Pomp

Alonzo,

Malaclypse has already dealt with the majority of my objections to your position as it applies to the example of the witness-killing thief, but I'd like to raise one additional issue: It still seems to me that you have failed to provide a non-circular reason for anyone to act on moral-oughts.

When asked how your conception of a moral-ought can have any real effect you stated:

The problem is that "good" and "evil," as you are using them here are defined by a moral theory. Prior to the theory, they have no meaning. On a practical level, of course we all judge what is good and bad for ourselves, but we can't identify "good" and "evil" in the abstract without some moral framework. You are claiming that people would adopt your particular conception of the framework out of an existing desire to promote or thwart ideas defined by the framework. How is this possible?

Of course, many of the "goods" defined by your framework are things that people really do want to promote for practical reasons and many of the "evils" are things that many people do prefer to avoid for practical reasons but, in these cases, it is the practical reasoning that acts as the motive, not the moral reasoning. People would want to promote or avoid these things even if the framework did not exist.

You have made one attempt at answering this that I have seen, and I apologize if I have missed any other answers you may have given. Your answer was that there will always be peopel in a group who desire to promote morality because their own reasons are being excluded by the non-moral-judgements of the goup as a whole. This is a practical reason to prefer moral actions, however, and therefore, moral-ought remains ineffective as a motivator.

Alonzo Fyfe

I will have more to add later on the other points, but I thought I would get this one out of the way.

I can give no such example because there are none. Your brain is the only entity with desires attached to your arm, and there is no way that your arm will move (in any way that makes it meaningfully true that you moved your arm) except as a consequence of your desires.

Your actions spring from your beliefs and your desires and nothing more. It would be a strange universe indeed if there were other entities in existence that could cause you to act in a particular way -- that would still allow you to call the action your action -- without working through your beliefs and desires.

No such entity exists. And any theory that requires the existence of such an entity should be hunted down and shot before it does real damage.

If you interpret anything I write as even hinting at such an entity or power, you either need to (1) come up with a different interpretation, or (2) demonstrate that every possible interpretation requires such an entity or power.

[ March 22, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Pomp

Alonzo,

In light of your most recent post to Malaclypse, I would like to ask what possible real world relevance your system can have if there is no situation in which an agent would comply with a moral-ought in the absense of a preexisting identical practical-ought.

Alonzo Fyfe

I should state that I have no fondness for intuitionism.

The process seems to assume that rights acts and good moral character release some sort of moral radiation, that people can detect these "goodons" and "badons" by clearning their mind and sitting in a calm meditative state contemplating the act or character trait in question.

Sounds like something to expect at the Psychic Friends Network.

All we are detecting in fact when we use this method are our own likes and dislikes. To use this as a measure of the accuracy of any theory is like telling a doctor, "I don't want to have cancer, therefore your diagnosis must be incorrect."

Besides, concerning your specific example of slavery -- you say it is counter-intuitive, yet it provides a plausible justification for the practices of taxation and conscription -- both of which happen to be similar enough to slavery. We just don't give it that name because 'slavery' has come to have such a bad rap.

We do, as a society, enslave people when the reasons that exist for slavery exceed the reasons that exist against it. And we do tell the slaves (the conscripts, the tax payers) that they have nothing to complain about.

Pomp

Alonzo Fyfe,

I should state that I have no fondness for intuitionism.

Actually, neither do I. I apologize for giving the impression that we should judge a moral system based upon how well it conforms to our intuitions. I did not intend to give that impression. I am more used to debating those who do judge a moral system based upon how well it conforms to their intuition. Believe me, I spend much of my time in this forum fielding charges that my own moral thinking does not match others' intuitive grasp of morality.

I would however, like to ask you to address the non-intuitionist point in my post. Contrary to your statement that the individuals whose reasons are being excluded in practical-ought-judgements have reason to promote moral-ought-judgements, I believe I have demonstrated that those individuals actually have the least reason to promote moral-ought-judgements under your system.

Besides, concerning your specific example of slavery -- you say it is counter-intuitive, yet it provides a plausible justification for the practices of taxation and conscription -- both of which happen to be similar enough to slavery. We just don't give it that name because 'slavery' has come to have such a bad rap.

I disagree vehemently that taxation and slavery are even remotely similar. Taxation is a fee levied upon those who benefit from a social organization to provide for the upkeep on that organization. Slavery is a more drastic "fee" levied upon those who do not benefit from a social organization to provide for the upkeep of that organization. The tax payer is, to a great extent, serving his own interest by paying taxes, while the slave is by no means serving his own interest.

The same applies to conscription, although the "fee" is higher than it is regarding taxation.

Alonzo Fyfe

Note: The following quotes have been edited to make them shorter. I hope I also preserved the original intent.

Not necessarily. To say that a person has a reason to do X does not mean that they have no reasons not to do X.


