Freethought & Rationalism Archive

jeffazi · 02-19-2003, 01:05 PM

Hi,

I'm new to the iidf. I've been reading some of the threads and this looks like a great forum. Anyway, here's my situation.

I am involved in a discussion with a self-professed Catholic theologian who insists on requiring syllogisms for every assertion anyone makes. In a recent discussion, I mentioned an argument that I read in a book (this is a frequent topic on this forum so I am hopeful someone here can help me out with this) which asserts that if God has perfect foreknowledge then human beings don't have free will. The argument assumes that we are talking about a God who is described traditionally as a "prime mover", a God who is outside of time and sees everything, past, present, and future, and a God who knows every choice everyone will make before they make it. The argument posits, therefore, that under these circumstances perfect foreknowledge is equivalent to pre-ordination.

The person I'm discussing this with says that the argument requires a "middle term". He states:

The syllogism you need to write has the following form:

All x is foreknowledge
Foreordination is x
Therefore all foreknowledge is foreordination.

Now all you need to do is find x, the middle term.

One of the arguments I made in the course of this discussion is as follows (I can't remember where I found this argument but it seems to make the point nicely):

1. God's knowledge cannot be wrong. (i.e., God has perfect
foreknowlege)

2. God knows that I will do A.

3. If I have free will, then (I can do A) and (I can do ~A).

4. If I can do ~A, then it is possibly true that I will do ~A.

5. If it is possibly true that I will do ~A, then God's 'knowledge'
that I will do A is possibly false.

6. If God's knowledge that I will do A is possibly false, then God's
'knowledge' can be wrong.

7. Therefore, God's knowledge that I will do A is not possibly false.

8. Therefore, it is not possibly true that I will do ~A.

9. Therefore, I cannot do ~A.

10. Therefore, it is false that (I can do A) and (I can do ~A).

11. Therefore, I don't have free will.

He claims that the claim is categorical and because I concede that there are circumstances where foreknowledge doesn't equate with pre-ordination that a "middle term" is required. I do maintain, hypothetically, that if God is NOT outside of time and can't see the future then foreknowledge wouldn't equate with pre-ordination (and for that matter foreknowledge woudn't be perfect).

Is his request reasonable? If so, how would one construct such a syllogism? I am skeptical of his request because, typically, when this person is boxed into a corner he starts demanding that others take tests and construct syllogisms. What boxed him in was a simple question I asked him about a God with perfect foreknowledge. The question comes from a book on process theology. It posits a dinner between a human and god and asks whether the human could order for dinner something other than what a god with perfect foreknowledge knows the person will order. He simply won't answer this question. I think the reason is because he knows that it will destroy his view of god.

Thanks in advance,
Jeff

Ensign Steve · 02-19-2003, 02:01 PM

Jeff,

I think your argument is very well written, and I don't think it is missing anything. Ask him to find a flaw in your logic. Ask him which premises are false. Ask him, at what point does the conclusion not logically follow from the premise. If he can't, then the argument is sound.

Then tell him that mankind's predestination is refered to 8 times in the New Testament (I'll look up the chapters & verses tonight).

Then ask him if god has the ability to create a stone so heavy that he himself would be unable to move it.

Good luck!

Jen

PS: I love your dinner table example. I had never seen that one before.

John Page · 02-19-2003, 07:47 PM

In a nutshell I don't think this debate can be concluded by syllogisms or other means - for proof we need to square away the solution and the problem but, since we don't have foreknowledge such rigorousness is denied us.

In partial support of such a view you might look at Church's Theorem on undecidability and predicate logic. Here's a link to Melbourne on him that is written in fairly plain language.

Church

Cheers, John

Wiploc · 02-19-2003, 08:47 PM

Welcome to II, Jeff.

Quote:

Originally posted by jeffazi
The argument assumes that we are talking about a God who is described traditionally as a "prime mover", a God who is outside of time and sees everything, past, present, and future, and a God who knows every choice everyone will make before they make it.

Sorry, those aren't relevant to the discussion. I'm not a god; I'm not outside of time, ecetera; and if I have perfect knowledge of the future, it presents you exactly the same problems as if that god has such knowledge.

Quote:

He claims that the claim is categorical

Remind me what this means?

Quote:

and because I concede that there are circumstances where foreknowledge doesn't equate

Why would there be some circumstances where it does and others where it doesn't?

Quote:

with pre-ordination that a "middle term" is required. I do maintain, hypothetically, that if God is NOT outside of time and can't see the future then foreknowledge wouldn't equate with pre-ordination (and for that matter foreknowledge woudn't be perfect).

