Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Taffy Lewis · 11-22-2002, 05:33 PM

One apparent contradiction in theistic belief involves God's omnibenevolence and moral freedom. If God is perfectly good then he cannot choose to do evil. However, often in response to the argument from evil, theists argue that freedom to choose between good and evil is a great good. The idea is that this sort of freedom, call it significant moral freedom, has such intrinsic value that it outweights many of the evils that people freely choose to bring about. The question naturally arises as to why God doesn't have moral freedom if it is of such intrinsic value. How can humans be better than God in this respect? And if lacking moral freedom is good enough for God then why isn't it good enough for humans? Why doesn't God simply create us such that we cannot choose to do evil?

The theistic philosopher William Wainwright in his Philosophy of Religion, 2nd edition presents the problem this way:

Quote:

Classical theists believe that God is essentially good and therefore cannot act badly. They also believe that God is a free moral agent. If God's actions are free even though He cannot act badly, then some sorts of necessitation are compatible with freedom. The fact that God necessarily acts well also suggests that the free will defense overestimates the value of contra-causal freedom. Although God cannot act badly, His agency is immeasurably greater or more perfect than any other kind of agency. If God had constructed us in such a way that we could not act badly, we would not be contra-causally free. Nevertheless, our agency would be more like His and thus much better than it is. (p.86)

The theistic philosopher Thomas Morris suggests a similar argument in his book Our Idea of God. He says:

Quote:

Being a moral agent, a person capable of and engaging in morally assessable conduct, requires having a certain sort of freedom with respect to one's actions. A being who is not free in the requisite sense does not perform actions which are morally characterizable at all, as either morally good or morally bad. A standard analysis of the conditions for moral agency often known as libertarianism specifies that morally significant freedom, the sort of freedom required for full moral agency, is the freedom to have done "morally otherwise" than as one in fact does. If I perform a bad action with morally significant freedom, then I could have performed a morally good action instead, and I am morally accountable for what I in fact do. But if God is necessarily good, he has no alternatives available to him apart from doing what is right. He is, in particular, never free to do evil. But if that is so, then he lacks morally significant freedom. And if he is not morally free, then we must conclude that, contrary to what we might have thought, he is not a moral agent at all, and his goodness, whatever it is, is not moral goodness....The problem can be summed up like this: "necessary moral goodness" is a contradiction in terms. If something is necessitated, it can't be morally good; and if something is morally good, it can't be necessitated. Thus, holding that God's goodness is necessary prevents us from holding that God is morally good. (p.59)

The key to solving this apparent difficulty is to recognize a certain asymmetrical depedence relation that is supposed to obtain between God and humans. God's existence and nature are not supposed to depend upon any facts beyond himself. God's character, for example, is not supposed to be due to any events or states of affairs outside God. This is in sharp contrast to humans. Our characters and personalities to a large degree are dependent upon our genetic history, upbringing and environment in general. However, if God exists and we are to have any responsibility for forming our characters, we must have libertarian free will. The reason is simple. If our actions are not free in the libertarian sense then they are brought about by states of affairs over which we ultimately have no control. That means that if our choices are determined then they ultimately are due to God's choices and character and not our own. William Wainwright expresses it this way:

Quote:

Classical theists believe that the sources of God's actions lie in His own nature. God is genuinely independent, neither determined nor causally affected by other powers. His activity is therefore fully autonomous. If, on the other hand, the choices of human agents are causally necessary consequences of conditions that ultimately extend beyond their control, human agents aren't genuinely independent and their activities are not autonomous. The two sorts of necessity (God's necessary goodness and causally determined human goodness) are thus significantly different.....An important feature of God's righteous activity is its autonomy. Freedom from causal necessitation may be necessary if human righteousness is to resemble God's righteousness in this respect. Suppose that God did construct human beings in such a way that it was impossible for them to choose evil. While the immediate cause of a person's righteous actions would lie within his or her own nature, its ultimate cause (God's decrees) would not. But in this case, the agent would not be genuinely independent and its actions would not be genuinely autonomous. (p.87-88)

The basic idea is that our choices and character would not be our own if God created us without the ability to choose evil. He would be the ultimate cause of our good characters and choices. They would be mere extensions of his own goodness. However, in the case of God, he is supposed to be eternal and independent. Nothing distinct from him could have caused his character to be what it is. Thus it is genuinely his character. If God desires the existence of morally good creatures that are distinct from himself then it may be necessary that he grant some of his creatures morally significant freedom.

Jobar · 11-22-2002, 07:30 PM

Taffy, I don't see any difference between this and the discussion in the <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=50&t=000650" target="_blank">If God has free will, why can he not do evil?</a> topic. If there is a significant point which that thread has not addressed, by all means continue; but please, review that thread first, and point out how your thesis here differs.

Zadok001 · 11-23-2002, 10:15 AM

I think there is a clear disconnect between what you describe and the general belief of God:

God isn't perfectly good, God is 'merely' perfect.

A 'perfect' being can do anything. (Let's ignore the rock so big God can't lift it argument, shall we?) That would include doing evil. Now, we can add to our definition of a perfect God that he is also intrinsically good. That sets us up a litte better: God can now do good or evil, but he is predisposed towards good. We now have a benevolent entity with the capacity to the create the world as we see it today, with imperfections, and both good and evil.

Keith Russell · 11-23-2002, 12:42 PM

Greetings:

Artists are generally not thought of as 'perfect' beings. (Far from it in fact.)

(I can say that; I'm an artist.)

To my knowledge, theists generally ignore this question: if 'God' is so perfect, why the need to create all this?

Keith.

Scrutinizer · 11-23-2002, 04:06 PM

Keith,

Quote:

Originally posted by Keith Russell:
To my knowledge, theists generally ignore this question: if 'God' is so perfect, why the need to create all this?