Correct.

All of the details would take too many megabytes. I can provide two quick examples that capture the bulk of the concept.

First, how do you weigh the differing, competing desires in your own mind when you make a decision? Now, imagine that you have all of the desires that exist. Your practical-ought under this assumption would be the same as the moral-ought in the real world.

Second, consider vector forces as an example. One force pushes an item to the right at 3 meters per second squared, another pushes it to the left at 5 meters per second squared. The result, the object moves to the left at 2 meters per second squared. Combining desires is similar to vector-adding forces.

All desires are morall relevant, just as all forces are relevant in a vector sum adding on a body. The fact that a force is outweighed by forces heading in the opposite direction does not mean that it ceases to exist.

Malaclypse the Younger

Alonzo Fyfe

Since I know these desires directly, I can know their relative importance directly.

If they are in conflict, I can choose, or I can deal with them paraconsistently. The human mind has an apparantly unlimited ability to remain functional even in the presence of an internal contradiction.

That's another good way--add another dimension and try to look for a vector-sum solution. I can sometimes have my cake and eat it to, with the proper definition of "have" and "eat".

Pomp

Alonzo,

Not necessarily. To say that a person has a reason to do X does not mean that they have no reasons not to do X.

All right. Can you describe how you are using the phrase "promote morality," then?

All of the details would take too many megabytes. I can provide two quick examples that capture the bulk of the concept.

First, how do you weigh the differing, competing desires in your own mind when you make a decision? Now, imagine that you have all of the desires that exist. Your practical-ought under this assumption would be the same as the moral-ought in the real world.

Second, consider vector forces as an example. One force pushes an item to the right at 3 meters per second squared, another pushes it to the left at 5 meters per second squared. The result, the object moves to the left at 2 meters per second squared. Combining desires is similar to vector-adding forces.

OK, I think I understand that.

Is my analysis of the slave-owning society correct, then, as it seems to me that it is? Is it fair to say that the slaves moral-ought to quit griping and get to work? WHat does this do to your argument that those whose reasons are excluded from practical-ought-judgements have reason to "promote morality," whatever you mean by that.

All desires are morall{y} relevant, just as all forces are relevant in a vector sum adding on a body. The fact that a force is outweighed by forces heading in the opposite direction does not mean that it ceases to exist.

All right. Is it fait to say that, when a 9 out of 10 individuals have reason to prefer A and the remaining individual has reason to prefer B, and when A and B are mutually exclusive, that A is the moral choice?

Alonzo Fyfe

I disagree vehemently with your vehement disagreement.

Or, actually, I must ask if you are using a question-begging definition of slavery which means 'immoral involuntary servitude' -- in which case your real question is not: "Is slavery justified." It is "What counts as slavery?" And taxation and conscription may be ruled out.

But if your definition of slavery is the morally neutral "involuntary servitude" (servitude that goes against the desires of the person performing the service), then taxation and conscription do count as slavery -- they are both enforced at the point of a gun. It just happens to be justified by the greater reasons that exist for requiring the service.

A definition of slavery as "unjustified involuntary servitude" makes a great deal of sense. Slavery can easy be understood as an institution of servitude where the desires of the person forced into service are considered irrelevant to the moral calculation -- that is, the slave is treated as a means only, a mere tool without morally relevant reasons. Of course, this would be wrong by definition under the system I have proposed and nothing -- but nothing -- can make it right.

[ March 23, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Malaclypse the Younger

Alonzo Fyfe

It is ludicrous to equate taxation and slavery. They are clearly different. However, that they are different does not necessarily imply that taxation is thus good.

Equation through similarity (X and Y have some similarity, therefore they are the same) is a fallacious argument, whether moral or nonmoral.

In the moral argument, you have to prove that the similarity itself is morally objectionable, not merely that X and Y are similar, X is objectionable therefore Y is objectionable.

Argue as you will against taxation, but argue well. Simply comparing taxation to slavery on the basis of coercion alone is inept and ridiculous, unless you are an anarchist and believe it is equally immoral to enforce contracts or social standards like the prohibition of murder. Remember the comparison is inept because it relies on the presence of coercion alone and thus contradicts other situations where you (presumably) would argue for coercion.

Coercion itself is justifiable (or, from the subjectivist POV agreed-up in some circumstances). Therefore, to argue against taxation, you cannot simply argue that it is coercive. You must argue that 1) the coercion is somehow different from the coercion applied in cases where we agree it it warranted and 2) I myself (or your readership in general) benefit from treating that objective difference ethically.

Merely declaring that you object to a certain kind of coercion is no more persuasive than declaring that you hate vanilla ice cream. You must show that I either do already object but don't realize it (perhaps because I am unaware of the consequences) or it is in my benefit to object.

[ March 23, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]</p>