This may be your answer to the above question, but if so it doesn't make sense. If you have dinner with me, and I have perfect foreknowledge of what you will order then your situation is no different that if you were having dinner with god.

Quote:

It posits a dinner between a human and god and asks whether the human could order for dinner something other than what a god with perfect foreknowledge knows the person will order. He simply won't answer this question. I think the reason is because he knows that it will destroy his view of god.

I don't see how anyone's foreknowledge can constrain your choices. God knowing what you will do is different from him causing you to do it.
crc

Neilium · 02-20-2003, 04:12 PM

Hi Jeff,

I'm also new to the iidf, and I agree; this is a great forum.

A couple things struck me. So I'd like to cast a couple of thoughts in and find out what you think.

Quote:

Originally posted by jeffazi

The syllogism you need to write has the following form:

All x is foreknowledge
Foreordination is x
Therefore all foreknowledge is foreordination.

Now all you need to do is find x, the middle term.

This strikes me as a red herring. I don't think it's your job to find the mechanism of God's foreknowledge or foreordination to make your case.

I also think the idea of God being outside of time is irrelevant: our actions and thoughts happen within time, and that's where free will and the perfect foreknowledge of God contradict one another. If there is perfect foreknowledge, then that knowledge contains the only possibe future that excludes all other possible futures. If, through exercising free will, we can change the future, then there are many possible futures and no foreknowledge.

Just a hunch.

-Neil

tk · 02-21-2003, 07:55 AM

Quote:

The person I'm discussing this with says that the argument requires a "middle term". He states:

The syllogism you need to write has the following form:

All x is foreknowledge
Foreordination is x
Therefore all foreknowledge is foreordination.

Now all you need to do is find x, the middle term.

Take x to be the set of all logical propositions relating to the future (think Temporal Logic) which can be known to be true right now.

Actually though, it's wrong for the theologian to restrict you to a specific form of argument. As long as you can exhibit a sound line of argument from your premise "God has complete foreknowledge" to your conclusion "Humans have no free will", it doesn't matter how it's argued.

ReasonableDoubt · 02-21-2003, 08:42 AM

Have you heard of Molinism? Being a determinist myself, I don't believe this, but it's a possible theory.

I'm quoting from "A Middle Knowledge Perspective on Biblical Inspiration" by
William Lane Craig

"In the first, unconditioned moment God knows all possibilia, not only all individual essences, but also all possible worlds. Molina calls such knowledge "natural knowledge" because the content of such knowledge is essential to God and in no way depends on the free decisions of His will. By means of His natural knowledge, then, God has knowledge of every contingent state of affairs which could possibly obtain and of what the exemplification of the individual essence of any free creature could freely choose to do in any such state of affairs that should be actual.

In the second moment, God possesses knowledge of all true counterfactual propositions, including counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. That is to say, He knows what contingent states of affairs would obtain if certain antecedent states of affairs were to obtain; whereas by His natural knowledge God knew what any free creature could do in any set of circumstances, now in this second moment God knows what any free creature would do in any set of circumstances. This is not because the circumstances causally determine the creature�s choice, but simply because this is how the creature would freely choose. God thus knows that were He to actualize certain states of affairs, then certain other contingent states of affairs would obtain. Molina calls this counterfactual knowledge "middle knowledge" because it stands in between the first and third moment in divine knowledge. Middle knowledge is like natural knowledge in that such knowledge does not depend on any decision of the divine will; God does not determine which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true or false. "

Ensign Steve · 02-21-2003, 09:28 AM

ReasonableDoubt: Let me see if I have this straight. I have heard another claim, in simpler terms, that I think is similar to what your quote is saying. I may be off, so if I am building a straw man, I apologize, but there are a lot of big words in your quote and I haven't finished my coffee, so I might be a little off!

Is it saying... (roughly)?:

God knows every possilbe choice you can make, and the consequences of each choice. But god doesn't necessarily know which choice you will make?

