John Page

Not formidable at all, IMO. I think Witt covered this in the OP when he stated "The existence of abstract objects is shown in virtue of tautology. " It is then the task of the theist to show that, for the proposed properties of a real god (as opposed to an abstract, imaginary god) the god falls into Witt's category "The existence of concrete objects is shown in virtue of fact. "

Cheers, John

Witt

John:
Not formidable at all, IMO. I think Witt covered this in the OP when he stated "The existence of abstract objects is shown in virtue of tautology. " It is then the task of the theist to show that, for the proposed properties of a real god (as opposed to an abstract, imaginary god) the god falls into Witt's category "The existence of concrete objects is shown in virtue of fact. "

Hi John,
The task of the theist is to show that their god is not a fictional object, ie. that it is not a mental myth. Surely they deny that it can be a physical object, since they claim it created the physical universe.

Their ontology is different from many other views in that they admit spiritual things (demons, souls, gods, angels, etc.) and I do not.

Any definition/description that includes 'that spiritual object such that' is termed meaningless, unless of course, they can show that these non-mental -- non-physical things do exist.

IMHO, God cannot be described or defined, in my ontology, without contradiction.

It is insufficient to infer the existence of spiritual things because of a 'gut feeling' that one may have about the idea.

Witt

SlateGreySky

John and Witt,

Sorry; I think (once again!) I came across as pushing a position I don't hold . . . I agree that the burden of proof is on the theist (I guess I'm undecided on A. Plantinga's notion of belief in God as properly basic). There, then, I think we're in agreement.

Certainly, though, at least one line of thought in the history of philosophy (i.e. Hegel's) has attempted to demonstrate the logical validity of an assertion implicit in Darth Dane's point; namely, that the existence of the Absolute is implied in the existence of the self.

Witt, according to your ideas about existence, are there reasons why such absolute idealism should be rejected a priori? No such reason seems to have been articulated in your original post, but maybe I'm just missing it.

In fact, Hegel roundly decries philosophical inquiry by way of 'gut feeling' (preface to the Phenomenology). If there are no reasons for the rejection of Hegelian absolute idealism a priori, though, then perhaps 'gut feeling' is more present in the out-of-hand rejection of such a metaphysic than it is in the positing thereof.

John Page

Right, so they have to invent something that interacts with the physcial universe but is itself not physical (a physical impossibility according to some definitions).
Agreed, abstract until proven guilty.

Cheers, John

John Page

Hi Witt:

I can suppose that some entity x exists and for it to exist for me it must exist in my mind and so defined, x has some primary statement true of it even if it only a mental object of my mind.

We can suppose that some entity x exists and for it to exist for both of us it must exist (not necessarily in the same form, because we could be supposing about very different things) and, so defined, x has some primary statement true of it in relation to its existence in both our minds.

The concept of a variable "x" implies an understanding of a substitutable variable. Where does that variable exist - I suggest in the mental entity that is contemplating it. Please see below on the concept of "nothing", upon which your conclusions seem contrary to your axiom above when substituting "nothing" for "x".

Nothing is an entity like any other and to confer upon it the property of non-existence is contradictory.

Nothing is a word that may be used to denote or convey the mental concept of an absence of existence. Nothing's description is a mental entity that refers to (the concept of ) no entity either mental or physical.

Thus, a mind can claim a primary truth for "nothing" in the same way as any other concept of something.

That was interesting, what do you say?

Cheers, John

John Page

Yes it can - try it! Unless, of course, you define "mind" as a word that refers to an object that cannot deny its own existence.

Cheers, John

Witt

Witt:
x exists, defined, x has some primary statement true of it.

John:
I can suppose that some entity x exists and for it to exist for me it must exist in my mind and so defined, x has some primary statement true of it even if it only a mental object of my mind.

Not as I see things.
That x is a name that I mentally ascribe to the presumed object, is not a primary statement about the referred object at all.
It is a primary predication of the name "x" and not of what is named.

Definition alone does not permit us to infer existence.

