Kantian

An excerpt from my essay I'd thought deserved sharing:

There are two suppositions that lead Leibniz to evaluate the present world as the best one: simplicity and the other is maximizing happiness. The universe is ultimately constituted of an infinite number of substances - indivisible monads. These individual monads are linked together like a network that functions in a "pre-established" universal harmony and is the result of the Divine objective. This harmonious elegance is simplicity- which maximizes the greatest difference of phenomena, yet uniformly ordered by a constant repetition of the differences- laws. The network is the best possible result, not because it contains no evil, but that any other possible universe will contain more evil. The infinite number of possible worlds are already present within the Divine Mind, which contemplates all potential combinations and chose the best one, then that combination gains existence. The existence of the present world already maximizes happiness in this sense, and is the best of all possible universes. The old Platonic argument “best of all possible worlds” is fatum christianum, a moral necessity, created by the free choice of the Divine entity because the universe is itself a contingent fact, not a necessary one. Since God is perfect, he has chosen the best possible configuration of existence, and the state of affairs in the universe necessarily produces the most quantity of happiness and goodness. Leibniz' theodicy demonstrates an a priori argument in defense of theism, unlike Voltaire's gross caricature Dr. Pangloss, who confuses the a priori state of existence as optimism and offers nothing more than a posteriori arguments in the satire, Candide.

Leibniz would try and convince the person who may have suffered at the hands of terrorists that while he or she is capable of conceiving a distinct feature of the world in a better, enriching, more profitable context, he or she is unable to know whether it is possible to create a superior world without that single act of terrorism. Since he or she can never truly contemplate all of the relations this single event obtains with other events in the world, he/she has no way of knowing that by altering the single incident the world would remain unchanged, or even improve the state of affairs in the world at all. Furthermore, the person who conceives of terrorism as an evil cannot assume that his conception of evil is identical to that of God’s. He supposes that the world is only good if each component is examined in isolation, and then evaluated accordingly, apart from other potential factors that may influence the evaluation itself. It is also questionable that the world is truly good if and only if people achieve happiness. Leibniz wasn’t willing to evaluate the “good” of the world with either an utilitarian or hedonistic standard of human happiness. It’s possible that the number human beings on earth make up but an infinitesimal percentage of the entire set of conscious entities in the universe.

According to Leibniz's metaphysics, there are three types of monads: rational, animal, and "bare" monads. The rational monads are not only capable of perception, they also are capable of gaining knowledge and perform acts of virtue, largely because they are self-conscious. Knowledge entails the capacity of ascertaining eternal truths such as those in logic, mathematics, and morality. Human beings as well as supernatural agents (angels) and other unknown rational entities are all moral agents. Animals are capable of perception, but since they are not self-conscious, they lack the ability to ascertain or gain knowledge and perform praiseworthy acts. As for "bare" monads, they unconsciously perceive to a certain extent and nothing more. The goal of God's creation is to glorify himself by maximizing the happiness of rational monads, which includes human beings. God prefers minds that express the glory of God rather than the world or its substance because it already expresses the world itself. (Discourse 35) In opposition to John Locke, Leibniz saw happiness as an on-going process rather than a fixed property, or a state of being, but a virtuous life where one is capable of good and bad deeds, and yet continue becoming a more perfect and more virtuous person.

Leibniz’s theodicy may be logically sound, but it remains preposterous, contrived, even. Suppose a pessimist a la Schopenhauer elucidated a rival metaphysics that persuades this was the absolute worst possible combination of existence, that whatever is good is but a means to a greater evil. Instead of the supposition of a theistic being, Descartes’ omnipotent demon actually exists, then the universe is teleologically bankrupt, driven by a useless force of meaninglessness, and those who were good are but mere playthings for the absolutely malevolent and they were punished for their good at every turn. Like Bertrand Russell, I think people are already conditioned towards a belief that the universe is good, or that there is a purpose for everything. This doesn’t mean that the apologist’s arguments are correct, but merely expressions of our deep seated psychological inclinations. If Leibniz' metaphysics is equally as valid as a robust version of Schopenhauerian idealism, one that inverts the platonic argument of evil as a "privation" of the good, that happiness is but a brief spell between bouts of suffering, that pain is the only reality, then the expression of a philosophy is in the end one's own existential evaluation of being.
~Transcendentalist~

Beoran

This Leibniz fellar was sure a jolly fellow. Uur universe the best possible? Even in my mind I can think up dozens of better universes. And if I can imagine something better, an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent creator surely could do even better than me.

Simplicity of the universe even doesn't come into the equation here. Our universe and it's laws are already quite complex. A benevolent creator wouldn't care too much about complexity, she would place priority on reducing evil first.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Kantian:

"The old Platonic argument 'best of all possible worlds' is fatum christianum, a moral necessity, created by the free choice of the Divine entity because the universe is itself a contingent fact, not a necessary one."

