid as my perception of body.

Actually, the body IS "illusion"! My body was scattered everywhere before I was concieved; size, volume, mass, shape, all variable; O2 in, CO2 out, etc. etc., I am physically different every moment; and after death my body again is scattered everywhere. All boundaries seem imposed by the mind. So does the "body" exist?
Does the body exist? I have one, so Yes.
Does the will exist? I have one, so Yes.

I don't see how calling either one an "illusion" furthers understanding. People make moral decisions all the time, and their decisions affect the physical world.

You said "There is freedom of action. My essay discusses freedom of the will, both external and internal. I agree entirely that humans can possess freedom of action and that this freedom can be denied (for example if I handcuff your arm). But freedom of the will seems to be a more subtle and profound notion than this. Philosophers do not usually think of "free will" as being something that a person may or may not have depending upon physical restraint, but rather as a inherent and unique quality of human beings. Most compatibilists dispute this definition but now, of course, the dispute becomes semantics."

"Looking inward" again resolves things for me (I mean, looking at the problem from both viewpoints). I see "freedom of action" and "freedom of will" as requiring each other. Semantics I guess.

Thanks for your patience!

John Page

But a man may think and in his thinking affect his testosterone levels - there are some feedback loops involved here. Furthermore, the man may deliberately expose himself to arousal materials (porn?) knowing full well his likely behavior.
By holding a man responsible for his actions, society requires he beahve in a way that will not breach the rules of civilized behavior. In this way, the societal rules form part of the behavioral feedback loop.

I think this points in the direction of soft determinism. You might be interested to look for mechanisms that balance out "purely deterministic" effects and enable our actions to enter the realm of decision making, rational or not.

Cheers, John

Kip

This is a very interesting experiment. I do not think that this example undermines my conclusions, however, for at least two possible reasons.

1. You seem to commit the same fallacy I mention in my essay by regarding human beings as perfectly rational beings who only consider relevant differences while deciding. This is not the case. Not only may a man prefer one woman to another because she is prettier, he may also prefer her because the weather was somewhat more humid, or because he saw her in his peripheral vision first, or for any number of irrelevant reasons. Indeed, the vast majority of this considerations are unconscious. This must be the case, or how else would a human being produce apparently random output? If a human being knows that two outputs are equally likely, there is no relevant reason to choose one over the other, and yet humans have the remarkable ability to do so? How does the human accomplish such a fantastic task? Irrelevant difference and unconscious decision processes (whims or flights of fancy) are responsible and not some mystical "free will".

2. That criticism may be missing the point. You might respond by suggesting that not only were the relevant differences the same but ALSO irrelevant differences. Indeed, assume that the conditions for both choices are mathematically identical and further than the human has absolute equal knowledge of both. This is the same point that Aristotle's "a donkey would starve before choicing between two equidistant meals" illustrates. My first response to this suggestion is that these conditions are vanishingly improbable. This situation simply never exists. If you were to press me and ask, "but what if it did", my response would be that this would be singularity. The situation in which a rational agent must choose between two perfectly equal choices is like asking a computer to divide by zero. Perhaps the man would simply be paralyzed and refuse to do so. Perhaps the universe would come to a halt. I do not know.

What possible differences might these be?

Kip

Your reply suggests a bunch of adverse consequences that simply do not follow from my conclusions. The compatilist literature provides a good response to these.

Here is a quotion from an essay about ethics I have written that should explain how hard determinism affects my concepts of responsibility and punishment: