Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Calzaer :

Then he's not omnipotent, because there's a bring-about-able state of affairs he'll never be able to perform.

Well, that's some nice argument by assertion, but I haven't seen any reasons to believe it's no longer a limitation on his omnipotence. Why don't you present your definition of omnipotence for scrutiny?

long winded fool

It sounds like the only way to create a contradiction in omnipotence is to reject it, posit a bring-about-able state of affairs strictly independent of omnipotence, and then accept omnipotence and point out the inconsistency. The creation of a rock that its creator cannot lift can never be a bring-about-able state of affairs if the creator is assumed omnipotent. Since omnipotence is necessarily absent in the statement "A being that can create an object too large for it to lift is a bring-about-able state of affairs," this cannot apply to an omnipotent being. This is not a limit and therefore omnipotence can still exist.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by long winded fool :

I have a question. Either the following is a bring-about-able state of affairs, or it isn't. Please tell me which: "A rock is created, the creator of which cannot lift."

Bring-about-able or not?

mattdamore

I was under the impression that the question 'can God make a rock so big that He can't lift it' was a non-sensical question, since it posits an action which is logically impossible for an omnipotent being to do. This isn't to say that all omnipotence means is being able to do everything which is logically possible (a la McEar). Only that a sensible substratum to a good definition of omnipotence not being able to do anything which is logically impossible.

The explication of the contradiction inherent in the question shall be put here in the words of Norman Geisler (posted as a spring-board for discussion): It is actually impossible to make a stone so heavy it cannot be moved. What an omnipotent Being can make, he can move. A finite creature cannot be more powerful in its resistance than the infinite Creator is in his power not to be resisted. If God brought it into existence, he can take it out of existence. Then he could recreate it somwhere else. Therefore, there is no contradiction in believing that God is omnipotent and that he can do anything that is possible to do.

God cannot literally do anything. He can only do what is possible to do consistent with his being as God. He cannot do what is logically or actually impossible. God cannot do some things. He cannot cease being God. He cannot contradict his own nature (Heb 6:18). He cannot do what is logically impossible, for example make a square circle. Like wise, God cannot make a rock so heavy that he cannot lift for the simple reason that anything he can make is finite. Anything that is finite he can move with his infinite power. If he can make it, he can move it.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by mattdamore :

But "can I fly" isn't non-sensical, despite it positing an action that it's impossible for a being who cannot fly to do. Going by the definitions of Flint & Freddoso, and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, witness "a rock is created such that its creator cannot lift it," a logically possible and bring-about-able state of affairs. Yet God cannot bring it about. So even by the definitions of those four esteemed philosophers, God fails to be omnipotent.

Ottman Out

I'm just wondering if some clarity can be achieved by taking out the word "omnipotence". For instance, imagine a being G that has the following characteristics:

• G is able to lift any object;
• G is able to create any object that can be described.

Now let R represent the following description: "A rock so heavy that G cannot lift it".

If we admit R as an "object that can be described", then we can ask the question, Is G able to create R? If yes, then G is not able to lift any object; if no, then G is not able to create any object that can be described. So we have our paradox, and we conclude that G cannot exist.

Alternatively, we can assert that R is not really an "object that can be described," since the description of R violates the characteristics of G, in the same way that "square circle" violates the characteristics of a circle.

Since the definition of R depends on G, but the definition of G does not depend on R, doesn't it make more sense to exclude R than to exclude G? If we exclude R, we can keep G, but if we exclude G, we also have to exclude R.

Ottman Out

By the way, we could change R to "a created rock that is so heavy that its creator cannot lift it". Then R would appear not to depend on G. Except that R in this case is not a single object, but a multitude of objects. For instance, if I can create rocks but can only lift 100 pounds, and you can create rocks and lift 200 pounds, then I can create a 101-pound rock and say it's R, but if you create the exact same 101-pound rock, it wouldn't be R. So I think that substituting "its creator" for "G" in the definition of R is a cheat.

Ottman Out

Upon further reflection, I probably shouldn’t have posted the preceding couple of posts. Most descriptions don’t describe specific objects. For example, “a rock so heavy that G cannot lift it,” if it is a valid description, is not describing a single object, but an infinite set of potential objects. After all, instead of creating the 101-pound rock, I could have created a 102-pound rock, a 103-pound rock, etc. So if I recast the definitions in terms of sets, I get something like the following:

Imagine a being G that has the following characteristics:

• G is able to lift any object;
• Given a description of a set of objects, G is able to create an object that belongs to the set.

Let R represent the following description: "The set of created rocks whose creators cannot lift them".

If I am able to create rocks, then R is a non-empty set, since I am just a mortal man. Thus the definition of R does not depend on G. And the definition of G does not depend on R. So there is no reason to keep G rather than R.

Ottman Out

OK, here is my last post on this for a while. I promise.

Now I'm wondering if I have to come to the opposite conclusion, namely that I must keep R and discard G. In fact, I'll change R from rocks to tables (specifically, the set of created tables whose creators cannot lift them). This is because I'm not sure I can create a rock, but I know how to create a table. In fact, I can create a table that is too heavy for me to lift. So R seems like a perfectly proper definition. So, keeping R, I am forced to reject G. If it is true that any omnipotent god would have the two properties I listed for G, then it follows that no omnipotent god can exist.

Edited to add: So I guess in the end I've just restated what Thomas Metcalf already wrote. My apologies for the wasted bandwidth.

Normal

The problem with "creating a rock so heavy it's creator cannot lift it", is it's trying to express a non-omnipotent attribute to an omnipotent being. To an omnipotent being, giving it a non-omnipotent attribute like the one above contradicts it's omnipotence, making it logically incoherent.

It's like saying "Can a being that can do anything, can't do something"?

Logically incoherent.