It is incorrect to conclude that because we give an idea a name that 'therefore' it actually names.

For example: The existent present king of France does not exist, even though existence is a part of its definition.

The Descartes-Anslem ontological argument makes this error, imo.

That an entity of mind, a symbol that represents a name of a defined/described 'purported' object, exists does not entail that which is named exists.

John:
We can suppose that some entity x exists and for it to exist for both of us it must exist (not necessarily in the same form, because we could be supposing about very different things) and, so defined, x has some primary statement true of it in relation to its existence in both our minds.

I don't agree here. Neither supposition nor naming entails existence. I suppose, x exists, implies, x does exist ..is invalid.
Belief is not knowledge.

The existence of an common 'intersubjective' definition cannot assure us that there is any reference.

John:
The concept of a variable "x" implies an understanding of a substitutable variable.

Yes, the pronouns of natural languages function in the same way.

'I exist' has meaning for each substitution instance of the variable I.

John:
Where does that variable exist - I suggest in the mental entity that is contemplating it. Please see below on the concept of "nothing", upon which your conclusions seem
contrary to your axiom above when substituting "nothing" for "x".




Witt:
Nothing exists, is unassertable, (i.e. contradictory).

Nothing exists, means, It is not the case that something exists.

Nothing is not a thing at all. It is certainly not a denoting phrase.
Nothing cannot be a vacuum.
Vacuum, defined as space empty of matter, requires the existence of space and therefore it is not no-thing.

Nothing exists, is a contradiction in terms!

There is no property of 'nothing'..i.e. it's description does not refer.
But, we can make true statements about 'nothing', eg. it does not exist.

*Nothing* cannot exist.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

John:
Nothing is an entity like any other and to confer upon it the property of non-existence is contradictory.

I don't agree.

Nothing is not an entity of any kind.

Nothing has non-existence, does not affirm a property of non-existence to nothing.

Nothing has non-existence, means, it is not the case that nothing does have existence.
The primary predicate is 'it is not the case that' and the primary subject is 'nothing does have existence'.

'has non-existence' is not a primary predication..rather it is a secondary predicate.

We cannot confer any property (primary predication) to nothing.

It is not the case that all predicates are properties. Properties are primary predicates.

John:
Nothing is a word that may be used to denote or convey the mental concept of an absence of existence. Nothing's description is a mental entity that refers to (the concept of ) no entity either mental or physical.

Yes, the predicate that is used to describe 'nothing' is all that there is to it. And, that predicate is contradictory.

John:
Thus, a mind can claim a primary truth for "nothing" in the same way as any other concept of something.

No we cannot.
What primary truth can you assert for 'nothing'?

We can say what it is not, but, we cannot say what it is.

When we say (nothing has the property Y) we mean ~(something has the proerty Y).

There is no property that nothing has.

Nothing is that which is not something. (ix:~Ey(x=y)).
But, everything is something. (Ax(Ey(x=y)).
That is to say, ~Ey(x=y) is contradictory, for all things x.

Nothing, is an existent thing such that it does not exist. ??

'Nothing' is a prefix that means 'not something'.
(~Ex)(Fx) <-> ~(Ex)(Fx)
Nothing has F, means, It's false that Something has F.

John: That was interesting, what do you say?

Yes, very interesting.



Witt:
'I exist' cannot be denied by any mind!

John:
Yes it can - try it! Unless, of course, you define "mind" as a word that refers to an object that cannot deny its own existence.

'I exist' is true, entails the existence of: I, existence, and truth.

To try to affirm the denial of 'I exist', is enough evidence (proof) of a primary predicate that I have, therefore, 'I exist' is true.

Witt

Rousseau_CHN

When I was in college, I was getting to like philosophy...that is until I met Bool, as in Boolean Logic. I sooner drop this Boolean Logic course and went straight to practical existentialism.

A=A or B=A if A=B is of no great consequence to me.

But I shall try to comment sensitively on Witt's post.

