Bill

As Simon Blackburn makes clear in his book <a href="http://www.secweb.org/bookstore/bookdetail.asp?BookID=637" target="_blank">Think : A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy</a>, the question about "free will" is frequently muddled up in any discussion of the concept. I would recommend that you read up on his approach to the sort of problem you raise.

== Bill

Kip

I am sorry but I must stop you at your first two sentences. There is a subtle, but important, distinction between these two. The former has only one outcome, but that outcome is not necessarily determined, the outcome could be any of the possible outcomes. The latter has only one outcome which is necessarily determined. This is determinism. The two are not equivalent. My proof only references the former and hence does not reference determinism.

This definition is new to me. I usually regard soft-d as synonymous with compatiblism (spelling?).

I never claimed that free-will necessarily involved randomness and acausality (although that is an absurd position that many libertarians may be philosophical pushed into defending). In summary, I am simply reminding you that the opposite of free will is not determinism. The distinction is not "either / or". If that were so, libertarians could cite a person who randomly committed acts without regard to laws of physics as possessing "free will" (many do cite the indeterminant nature of quantum physics). Obviously that is absurd because free will implies some element of "control".

Kip

I wish you would have been more precise but I suspect the disagree is simply that we are using two different definitions of "free will". My proof referenced the definition "the ability to do otherwise that one did" and so, unless one did other than what one did (which is logically impossible), "free will" did not "already" act, rather, free will never acted. Of course, this definition of free will is questionable and that is the reason I cited the proof.

owleye

Kip...

"The former has only one outcome, but that outcome is not necessarily determined, the outcome could be any of the possible outcomes."

If what you say is true, then it seems to me that we could have done otherwise. But there is one interpretation that I might have overlooked. Let me suppose you are distinguishing between the ability to bring about an outcome and the possibility of bringing about an outcome. Thus, in a choice between raspberry and chocolate ice-cream, it may be that either of two outcomes are possible, but you wish to assert that the person would not have the ability to choose between them. The person would not be able to select one of the two possibilities. But, in this case, if the person has no ability to choose raspberry, for example, then it seems to me that his choice of chocolate would be determined. Indeed, though you would claim there are two possible outcomes it seems to me that in this situation one of them is excluded -- i.e., there was no real choice in the first place.

"In summary, I am simply reminding you that the opposite of free will is not determinism. The distinction is not "either / or"."

Because I'm a compatibalist I would certainly concur, but in order to do so, I have to soften determinism. But, it is not my position that is under scrutiny. As yet, I don't quite see how you've accomplished your "reminder".

owleye