ReasonableDoubt · 02-21-2003, 10:03 AM

No, God knows which choice you will make - through His middle knowledge - but it doesn't follow that you didn't have a free choice.
God can know by middle knowledge how people would act in the free will which he obtains from God, with regard to following or rejecting God, in all possible or potential theoretical conditions.
In other words, God knows how we as free creatures would act in all possible worlds. He actualized this world, and whatever happens in this world, he knows beforehand how human creatures would exercise their free will. But that doesn't mean he has determined their choices- he knows what each person would do in any given situation, and so he knows, e.g., that in the year 2020, John would retire from his job. He knows that now, but that doesn't mean that John has no choice. For if in actuality, John would actually choose to retire in 2025, then God would know that in the year 2025, he retires. Do you see the difference?
Of course there are some problems with this view as well. Why did God choose to actualize this particular world, where he knew certain people would exercise their free will for evil? This goes back to the Problem of Evil - and the response that this is the only possible world that God could actualize- the best possible world taking into consideration free choice, etc.

Ensign Steve · 02-21-2003, 10:08 AM

Thanks for the clarification. That answer actually does satisfy me, and that lightbulb turned on for me when a previous poster mentioned that just because god knows what so-and-so will choose to order for dinner doesn't mean that the person isn't still choosing it.

It doesn't settle all my issues (PoE for example), but at least that one is out of the way. Who knows? Maybe if I hang around this infidel board long enough, all my doubts will be addressed satisfactorily, and I'll find religion. LOL! That's about as ironic as an xian rejecting god after finally reading all the stuff he did in the bible! Heehee!

Jen

02-19-2003, 01:05 PM	#1
jeffazi New Member Join Date: Feb 2003 Location: St. Louis Posts: 3	Foreknowledge - Syllogism Hi, I'm new to the iidf. I've been reading some of the threads and this looks like a great forum. Anyway, here's my situation. I am involved in a discussion with a self-professed Catholic theologian who insists on requiring syllogisms for every assertion anyone makes. In a recent discussion, I mentioned an argument that I read in a book (this is a frequent topic on this forum so I am hopeful someone here can help me out with this) which asserts that if God has perfect foreknowledge then human beings don't have free will. The argument assumes that we are talking about a God who is described traditionally as a "prime mover", a God who is outside of time and sees everything, past, present, and future, and a God who knows every choice everyone will make before they make it. The argument posits, therefore, that under these circumstances perfect foreknowledge is equivalent to pre-ordination. The person I'm discussing this with says that the argument requires a "middle term". He states: The syllogism you need to write has the following form: All x is foreknowledge Foreordination is x Therefore all foreknowledge is foreordination. Now all you need to do is find x, the middle term. One of the arguments I made in the course of this discussion is as follows (I can't remember where I found this argument but it seems to make the point nicely): 1. God's knowledge cannot be wrong. (i.e., God has perfect foreknowlege) 2. God knows that I will do A. 3. If I have free will, then (I can do A) and (I can do ~A). 4. If I can do ~A, then it is possibly true that I will do ~A. 5. If it is possibly true that I will do ~A, then God's 'knowledge' that I will do A is possibly false. 6. If God's knowledge that I will do A is possibly false, then God's 'knowledge' can be wrong. 7. Therefore, God's knowledge that I will do A is not possibly false. 8. Therefore, it is not possibly true that I will do ~A. 9. Therefore, I cannot do ~A. 10. Therefore, it is false that (I can do A) and (I can do ~A). 11. Therefore, I don't have free will. He claims that the claim is categorical and because I concede that there are circumstances where foreknowledge doesn't equate with pre-ordination that a "middle term" is required. I do maintain, hypothetically, that if God is NOT outside of time and can't see the future then foreknowledge wouldn't equate with pre-ordination (and for that matter foreknowledge woudn't be perfect). Is his request reasonable? If so, how would one construct such a syllogism? I am skeptical of his request because, typically, when this person is boxed into a corner he starts demanding that others take tests and construct syllogisms. What boxed him in was a simple question I asked him about a God with perfect foreknowledge. The question comes from a book on process theology. It posits a dinner between a human and god and asks whether the human could order for dinner something other than what a god with perfect foreknowledge knows the person will order. He simply won't answer this question. I think the reason is because he knows that it will destroy his view of god. Thanks in advance, Jeff

02-19-2003, 07:47 PM	#3
John Page Veteran Member Join Date: May 2001 Location: US Posts: 5,495	Alonzo Church In a nutshell I don't think this debate can be concluded by syllogisms or other means - for proof we need to square away the solution and the problem but, since we don't have foreknowledge such rigorousness is denied us. In partial support of such a view you might look at Church's Theorem on undecidability and predicate logic. Here's a link to Melbourne on him that is written in fairly plain language. Church Cheers, John

Thread Tools	Search this Thread
Show Printable Version	Search this Thread: Advanced Search

02-19-2003, 02:01 PM	#2
Ensign Steve Veteran Member Join Date: Jan 2003 Location: Augusta, Georgia, United States Posts: 1,235	Jeff, I think your argument is very well written, and I don't think it is missing anything. Ask him to find a flaw in your logic. Ask him which premises are false. Ask him, at what point does the conclusion not logically follow from the premise. If he can't, then the argument is sound. Then tell him that mankind's predestination is refered to 8 times in the New Testament (I'll look up the chapters & verses tonight). Then ask him if god has the ability to create a stone so heavy that he himself would be unable to move it. Good luck! Jen PS: I love your dinner table example. I had never seen that one before.