Let me begin with:

Very dogmatic. Very unphilosophical. For if it is true, then Wittgenstein and the rest of the "linguistic philosopher" or logical positivists were wrong to even doubt the validity of that statement. Some logical positivist would ask is it really the "I that exist" or "the exist that I." Is it in doing that we become or in becoming that we do.

Language is twisted. So sir, do not assert that "I exist" cannot be denied by any mind. Absurd idea will always find a champion.

Furthermore, I find it absurd that the matter of existence is being tackled by professors of logic, as if man's being is perfectly arranged in a's and b's. That human experience are so precise, mathematical equations can be made out of them.

man's being and experience are matter of the heart. They should be treated that way. The mind is an obstacle. The sooner we think, the sooner we are undermined.

John Page

Hi Witt!
Picking up your the statement first, I am not saying that naming precedes the object. In fact, I'm saying precisely the opposite - even when the name concerned is a "pure invention" (see below).

Backing up to where you say "x is a name that I mentally ascribe to a presumed object," please consider to what you are refering when you use the term "presumed object". If by this term you mean an actual object as opposed to an abstract object then I'm confused - if this is the case we should not be able to have a conversation about abstract objects!

I am offering a view where conversation about "anything" requires a language label (such as a name). We can invent names just for fun, in which case the name is just about itself i.e. it refers to the concept of a name that refers to the concept of a name that is just about itself.

I'm not sure I'm being too clear, but do you agree all our knowledge is of something in the mind? Epistemologically speaking, I'm implying a causal chain for knowledge that starts with the physical effects of the (presumed) object concerned that are received at the human senses which assemble a conceptual or mental (presumed) object. Our ontology, then, derives from (the physical process of) how the mind assembles and manipulates its conceptual objects.

Perhaps if I could get your response to the above, it might solve our disconnect.

Cheers, John

Witt

John:
I'm not sure I'm being too clear, but do you agree all our knowledge is of something in the mind?

Yes, knowledge (imo) is that which is shown to be the case, within some system of decision. The relativity of knowledge is that its certainty is relative to the method that decides it.
That is, there is no absolute certainty.
Knowledge systems gets better and better, without a 'best' system.

Without mind there is no: knowlege, truths, numbers, words, etc.

Of course, the rest of the world continues on, with or without mind.
Even time, which some people consider to be a mental thing, continues without mind!

John:
Epistemologically speaking, I'm implying a causal chain for knowledge that starts with the physical effects of the (presumed) object concerned that are received at the human senses which assemble a conceptual or mental (presumed) object.

OK, The senses do seem to be human receptors of some phenomena, which is then conceptualized within mind.

We presume the existence of objects that we percieve by the senses.

Our ontological commitments precede our language and our logic.
They are the things that we presume to exist that make up our universe of discourse.

That we admit 'physically sensible' objects seems clear.

The existence of the world is shown by presence.
Perceptability is an essence of physical things.
And, perceptability implies existence.

John: Our ontology, then, derives from (the physical process of) how the mind assembles and manipulates its conceptual objects.

I would say our reality, then, derives from our essential ontology and, how we reason about those given situations (facts).

All of our conceptions are representations of mind.
We can see within conceptualised language truths about the concrete world and about the abstract world.

John:
Backing up to where you say "x is a name that I mentally ascribe to a presumed object," please consider to what you are refering when you use the term "presumed object".
If by this term you mean an actual object as opposed to an abstract object then I'm confused - if this is the case we should not be able to have a conversation about abstract objects!

I consider abstract objects just as real as concrete objects. I do not think that abstract objects are ficticious. e.g. numbers and sets are necessarily existent abstract objects.

Their possibility ensures their necessity..i.e. they are analytic objects.

Existence, defined for physical objects or for abstract objects, is decided in the same way.

Existence like Identity, is a universal predicate...it applies to all objects, concrete an abstract.

Certainly all fictions are mental objects, but, it is not the case that all mental objects are fictions. 2+2=4, is a part of our knowledge no matter how tautologous it is.

Witt