Witt

x exists, defined, x has some primary statement true of it.

x exists, means:
x has a property.
x has an extension.

If we can show that x *has* at least one property then it exists.

The existence of concrete objects is shown in virtue of fact.
The existence of abstract objects is shown in virtue of tautology.

Examples:

My car is blue, proves my car exists.
7>4, proves 7 exists.
God is omniscient, proves God exists.

In each case it is presumed that the premise can be shown true!

x exists, is analytic. I.e. it is either tautologous or contradictory.

Existent abstract objects are *convenient* mental objects.

If there is any fact that you participate in...you exist.
Even the process of denying your existence proves that you do exist.

'I exist' cannot be denied by any mind!

That is to say, 'I exist' is true for anyone who understands the statement.

Descartes dictum: Fx -> E!x, is valid...for primaryl properties F.

Formally:
E!x defined (EF)(Fx), for all primary properties F.

E!x <-> x=x
E!x <-> Ey(x=y)
E!x <-> EyAz(z=x <-> z=y)

What is a "property"?

"A simple general term"..W.Quine: Methods of Logic (1982), page 279.

A property is a primary context. That is, a predicate that talks directly about x.

For example:
In, x is red, x has a primary predicate.
In, it's false that x is red, x has a secondary predicate.

Primary contexts entail existence
Secondary contexts do not entail existence.

"There is a property P such that P is possesed by x; So, x has being"..
See: K Lambert, Meinong and the Priciple of Independence (1983), page 29.

Something exists, is undeniable.
Nothing exists, is unassertable, (i.e. contradictory).

Nothing exists, means, It is not the case that something exists.

Nothing is not a thing at all. It is certainly not a denoting phrase.
Nothing cannot be a vacuum.
Vacuum, defined as space empty of matter, requires the existence of space and therefore it is not no-thing.

Nothing exists, is a contradiction in terms!

There is no property of 'nothing'..i.e. it's description does not refer.
But, we can make true statements about 'nothing', eg. it does not exist.

*Nothing* cannot exist.

To prove that x does not exist is to prove that it is false that there is some primary statement true of it.

~(E!x) <-> ~(EF)(Fx).

Concrete or abstract objects, defined/described by contradictory predications, cannot exist.

What do you think?

Witt

phil

well put. Nothing cannot exist.

-phil

SlateGreySky

Nice work, Quine.

"To be is to be the value of a variable."

That pretty much sums it up, right?

Adrian Selby

can what we call a property actually be incoherent, or, not actually a property. Saying there is a property of omniscience seems fine on the surface, but I'm not sure it can be said to be an abstract property akin to properties of numbers or a real 'out there' descriptor for some ability of some being. I'm not sure it makes much sense, if that makes sense

Consider 'infinite redness', one can say, yes, if I apply it to that thing there, it exists, but isn't redness just redness?

Darth Dane

Instead of "I exist" say "I Am"

Then it gets real interesting.

And Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel, and shall say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me, What is his name? what shall I say unto them?

And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you.

And God said moreover unto Moses, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, The LORD God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, hath sent me unto you: this is my name for ever, and this is my memorial unto all generations" Exd 3:13-15


So by admitting that "I Am" we admit God Is?


What do you think?





DD - Love Spliff

Philosoft

I think the Bible is an exceedingly poor nature-of-reality-and-existence philosophy book.

Witt

SlateGreySky:

Nice work, Quine.

"To be is to be the value of a variable."

That pretty much sums it up, right?
--------------------------------------------

Yes, the existent entities of our language, ..the quantifiable variables (pronouns) ..are the primal things for which we presume existence.

..and he (Quine) says: "no entity without identity."

That is to say, that something exist, is to say that it is some existent thing, ie. E!x <-> Ey(x=y).

Witt

Witt

Darth Dane:

Instead of "I exist" say "I Am"
Then it gets real interesting.
------------------------------------

I don't see a difference between "i exist" and "I am".

Darth Dane:
And Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel, and shall say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me, What is his name? what shall I say unto them?

That Moses said *anything* to God, is in need of serious justification.
Talking to oneself does not warrant conversing with some other entity, does it?

Darth: And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you.

Again, that God said anything at all is the issue.
I AM THAT I AM, is nothing more than (p->p)..it begs the question, and it says nothing at all.

Garth:
And God said moreover unto Moses, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, The LORD God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, hath sent me unto you: this is my name for ever, and this is my memorial unto all generations" Exd 3:13-15

So by admitting that "I Am" we admit God Is?
---------------------------------------------------------

Nonsense, "I Am" admits that "I exist", and it has nothing to do with the presumed existence of an *external* entity of any kind!

Witt

SlateGreySky

I think this issue is a truly fascinating one, and I do believe that Darth Dane's question, "So by admitting that "I Am" we admit God Is?" is perhaps far more formidable than it first appears, calling into question traditionally-held notions about the subject/object dialectic in metaphysics.

For example, I think Hegel would answer "yes" to that question (and I believe the Phenomenology of Spirit is precisely his doing so). For him, even the level of sense-certainty is an instance of an individual consciousness progressing toward its (already) implicit unity with the Absolute.

Then again, what was it that Nietzsche said of Hegel? A "theologian in disguise," or something? Perhaps we should all be careful . . .

SlateGreySky

And why is that, Philosoft?