I think this is one of the most objectionable parts of Leibniz. It's not clear that a morally perfect being can make free choices at all; it seems that there really is only one possible world because God just wouldn't have created any other. If this is so, then the world isn't in fact contingent.

Leibniz wants us to have free will, but libertarian free will seems to require transworld identity, which seems to require, in turn, that there are essential and accidental properties. But Leibniz has abandoned these with his discussion of entities' "complete concepts." So it doesn't look as if humans can have free will, unless some real work is done to provide an alternate account of transworld identity.

Further, if God freely chose to produce this world, it seems that there must be other possible worlds in which He did not choose this world, but now we've got an iterated alethic modality, which, I think, presents its own problems. Who freely chose (and thereby made contingent) which possible God-world to bring about? Was it God's God?

The Dionysian

"Leibniz wants us to have free will, but libertarian free will seems to require transworld identity, which seems to require, in turn, that there are essential and accidental properties. But Leibniz has abandoned these with his discussion of entities' "complete concepts." So it doesn't look as if humans can have free will, unless some real work is done to provide an alternate account of transworld identity."

I believe he said the actions of humans are hypothetically necessary. This goes along with his distinguishing between truths of essence and truths of existence and then truths of essence are divided into two varieties and truths of existence are divided into 4 or 5(can't remember exactly) varieties. But somewhere in the 4 or 5 varieties of the truths of existence he explained the human will. I really hate talking about Leibniz. He had the most absurd ideas.

[ December 08, 2002: Message edited by: The Dionysian ]</p>

The Dionysian

"Further, if God freely chose to produce this world, it seems that there must be other possible worlds in which He did not choose this world, but now we've got an iterated alethic modality, which, I think, presents its own problems."

You would think there would be other possible worlds in which god did not choose this world but not for Leibniz. For Leibniz god is the necessary being which explains contingent being, no questions asked. I really can't stand talking about him so I'm going to stop.

flatland

If I remember, for Leibniz, God is in fact separate from 3 laws which rule him and his thought processes. The first is the principle of non-contradiction, which determines what is necessary and what is contingent. The next is the principle of sufficient reason, which decides what is and what is not to be(exist). The third is the principle of best perfection, which is just what it sounds. So God recognizes these three laws and acts accordingly, which leads yo our world existing. our world is one that is the best possible world that is non-contradictory, and God creates this and only this world because his reason sees that this is the best one. The world is therefore contingent in that its negation is not a contradiction, but not truly contingent because given these three ruling laws, Gd could not have created any other world. The free will he gives us is similar; we could theoretically decide to do anything at any juncture, but our natures compel us to choose exactly one course of action. As our monads and therefore our natures were created with their complete concepts at the origin of the universe, we have free will only in that our theoretical other choices do not violate the principle of non-contradiction.

Kantian

Won't the possibility of conceiving a 'better universe' depend on your definition of "better" and a working understanding of the fundamental nature of reality? Not that i am saying you cannot, but i'm happy to hear what you have in mind.

I think you misunderstand. Simplicity does not mean that the universe is simple. Simplicity in this context actually means that there is a repeated state of affairs, or linguistic units we call "laws of nature," a form of simplicity inherent in diffuse phenomena identified as a simple mathematical unit that describes the repetition of phenomena. These laws establish a constant character of phenomena, and that "divine" harmony is [supposedly]what entails the best of all possible worlds.

Why?

~transcendentalist~

[ December 09, 2002: Message edited by: Kantian ]</p>

Beoran

Kantian: Won't the possibility of conceiving a 'better universe' depend on your definition of "better" and a working understanding of the fundamental nature of reality? Not that i am saying you cannot, but i'm happy to hear what you have in mind.

Beoran: Sure, it depends on what I as a human judge to be "better". However, if the definition that the supposed creator has differs mluch from mine, then we have nothing to discuss. If a creator declares that a world with more suffering is better, then we're back at the "might makes right, she moves in mysterious ways" defense. It's our wourld, we have to live in it, so that gives us the right to judge it by our standards. Creations are to be judged by those who use them, not by those who make them.

The nature of reality is irrelevant, as a creator can make that what the creatior wants it to be.

Kantian: I think you misunderstand. Simplicity does not mean that the universe is simple. Simplicity in this context actually means that there is a repeated state of affairs, or linguistic units we call "laws of nature," a form of simplicity inherent in diffuse phenomena identified as a simple mathematical unit that describes the repetition of phenomena. These laws establish a constant character of phenomena, and that "divine" harmony is [supposedly]what entails the best of all possible worlds.

Beoran: So what is it then that is siple? The laws of nature? No, they aren't simple. Newton's laws seem simple, but in essence, they are wrong. The "math of our universe"? You cannot describe our world correctly through simple math. You can approximate reality only through very complex math, and even then... Or are we talking about consistency? That's not real simplicity either.

Kantian: Why?
Beoran: Because, that is the essence of benevolence. The desire, the will, to reduce suffering and to inbcrease joy. We cannot use the word benevolent for a being that lets other considerations dominate over this will to reduce suffering.