02-21-2003, 08:42 AM	#7
ReasonableDoubt Junior Member Join Date: Jan 2003 Location: Chicago Posts: 86	Have you heard of Molinism? Being a determinist myself, I don't believe this, but it's a possible theory. I'm quoting from "A Middle Knowledge Perspective on Biblical Inspiration" by William Lane Craig "In the first, unconditioned moment God knows all possibilia, not only all individual essences, but also all possible worlds. Molina calls such knowledge "natural knowledge" because the content of such knowledge is essential to God and in no way depends on the free decisions of His will. By means of His natural knowledge, then, God has knowledge of every contingent state of affairs which could possibly obtain and of what the exemplification of the individual essence of any free creature could freely choose to do in any such state of affairs that should be actual. In the second moment, God possesses knowledge of all true counterfactual propositions, including counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. That is to say, He knows what contingent states of affairs would obtain if certain antecedent states of affairs were to obtain; whereas by His natural knowledge God knew what any free creature could do in any set of circumstances, now in this second moment God knows what any free creature would do in any set of circumstances. This is not because the circumstances causally determine the creature�s choice, but simply because this is how the creature would freely choose. God thus knows that were He to actualize certain states of affairs, then certain other contingent states of affairs would obtain. Molina calls this counterfactual knowledge "middle knowledge" because it stands in between the first and third moment in divine knowledge. Middle knowledge is like natural knowledge in that such knowledge does not depend on any decision of the divine will; God does not determine which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true or false. "

02-21-2003, 09:28 AM	#8
Ensign Steve Veteran Member Join Date: Jan 2003 Location: Augusta, Georgia, United States Posts: 1,235	ReasonableDoubt: Let me see if I have this straight. I have heard another claim, in simpler terms, that I think is similar to what your quote is saying. I may be off, so if I am building a straw man, I apologize, but there are a lot of big words in your quote and I haven't finished my coffee, so I might be a little off! Is it saying... (roughly)?: God knows every possilbe choice you can make, and the consequences of each choice. But god doesn't necessarily know which choice you will make?

02-21-2003, 10:03 AM	#9
ReasonableDoubt Junior Member Join Date: Jan 2003 Location: Chicago Posts: 86	No, God knows which choice you will make - through His middle knowledge - but it doesn't follow that you didn't have a free choice. God can know by middle knowledge how people would act in the free will which he obtains from God, with regard to following or rejecting God, in all possible or potential theoretical conditions. In other words, God knows how we as free creatures would act in all possible worlds. He actualized this world, and whatever happens in this world, he knows beforehand how human creatures would exercise their free will. But that doesn't mean he has determined their choices- he knows what each person would do in any given situation, and so he knows, e.g., that in the year 2020, John would retire from his job. He knows that now, but that doesn't mean that John has no choice. For if in actuality, John would actually choose to retire in 2025, then God would know that in the year 2025, he retires. Do you see the difference? Of course there are some problems with this view as well. Why did God choose to actualize this particular world, where he knew certain people would exercise their free will for evil? This goes back to the Problem of Evil - and the response that this is the only possible world that God could actualize- the best possible world taking into consideration free choice, etc.

02-21-2003, 10:08 AM	#10
Ensign Steve Veteran Member Join Date: Jan 2003 Location: Augusta, Georgia, United States Posts: 1,235	Thanks for the clarification. That answer actually does satisfy me, and that lightbulb turned on for me when a previous poster mentioned that just because god knows what so-and-so will choose to order for dinner doesn't mean that the person isn't still choosing it. It doesn't settle all my issues (PoE for example), but at least that one is out of the way. Who knows? Maybe if I hang around this infidel board long enough, all my doubts will be addressed satisfactorily, and I'll find religion. LOL! That's about as ironic as an xian rejecting god after finally reading all the stuff he did in the bible! Heehee! Jen

Freethought & Rationalism Archive

The archives are read only.