NialScorva

Keep in mind that I'm an amature who hasn't really looked at philosophy much (other than the moderation of this board, of course) in at least 6 months, so I very possibly could be wrong in my interpretations. Which of course, is why I'm posting it.

Most of the philosophy I've read has been by these three guys, so I probably link them more than they are actually linked. Hume tends to be biased to the epistemology of one, looking internally to explore what we know. Wittgenstein hit the problem from the other end-- the epsitemology of many-- where knowledge is only possible based upon an exchange between people. That exchange is the language that forms the fabric in which knowledge is woven. What I thought was neat about Quine was that in Word and Object, he offered what seemed to me to be a reinterpretation of Hume's idea/impression distinction as a way of building the fabric of language, and how that fabric subtly differs from individual to individual. The indeterminancy of translation is not just a cross-language barrier, but it's also a cross-individual barrier.

James Still

Ok, I see what you mean. Definitely both Hume and Wittgenstein are skeptical of the truths of reason and they each sought to clarify the process of belief-formation. There is an important difference between them that I think should be noted. Hume (a product of the Enlightenment) sought to explain why we believed the things we do. Wittgenstein (firmly postmodern) felt that we cannot explain beliefs only describe them.

Yes, I can see what you mean. The modernists seemed really wrapped up in problems of identity, impressions, and ideas and it wasn't until Pierce really that the distinction between signs and their objects came about. In that sense, Quine was able to solve a lot of the problems that plagued Hume by just examining the logic of the language itself. Hume wondered how a thing could be identical to itself (since wouldn't that require two copies of the thing, which are distinct?) Today we would think it really bizarre to worry about such a thing. We all agree that "=" is an identity sign describing a relationship between signs and not objects. The identity does not signify equality between things but rather equality between the signs themselves, which are not existent objects. That's why all of this fuss over how 1/3 + 2/3 can equal 1 is a nonstarter. But Walrus should take comfort in the knowledge that he is in good company. Whitehead, Frege, and many others were similarly bewitched by the thought that we're here comparing three distinct objects rather than abstract signs in relation to one another.

abe smith

[Opinion:} NOTHing is identical to ANYthing else! I have no idea what the Professionals may have to say or have-said, on this score. OI tell you. {This probably owes to my calling -sic- myself a Nominalist and a Biologist. A pretty snarl of oxymoron... T.e. A Nominalist can't CALL hisself a Nominalist, can "e? A canner can't can a can , can he?} Abe

John Page

They could be, but we wouldn't be able to tell them apart (by definition).

I find it curious that I can reach this conclusion by applying axioms of logic that essentially state what you just did. i.e. If you apply them to themselves, a contradicion arises.

Cheers, John