I don't know any theist who argues that God needed to create the universe.

Regards,

- Scrutinizer

Taffy Lewis · 11-24-2002, 08:08 AM

Jobar,

Quote:

Taffy, I don't see any difference between this and the discussion in the If God has free will, why can he not do evil? topic. If there is a significant point which that thread has not addressed, by all means continue; but please, review that thread first, and point out how your thesis here differs.

This thread has a more elaborate statement of the problem. Your original post was simply a series of three questions.

This thread offers a set of considerations that resolves the apparent difficulty.

Taffy Lewis · 11-24-2002, 08:22 AM

Zadok001,

Quote:

A 'perfect' being can do anything. (Let's ignore the rock so big God can't lift it argument, shall we?) That would include doing evil.

God can do evil only insofar as it is a logically necessary condition of a good which outweighs it. God cannot choose to bring about some evil state of affairs simply for the sake of that evil. Further, God can perform evil in the sense that he has the power to do so. But having the power to do something does not mean one can choose to do it. For example, a person may have the power to drink cranberry juice (they can move their arms and hands to bring a cup to their lips) but it may be psychologically impossible for them to choose to drink it (they may have an overpowering aversion to drinking anything red).

Taffy Lewis · 11-24-2002, 08:27 AM

Keith Russell,

Quote:

To my knowledge, theists generally ignore this question: if 'God' is so perfect, why the need to create all this?

Theists normally claim that God freely chose to create this universe because he considers it to be a great good.

Saying creation was a need of God suggests that he could not have chosen to not create.

[ November 24, 2002: Message edited by: Taffy Lewis ]</p>

Keith Russell · 11-24-2002, 08:33 AM

Greetings:

I have often heard theists claim that 'God' 'needs' us, needs our prayers, need us to 'complete 'His' plan', needs our worship, needs us to believe in 'Him', desires our 'souls', etc. (Yes, looked at for more than a few seconds, these things are--honestly--rather silly.)

Now, just because I 'need' something, doesn't mean I'll get it, or that things couldn't have been otherwise. With 'God', all things are possible, right, so one can never really know what 'had to be', or what 'God' might have simply 'felt like doing' during 'Creation week', 5,000 years ago. (LOL.)

But, if 'God' is perfect, and omnipotent, then is 'He' really going to do anything that is capricious, or out of 'whim'?

Theists can answer these questions any way they like; 'God' can do anything 'He' wants...

...apparently except show 'Him'self, or explain 'Him'self--in a meaningful, rational way--to human beings, including 'His' followers.

Keith.

Scrutinizer · 11-24-2002, 02:44 PM

Keith,

Quote:

I have often heard theists claim that 'God' 'needs' us, needs our prayers, need us to 'complete 'His' plan', needs our worship, needs us to believe in 'Him'

That's interesting, because I haven't heard that before. It does, of course, depend in what sense they mean the word "need". God "needs" us to complete his plan? Well, perhaps in the sense that his plan couldn't be fulfilled without us. That still doesn't mean that God needed to create the whole world with a "plan" in the first place.

Quote:

But, if 'God' is perfect, and omnipotent, then is 'He' really going to do anything that is capricious, or out of 'whim'?

Of course not.

Regards,

- Scrutinizer

Thread Tools	Search this Thread
Show Printable Version	Search this Thread: Advanced Search

11-22-2002, 07:30 PM	#2
Jobar Veteran Member Join Date: Jun 2001 Location: secularcafe.org Posts: 9,525	Taffy, I don't see any difference between this and the discussion in the <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=50&t=000650" target="_blank">If God has free will, why can he not do evil?</a> topic. If there is a significant point which that thread has not addressed, by all means continue; but please, review that thread first, and point out how your thesis here differs.

11-23-2002, 10:15 AM	#3
Zadok001 Veteran Member Join Date: Nov 2002 Location: Two Steps Ahead Posts: 1,124	I think there is a clear disconnect between what you describe and the general belief of God: God isn't perfectly good, God is 'merely' perfect. A 'perfect' being can do anything. (Let's ignore the rock so big God can't lift it argument, shall we?) That would include doing evil. Now, we can add to our definition of a perfect God that he is also intrinsically good. That sets us up a litte better: God can now do good or evil, but he is predisposed towards good. We now have a benevolent entity with the capacity to the create the world as we see it today, with imperfections, and both good and evil.

11-23-2002, 12:42 PM	#4
Keith Russell Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Overland Park, Kansas Posts: 1,336	Greetings: Artists are generally not thought of as 'perfect' beings. (Far from it in fact.) (I can say that; I'm an artist.) To my knowledge, theists generally ignore this question: if 'God' is so perfect, why the need to create all this? Keith.

11-24-2002, 08:33 AM	#9
Keith Russell Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Overland Park, Kansas Posts: 1,336	Greetings: I have often heard theists claim that 'God' 'needs' us, needs our prayers, need us to 'complete 'His' plan', needs our worship, needs us to believe in 'Him', desires our 'souls', etc. (Yes, looked at for more than a few seconds, these things are--honestly--rather silly.) Now, just because I 'need' something, doesn't mean I'll get it, or that things couldn't have been otherwise. With 'God', all things are possible, right, so one can never really know what 'had to be', or what 'God' might have simply 'felt like doing' during 'Creation week', 5,000 years ago. (LOL.) But, if 'God' is perfect, and omnipotent, then is 'He' really going to do anything that is capricious, or out of 'whim'? Theists can answer these questions any way they like; 'God' can do anything 'He' wants... ...apparently except show 'Him'self, or explain 'Him'self--in a meaningful, rational way--to human beings, including 'His' followers. Keith.

Freethought & Rationalism Archive

The archives are read only.